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1 Introduction 
According to recent estimates, by the year 2004 more than 1 billion people were not using 
safe drinking water services and more than 2.5 billion were not using appropriate sanitation 
services in developing countries (WHO / UNICEF 2006). Every day, around 6,000 people, 
mostly children under five, die from diarrhoeal diseases caused by inappropriate water and 
sanitation (WS) services (UN-HABITAT 2003: 59). Increasing the coverage with appropriate 
WS services can therefore be considered a priority for development that is also acknowledged 
in the WS target set in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1 Meeting this WS target 
will require substantial efforts in terms of mobilisation of financing and in terms of reforming 
WS sectors. 
During the 1990s the mainstream approach in development co-operation with respect to the 
WS sector was private sector participation (PSP)2 in order to tackle the double challenge of (i) 
increasing investments in developing countries and (ii) reforming an industry characterised 
mainly by financially strained and inefficient public WS service providers. By the beginning 
of the new millennium this view has changed due to several reasons: Popular protests and 
political opposition to PSP are an issue in several developing countries,3 the private sector has 
shown a relatively low engagement to invest in WS services in developing countries,4 and the 
research literature has not found a conclusive empirical evidence concerning the actual bene-
fits of PSP.5 This change of attitude towards PSP in the WS sector becomes evident in the 
following citation taken from a report of the Operations Evaluation Department of the World 
Bank (2003: 21): 
                                                 
1 The target is to “[h]alve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation” with respect to the proportion in 1990 (Development Committee / International Mone-
tary Fund / World Bank 2004: xxii). See tables A2.7 and A2.8 in the appendix for an overview of the pro-
jected increase in coverage necessary to meet the target. 
2 PSP means the involvement of private actors in the delivery of WS services. PSP can take a range of organ-
isational forms (delivery models) that differ with respect to the scope of rights granted to and the scope of 
responsibilities borne by private actors. An extreme form of PSP is full divestiture which means the com-
plete transfer of ownership of assets – and consequently of the implied rights and responsibilities – to a pri-
vate enterprise. Subsection 3.2.3.3 discusses to more detail different types of PSP delivery models in the WS 
sector. The term public-private partnership (PPP), which is often found in the literature, is a synonym for 
PSP. 
3  Cf. Inkota-Netzwerk e.V./ Brot für die Welt (2004) for a critical perspective on PSP in WS services in de-
veloping countries. Generally, we can observe that the global political debate on water issues is marked by 
ideological polarisation; cf. Urquhart / Moore (2004) for a survey of the different positions in this debate. 
See Hall / Lubina (2002) for a survey of opposition to PSP in WS services in Latin America. 
4  Cf. Izaguirre (2004) for the trend of private investments in WS services in developing countries as compared 
to other infrastructure services. 
5  Cf. e.g. Clarke / Kosec / Wallsten (2004). See subsection 2.4.3 for a review of the empirical literature to this 
respect. 
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“[PSP] is not a panacea to deep-seated problems and cannot be expected to sub-
stitute for decisions that only governments have the power and obligation to 
make. PSP is better likened to a sharp tool. A capable government can use it to 
great advantage to improve the water supply and sanitation situation but an inept 
government can make matters worse through an injudicious use of PSP without 
providing clear quality and price regulation and lending strong and sustained 
support to PSP.” 
At present, development agencies do not follow a clear policy paradigm regarding WS sector 
reform and there is a debate in the policy-oriented literature on second-generation approaches 
to infrastructure reform in developing countries.6 The present study intends to contribute to 
this debate by shifting the attention towards the importance of governance. 
In this study the term governance7 describes the elements that shape policy making and public 
decision taking. Institutions8 are crucial elements of governance since they shape the behav-
iour of the actors responsible for policy making and public decision taking. The approach fol-
lowed here distinguishes between the general political governance of a country and the spe-
cific governance of the WS sector (WS governance). The key elements of political govern-
ance are the institutions that shape the relation between citizens and government actors (elec-
toral systems, political rights) and the rules that determine the organisation of government 
(separation of powers, checks and balances). Crucial elements of WS governance are the ar-
ticulation of the actors responsible for policy making, regulation and service delivery and the 
institutional boundaries between them as well as the institutions for user participation. 
The present investigation sets the focus on analysing the influence of political governance and 
of WS governance on the performance of WS services in developing countries. It does so be-
cause the focus on private versus public providers, which has dominated the political and the 
academic debate, seems too narrow in order to explain success or failure in the provision of 
WS services. Due to the equity9 implications of WS services, their widespread use and the 
market failures associated with these services, public actors driven by political incentives play 
a more important role in the WS sector than in many other sectors of the economy (Spiller / 
Savedoff 1999), irrespective of whether the private sector is involved in service delivery or 
                                                 
6  Cf. e.g. Kessides (2004: 22) who applies the term second generation reform to infrastructure policy. Cf. 
Pastor / Wise (1999) and González / Munar (2003) for the broader context of second generation reform ap-
proaches in development policy. In contrast to first generation reform approaches, that were inspired by the 
Washington Consensus and concentrated on privatisation and liberalisation, these second generation ap-
proaches are intended to tackle distributional and institutional problems. 
7  For more details on the definition of governance see subsection 3.1.4. 
8  According to Scharpf (1997: 38) institutions can be defined as “systems of rules that structure the courses of 
actions that a set of actors may choose.” For more details concerning the term institution cf. subsection 
3.1.2. 
9  Equity in this study basically means equality of opportunity and avoidance of absolute deprivation. For more 
details see subsection 2.2.1. 
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not. Therefore, the characteristics of the political institutions that shape the actions of public 
officials and the characteristics of WS sector institutions that shape the actions of regulators, 
providers and users seem especially important for understanding the performance of WS ser-
vices. 
The neglect of these governance factors in many empirical studies could be one reason for the 
inconclusive evidence in academic literature regarding the effects of PSP on coverage expan-
sion and on efficiency improvements of providers.10 In several countries, inappropriate politi-
cal or WS governance could dominate or go against the expected benefits of PSP. On the 
other hand, it can be supposed that the relatively good performance of some purely public WS 
service providers – e.g. in Chile before privatisation – is related to the good quality of the po-
litical and the WS sector institutions.11 Therefore, here it is supposed that the quality of the 
political and WS governance of a certain country is a crucial factor that strongly influences 
the performance of WS services. This main supposition contrasts from the bulk of research 
work that has concentrated on the consequences of the delivery model (PSP versus purely 
public) for the provision of WS services. 
The effect of governance on the provision of WS services has not been systematically investi-
gated in quantitative empirical research. However, there is some evidence from the quantita-
tive research literature supporting the hypothesis that governance affects the provision of 
other infrastructure services. With regard to the effect of political institutions, Henisz and 
Zelner (2001) find that more checks and balances in a political system have a significant posi-
tive effect on access to telephone services. With regard to sectoral institutions, Cubbin and 
Stern (2006) report a statistically significant effect of higher quality regulatory governance on 
electricity generation capacity.12 The present study adds to this body of empirical research by 
presenting evidence for the influence of governance on the access to WS services and on the 
efficiency of WS service provision. 
In line with the main supposition stated above, the purpose of this study is to answer the fol-
lowing main research question: 
• How does the quality of (a) political governance and (b) WS governance affect (i) ac-
cess to and (ii) efficiency of WS services in developing countries? 
This main research question is mirrored by a complementary enquiry which asks the conven-
tional question addressed in the research literature: How does PSP affect access to and effi-
ciency of WS services? Enlarging the focus of the investigation to include this complemen-
tary question serves to learn about the relation between governance and PSP as well as about 
                                                 
10  In an econometric study Clarke / Kosec / Wallsten (2004) find no statistically significant effect of PSP on 
coverage expansion. Moreover, the authors review the inconclusive empirical literature regarding the effect 
of PSP on internal efficiency. For more details see subsection 2.4.3. 
11  Cf. United Nations Development Programme (2003: 116-120); Shirley / Ménard (2002). 
12  For more details see the review of econometric literature in subsection 4.1.2. 
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the relative importance of these two dimensions for the performance of WS services. Evi-
dence with respect to this aspect seems especially relevant for practical policy making. It 
could, for instance, give an orientation to policy makers whether priority should be given to 
improve governance or to introduce PSP. 
The determinants of widespread access to WS services are an obvious subject of research, 
since the lack of access is a pressing problem in developing countries. In addition, it is asked 
for the determinants of the efficiency13 of WS service provision because neglecting this aspect 
would mean to risk wasting scarce natural and financial resources. This way, the environ-
mental and economic sustainability of the provision of WS services and thus ultimately the 
widespread access to these services would be compromised. 
The main and the complementary research questions are analysed conceptually and empiri-
cally. The conceptual part of the study (chapters 2 and 3) develops a heuristic framework 
that offers an explanation for the influence of political governance and WS sector governance 
on two desirable attributes of the WS service industry: widespread access to services and high 
efficiency. The heuristic framework combines a normative economic perspective and a politi-
cal-economic perspective. 
The normative analysis in chapter 2 develops the categories necessary for judging the state of 
affairs in the WS sector and deriving desirable WS policies, given the particular ethical and 
economic characteristics of WS services. It is looked at typical problems of the WS sector 
from three different normative perspectives: equity, allocative efficiency and internal effi-
ciency. Based on this analysis general policy implications are deduced. The analytical frame-
work used is standard microeconomic theory. 
The political-economic analysis in chapter 3 explains how political governance and WS sec-
tor governance shape WS policies, regulation and service delivery and thus access to and effi-
ciency of services. Regarding the effects of political governance it focuses on the aspects of 
democratic participation and checks and balances. The issue of different degrees of involve-
ment of the private sector in service delivery (PSP versus purely public delivery models) is 
conceived as one important aspect of the institutional setting of the WS sector. Other impor-
tant aspects of WS governance analysed are the institutional design of regulation, user partici-
pation and the articulation of the actors responsible for policy making, regulation and service 
delivery. The analytical framework used in this chapter builds on the work of the schools of 
                                                 
13  In the present study it is distinguished between two concepts of efficiency: the allocative efficiency of the 
whole WS sector (or even the whole economy) and the internal efficiency of a single WS service provider 
(see subsection 2.3.1 for the definition and discussion of these concepts). Internal efficiency is a subconcept 
of allocative efficiency, i.e. a situation of the economy that is allocatively efficient implies that the individ-
ual providers are internally efficient. When in the following the term efficiency is used without any attribute, 
it is meant to refer to the broad notion of allocative efficiency (which includes the internal efficiency of pro-
viders as one relevant aspect). Whenever it is referred to the subconcept of internal efficiency alone, this is 
made explicit by using the attribute “internal”. 
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new institutional economics, public choice and political economics.14 It takes a perspective 
that looks in an integrated manner at the economic and political system of a society, acknowl-
edging that the behaviour of actors is shaped by both economic and political incentives. 
The empirical part of this study (chapters 4 and 5) analyses the main and the complementary 
research questions mentioned above, using both quantitative and qualitative empirical ap-
proaches.15 Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches has the advantages (i) of get-
ting a richer picture of the research subject, since the approaches elaborate on different as-
pects and (ii) of using one empirical approach to compensate for the supposed weaknesses or 
the blind spot of the other. For instance, qualitative approaches, as compared to quantitative 
approaches, have the disadvantage that the strength of the effect of one factor on another can-
not be quantified and that the observed results typically cannot be generalised. However, 
qualitative approaches have the advantage that it is possible to dig deeper into causality 
mechanisms identified by quantitative research and to gain valuable information about the 
empirical plausibility of supposed causal relations. 
Chapter 4 analyses the influence of political governance (democratic participation, checks 
and balances) on the coverage with WS services, using a multivariate regression model and 
cross-sectional data from 69 developing countries. The quality of political governance is 
measured by governance indicators conventionally used in econometric work. The chapter 
concentrates on the influence of political governance, since there is no comprehensive and 
reliable data available on WS governance (e.g. on the institutional characteristics of regula-
tion, service delivery or user participation). The data on coverage with WS services was taken 
from the database provided by the Joint Monitoring Programme of WHO and UNICEF. The 
model controls for conventional economic and demographic variables as well as for the avail-
ability of freshwater resources. Based on the reasoning in chapter 3, the main hypothesis is 
that a higher level of democracy will have a positive influence on the coverage with WS ser-
vices. 
Chapter 5 investigates the case of Colombia. Colombia is well suited for analysing the ques-
tions addressed in this study, since thanks to its decentralised structure the country offers a 
diversity of delivery models, including PSP and purely public delivery models. This allows 
not only to analyse whether the variation in local governance is able to explain the variation in 
service performance on the sub-national level but also to explore the effect of PSP on service 
performance and to assess the interaction of PSP and governance. 
The chapter has two purposes. First, it applies the heuristic framework developed in the con-
ceptual part of the study in order to describe and to assess the main elements that influence 
the provision of WS services in Colombia: the institutions and actors that are key for the pol-
icy making process, the main institutions and actors of the WS sector and the principal WS 
                                                 
14  For more details see section 3.1. 
15  For an in-depth discussion of the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in empirical research cf. King / Keohane / Verba (1994); Creswell (1994); Neubert (2003). 
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policies. The analysis concentrates on identifying potential weaknesses rather than elaborating 
on achievements. 
Second, chapter 5 analyses the influence of local governance and of PSP on the performance 
of WS service providers. The analysis is conducted in two steps. First, the effect of PSP on 
internal efficiency improvements and on coverage expansion is investigated by means of a 
multivariate regression analysis, using cross-sectional data from 30 Colombian providers. The 
data on ownership, internal efficiency and coverage has been provided by the two regulatory 
authorities Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico (CRA) and Su-
perintendencia de Servicios Públicos (SSPD). The main hypothesis tested is that providers 
with PSP show a higher internal efficiency than their public counterparts. Second, the effect 
of local governance on provider performance is examined. This is done by a qualitative ap-
proach that compares the purposefully selected providers of the four provincial capitals of 
Manizales (public), Santa Marta (private), Tunja (private) and Villavicencio (public). The 
hypothesis analysed is that local governance can dominate the expected effect of PSP on ser-
vice performance and that unexpected performance – such as a public provider with out-
standing internal efficiency indicators (Manizales) or a private provider with poor internal 
efficiency indicators (Santa Marta) – can be explained by the quality of local governance. The 
main portion of information for the qualitative analysis has been collected by the author in 
interviews conducted in the four cities mentioned and in Bogotá in June and July 2005. 
Finally, chapter 6 summarises the findings of the investigation and draws some overall con-
clusions. The key result of this study is the empirical evidence found on the influence of po-
litical governance on WS service performance. First, the cross-country regression performed 
in chapter 4 yields significant and robust statistical evidence that higher levels of democratic 
participation have a positive effect on coverage with WS services. This is an innovative result 
that, to the knowledge of the author, has not been reported in the econometric research litera-
ture so far. It supports the hypothesis that democratic governments, thanks to institutions such 
as free and fair elections, fundamental political rights and alternative information, have 
greater incentives than autocratic governments to respond to the interests of the broad major-
ity and thus to care more for the coverage of their citizens with WS services. Second, the 
qualitative comparison of the four Colombian cities finds some evidence that a higher quality 
of local governance (strong civil society and business organisations, better control of corrup-
tion and lower levels of non-state armed groups’ activities) has a positive effect on the inter-
nal efficiency of providers and on the coverage with WS services. This influence of the qual-
ity of local governance seems to be able to partially dominate the positive effect of PSP on the 
internal efficiency of Colombian providers, for which statistical evidence was found in the 
regression analysis performed in chapter 5. 
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2 Normative and problem-oriented framework for assessing WS policies 
The present chapter develops the basic principles for normatively assessing WS policies (the 
term WS policies, here, includes the design of WS sector institutions, e.g. concerning regula-
tion). This is done by combining a descriptive perspective – that focuses on key supply, de-
mand and institutional characteristics of the WS sector and their consequences for the provi-
sion of WS services – and a normative perspective – that assesses the desirability of WS poli-
cies. A descriptive analysis is a necessary first step for a well-grounded normative analysis of 
WS policies because assessing the desirability of WS policies implies (i) information about 
their effect on the given state of affairs (descriptive perspective), and (ii) value judgements 
about what shall be considered a problem and what a good solution (normative perspective).16 
The argumentation below is based on a review of the relevant theoretical and empirical litera-
ture. The analytical framework used could be termed “standard microeconomic theory” which 
is meant to comprise basically the school of neoclassical economics as well as certain aspects 
of new institutional economics.17 The present chapter does not include a systematic and com-
prehensive analysis of the effect of governance on the provision of WS services. The concept 
of governance is introduced and discussed in chapter 3. 
The present chapter is organised as follows. First, the main economic characteristics of the 
supply of and the demand for WS services are very briefly described (section 2.1). After-
wards, the key problems of the WS sector are discussed and broad policy implications are 
deduced, looking from different normative perspectives that are relevant for the debate in de-
velopment studies: Section 2.2 takes an equity perspective, section 2.3 takes an allocative 
efficiency perspective and section 2.4 takes an internal efficiency perspective. Finally, section 
2.5 draws some conclusions. 
2.1 Basic economic supply and demand characteristics of WS services 
2.1.1 Supply 
With respect to the technology used for supplying the final user with WS services we can dis-
tinguish network solutions from on-site solutions (see table A2.1 in the annex). The focus of 
this study is set on urban areas for which networks are typically the most efficient18 as well as 
most adequate solution from a public health and environmental perspective (some more de-
                                                 
16  For a brief discussion of normative and positive issues in general policy research cf. Scharpf (1997: 12-15). 
17  These certain aspects are incomplete information and property rights (see discussion below, especially sub-
section 2.4.3). For an assessment of the school of new institutional economics contrasting it with neoclassi-
cal economics cf. Furubotn / Richter (1991). 
18  When looking from an allocative efficiency perspective. Supplying a given urban settlement with a given 
service level (quantity and quality) at minimum social costs is typically achieved by choosing a network 
supply technology. For the details regarding the concepts of allocative efficiency and social costs see 2.3. 
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tails regarding adequacy of WS services are discussed in section 2.2).19 This is why comments 
made in this section are limited to network supply technologies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Network supply of WS services: production stages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Sauer (2003: 16); adapted and complemented by the author 
Supplying WS services via network technologies involves the following activities or produc-
tion stages (Noll 2002: 44-45): 
i. The physical process consists in capturing (and storing) surface water or groundwater, 
transporting it to the area of consumption, treating it in order to raise quality, trans-
porting the water to the final user through a pipe system, collecting wastewater 
through a sewer system and treating the wastewater before discharging it to the envi-
ronment.20 Neglecting the latter two steps can have serious consequences for the pub-
lic health situation and the environment depending on population density and local 
natural conditions (see section 2.3.4). Still, an important portion of the sewage in de-
veloping countries is not collected and that portion of sewage that is collected is rarely 
treated (Winpenny 2003: 5). 
ii. Besides the physical process, the commercial process has to be managed. This in-
cludes above all the purchase of services and materials and the sales of WS services 
                                                 
19  An in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of different supply technologies for urban areas is provided by 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2003: 1-8). 
20  Often, besides collecting wastewater, urban service providers are also responsible for collecting storm water. 
Collection can be done by one combined sewer system or two separate systems for wastewater and storm 
water. 
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including metering, billing and collection. Figure 2.1 illustrates the production stages 
of network supply. 
Although the costs of WS service supply can show substantial variation due to differences in 
climate, location of freshwater sources, quality of freshwater, topography and spatial popula-
tion patterns, the private costs21 of supply show some typical patterns that are due to the char-
acteristics of the supply technology described above (Noll 2002: 43-45). Relatively huge in-
vestments in capital assets (dams, canals, pipes, sewers) have to be made which imply rela-
tively high fixed capital costs22 (see table A2.2 in the annex for an illustration of typical in-
vestment costs per capita). At the same time variable costs are relatively low. One main com-
ponent of the variable costs is the energy required for pumping.23 Systems that do not require 
pumping (i.e. that are gravity fed) can show very low variable costs of supply. Therefore, the 
ratio of fixed to variable costs in the WS sector is high. According to Komives et al. (2005: 
30-35), fixed capital costs account up to 65% (water) and up to 80% (sewerage) of total 
costs.24 One implication of this cost structure (and of the underlying supply technology) is 
that WS systems often show decreasing average costs throughout a large range of production 
thanks to economies of scale (see subsection 2.3.3). Moreover, assets have very long typical 
lives (water: 20-40 years; sewerage: 40-60 years) which makes it possible to postpone main-
tenance and replacement investment expenses – and consequently to “underfund” the WS 
provider – for quite a long time. The negative effect of such a practice will become apparent 
only gradually as service levels decline (see subsections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). 
These characteristics of network supply of WS services have a series of implications – for the 
optimal tariff structures, the desirability and feasibility of competition, the viability of private 
financing and the amount of financing needed in order to expand services – which are dis-
cussed to some detail in sections 2.2 to 2.5. 
2.1.2 Demand 
The individual demand for WS services resembles the individual demand for food which is 
price inelastic for a relatively small subsistence amount and then becomes price elastic. Price 
elasticity of individual water services depends on the type of use and the implied necessary 
                                                 
21  I.e. the costs that accrue to the WS service provider. For the distinction of private costs and external costs 
see subsection 2.3.4. 
22  In general, capital costs (basically depreciation and payment of interests) are the largest components of the 
fixed costs in the WS industry. Other relevant components of fixed costs are maintenance of capital assets 
and administrative overheads. 
23  Another relevant component of the variable costs are the materials required for drinking water treatment. 
24  However, the share of fixed capital costs in total costs will vary across countries depending on the tax and 
business regulation. The annual capital costs of a WS service provider are driven to a good extent by the 
amount of depreciation. The amount of depreciation varies according to the method of depreciation chosen, 
which in turn depends on the respective rules fixed in tax and business legislation. 
 10
quality (contrary to water for e.g. gardening, drinking water25 has to be free of disease-
inducing micro-organisms and toxic elements). This is illustrated in the exemplary individual 
demand curve in figure 2.2 which shows a price inelastic area for drinking use and a price 
elastic area for uses like laundry and gardening. 
 
Figure 2.2: Exemplary individual water demand curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hansson (2004: 22) 
There is more empirical evidence on the demand for water services than on the demand for 
sanitation services. Table A2.3 (annex) gives an overview of the estimated price and income 
elasticity of aggregate demand for piped water services. Estimated mean elasticities show the 
common sign for superior goods (own price elasticity is negative whereas income elasticity is 
positive). Still, absolute values are well below 1 which means that demand changes less than 
proportionally to price and income increases. Note that the demand of industrial customers is 
more sensitive to price changes than the demand of their residential counterparts. 
The tariff for water services (and its consequences for demand) is a matter of heated discus-
sions in the political arena. Judgements on the optimal or just tariff depend on the normative 
position taken and on the problems focused on. These issues are discussed to more detail in 
the following sections 2.2 to 2.5. In recent years, numerous empirical studies have been pub-
                                                 
25  The World Health Organization (2004) has issued detailed guidelines concerning drinking-water quality. On 
other aspects of the adequacy WS services (sufficient quantity, regularity, accessibility and affordability) cf. 
subsection 2.2.2. 
Price/ 
m3 
Quantity 
(m3) 
drinking 
cooking 
sanitation
laundry 
gardening 
 11
lished that attempt to measure the individual willingness to pay26 of households for good qual-
ity water services.27 One important factor besides income that will in general affect the 
household’s willingness to pay for piped water services is the availability of alternative 
sources of water supply, which in its turn depends on the natural conditions (quantity and 
quality of freshwater available). For instance, research from Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that 
households are willing to pay between 0.30 and 0.40 US Dollars per m3 for a service with an 
in-house connection (Komives et al. 2005: 39). 
Average water consumption per household varies widely across countries, urban versus rural 
areas, income groups, type of connection (in-house, public taps, water vendors etc.), water 
price and water quality (Komives et al. 2005: appendix C.2). E.g. monthly average consump-
tion of Latin American households connected to a pipe system in a sample of 16 cases ranges 
from 8.0 m3 (Colombia) to 40.8 m3 (Venezuela).28 Households that rely on public taps con-
sume considerably less than households with in-house or yard connections. E.g. in Kath-
mandu (Nepal) monthly average consumption in the former case amounts to 1.6 m3 whereas 
in the latter case it is 22.1 m3.29  
The individual willingness to pay for sanitation is typically considered to be lower than for 
water, similar to the awareness among users for the benefits associated with sanitation ser-
vices (McIntosh 2003: 72). Whittington et al. (1992) provide a careful study of the willing-
ness to pay for improved30 sanitation services in Ghana and find that willingness to pay is 
generally high enough to cover the costs of ventilated pit latrines but not to cover the costs of 
sewer connections. One peculiarity of the demand for sanitation services is that individual 
demand for safe services is associated with positive external benefits for the neighbourhood 
and that the full benefits of sanitation services are only likely to materialise if users have an 
adequate level of hygiene education. This aspect is touched in subsection 2.3.4. 
                                                 
26  The willingness to pay indicates the maximum price at which a household is willing to use the service in a 
setting in which the household chooses the bundle of goods (including water services) that maximizes its 
utility, given its preferences and given its budget constraint. There are two basic methodological approaches 
to measure the willingness to pay: (i) Revealed preferences approaches which rely on information on ob-
servable economic behaviour (e.g. prices paid to water vendors by households that lack a service through the 
network). (ii) Stated preferences approaches that use information collected through household surveys based 
on constructed hypothetical scenarios (e.g. contingent valuation method). Cf. Komives et al. (2005: 37-38). 
27  Komives et al. (2005: 37-45) provide a brief review of this body of literature. 
28  Assuming a household size of 5 (4) persons this corresponds to ca. 53 (67) litres per day and capita in the 
former case and to ca. 272 (340) litres per day and capita in the latter case. In OECD-countries water use per 
day and capita varies between 129 litres (Germany) and 382 litres (United States); cf. Levin et al. (2002: 44). 
29  Assuming a household size of 5 (4) persons this corresponds to ca. 10.7 (13.3) litres per day and capita in the 
former case and to ca. 147 (184) litres per day and capita in the latter case. These figures can be qualified by 
comparing them with normative benchmarks used in development co-operation. For instance, the guidelines 
used by German bilateral development agencies for the assessment of WS projects stipulate the following 
benchmarks for sound per capita consumptions: 40 litres per day (public standpipes), 60 litres per day (yard 
connections) and 120 litres per day (in-house connections); cf. KfW (2004: 5). See also subsection 2.2.2. 
30  See subsection 2.2.2 for a definition of “improved” services. 
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After this brief descriptive overview of basic economic supply and demand characteristics of 
WS services, the following sections turn to assessing the key problems of the WS sector and 
to deducing broad policy implications looking from different normative positions. 
2.2 Key problems from an equity perspective 
2.2.1 Equity and its relation to WS services 
Equity concerns is what has dominated the international and national political debates on WS 
policies and the coverage in newspapers and other mass media.31 The concept of equity has 
different interpretations across nations, societies and cultures.32 A general definition which 
probably meets with rather broad approval is given by the World Bank (2005: 18-19). Ac-
cording to this definition – which draws on the theoretical work on justice of Rawls (1971), 
Dworkin (1981a; 1981b), Sen (1985) and Roemer (1998) – equity can be conceived in terms 
of two basic principles: 
• Equal opportunity: “Predetermined circumstances – gender, race, place of birth, fam-
ily origins – and the social group a person is born into should not help determine 
whether people succeed economically, socially, and politically.” 
• Avoidance of absolute deprivation: The livelihoods of the members of a society 
should be protected from falling below some absolute threshold of well-being33 re-
gardless whether the deprivation is due to bad luck or a person’s own failings. 
WS services are clearly relevant for achieving equity. Lacking access to adequate34 WS ser-
vices for personal and domestic use constitutes an absolute deprivation with respect to essen-
tial human needs (drinking, cooking, personal hygiene). At the same time, lacking access to 
these services is one important factor causing deprivations in other dimensions of well-being. 
It increases the risk of falling ill with the further consequences of decreasing productivity and 
economic possibilities of the household.35 Productivity and economic possibilities do not only 
                                                 
31  See e.g. the newspaper coverage of the Fourth World Water Forum held from March 16 to 22, 2006 in Mex-
ico City. 
32  Cf. e.g. World Bank (2005: chapter 4) and the quoted literature. 
33  According to modern definitions of poverty, deprivations in well-being include the following dimensions: (i) 
material deprivation, (ii) low achievements in education, (iii) ill health, (iv) vulnerability, (vi) political 
voicelessness and powerlessness (World Bank 2001: chapter 1). 
34  For a definition of adequate WS services see table 2.1 below. 
35  The health and economic benefits for households from WS services are well documented. Cf. Hutton / Hal-
ler (2004); United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2003: chapter 2); World Health Organization / 
United Nations Children’s Fund (2000: 1-3); KfW (2004: 4); Fuest / Laube (2004: section 2.2). For an in-
depth empirical analysis and discussion of health benefits from WS services cf. e.g. Galdo (2005); Jalan / 
Ravallion (2001); Esrey (1996). 
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decrease due to the consequences of ill health but also due to time and money spent in getting 
safe water, e.g. from a dug well two miles away or from an expensive source like water ven-
dors. Therefore, besides constituting an absolute deprivation, lacking access to adequate WS 
services reduces the opportunities of a person with respect to several economic, social and 
political dimensions of well-being. 
The relevance of equity with respect to WS services is not confined to the debate in academia. 
Its political relevance is e.g. manifest in international targets for development cooperation, in 
the international human rights charter and in many national legal frameworks. (i) Goal 7 (tar-
get 10) of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – “Halve by 2015 the proportion of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (Development 
Committee / International Monetary Fund / World Bank 2004: xxii) – is an expression of the 
equity concerns of the international community with practical consequences for Official De-
velopment Assistance (ODA) flows from donor countries to developing countries. (ii) The 
General Comment No.15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social 
Rights states that “’The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, affordable, physi-
cally accessible, safe and acceptable water for personal and domestic use’” (United Nations 
Economic and Social Council 2002; as cited by Budds / McGranahan 2003: 94). (iii) Finally, 
many national constitutions and sectoral laws contain some reference to the obligation of the 
state to take actions that assure an equitable access of its citizens to basic WS services (see 
chapter 5 for the Colombian case). 
2.2.2 Adequate WS services and coverage situation in developing countries 
Definition of adequate WS services 
The exact definition of what shall be the characteristics of adequate and essential WS services 
anybody shall be able to use, irrespective of gender, race, wealth, social status etc., differs 
across countries and societies depending on the respective social values, economic means and 
political institutions. Table 2.1 presents an exemplification of such adequate essential WS 
services based on the recommendations of international organisations such as WHO, UNICEF 
and UN-HABITAT. Any useful definition is likely to comprise the dimensions (i) safety with 
respect to health hazards, (ii) sufficient quantity or capacity, (iii) regularity of the service, (iv) 
physical accessibility and convenience of the service, and (v) affordability. Affordability is 
typically conceived as a proportion of household income (common thresholds are 3 to 5%, 
Komives et al. 2005: 40-41). It is argued that household expenditures for WS services shall 
not exceed this threshold because otherwise households could choose not to use adequate ser-
vices or stop using them.36 
                                                 
36  Such decisions will however typically depend on the individual willingness to pay (see above). The politi-
cally set affordability (or burden) threshold may lie above or below the willingness to pay of a particular 
household. 
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In order to measure the share of population in a country that uses adequate and essential WS 
services as defined above, WHO and UNICEF (2000: Annex A) have developed the concept 
of improved WS services. It is used among other things to monitor progress towards the 
MDGs. The definition of improved WS services – which is an attempt to operationalise the 
various dimensions of adequacy for measurement – is basically based on two criteria:37 
i. the technology that is used by households and 
ii. an additional criterion: (a) water: “availability of at least 20 litres per person per day 
from a source within one kilometre of the user’s dwelling”38; (b) sanitation: private or 
shared (not public) system that “hygienically separates human excreta from human 
contact”. 
Table A2.4 in the annex shows the classification of common WS technologies by improved 
and unimproved (subsection 4.3.1 addresses to greater detail the methodology used by WHO 
and UNICEF to produce the worldwide coverage statistics). 
                                                 
37  For a more in-depth discussion of the problems related to the definition and the measurement of adequate 
WS services with some critical remarks concerning the concept of “improved” services cf. United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (2003: 1-8). 
38  According to Boland / Whittington (2000: 225), internationally cited standards for basic water needs are not 
20 but 25-30 litres per person per day. 
Table 2.1: Adequate essential WS services 
Criteria Illustrative comments water Illustrative comments sanitation 
Safe Drinkable without health risks Eliminates human contact with 
excreta 
Sufficient 20 to 30 litres / person / day - 
Regular Close to 24 hours / day and to 365 
days / year 
Close to 24 hours / day and to 365 
days / year 
Physically accessible and conven-
ient 
Piped to the dwelling or close by; 
does not require much time and 
effort 
At home or close by; respects pri-
vacy; suited for the needs of girls 
(children in general) and women 
Affordable Does not exceed a share X of income that makes people to choose an in-
adequate service/ reduce consumption of other essential commodities (e.g. 
health care) below a certain threshold 
Spending for WS services does not exceed 3% to 5% of income  
Source: Own compilation based on United Nations Human Settlements Programme (2003: 2). Complemented 
with World Health Organization / United Nations Children’s Fund (2000: annex A); Boland / Whittington 
(2000: 225); Komives et al. (2005: 40-41) and own reasoning 
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Coverage situation and access barriers in developing countries 
According to estimates of the worldwide coverage situation by WHO and UNICEF, in devel-
oping countries in 2002 about 1 billion persons were not using improved domestic water ser-
vices and about 2.5 billion persons were not using improved domestic sanitation services (see 
table A2.5 in the annex for the details and source). Coverage with improved services does not 
only differ between developed and developing countries but also within the group of develop-
ing countries, e.g. depending on whether households live in rural or in urban39 areas: rural 
areas show considerably lower coverage rates than urban. Moreover, according to WHO and 
UNICEF (2004: 20) the income poor are more affected by inadequate services than the in-
come rich. Estimates indicate that in developing countries the richest quintile of the income 
distribution is twice as likely (four times more likely) to use improved water services (sanita-
tion services) than the poorest quintile. Finally, the coverage situation also depends on the 
local natural conditions, for instance the availability of sufficient freshwater resources. 
The high investment costs associated with WS network services work like an access barrier 
for the income poor. In urban areas the formal way to gain access to network services is to be 
owner or tenant of a dwelling or an official plot (authorised by the urban planning authority) 
for which at its time of development a water and sewer connection is constructed. In this case 
the investment costs associated with the WS services (as well as with other public services 
like electricity etc.) are paid for by the company that develops the plot and are ultimately 
borne by the owner when purchasing the plot or dwelling or by the tenant when paying the 
rent. The urban poor in developing countries typically lack the capital (the income) to pur-
chase a developed plot (to rent an official dwelling) and thus settle on unofficial plots without 
improved WS services. Inappropriate urban planning and real estate registration procedures as 
well as a lack of transparency in property markets often compound the situation and further 
hamper access of the urban poor to adequate housing and improved WS services. Thus, the 
lack of access to improved WS services is linked to the problem of lacking access to formal 
property markets and adequate housing. Due to these access barriers, many households in 
developing countries use unimproved WS services. E.g. in Angola, 25.2 % of the urban popu-
lation relies on tanker trucks for water supply (WHO / UNICEF 2000: 78). 
Consequences of inadequate WS services 
If people do not have access to adequate WS services, one possible consequence is that they 
rely on unsafe services which considerably increase their risk to fall ill. Those most vulner- 
 
                                                 
39  WHO and UNICEF do not use a standard definition to classify households in terms of urban or rural areas 
(WHO / UNICEF 2000: annex A). Instead, the worldwide coverage statistics relies on the countries’ own 
definitions for urban and rural. These definitions vary considerably between countries (Corbridge / Jones 
2005: 21). 
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able to health hazards, above all children, are most likely to be affected by one of the several 
water-related diseases listed in table A2.6 (annex) which are associated with considerable 
morbidity and mortality rates. According to recent estimates, improved water (sanitation) ser-
vices reduce diarrhoea morbidity on average by 25% (32%) (World Health Organization / 
United Nations Children's Fund 2005: 13). 
Another possible consequence is that people have to incur relatively high costs in terms of 
money (or time) for getting safe water from e.g. water vendors (or public standpipes far away) 
or for investments in water reservoirs and water pumps at their home. Prices per litre charged 
by water vendors can be 5 times (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire) to 100 times (Nouakchott, Maurita-
nia) higher than prices charged by public utilities40 (Kessides 2004: 222). Therefore, those 
(mainly poor) households that have to rely on sources like tanker trucks and water vendors 
often spend a considerably higher share of income on WS services than those with access to 
adequate services. 
Figure 2.3 shows estimates for residential expenditures on water services as income share by 
income quintile for Latin America, Eastern Europe and South Asia. In Latin America and 
South Asia the income share spent by the poorest quintile is more or less twice the income 
share spent by the richest quintile. The income share spent by the poorest quintile does not 
exceed the common threshold used to judge affordability (3% to 5% of income – see above). 
However, the sample is limited to expenditures for piped water services (i.e. expenditures for 
purchases from water vendors and tanker trucks are not included). If expenditures for non-
piped services were considered, it is to expect that the income share spent by the poorest quin-
tile would increase considerably, whereas the income share spent by the richest quintile would 
not change significantly as the latter typically rely above all on piped services. 
Policy implications 
The challenge of these equity-related key problems for WS policy is to strive for a situation 
where anybody is able to use adequate essential WS services, irrespective of the economic 
situation, gender, race, etc. The WS target set in the MDGs points at that direction by aiming 
at halving the proportion of the population that does not use improved WS services by 2015.41  
                                                 
40  Water sold by public utilities is however commonly underpriced (with respect to the private costs of provid-
ing the services) which leads to a series of problems (water spillage, financially unsustainable firms which 
provide an unreliable and bad quality service etc. – see below). 
41  It shall be noted here, that an increase in general coverage does not automatically imply an increase in the 
coverage among the income poor because the increase might be due to the fact that proportionally more non-
poor than poor have gained access to WS services. According to empirical evidence from Latin America, 
this effects seems to depend on the initial coverage rate: when the initial rate is low, the poor benefit less 
than proportionally; when the initial rate is high, the poor benefit more than proportionally (de Ferranti et al. 
2004, section 7.3). 
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Source: Komives (2005: 42) 
Tables A2.7 and A2.8 in the appendix give an overview of the projected increase in coverage 
necessary to meet this target. It is estimated that in the developing regions, each year 88.5 
million people have to gain access to improved water services and 118.5 million to improved 
sanitation services in order to reach the objective. 
The following broad policy issues emerge to this respect: 
i. Expanding access to improved services means raising considerable financial means in 
order to finance the huge investments involved. According to estimates, an extra sum 
of about 10 billion US Dollars42 has to be invested annually if the MDGs shall be 
achieved, using the most basic standards of service and technology (Winpenny 2003: 3). 
ii. Investments should be focused to benefit those who at present lack access to adequate 
WS services, i.e. should typically be concentrated in poor urban and in rural areas. 
iii. Special emphasis should be given to removing access barriers for poor urban and rural 
households. This can be achieved by providing some sort of infrastructure expansion 
                                                 
42  The current annual investments amount to 15 billion US Dollars. 
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or connection subsidy in order to lower the burden of investment costs that have to be 
borne by the new users. Further measures in this context include removing legal and 
other obstacles related to land tenure as well as raising awareness among future users 
for the benefits associated with improved services, especially with respect to sanita-
tion. 
iv. Apart from the above mentioned infrastructure expansion or connection subsidies, fur-
ther subsidies should be targeted to low-income households if their current tariff ex-
penditures for a basic service level, once connected, exceed a threshold that is consid-
ered affordable by society. 
2.3 Key problems from an allocative efficiency perspective 
2.3.1 Allocative efficiency, internal efficiency and their relation to equity 
Although the present section 2.3 deals with allocative efficiency, it is useful to introduce the 
concept of the internal efficiency of a single firm together with the concept of the allocative 
efficiency of the whole economy, since these concepts are related to each other. 
The concept of internal efficiency is confined to a single firm, e.g. a WS service provider 
(Vickers / Yarrow 1988: 67).43 It serves to judge from the firm’s individualistic perspective 
whether it makes the best use of its resources (production factors), assuming that the firm’s 
objective is to maximise profits. A firm is internally efficient if it produces a given quantity 
and quality of output at minimum private costs.44 An important determinant of internal ineffi-
ciency is managerial slack (the so-called X-inefficiency),45 which in turn depends on the in-
centives managers are facing and on the ownership structure of the firm.46 An in-depth discus-
sion of the internal efficiency-related problems of WS service providers follows in section 2.4. 
The concept of allocative efficiency, by contrast, applies to the whole economy. It is the clas-
sical criterion used in welfare economics to judge the desirability of a given state of affairs 
from the point of view of the society and to derive and justify welfare-enhancing policies (e.g. 
Atkinson / Stiglitz 1980: 333-65). It is a very encompassing concept which builds on micro-
economic theory. Allocative efficiency is used to make statements on how markets should be 
                                                 
43  The terminology used in the literature is not uniform. In the present study the term internal efficiency is used 
in the sense given by Vickers and Yarrow (1988: 67). However, Lundsgaard (2002: 47) uses the term pro-
ductive efficiency and Shirley and Walsh (2000: 5) use the term operational efficiency for what here is 
called internal efficiency. Yet other authors use the term technical efficiency (e.g. Fraquelli / Erbetta 1999). 
44  I.e. the costs that accrue to the single firm. For the distinction of private costs and external costs see subsec-
tion 2.3.4. 
45  The term X-(in)efficiency has been coined by Leibenstein (1966). 
46  It is returned to this issue in subsection 2.4.3, when discussing the consequences of private versus public 
ownership for the internal efficiency of a WS service provider. 
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organised and which economic policies should be taken in order to maximise social welfare – 
which is conceived as an aggregate of individual utility47 – and thus to make the best use of 
available scarce resources. There are two versions of the definition of allocative efficiency: (i) 
According to the Pareto-criterion, a situation is allocatively efficient if consumers are pro-
vided with goods and services at the lowest possible social cost48 and if the only way to make 
one person better off is to make another person worse off.49 (ii) The Kaldor-Hicks-criterion 
relaxes the second part of the Pareto-criterion as it allows for a compensation of the losers of 
a reallocation of resources by the winners (e.g. Zerbe / Bauman / Finkle 2006).50 An alloca-
tively efficient situation presupposes both production efficiency (i.e. the economy produces 
along its production possibility frontier and it is not possible to expand the production of one 
good without reducing the production of another good) as well as exchange efficiency (i.e. 
individuals trade the goods produced consistent with their valuation (Rosen 1992: 42-51; 
Hemmer 2002: 62-69)). Whether an economy reaches an allocatively efficient situation or 
not, relying on market transactions alone, depends on the allocative efficiency conditions ex-
plained below (subsection 2.3.2). 
The relation between internal efficiency and allocative efficiency is as follows: Internal effi-
ciency is a subconcept of allocative efficiency. An allocatively efficient situation of the econ-
omy implies that all firms are internally efficient and, thus, do not “waste” production factors. 
By contrast, a situation in which all firms are internally efficient does not automatically mean 
that the economy is in an allocatively efficient situation (i.e. internal efficiency is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for reaching allocative efficiency). For instance, a WS service 
provider may be internally efficient but sell services at a monopolistic price, which makes 
demand drop and consequently means that less users than possible are supplied with services 
(for more details see subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). When in the following the term efficiency 
is used without any attribute, it is meant to refer to the broad notion of allocative efficiency 
(which includes the internal efficiency of providers as one relevant aspect). Whenever it is 
referred to the subconcept of internal efficiency alone, this is made explicit by using the at-
tribute “internal”. 
On the relation between allocative efficiency and equity it can be said the following: A situa-
tion that is allocatively efficient is not necessarily equitable according to the definition of  
equity given in section 2.2 (and vice versa).51 This is so because allocative efficiency does not 
consider the distribution of utility (wealth, opportunities) within society. The allocative effi-
                                                 
47  This is true for Paretian social welfare functions (Atkinson / Stiglitz 1980: 339). 
48  See subsection 2.3.4 for a definition of social cost. 
49  For a more in-depth discussion cf. e.g. Atkinson / Stiglitz (1980: 336-50); Rosen (1992: chapter 4). 
50  The Kaldor-Hicks-criterion builds the basis for economic cost-benefit analyses (e.g. Zerbe / Bauman / Finkle 
2006). On the application of cost-benefit-analyses for evaluation in development co-operation cf. Hemmer 
(2002: 971-979). 
51  A discussion of the relation between the Pareto-criterion and different conceptualisations of equity is pro-
vided by Atkinson / Stiglitz (1980:336-43). 
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ciency of an economy improves as long as the utility of anybody can be raised without reduc-
ing the utility of anybody else, irrespective to whom the utility accrues and irrespective to 
what the initial distribution of wealth between individuals was (put another way: assuming 
that the allocative efficiency conditions explained below hold, pure market transactions lead 
to different allocatively efficient situations, depending on what the initial distribution of 
wealth within society was). E.g. a situation in which some members of the society have con-
siderably less opportunities than the rest because they do not enjoy adequate WS services can 
be allocatively efficient, but it is inequitable according to the definition given above. 
In this study, both improvements in allocative efficiency as well as improvements in equity 
are considered valid arguments for justifying welfare-enhancing WS policies. Depending on 
the concrete empirical situation, pursuing these two social goals will imply either trade-offs or 
complementarities (see section 2.5). 
2.3.2 Allocative efficiency conditions 
It can be shown that under certain restrictive conditions a pure market economy theoretically 
achieves allocative efficiency.52 According to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980: 343) this statement 
(referred to usually as the first basic theorem of welfare economics) rests basically on three 
conditions: 
(1) “[H]ouseholds and firms act perfectly competitively, taking prices as parametric, 
(2) there is a full set of markets, and 
(3) there is perfect information”. 
The first basic theorem of welfare economics implies that (allocative and internal) efficiency-
related problems, which would call for specific policies to solve them, can arise only if one or 
more of these conditions do not hold in practice. Although the specific economic characteris-
tics of WS systems in practice show substantial variation due to local differences in e.g. loca-
tion of freshwater sources, topography and spatial population patterns (Noll 2002: 43), it is 
clear that WS services are marked by several general features that contradict the above stated 
conditions. This means that a pure market economy will not achieve an allocatively efficient 
situation in the WS sector.53 
                                                 
52  For complete statements and proofs of Pareto-efficiency in a market economy cf. Arrow / Hahn (1971). 
Even a “pure market economy” presupposes certain state activities, such as the protection against violence, 
theft and fraud, the definitions of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, and thus entails taxation 
in order to finance these public goods (Atkinson / Stiglitz 1980: 336-37). 
53  This statement does not imply that any specific sector policy necessarily will make things better as com-
pared to a pure market allocation. Cf. e.g. Noll’s (1989: 1262-77) comments on “how regulation can make 
matters worse”. 
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In what follows the most prominent features of the WS service industry that are not in accor-
dance with the allocative efficiency conditions are discussed.54 The issues touched in the fol-
lowing two subsections are, 
(1) with respect to the lack of perfect competition: the natural monopoly characteristics 
of the supply technology which largely preclude competition (2.3.3) and, 
(2) with respect to the lack of a full set of markets: the externalities associated with WS 
services – which can be conceived as a consequence of lacking property rights re-
garding natural water resources and, consequently, lacking raw water markets 
(2.3.4).55 
The lack of perfect information is one underlying reason for the internal efficiency-related 
problems and is treated in section 2.4.56 
2.3.3 Natural monopoly characteristics57 
Urban water and sewer network services are usually cited in economic literature as being 
among the most relevant examples for natural monopolies (Joskow / Rose 1989: 1454; 
Shirley 2000: 148; Noll 2002: 46). According to the traditional and technology-oriented defi-
nition given by Kahn (1971: 2; as cited by Braeutigam 1989: 1292) a natural monopoly means 
“that the technology of certain industries or the character of the service is such that the cus-
tomer can be served at least cost or greatest net benefit only by a single firm”. In the single 
product case, a technology characterised by economies of scale (which translate into decreas-
ing average costs) throughout the range of production given by the demand is a sufficient 
condition for this to hold58 (see figure 2.4). According to Noll (2002: 46) WS systems exhibit 
engineering economies of scale in some of their components (e.g. pipes and canals) because 
investment costs per volumetric unit fall more than proportionally with an increase in capac-
ity. Besides, literature points at economies of scope between water supply, sewerage and 
stormwater services (Shirley 2000: 153; Kessides 2004: 225). However, engineering econo-
mies of scale do not necessarily translate into organisational economies of scale (especially if 
effective competition is lacking) which are the ones relevant for judging the desirability of a 
                                                 
54  On the efficiency-related characteristics of the WS industry and policy implications cf. also Noll (2002); 
Vickers / Yarrow (1988: chapter 11); Shirley (2000: 148-155); Kessides (2004: 219-227). 
55  On the relation between (lacking) property rights and externalities cf. the seminal paper by Coase (1960). 
56  See especially subsection 2.4.3 on private versus public ownership. 
57  For thorough discussions of natural monopoly characteristics and policy implications cf. Joskow (2006); 
Braeutigam (1989). 
58  It is however not a necessary condition. The less restrictive condition for a natural monopoly according to 
the technology-oriented definition is subadditivity of the cost function. In the multiproduct case cost subad-
ditivity can arise from economies of scale or economies of scope. Cf. Braeutigam (1989) for a thorough dis-
cussion of cost subadditivity. 
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monopoly.59 For the empirical evidence on the existence of organisational economies of scale 
(in what follows the term economies of scale is used to refer to organisational economies of 
scale) in the WS service industry see e.g. Sauer (2005), Torres and Morrison Paul (2006). 
 
Figure 2.4: Decreasing average costs (AC) throughout the range of production given by demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
If the production technology is marked by economies of scale throughout the relevant range 
of production,60 competition is not desirable from an allocative efficiency point of view be-
cause the feasible least-cost price is higher if there are two or more firms serving the market 
than if there is only one. Non-desirability of competition presupposes that the natural mo-
nopolist produces at the least-cost optimum and does not charge a monopolistic mark-up (or 
at least that allocative efficiency losses in the natural monopoly situation are lower than those 
in the alternative situation with more than one firm serving the market). 
If the production technology, in addition to economies of scale, shows substantial sunk 
costs,61 competition in the market is not feasible. Sunk costs are highly relevant for the WS 
                                                 
59  Engineering economies of scale translate into organisational economies of scale if (i) there are no substantial 
diseconomies of scale at another stage of the production process and (ii) there are no substantial disecono-
mies of scale in organisational management. 
60  For a more precise statement based on the concept of cost subadditivity cf. Braeutigam (1989). 
61  For a technical definition of sunk costs cf. Braeutigam (1989: 1304) and for a general discussion of the impor-
tance of sunk costs in the context of natural monopolies cf. Joskow (2006). Sunk costs result from investments 
in specific assets that have no alternative economic use (more precisely: for which the economic return from an 
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service industry since long-lived assets like buried water and sewer pipe systems or aqueducts 
for water transportation are specific investments with a limited alternative economic use. 
Competition in the market is in this case restricted because the sunk costs associated with 
market entry can serve as an effective barrier that protects the incumbent firm from potential 
competitors.62 The conventional view in literature is that feasible (and desirable) competition 
in the WS industry is limited to capture and storage of raw water in systems that rely on mul-
tiple sources as well as to the contracting out of certain activities like construction, mainte-
nance, metering and billing. 
Policy implications 
Effective competition in the core activities of the WS industry is under plausible and empiri-
cally relevant conditions hardly feasible and typically not desirable. In order to minimise 
losses in allocative efficiency, WS policies have to provide incentives for the service provider 
to take advantage of the economies of scale (and thus to produce at the least-cost point) and at 
the same time counteract the negative effects of monopolistic power (by compensating for the 
lack of competition). These characteristics call for an economic regulation of the WS industry 
with the two main available sets of instruments being 
i. competitive bidding procedures (referred to in research literature as “Demsetz compe-
tition”)63 for allocating franchise contracts that comprise the right to serve a certain 
area as a monopolist; 
ii. price and quality regulation of an established service provider to avoid the abuse of market 
power in terms of charging monopolistic prices or delivering bad quality services. 
                                                                                                                                                        
alternative use is substantially lower than for the specific use). Sunk costs are thus irreversible. For a certain 
time period they have to be incurred even if production ceases. In combination with imperfect information (un-
certainty) sunk costs give rise to the hold-up problem in contractual settings (Grossman / Hart 1986). If no 
credible commitments among the parties (e.g. the municipality and the WS service provider) involved in the 
contract are feasible, this might imply that necessary investments in specific assets (like water and sewer pipes) 
are not carried out. Cf. Spiller / Savedoff (1999) on this subject in the context of the WS industry. Cf. Krause 
(2002: 13) for an illustrative example of the hold-up problem in the electricity industry. 
62  For more in-depth discussions of these issues cf. Joskow (2006); Tirole (1988: chapter 8, 9). Further reasons 
that limit competition in the market for WS services are given by Kirkpatrick / Parker / Zhang (2004: 17-18). 
63  Cf. Demsetz (1968). 
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Box 2.1: Externalities associated with WS services 
Intratemporal externalities 
There are several intratemporal externalities (i.e. externalities that occur immediately or in the present) associ-
ated with the production and usage of WS services: 
• External costs of water production arise if at prices reflecting the private costs of water supply the asso-
ciated water abstraction from its source causes negative effects on competing (downstream) uses by 
fishery, agriculture, the energy industry, the ecosystem, other urban water supply systems etc. due to a 
reduction of the water flow. 
• External costs of water spillage or inadequate drainage: If prices reflecting the private costs of water 
supply are very low it may be perfectly rational from an individual point of view not to repair leaky 
pipes or taps but to constantly release water into the environment even when it is not used. However, if 
there is no drainage (sewer) system or if natural soil conditions are disadvantageous, such a practice 
leads to the formation of standing puddles which serve as a breeding ground for disease-carrying insects 
and disease-causing micro-organisms implying health hazards for the neighbourhood. 
• External costs of pollution: The usage of water for domestic (or other) purposes typically implies a dete-
rioration of water quality because different polluting substances (including excreta from sanitation) are 
added to the water. From an economic point of view the release of wastewater into the environment 
causes costs on downstream uses that are very similar to those mentioned above regarding water ab-
straction. Moreover it imposes costs in terms of health hazards or costly treatment for domestic down-
stream users. 
• External costs and benefits of sanitation: (i) Sewer-based sanitation technologies directly imply water 
pollution if wastewater is not treated (see above). Non-sewer-based sanitation technologies like e.g. la-
trines do not directly imply water pollution but can lead to pollution of ground water via infiltration if 
soil conditions, installations or maintenance are inadequate implying external costs of pollution (see 
above). (ii) Inadequate sanitation installations or practices (unsafe separation of excreta from human 
contact) do not only constitute health hazards for the individual household in question but, in addition, 
increase the risk of contagion for neighbours. A household faced with the private costs of sanitation may 
therefore choose an inadequate sanitation technology (underconsume sanitation services) because it does 
not take into account the benefits of a superior (more expensive) sanitation technology that accrue to his 
neighbours. 
Intertemporal external costs 
Intertemporal external costs occur in the future thanks to an activity carried out in the present. They arise if a 
water source is used (polluted) in an unsustainable manner, i.e. if water consumption (pollution) of all current 
uses – including the ecosystem – at prices reflecting private costs plus intratemporal external costs (= direct 
social costs) exceeds the refreshment (regeneration) rate of the source. Intertemporal external costs take the 
form of higher future intratemporal external costs (see above) and higher future private costs of water produc-
tion. 
Source: Based on Noll (2002) 
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2.3.4 Externalities 
Private costs, external costs and social costs 
According to Noll (2002: 44), the total social costs of providing WS services can be decom-
posed into the following elements:64 
Private costs  
+ intratemporal external costs  = direct social costs 
+ intertemporal external costs  = total social costs 
The distinction between private costs and external costs is very important within the frame-
work of welfare economics (for an illustration of the intratemporal and intertemporal external 
costs associated with WS services see box 2.1). External costs arise if the assumption of a full 
set of markets does not hold and are the result of an “activity of one person affecting the wel-
fare of another in a way that is outside the market” (Rosen 1992: 66).65 Private costs, by con-
trast, are those costs that accrue to households and firms via their transactions at market prices 
within the given set of markets. From the perspective of the welfare of a society it is not the 
private costs of WS services that should determine their price and thus their allocation but the 
sum of private and external costs (total social costs). 
The implication for WS policy is that private as well as external cost components have to be 
considered when ascertaining optimal water tariffs, abstraction permits, sanitation standards 
etc. Otherwise allocative efficiency cannot be achieved, since service providers and users will 
consider only their private costs (and benefits) when deciding on WS service supply and de-
mand but not the external costs associated with these services. 
Optimal tariff policy if external costs equal zero 
The least complex scenario is one in which intratemporal and intertemporal external costs 
equal zero. This is not likely to happen very often in practice. It is an approximation to reality 
for the situations in which the sum of current water uses (wastewater releases) is very low 
compared to the refreshment (regeneration) rate of a source and in which there are no signifi-
cant competing uses within a hydrological system. In these cases the problem is reduced to 
the question of the optimal tariff for the private costs of WS service supply. This would not be 
an issue for public policy if markets for WS services were fully competitive. But given their 
                                                 
64  Noll (2002: 44) uses the terms external costs for what here is called intratemporal external costs, and oppor-
tunity costs for what here is called intertemporal external costs. Since the term opportunity costs in the eco-
nomic literature commonly has a different meaning than the one intended by Noll, here the term intertempo-
ral external costs is preferred. 
65  For an in-depth theoretical analysis of externalities and public goods and their relation to property rights/ a 
full set of markets cf. Coase (1960), Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
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natural monopoly characteristics, it is a highly relevant question for economic regulation. The 
high ratio of fixed to variable costs that is typical for network systems has implications for the 
optimal water and sewerage tariff.66 The optimal tariff conventionally recommended in litera-
ture is a two-part tariff with the first part being a fixed charge and the second part a variable 
usage price equalling the private marginal cost of supply – that typically is very low compared 
to private average costs (Noll 2002: 47-48).67 A variable usage price implies metering.68 
In principle, there are no practical problems in quantifying the private costs of water and sew-
erage services (they are recorded in the books of the utility, provided that the utility keeps its 
book in accordance with the facts).69 As a rule of thumb, it can be said that in low-income 
countries the average private costs of urban water services (operating, maintenance and capital 
costs) range between 0.40 and 1.00 US Dollar/m3 (Media Analytics Ltd. 2004: 9). Actual aver-
age water tariffs frequently lie below this private cost covering level (see also subsection 2.4.2) 
which means that services are used for purposes for which the private benefits for users are 
less than the private costs of supply, implying a wasteful use of the resources of the economy. 
Policy implications for situations with positive external costs 
Things get more complex in the empirically more relevant situations in which there are positive 
intratemporal and intertemporal external costs. The challenge for environmental policy and 
regulation is to provide the necessary incentives and instruments so that all actors involved in-
ternalise these costs when choosing their water usage and thus put the resource to its socially 
most valuable uses. These issues are extensively treated in the specialised literature on envi-
ronmental and natural resource economics.70 As the environmental problems associated with 
WS services are not in the focus of the present study, here, just some few remarks are made: 
• The relevant geographical area for environment-oriented WS policy is not given by a 
single urban WS system but by the boundaries of the hydrological system the settle-
ment belongs to, typically a river basin. 
• There are four types of instruments available for environment-oriented WS policy: (i) 
price-related instruments: taxes or fees, subsidies, price regulation etc.; (ii) quantity-
                                                 
66  Standard marginal cost pricing leads to financial losses of the provider as long as he produces in the range of 
falling average costs. 
67  Cf. also Garcia / Reynaud (2004: 3-5); Komives et al. (2005: 30-32). 
68  In systems that are fed by abundant sources nearby the costs of metering and usage-based billing are typi-
cally high compared to private marginal costs of supply. If intratemporal and intertemporal external costs 
can be neglected, it might be therefore preferable not to meter consumption but to rely exclusively on a fixed 
charge (Noll 2002: 48). 
69  The asymmetric information regarding the “true” private costs between the utility and the regulator is indeed 
a problem which impedes a “perfect” price regulation in practice. Cf. e.g. (Joskow 2006: 94-96). 
70  Cf. e.g. Siebert (2004); Perman et al. (1999); Baumol / Oates (1988). 
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related instruments: maximum limits for water abstraction, minimum flow require-
ments for water bodies, maximum limits for the discharge of pollutants etc.; (iii) the 
definition of tradable water rights and the creation of an institutionalised water market 
all users of a river basin have access to; (iv) mandatory technological standards, e.g. 
for wastewater treatment. 
• As compared to the private costs of WS services, there are considerable practical prob-
lems71 in assessing intratemporal and intertemporal external costs due to the informa-
tion requirements on (i) water flows within the boundaries of the hydrological system, 
(ii) the natural regeneration capacity of the water bodies, (iii) the quantification of 
competing uses, (iv) the valuation of costs associated with environmental degradation 
and (v) due to lacking markets for future water uses. 
Real-world tariff structures in developing (and industrialised) countries differ remarkably 
from what economic literature recommends (Renzetti 2000; Kessides 2004: 236-40; Komives 
et al. 2005: 19-27). This is due to the fact that tariff design in practice has to take into account 
various normative goals (equity, internal efficiency), not “only” allocative efficiency, and that 
the governance factors (see chapter 3) that shape the making of tariff policies in practice in-
troduce rationalities that differ from the normative goals discussed here. 
2.4 Key problems from an internal efficiency perspective 
Internal efficiency has been defined in subsection 2.3.1. Internal efficiency is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for reaching allocative efficiency. This means that in situations in 
which the conditions of the first basic theorem of welfare economics do not hold, achieving 
internal efficiency in firms does not automatically imply achieving allocative efficiency in the 
economy. We cannot say that a situation (A) in which firms are internally efficient but wel-
fare losses occur due to monopolistic price setting and external costs, is generally preferable 
to a situation (B) in which firms are not internally efficient but less welfare losses due to mo-
nopolistic price setting and external costs arise. 
Still, achieving internal efficiency is a necessary first step for achieving allocative efficiency. 
In what follows three aspects that condition the internal efficiency of WS service providers 
shall be highlighted: 
• Quasi-rents 
• Financial sustainability 
• Private versus public ownership. 
                                                 
71  Cf. also KfW (2004: 15). 
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2.4.1 Quasi-rents 
Sunk costs have been treated above (see subsection 2.3.3) because they can work as a market 
entry barrier, substantially limiting competition in WS service markets. Here, a further aspect 
of sunk costs discussed by Noll (2002: 48-50) and Spiller and Savedoff (1999) shall briefly be 
touched: quasi-rents. Unlike monopoly rents, quasi-rents do not arise from market power and 
they do not harm allocative efficiency. Quasi-rents arise if the ratio of fixed, sunk costs (SC) 
to variable costs (VC) is high and if the service provider earns a tariff covering the full costs 
of service (T). Then, the difference between tariff receipts and variable costs are quasi-rents 
(QR): 
 
SC + VC = T; T – VC = QR → QR = SC (E2.1)
Quasi-rents do not need to be collected to induce continued supply in the short run because 
technical workability can be secured by collecting just an amount equal to the variable costs 
(see also 2.4.2 below). Given the extremely durable nature of capital assets, the “short run” 
can last more than a decade. However, if quasi-rents are not collected, investors do not re-
cover their capital with the consequence that the service company will lose access to the pri-
vate capital market due to the debt default. And, if quasi-rents are not collected, the company 
does not dispose of any own reserves that can be used to pay for future replacements of capi-
tal assets (see also table 2.2 below for an illustration of cash flow requirements). 
Quasi-rents are prone to be captured by public officials and politicians either by re-
channelling the receipts to other uses or by imposing tariff reductions – typically before elec-
tions – for their political benefit. The availability of quasi-rents in the WS sector leads to the 
problem that for politicians it is hard to credibly commit to not capturing them.72 This may 
have negative implications for the financial sustainability of WS providers as well as the fea-
sibility and sustainability of private investments (see below). 
2.4.2 Financial sustainability 
In competitive markets financial sustainability of firms is not an issue for efficiency-oriented 
public policy. In competitive markets financial sustainability of firms is a function of a firm’s 
competitiveness: if a firm lacks competitiveness (and thus creditworthiness), it becomes fi-
nancially unsustainable and has to exit the market. This is no problem for consumers because 
demand is satisfied by the competitors remaining in the market or by new firms that enter the 
market. 
However, in the context of WS sector reform in developing countries, the issue of financial 
sustainability of service providers has received quite some attention. This is explained by the 
                                                 
72  Cf. Levy and Spiller (1996) for an analysis of this problem in the telecommunication sector. 
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special characteristics of WS services discussed above, which suggest the adoption of equity- 
and efficiency-enhancing WS policies by governments. These policies in practice often condi-
tion financial sustainability of the service provider (e.g. by regulating tariffs, prescribing pub-
lic ownership, ruling out disconnection from the service etc.). Financial sustainability in its 
turn can be regarded a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for achieving internal effi-
ciency and has thus to be taken into consideration when designing WS policies. 
There is no unanimously accepted definition of financial sustainability in the context of WS 
services.73 In a very general way it can be said that the situation of a service provider is finan-
cially sustainable if it generates the cash flow necessary to pay for its expenses. However, this 
definition is not useful for the purpose of this study as financial sustainability on its own is no 
goal for public policy. A more useful definition is to say that desirable financial sustainability 
is given if a service provider generates the cash flow necessary to produce a given output 
(quantity and quality) at a minimum private cost (i.e. we define financial sustainability condi-
tional on internal efficiency). With respect to the necessary cash flow requirements for 
achieving financial sustainability it seems useful to distinguish three dimensions: 
Cash flow requirements in order to: 
I. maintain the technical workability of the system: (a) short run (capital assets need not to 
be replaced); (b) long run (capital assets need to be replaced); 
II. amortise the financing of the initial capital assets: (a) grant; (b) debt (or other market-
based financing); 
III. gain or sustain independence from public financing sources (gain or sustain access to the 
private capital market): (a) no building up of equity capital; (b) building up of equity 
capital. 
From table 2.2 it can be seen that cash flow requirements – and therefore the necessary tariff 
levels – vary depending on these three dimensions. The term sustainability always implies a 
long-term perspective which is why the relevant aspect of dimension I here is the long run in 
which the replacement of capital assets has to be faced. Unlike grant financing, debt financing 
implies additional cash flow requirements in order to cover debt repayment and payment of 
interest (dimension II). With respect to dimension III, the WS service company achieves a 
higher degree of financial autonomy if it accumulates (or preserves) reserves in the long run, 
i.e. if it is economically profitable. This holds irrespective of whether the initial capital assets 
have been financed by grants or debt. If the company does not accumulate (or preserve) some 
reserves in the long run, its financial sustainability – and thus the technical workability of the 
system – depends completely on whether it is able to integrally finance necessary replace-
ments of capital assets by new grants, new debt or new equity capital. However, a company 
                                                 
73  For the following remarks cf. also KfW (2004: 7-13). 
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that is not economically profitable, will hardly be able to get private capital and will thus, de 
facto, depend on grants. 
Table 2.2: Dimensions of financial sustainability: The cash flow has to cover… 
II) Financing of initial capital assets 
a) Grant b) Debt 
I) Technical 
workability 
IIIa) No building up 
of equity capital 
IIIb) Building up of 
equity capital 
IIIa) No building up 
of equity capital 
IIIb) Building up of 
equity capital 
a) Short run …operating costs …operating costs …operating costs …operating costs 
b) Long run …operating costs …operating costs 
…reserves  
…operating costs 
…debt repayment 
…interest 
…operating costs 
…debt repayment 
…interest 
…reserves 
 Replacement of 
capital assets has to 
be integrally fi-
nanced by new 
grants, new debt or 
new equity capital 
Replacement of 
capital assets can be 
(partially) financed 
by accumulated 
equity capital; equity 
capital makes access 
to private capital 
market easier 
Replacement of 
capital assets has to 
be integrally fi-
nanced by new 
grants, new debt or 
new equity capital 
Replacement of 
capital assets can be 
(partially) financed 
by accumulated 
equity capital; equity 
capital makes access 
to private capital 
market easier 
Tariff level that 
covers cash flow 
requirements 
Operating costs Operating costs 
+ Reserves 
Operating costs 
+ Debt repayment 
+ Interest 
Operating costs 
+ Debt repayment 
+ Interest 
+ Reserves 
Source: Author 
The conventional position in literature is that in order to achieve financial sustainability the 
cash flow should be generated through tariff receipts (alternatively, the cash flow could be 
generated through government transfers; government transfers are, however, judged less reli-
able than tariff receipts). This is in principle perfectly compatible with the goal of allocative 
efficiency but might conflict with the equity goal in case of low-income households (the 
trade-offs between the equity and the efficiency goals are illustrated in table A2.9). 
In practice, average tariffs are in many cases too low to meet even the minimum requirement 
for financial sustainability which is to cover operating costs.74 According to estimates based 
on data drawn from water utilities serving 132 major cities worldwide (OECD: 47; South 
Asia: 24; Latin America and the Caribbean: 23; East Asia and Pacific: 19; Middle East and 
Northern Africa: 12; Non-OECD Europe and Central Asia: 6), average tariffs appear to be too 
low to cover basic operating costs in 39% of cases (OECD: 6%; Latin America and the Carib-
                                                 
74  It is emphasized here, that tariff receipts do not only depend on average tariff height but (among other 
things) also on collection performance. 
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bean: 13%; East Asia and Pacific: 53%; Middle East and Northern Africa: 58%; Non-OECD 
Europe and Central Asia: 100%; South Asia: 100%) (Komives et al. 2005: 21).  
2.4.3 Private versus public ownership of the provider 
This subsection turns to an issue that has received much attention in theoretical and empirical 
research in recent years and that has been associated with a marked controversy between sup-
porters and opponents:75 the question whether private WS service providers achieve a higher 
internal efficiency than public ones. In order to work out the main arguments of this debate, 
here just the two exemplary cases of fully privately-owned and fully state-owned providers 
are considered. Subsection 3.2.3.3 treats to more detail the whole spectrum of public and PSP 
delivery models that exist in the WS industry, when discussing the institutional design of ser-
vice delivery from a governance perspective. 
The mainstream view in academic literature is that the most effective force spurring the inter-
nal efficiency of firms (and the allocative efficiency of an economy) is competition in product 
and factor markets thanks to the associated incentive and information effects (e.g. Vickers / 
Yarrow 1988: 67-69; Shirley / Walsh 2000: 5-6).76 As has been exposed above, there is only 
little scope for competition in WS service markets due to their natural monopoly characteris-
tics. Given this situation, the incentives stemming from ownership may play a prominent role. 
The question is whether private owners are generally more effective in providing internal effi-
ciency-enhancing incentives – for instance by monitoring the firm’s management – than pub-
lic owners (it is emphasised here that internal efficiency-enhancing incentives are not suited 
to prevent the service provider from appropriating monopolistic rents and are thus not a sub-
stitute for economic regulation). 
Theoretical arguments for a superior internal efficiency of private firms 
There are quite convincing theoretical arguments for the position that privately-owned firms 
will generally show a superior internal efficiency (Shirley / Walsh 2000).77 In the absence of 
competition in the product market, managerial slack is likely to occur in both privately and 
                                                 
75  Cf. Inkota-Netzwerk e.V./ Brot für die Welt (2004) for a critical perspective on privatisation in WS services 
in developing countries. Generally, we can observe that the political debate on privatisation in the WS indus-
try is marked by ideological polarisation. See Urquhart / Moore (2004) and Budds / McGranahan (2003) for 
a survey of the different positions and arguments in this debate. 
76  A classical work on this issue is Hayek (1945). Under conditions of perfect competition, perfect information 
and complete contracts, ownership does not matter (Shapiro / Willig 1990). These are the conditions under-
lying the first basic theorem of welfare economics (see above). 
77  For a critical perspective on the theoretical arguments for a superior internal efficiency of privately-owned 
firms in the WS sector cf. Renzetti / Dupont (2004). 
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state-owned firms. However, state-owned firms show three general “handicaps” with respect 
to internal efficiency as compared to their privately owned counterparts: 
• In a world of asymmetric information, internal efficiency depends on the monitoring 
of the management by owners. Private owners have a strong incentive to monitor the 
management as improvements in internal efficiency will translate into higher returns. 
In the case of public firms ownership is often highly diffuse (in the extreme case all 
citizens are owners) and ownership shares may not have any value or cannot be sold78 
which implies extremely low-powered incentives for public owners to monitor the 
management with respect to the returns to capital. Moreover, state-owned firms face 
no credible bankruptcy threat and thus managers do not have to fear the associated loss 
in reputation. This lowers the incentives for the management to spur internal efficiency. 
• Public officials and politicians acting as representatives of the public owners are likely 
to induce managers of public firms to follow other goals than the provision of WS ser-
vices at low costs (e.g. maximisation of employment or construction activities, tariff 
reductions below cost recovery levels, special treatment of certain neighbourhoods). If 
monitoring by owners and regulatory authorities is weak, the monopolistic and quasi-
rents available in the WS market are very attractive sources to finance such activities. 
However, such a practice is harmful for internal efficiency. 
• Public firms may be constrained by legal conditions in achieving internal efficiency. 
Administrative and public service law may limit flexibility of the management e.g. 
with respect to accommodate the labour force by prescribing public service pay scales 
or by making dismissals very difficult and costly (Kessides 2004: 12-13). 
One assumption underlying this argumentation is that private ownership insulates the man-
agement effectively from negative political governance factors. However, it is emphasised 
here that negative political governance effects will generally not be confined to state-owned 
providers but will also affect the internal efficiency of private firms. One example are the in-
centives stemming from the availability of quasi-rents. If public officials cannot credibly 
commit to abstain from capturing quasi-rents, then it is likely that private investors will en-
gage in one of the following strategies to compensate for the risk of “expropriation”: (i) Under-
investment in capital assets; (ii) siphon off returns to capital above the market rate in order to 
compensate for the high risk (which implies charging “too high” tariffs or incurring “too low” 
costs); (iii) bribery of public officials or intense lobbying activities in order to prevent “ex-
propriation” of quasi-rents. All these strategies imply losses in efficiency. Section 3.2 will 
return to this issue and provides a thorough discussion of the influence of governance on the 
provision of WS services. 
                                                 
78  Whether ownership of public firms is highly diffuse and whether shares cannot be sold depends on whether 
it is e.g. a government department governed primarily by public law or whether it is e.g. a stock corporation 
governed by private-sector law with the government holding the majority of  stocks (see subsection 3.2.3.3). 
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Empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence concerning the expected superior internal efficiency of private firms 
in the WS sector is inconclusive.79 Reviews of the econometric and statistical literature are 
provided among others by Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2004: 4-7), Jouravlev (2000: 5), Ren-
zetti and Dupont (2004: 12-16), Wolff and Hallstein (2005: 97), Estache and Rossi (2002: 
139), Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2004: 7-8) (the latter two articles, in addition, present 
results from own empirical analyses on the internal efficiency of WS service providers). Re-
sults from this body of literature show no clear tendency: while some studies find a significant 
superiority of private firms, others yield the opposite result and yet others do not find any sig-
nificant differences between private and public utilities. Several studies point at the impor-
tance of regulation and governance for the internal efficiency of providers.80 Besides the 
econometric and statistical work, there have been published numerous case studies,81 typically 
comparing performance before and after privatisation. Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2004: 7-
11) provide a review of this body of literature and conclude that – except from some notable 
failures – most case studies find that coverage, productivity and service quality improved after 
privatisation. These reforms were associated with price increases. Lobina (2005) instead, 
based on his review of the case study literature, reaches a critical conclusion concerning the 
performance of WS service providers after privatisation. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
Financial sustainability of WS service providers is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition 
for achieving internal efficiency. One threat to the financial sustainability of service providers 
is that public officials can take away the quasi-rents that are associated with the production of 
WS services. Private ownership of service providers makes the direct access of public offi-
cials to the provider’s resources more difficult and can, thus, up to a certain point prevent the 
“expropriation” of quasi-rents (private ownership has further positive expected effects on in-
ternal efficiency like the closer monitoring of the management through owners). However, 
even with private ownership, public officials can “expropriate” quasi-rents by indirect means, 
e.g. through tariff policy. This suggests that the effect of private ownership on internal effi-
ciency will be strongly influenced by political governance. The expected effects of govern-
ance on widespread access to and on the (internal) efficiency of WS services will be thor-
oughly discussed in the following chapter 3. Here, just some preliminary policy implications 
shall be mentioned: 
                                                 
79  Things are different when looking at competitive markets. There is substantial empirical evidence that pri-
vate firms perform better than state-owned firms in competitive markets (Shirley / Walsh 2000: chapter 6). 
80  See subsection 4.1.2 for a review of the econometric literature touching this issue. 
81  Due to the sample selection bias, results from case studies cannot easily be generalised. 
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i. Economic regulation seems not only desirable to avoid the abuse of market power (see 
subsection 2.3.3). If the regulation succeeds in substituting the lacking competitive 
forces, it can also contribute to spur internal efficiency by reducing managerial slack. 
ii. The monitoring by owners provides important incentives for managers to achieve 
profitability and thus internal efficiency. As in state-owned firms these incentives are 
typically low-powered, they should be strengthened, either by privatisation or by other 
means like corporatisation under public ownership (see also subsection 3.2.3.3). 
iii. The management should be insulated from direct political interference in investment 
and staffing decisions. 
iv. The application of private-sector (labour) law to state-owned service providers gives 
managers more flexibility to pursue internal efficiency. 
v. Financial sustainability is a necessary condition for achieving internal efficiency. The 
level of cash flow that has to be generated (and thus the tariff level) in order to achieve 
financial sustainability, depends among other things on the type of capital financing 
(grants versus market-based financing). The financial sustainability of providers that 
do not manage to accumulate some reserves thanks to their cash-flow depends com-
pletely on public grants or guarantees. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 2 has developed a general framework for judging the desirability of WS policies on a 
rather aggregate level. This has been done by reviewing the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture and by combining two perspectives: 
i. A descriptive perspective that has focused on key characteristics of supply (e.g. cost 
characteristics, interaction with the environment), demand (e.g. basic needs aspect, in-
teraction with individual and public health) and market institutions (e.g. the feasibility 
of competition, absence of a full set of markets, ownership of service providers) as 
well as on their consequences for the behaviour of actors and the state of affairs in the 
WS sector in general. 
ii. A normative perspective that has judged the desirability of the state of affairs (e.g. use 
of adequate WS services), policies (e.g. WS tariff levels), market institutions (mo-
nopolies, ownership) and related problems in developing countries, taking an equity-, 
an allocative efficiency- and an internal efficiency perspective. 
Through the combination of these two perspectives, key problems, underlying reasons and 
broad policy implications have been identified which are systematised and summarised in 
table A2.9 (annex). In addition the table contains statements regarding plausible trade-offs 
and complementarities between equity, allocative and internal efficiency, associated with the 
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respective policy interventions. While some of the policy interventions imply trade-offs be-
tween these goals (e.g. raising WS tariffs in order to internalise external costs will typically 
mean that some low-income households will stop using adequate WS services, assuming that 
tariffs rise above their willingness to pay) several other policy interventions are likely to entail 
complementarities (e.g. introducing regulation of WS services will typically improve alloca-
tive efficiency by abolishing monopolistic rents and at the same time improve equity, since 
with lower tariffs and higher-quality services a greater share of households will be able to 
afford adequate WS services). 
It is not claimed that the normative perspectives, key problems, underlying reasons, policy 
implications and trade-offs or complementarities listed are relevant for any WS sector in any 
country. The relevance of these factors for any particular case in consideration is an empirical 
question that has to be answered through empirical research. Also, it is not claimed that table 
A2.9 is a complete list. The table is rather a general system that relates key problems, policy 
implications and trade-offs or complementarities based on theoretical reasoning and stylised 
empirical facts. 
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3 Political-economic framework for analysing the relation between governance and 
the provision of WS services 
Together with the preceding chapter, the present chapter 3 lays the analytical groundwork for 
the empirical analysis that follows (chapters 4 and 5). It sets the framework for investigating 
the relation between governance and the provision of WS services. The normative and prob-
lem-oriented analysis carried out in chapter 2 has yielded a list of typical problems affecting 
the WS sector, underlying reasons, and broad policy implications. This analysis has largely 
abstracted from the effects of political governance and a WS governance on the provision of 
WS services. There is a (i) theoretical argument and a (ii) practical argument which both 
strongly suggest to include governance into the analytical framework: 
i. Given the great responsibility of the state to enact and implement the equity- and effi-
ciency-enhancing WS policies deduced in the preceding chapter and given the com-
plexity of the related measures and institutional arrangements, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at “the state” and to choose a framework that explicitly takes into account 
those governance factors that systematically influence the process of collective deci-
sion making and implementation within the state. Or, to put it differently, it is neces-
sary to analyse under which conditions the WS policies deduced in chapter 2 are likely 
to being implemented. Governance factors may well be the underlying reasons for a 
low coverage with WS services (e.g. certain regions may lack political representation 
in the government with the consequence that they do not receive public funds in order 
to finance WS infrastructure). And governance factors are likely to affect the imple-
mentation of desirable policies (e.g. necessary tariff increases to improve allocative ef-
ficiency may not be authorised by the regulator because politicians concerned with 
their re-election put pressure on the regulator). 
ii. In practice, public actors (national ministries, local governments, regulatory agencies, 
state-owned enterprises etc.) play a vital role in the WS sectors all over the world. 
This is not only true for the roles of WS policy making and regulation which are quin-
tessential responsibilities of the state and therefore are shaped by governance factors 
the same way like in any other policy area. This is also true for financing and service 
delivery. According to estimations for developing countries, in the mid-1990s 75% to 
85% of the financing for the WS sector came from public sources (65% to 70% from 
public domestic sources and 10% to 15% from international donors) and, at present, 
just about 3% of the population is served by providers that are fully or partially private 
owned (Winpenny 2003: 6-7). Even for Latin America, the continent where PSP in 
WS services has spread fastest during the last 15 years, it is estimated that the share of 
urban population served by fully or partially private-owned providers amounts to just 
15% (Foster 2005: 1). 
These two arguments illustrate the particular importance of governance factors for the WS 
sector. An approach that does not explicitly account for the political incentives of public ac-
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tors is therefore of limited empirical relevance for analysing the allocation of resources in the 
WS sector and the performance of WS services. 
Consequently, the present chapter presents a political-economic framework in order to sys-
tematically investigate the influence of governance on the provision of WS services. This 
framework allows to model the state as being composed of various actors82 that act within a 
setting of political institutions which shape their actions (see section 3.1). This political-
economic framework differs from neoclassical microeconomic theory which treats the state 
and the political system as a black box. In neoclassical microeconomics, if from the normative 
and problem-oriented analysis it is concluded that state interventions are desirable, typically a 
benevolent government is assumed that implements equity- or allocative efficiency-enhancing 
policies in a selfless manner, without opposition and for the benefit of society as a whole. 
These are without doubt heroic assumptions. 
The framework developed below tries to link two bodies of literature that commonly are 
treated separately in research. (i) The literature that investigates the role of fundamental po-
litical institutions – such as political rights, electoral systems or checks and balances – on pol-
icy making in general.83 (ii) The literature that analyses the effects of the sectoral governance 
characteristics, particularly of regulatory authorities, on infrastructure policies and on the per-
formance of infrastructure services.84 Furthermore, the chapter places the issue of PSP into 
the broader context of WS governance. 
The remainder of the present chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 defines the basic 
concepts of the political-economic framework used. Section 3.2 enters into a detailed analysis 
of the influence of governance on the provision of WS services. First, the three WS sector 
roles of policy making, regulation and service delivery are briefly defined (3.2.1). Afterwards, 
the effects of political governance factors (3.2.2) and of WS governance factors (3.2.3) on 
these roles are discussed to some detail. Finally, section 3.3 draws some conclusions. 
3.1 Political-economic framework: definitions 
In order to model the behaviour of actors, whose actions are shaped by both political and eco-
nomic contexts and incentives, this study uses a theoretical framework that builds on the  
schools of new institutional economics, public choice and political economics.85 In what fol-
lows, the most important concepts and definitions of this framework are treated. 
                                                 
82 For a characterisation of the term actor see subsection 3.1.3. 
83 Cf. Haggard / McCubbins (2001: 1) for a brief overview of this body of research. 
84 Cf. Brown (2003); Cubbin / Stern (2006); Gutierrez (2003); Levy / Spiller (1996); Smith (2000); Stern / 
Holder (1999). 
85 Erlei / Leschke / Sauerland (1999) provide a good overview of new institutional economics and public choice 
approaches. For an overview in English language see Richter / Furubotn (1997). The term political econom-
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3.1.1 Political economy 
Political economy is a broad term covering a great variety of approaches from social sciences 
and meaning different things to different people.86 From the late 18th through the 19th century 
the term was used to describe what political philosophers, social theorists and economists did 
(Offe 1996: 676).87 The classical period of political economy starts with the writers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment and ends with Karl Marx. In the course of the 20th century the expres-
sion becomes somehow “old-fashioned” (Atkinson 1996: 702) thanks to the differentiation of 
the social sciences (economics, political science, sociology), and the term economics begins 
to be commonly used to refer to what economists do. With the differentiation of economics 
and political science, economic and political aspects of society are typically analysed sepa-
rately. During the 20th century the term political economy is often used to refer to Marxist 
analysis. Since the 1960s authors from the Chicago school start to use the expression (Groe-
newegen 1991), typically with the attribute “new”. Later, the expression spreads to the schools 
of new institutional economics, public choice and political economics which build the basis of 
the framework chosen here. 
In this study political economy is used to describe a theoretical approach that, above all, looks 
at the economic and the political system of a society in an integrated manner. Individual ac-
tions and thus social phenomena are shaped by both economic incentives (the decision of a 
household to connect to a network will depend – among other things – on the connection 
costs, the tariff of the WS service and the subsidies received) and political incentives (the de-
cision of a public official to subsidise WS services will depend – among other things – on 
whether this policy measure will improve his chance for re-election or strengthen his political 
power). “[P]olitical economy emphasizes both ‘economic’ behaviour in the political process 
and ‘political behaviour’ in the marketplace” (Alt / Alesina 1996: 645-46). 
3.1.2 Institutions 
Institutions are a crucial element of the approach chosen. According to Scharpf (1997: 38) we 
can define institutions88 as “systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of 
actors may choose. In this definition we would, however, include not only formal legal rules 
that are sanctioned by the court system and the machinery of the state but also social norms 
                                                                                                                                                        
ics refers to the work of a rather small group of scholars, most notably Alberto Alesina, Torsten Persson and 
Guido Enrico Tabellini. Cf. Blankart / Koester (2006) and Alesina / Persson / Tabellini (2006) for a debate 
on the characteristics and merits of the school of political economics as compared to the school of public 
choice. 
86 The articles of Alt / Alesina (1996), Atkinson (1996), Grofman (1996), and Offe (1996) contained in the New 
Handbook of Political Science edited by Goodin and Klingemann give an excellent overview of the various 
meanings of political economy from different perspectives. 
87 Major figures in classical political economy are, among others, James Mill, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo. 
88 An influential contribution to the theory of institutions from an economic perspective is North (1990). 
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that actors will generally respect and whose violation will be sanctioned by loss of reputation, 
social disapproval, withdrawal of cooperation and rewards, or even ostracism.” Institutions 
are thus characterised by (i) a set of (formal or informal) rules and (ii) (formal or informal) 
sanctioning mechanisms that will determine their effect on human actions. 
Institutions structure human actions in two ways.89 First, institutions directly affect the 
choices of actors by influencing the expected cost-benefit-relations (payoffs) that result from 
actions. E.g. the formal rule that tapping into a service provider’s pipe system without permis-
sion is forbidden by law may prevent urban dwellers from making illegal connections and 
receiving water for free if they judge the expected benefits (clean water for free) lower than 
the expected costs (the payment of a fine when the illegal connection is discovered). However 
this judgement will depend on the effectiveness of the sanctioning mechanism for illegal con-
nections. Informal institutions, like e.g. the norm that water is God-given and thus free, may 
affect the effectiveness of formal sanctioning mechanisms. Another way of how institutions 
affect expected payoffs from interactions is by systematically increasing (decreasing) the bar-
gaining power of certain actor groups (e.g. prohibiting by law the formation of trade unions 
will limit the bargaining power of workers face to employers). 
Second, institutions indirectly influence the actions of actors by structuring their perceptions 
and reducing the complexity of reality. This way institutions reduce the number of cognisable 
choices and affect expectations and judgements on payoffs that result from certain actions. 
This does not imply a departure from the assumptions of rational and self-interested actors 
that choose their actions based on an individual optimisation calculus (and instead an adher-
ence to a sociological model of human behaviour that asserts that there is a deterministic rela-
tion between rules or norms and individual action90). An important assumption, however, is 
that actors are boundedly rational.91 
Since now it has been stressed that institutions have an influence on human actions. This is 
the relevant aspect of the relation between institutions and human actions if the institutional 
setting is held fix and we are looking at the behaviour of actors. This is also the predominant 
perspective taken in this study. However, it has to be kept in mind that institutions change 
over time and that new institutions are created. Formal institutions (e.g. a decentralisation law 
for the WS sector) are changed or created through the policy-making process which in its turn 
is governed by higher-order institutions like the electoral system or administrative law. The 
                                                 
89 A more in-depth discussion of this aspect is developed by Scharpf (1997: 38-43). 
90 On this issue see Faust / Marx (2004), especially for a discussion of the problem of decreasing theoretical 
consistency that arises when a rational choice perspective is combined with a sociological institutionalism 
perspective. 
91 On bounded rationality in this context see Scharpf (1997: 19-22) and Esser (1990). Moreover Esser (1990) 
presents a model of how the assumption of rational choice can be reconciled with the observation that actors 
often behave according to traditions. 
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following subsection discusses to greater detail the subject of the policy-making process and 
its outcomes. 
3.1.3 Public decision making and policy making: actors, interactions and institutions 
The conceptualisation of the making of policies, which is described in what follows, is based 
on Scharpf’s (1997) actor-centred institutionalism. According to this view, public decisions 
and policies are not the product of an unitary actor (“the state”) but result from the strategic 
interaction of various actors with different preferences and understandings of policy prob-
lems, within a given institutional setting (see figure 3.1). 
Actors can be individual or composite. Examples for composite actors are coalitions, clubs, 
movements, associations or hierarchical organisations (examples for the latter are political 
parties, enterprises or state agencies).92 Actors are characterised by specific capabilities, per-
ceptions and preferences: 
• The term capabilities describes all those action resources an actor controls directly and 
hence enable him to influence policies (or other publicly-relevant actions) that are 
produced in a given interaction. Capabilities include personal properties (intelligence, 
experience, etc.), physical and financial resources (financial capital, land, military 
power, etc.), the access to information and technologies and so on. Together with the 
institutional setting (i.e. the general rules of the “game”) and the specific actor constel-
lation (i.e. the number and the characteristics of the other “players”) the capabilities 
will determine the relative power of an actor. 
• Perceptions and preferences together determine the action orientation of an actor, i.e. 
the strength of his motivation to engage in an interaction with other actors in order to 
influence a certain outcome (e.g. the drafting of a WS sector reform law or the deci-
sion of a regulatory agency concerning tariff increases). Action orientation is activated 
by an underlying policy problem that is perceived as desirable or undesirable with re-
spect to the actor’s preferences and triggers off activities pro or contra this issue. Ac-
tors maximise their expected utility given their capabilities, the institutional setting 
and the actor constellation. 
                                                 
92 For the purpose of policy analysis it is meaningful to treat actors above the level of individuals similar to 
individual actors if they are capable of unified action, i.e. if “the individuals involved intend to create a joint 
product or to achieve a common purpose. Mere exchange relationships would not qualify, but a joint ven-
ture could.” (Scharpf 1997: 54). 
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The outcome of policy interactions can be explained by specifying the actor constellation and 
the mode of interaction. The relevant actor constellation is given by the actors involved in the 
production of particular empirically observable policies that are to be explained. The modes 
of interaction are shaped by the specific rules that govern a given interaction (or by the ab-
sence of such rules). Scharpf (1997: 46-49) distinguishes four general modes of interaction: 
(i) unilateral action, (ii) negotiated agreement, (iii) majority vote and (iv) hierarchical direc-
tion. 
Finally, the manifold influences of institutions in the process of public decision making and 
policy making is once again highlighted. Institutions structure the perceptions of actors and 
thus their action orientation, influence the number and characteristics of actors involved (e.g. 
the amendment of a WS law may need to be approved by both the upper and the lower legis-
lative chamber) and shape the mode of interaction (e.g. prescribing a majority of two thirds of 
the votes). 
3.1.4 Governance 
The term governance (and its normatively connoted twin term good governance) has been 
widely used for some years in development studies. There is no generally accepted definition 
of governance and authors and development agencies often focus on different aspects when 
Figure 3.1: Governance and the making of policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Scharpf (1997: 44) 
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using it.93 However, with respect to the general meaning there is a consensus that governance 
is essentially about collective decision making and implementation, i.e. about the principles 
according to which a collective (a company,94 a local community or a nation) takes and sanc-
tions decisions that concern the members of the collective. In this sense governance describes 
the way a collective is steered or steers itself. A brief definition of governance along these 
lines is given by the Commission on Global Governance as cited in Weiss (2000: 796): Gov-
ernance is “the sum of the many ways individuals and [.] [organisations], public and private, 
manage their common affairs” (citation adapted by the author). With the actor-centred institu-
tionalism approach introduced above we have a theoretical model at hand that describes fairly 
precisely the main elements of this process of managing the common affairs or – which is 
essentially the same – of public decisions taking and policy making: institutions, actors, con-
stellations and modes of interactions (see the “space of governance” in figure 3.1). 
The present study distinguishes two aspects of governance that differ from each other in rela-
tion to the level of generality: (i) political governance and (ii) WS governance. 
i. Political governance refers to those elements that describe the way a nation is gov-
erned in general terms and which therefore affect the way policy making and public 
decision making is organised in general terms. Fundamental elements to this respect 
are (i) the rules by which those actors in government power acquire their public office 
(e.g. by means of majority vote in free and competitive democratic elections versus by 
means of negotiation among small elites and repression of basic political rights), (ii) 
the organisation of government (e.g. separate legislate, executive and judicial branches 
versus concentration of government branches) and (iii) the delegation of power from 
the public officials to the bureaucracy and the various government agencies (Cox / 
McCubbins 2001: 21-22). In the present study the focus is set on the first two elements 
and their effects on the provision of WS services (see subsection 3.2.2). 
ii. WS governance refers to those elements that are more specific to the provision of WS 
services. Literature usually distinguishes three roles that have to be accomplished in 
order to provide WS services: (a) policy making, (b) regulation, and (c) service deliv-
ery (for more details see subsection 3.2.1). The institutions that shape the way how 
and by which kind of actors each of these roles is accomplished and the institutions 
that determine how these three roles are articulated with each other are the main in-
gredients of WS governance. Important questions to this respect are e.g. whether the 
three roles are institutionally separated or accomplished by one single (composite) ac-
tor, whether citizens or users participate in these activities and whether the regulators 
and service providers are autonomous in their decisions (see subsection 3.2.3). 
                                                 
93 Cf. Faust (2004), Mkandawire (2004) and Haldenwang (2005: 35-36) for brief overviews of the use of the 
term (good) governance in the development community. For more in-depth discussions cf. e.g. United Na-
tions Development Programme (1997); World Bank (1992). 
94 When a company or organisation is the object of analysis, we speak of corporate governance. 
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3.2 The relation between governance and the provision of WS services 
Figure 3.2 describes in a very condensed manner the postulated relation between political 
governance, WS governance and WS services which will be discussed to some detail in the 
present section. Before this governance analysis is started, it is reminded that governance fac-
tors are not the only factors that can “deviate” WS policy making from the “equity cum allo-
cative efficiency avenue”. The economic characteristics discussed in chapter 2 – like the ab-
sence of competition in the market and the availability of (quasi-) rents – create strong incen-
tives for actors to take advantage of this situation to their individual benefit but to the detri-
ment of equity and allocative efficiency. Governance factors work together with these eco-
nomic factors. In the best case governance characteristics can “correct” these incentives and 
in the worst case they can compound the situation. 
This problem is addressed by Noll (2002: 61-62) who after an analysis of the allocative effi-
ciency-related problems of the WS service industry concludes: “The optimal design of urban 
water delivery systems (including their governance institutions) is deceptively complicated. 
[…] [The] features of water utilities inevitably lead to the conclusions that extensive govern-
ment intervention in the industry is inevitable, and likely to take forms that are at variance 
with the conventional prescriptions from the research literature. Moreover, government inter-
ventions are especially likely to be distorted by distributive politics because of both measure-
ment problems (and hence the difficulty of resolving controversies through evidentiary inquir-
ies) and the competition for the enormous rents that are available from the system in an envi-
ronment in which many of the social costs of inefficient policies that redistribute rents are 
likely to be delayed and difficult to observe.” 
Figure 3.2: Relation between governance and WS services 
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In what follows, first, the three WS sector roles are briefly defined (3.2.1). Afterwards, the 
effects of political governance factors (3.2.2) and of WS governance factors (3.2.3) on these 
roles – and consequently on the equitability and efficiency of service provision – are dis-
cussed to some detail. 
3.2.1 WS sector roles: policy making, regulation and service delivery 
The practice- and policy-oriented literature usually distinguishes three roles that have to be 
accomplished in an economy in order to provide WS services for citizenry (e.g. Foster 1996: 
2-5; World Bank 2004: 2-3, see table A3.1 in the annex): 
• WS policy making 
• Regulation 
• Service delivery 
While policy making and regulation are tasks of the state (see chapter 2 for a justification on 
normative and problem-oriented grounds) and will thus be strongly influenced by the political 
governance factors discussed in subsection 3.2.2, service delivery can be delegated to the pri-
vate sector with the consequence that, in this case, it will be more influenced by market and 
private sector incentives95 (see subsection 3.2.3.3). 
The scope of service delivery is in principle well defined. It includes the whole physical and 
commercial process of supplying final users with WS services (see subsection 2.1.1) as well 
as the financing of these activities (see subsection 2.4.2). There are contractual arrangements 
that further subdivide service delivery into ownership of assets, investment and operations 
and that assign the responsibility for these activities to different public or private actors, giv-
ing rise to several ways of PSP (for more details see subsection 3.2.3.3). 
The distinction between policy making and regulation is not clear cut. Economic literature 
typically does not distinguish between policy making and regulation. The term regulation is 
used to describe the whole process of state interventions in markets, typically with respect to 
market entry and prices (e.g. Joskow / Rose 1989: 1450). The practice- and policy-oriented 
literature on infrastructure regulation characterises policy making often as the process of set-
ting policies and regulation as the process of implementing policies (Brown 2003: 1; Foster 
2005: 8-9). Another way of drawing the line of distinction, which is preferred here, is to look 
at the scope of the policy issue in question, at the level of detail of the norm, at the level of 
specific expertise implied, and at the intensity of monitoring or the promptness of reaction 
required by the issue:96 
                                                 
95 With the limitation that competitive forces will not be at work due to the natural monopoly characteristics of 
the WS industry. 
96 For a more in-depth discussion on the distinction of policy making and regulation cf. Brown (2003). 
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• Policy making typically deals with fundamental issues (like the principles of tariff pol-
icy, the definition and assignment of certain responsibilities to certain actors, the deci-
sion to award a concession to a private firm). Norms rarely enter into many technical 
details. Typically, the public actors that are formally responsible for policy making 
(legislative actors: national or local parliaments; executive actors: president, ministers, 
governors, mayors) have the authority for deciding on a broad scope of policy issues. 
• The scope of regulation and the authority of the actors responsible is typically much 
more limited (e.g. setting the precise rules for tariff definition and monitoring the pro-
vider’s compliance with these rules). Norms often enter into greater detail and typi-
cally require specific technical, economic and legal expertise. Regulation often has to 
do with implementing the outcomes of the policy making process (norms, decisions) 
but usually also involves genuine decisions or setting of norms on a lower hierarchical 
level (e.g. the definition of standards for service quality). Moreover, the process of 
regulation typically includes monitoring activities in order to control the compliance 
of regulated actors with legal norms. The quality of drinking water is a good example 
for an issue that requires a constant monitoring. 
3.2.2 The effects of political governance factors 
With respect to the political governance factors that influence WS sector roles, this study fo-
cuses on political institutions (e.g. electoral systems, political and civil rights, systems of 
separation of powers and checks and balances). Following Cox and McCubbins (2001) and 
others it is argued that political institutions have systematic effects on policy making. The 
focus here will be on two aspects that are relevant for WS policy making: 
First, in subsection 3.2.2.1, those aspects of political institutions will be discussed that have 
an effect on whether the policies implemented are likely to be more public regarding or more 
private regarding.97 Usually, the literature identifies public-regarding policies with general 
welfare improvements (provision of public goods, improvements in allocative efficiency) and 
private-regarding policies with redistributive measures and the creation of rents that benefit 
narrow special interests (e.g. Cox / McCubbins 2001: 47f). The definition chosen in the pre-
sent study is the following: As has been argued in subsection 2.3.1, both equity and allocative 
efficiency can be considered valid normative goals for justifying welfare-enhancing WS poli-
cies. Therefore, both equity- and allocative efficiency-enhancing WS policies are considered 
public regarding in the present study. With respect to the desirable WS policies deduced in 
chapter 2 (table A2.9), it is possible to state the following. Those WS policies that are either 
equity- or allocative efficiency-enhancing and that do not involve trade-offs can be clearly 
considered as public regarding. Those WS policies that diminish both equity and allocative 
                                                 
97 This classic question in political economy is treated among others by Cox / McCubbins (2001), Olson (1993), 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002). 
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efficiency can be clearly considered as private regarding. The remaining WS policies imply 
trade-offs between the normative goals and cannot clearly be divided into public or private 
regarding without considering further criteria. 
After, in subsection 3.2.2.2, those aspects of political institutions are discussed that have an 
effect on whether governments are more or less able to credibly commit to maintaining poli-
cies implemented in the past.98 
3.2.2.1 Public-regardedness of policy: the role of democracy and of veto players 
The role of the fundamental institutions of power delegation: democracy versus 
autocracy 
The way public officials acquire government power is important for the question whether 
policies will be likely to be more public regarding or more private regarding. The way power 
is delegated from citizens to governments determines to whom public officials are account-
able which in its turn has an effect on the responsiveness of governments to the interests of 
citizenry. From a bird’s eye perspective, two opposed regime types can be distinguished: de-
mocracies and autocracies.99 According to the widely used definition of Dahl (1989: 221) the 
constituent attributes of democracies (“polyarchies”) are: 
(1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to 
run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; (7) associational 
autonomy. 
Free and competitive elections (attributes 1 to 4) together with fundamental political rights 
and alternative information (attributes 5 to 7) give rise to vertical accountability of govern-
ments to a broad majority and permit citizens to voice their demands on public officials 
(O'Donnell 1998: 112f). Democratically elected public officials, for their own interest, are 
likely to take into account these demands because (i) thanks to the freedom of expression and 
the availability of alternative information, citizens are capable to judge whether policies are in 
accordance with their interests and with the policies announced by candidates before the elec-
tion date, and (ii) thanks to periodically held free and competitive elections, citizens can sanc-
                                                 
98 The underlying general problem of time-inconsistency of government policies has been first discussed by 
Kydland / Prescott (1977) in the context of monetary policy. Keefer / Stasavage (2003) analyse the effect of 
political institutions on the credibility of monetary policy. Levy / Spiller (1996) treat the effect of political 
institutions on the credibility of regulatory policy in the infrastructure industries. 
99 For an in-depth discussion of the attributes of democracies (“polyarchies”) contrasting them to autocracies cf. 
Dahl (1989). 
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tion governments at the next election date by giving their vote to another candidate or 
party.100 
In autocracies, by contrast, one or several of the above mentioned attributes are not satisfied. 
Autocratic regimes typically base their power on repression and on the support of relatively 
small groups (like the military and the business elite). Their vertical accountability is thus 
limited to the narrow interests of these small groups, and they cannot be sanctioned by citi-
zenry as long as the repressive system works. It is true that also autocratic regimes, for their 
own interest, have an incentive to provide the public goods and policies necessary to promote 
economic development (i.e. to enact public-regarding policies) because the larger the eco-
nomic output is, the greater is the share that governments can redistribute to themselves via 
e.g. taxation. However, other things being equal, a democratic majority government will 
choose a policy mix of public goods and taxation that is associated with a greater welfare 
since it has a more encompassing interest in the productivity of the society than an autocratic 
government. This is due to the fact that the broad majority it represents depends directly on 
the market earnings of the economy which are reduced by excessive taxation. A democratic 
government will therefore redistribute less to itself than an autocrat (Olson 1993: 570).101 
This is not to claim that democratic governments always pursue public-regarding policies. As 
will be discussed below, democracies can show institutional characteristics that may hamper 
public-regardedness of policy making.102 Nor is this to claim that in democracies the different 
social groups and actors representing them have similar capabilities that would enable them to 
voice their preferences in the policy making process with a similar strength: e.g. poor citizens 
with low educational achievements and a low level of organisation will have more difficulties 
to voice their preferences than wealthy, well educated and well organised citizens.103 
But this is to claim that, as compared to autocratic governments, democratic governments 
have incentives to design their policies in response to the interests of relatively bigger parts of 
the society (have a greater vertical accountability) and thus, other things being equal, are more 
likely to implement public-regarding (water and sanitation) policies. 
The role of separation of powers and checks and balances 
The characteristics of the separation of powers (separation of government branches: legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches and federalism: separate spheres of action for national 
and subnational governments) shape the way mutual control among public actors is exerted 
                                                 
100 Cf. Stasavage (2001: 5) for a similar argumentation. 
101 For an empirical analysis that provides support to the hypothesis that democracies earn fewer monopoly rents 
and produce a higher level of services than autocracies cf. Lake / Baum (2001). 
102 Cf. also Olson (1965; 1982) who focuses on the welfare-diminishing role of interest groups and rent-seeking. 
103 Cf. e.g. Goetz / Gaventa (2001: 2). 
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and hence the system of checks and balances (O'Donnell 1998). The mainstream view in the 
literature is that a system of checks and balances enhances public-regardedness of policy mak-
ing because horizontal accountability of governments is strengthened. This argument is elabo-
rated first (enhancement of horizontal accountability and public-regardedness).104 
However, some analysts (e.g. Cox / McCubbins 2001) argue that an “excessive” separation of 
powers, which manifests in a high number of veto players,105 enhances private-regardedness 
of policy making.106 This argument is elaborated second (the number of veto players and pri-
vate-regardedness). 
Enhancement of horizontal accountability and public-regardedness 
The separation of government power and the related establishment of a system of checks and 
balances is an important element of the institutional design of democratic governments. By 
many scholars it is seen as a means to enhance the accountability of public officials to a broad 
citizenry und thus to strengthen public-regardedness of policy making. The underlying ques-
tion is: Why should public officials be accountable to citizens once they are elected or ap-
pointed? Periodical elections may prove to be an incentive which is too weak to keep officials 
accountable to the public between election dates. Furthermore, a free media lacks means to 
sanction abuses of power, omissions of duties or embezzlement of public funds it may bring 
to the public. 
According to O’Donnell (1998: 113-117) these potential weaknesses can be overcome by 
institutional arrangements that enhance the horizontal accountability107 of governments and 
which include essentially the following two elements: 
i. A system of checks and balances, i.e. the factual mutual oversight among independent 
state agencies and the sanctioning of actions that infringe the laws (state agencies in-
clude the executive, legislative, and judicial government branches as well as oversight 
or regulatory agencies, accounting offices etc.) 
ii. A system of rule of law, i.e. the existence of a constitution and of laws that set the 
rights and duties of state agencies, their boundaries and overlaps. 
                                                 
104 Cf. also Keefer / Stasavage (2003) who argue that an increasing number of veto players prevents political 
leaders from serving special interests. 
105 See below for a definition. Cf. Tsebelis (2002) for an in-depth discussion of the veto player concept. 
106 Cf. Franzese (2002) for a similar argumentation. 
107 Horizontal accountability depends on “the existence of state agencies that are legally empowered – and 
factually willing and able – to take actions ranging from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or im-
peachments in relation to possibly unlawful actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state.” 
(O'Donnell 1998: 117). 
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Typically a network of mutually controlling authorities is necessary to render horizontal ac-
countability effective with the courts having an especially important function to uphold the 
rule of law. 
The number of veto players and private-regardedness 
The concept of veto players is related to the issue of separation of powers (Cox / McCubbins 
2001).108 A veto player is an (individual or composite) actor that holds an effective veto over 
policy change. This entails two aspects: (i) The actor has de facto the power to veto political 
decisions. For example, in presidential systems, the president typically can veto policies pro-
posed by the parliament. (ii) There is diversity of purposes among actors holding vetoes. The 
importance of this latter aspect is illustrated by the following example. In a presidential sys-
tem, one single party may control both the majority of the parliament and the presidential of-
fice (e.g. Mexico before the late 1990s). In such a situation, although formally seen there are 
two109 vetoes, there is only one effective veto player: the party. This is due to the fact that the 
two formal veto players share the same purpose and, thus, will not veto any policies proposed 
by the other. 
In general, it can be said that at the constitutional level the effective number of vetoes is es-
tablished by 
(1) “the institutional separation of powers; and 
(2) the separation of purpose, which depends both on the electoral code used to ‘filter’ 
societal interests into seats in the national assembly (and other offices) and on the di-
versity of preference in society” (Cox / McCubbins 2001: 26). 
It can be argued that democracies which show constitutional rules that underscore the separa-
tion of powers, and at the same time are characterised by electoral systems that favour a sepa-
ration of purposes among members of parliament (which together implies a relatively high 
number of effective vetoes) are likely to produce more private regarding policies than democ-
racies that do not show this combination of institutional characteristics (Cox / McCubbins 
2001: 47-52). The more veto players are involved in the policy making process 
i. the likelier it is that actors use their veto power to channel geographically targetable 
public expenditures or rents (e.g. monopoly rights) to their constituencies, and 
ii. the likelier it is that a veto player representing a constituency that loses with the policy 
change will demand side payments for this constituency. 
                                                 
108 A thorough discussion of the veto player concept is provided by Tsebelis (2002). Cf. also Keefer / Stasavage 
(2003). 
109 Provided it is a unicameral presidential system. In a bicameral presidential system there would be three for-
mal vetoes. 
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Veto players will engage the more in such activities, the more the electoral system favours 
candidate-centeredness (instead of party-centeredness) and thus separation of purposes. Legis-
lators in candidate-centred electoral systems need targetable expenditures and rents in order to 
win elections because – contrary to larger parties in party-centred electoral systems – they 
cannot credibly claim credits for the provision of broad public goods, but only for narrowly 
targeted benefits. 
It can be concluded that the expected effect of the separation of powers on the public-re-
gardedness of WS policy making is ambiguous. On the one hand, it can be argued that the 
separation of powers – if combined with a system of rule of law and mutual oversight – 
makes public officials more accountable to the public and thus favours the formulation and 
implementation of policies that respond to the interests of a broad citizenry. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that an “excessive” separation of powers – if combined with an elec-
toral system and societal characteristics that favour a separation of purpose among public of-
ficials (e.g. candidate-centred electoral systems) – gives rise to a relatively great number of 
effective vetoes and a tendency towards private-regarding policies that benefit above all nar-
row special interests. 
3.2.2.2 Ability to commit to a given policy: the role of veto players 
Like other infrastructure, WS services require substantial investments in long-lived assets (see 
subsection 2.1.1). The materialisation of such investments depends not only on the character-
istics of the property-rights institutions but also on the reliability and credibility of the policy 
environment (Levy / Spiller 1996; Spiller / Savedoff 1999; Henisz 2002). As the production 
of WS services entails considerable sunk costs (see subsection 2.4.1), the reliability and 
credibility of WS policies is critical for the WS service industry. The quasi-rents linked to 
sunk costs are prone to be captured by public officials (e.g. by discretionary changing regula-
tory or subsidy policy) with the consequence that investors will refrain from investing in WS 
services unless politicians are able to credibly commit to a given WS policy.110 While this 
argument is clearest when considering private investment, Henisz (2002: 362) argues that it 
can partially be extended to public investment. So long as public sector managers pursue sub-
goals, like maximising discretionary income streams, their investment decisions will be af-
fected by the credibility of the policy environment. 
The question is thus: how can governments credibly commit to a given WS policy? Typical 
solutions discussed in the literature on regulation are the delegation of decisions to an inde-
pendent regulatory body and the adoption of written policy rules (e.g. the tariff formula) 
                                                 
110 The underlying problem here is one of time-inconsistency of government policy. This problem has been first 
addressed in a seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977) in the context of monetary policy. 
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which are fixed in contracts or laws.111 These kind of institutional arrangements are discussed 
below in the subsection on WS governance (see 3.2.3.2). 
Here, the closely related issue on the relation between political institutions and the ability of 
governments to credibly commit to a given policy is briefly treated. According to several ana-
lysts, this ability hinges on the characteristics of the separation of powers and the number of 
effective vetoes (Levy / Spiller 1996; Cox / McCubbins 2001; Henisz 2002; Keefer / Stasav-
age 2003). Policy measures meant to improve WS governance, like the creation of an inde-
pendent regulatory body, may lack credibility and thus effectiveness if they are easily re-
versed by the government. With an increase in effective vetoes, however, transaction costs for 
policy change rise as more actors have to be involved in the policy making process. Since 
more interest groups are provided with effective veto power, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to structure negotiations and to ensure that every actor receives enough value to accept the 
deal. Consequently, policy change becomes increasingly costly and thus less likely, and the 
maintenance of a given policy gains credibility in spite of the existing incentives for politi-
cians and public officials to discretionarily change it. Levy and Spiller (1996) put special em-
phasis on the role of one specific kind of veto player: the courts. An independent and strong 
judiciary, whose decisions are enforceable, appears to be a necessary condition for making 
credible commitments, because it can protect investors from discretionary administrative “ex-
propriation”. 
With respect to the effect on WS services it can be summarised that, other things being equal, 
an increase in the number of effective vetoes makes government commitment to a given WS 
policy more credible and, thus, enhances investments in WS assets. The greater credibility 
and policy stability related with multiple veto players may, however, come at the expense of 
inflexibility and indecisiveness. The same way multiple veto players curb administrative and 
legislative discretion, they may hinder introducing sensible policies in the first place as well 
as adapting to technological, environmental or social change. 
3.2.3 The effects of WS governance factors 
Similar to the procedure in the preceding subsection, here, the focus is on institutions in order 
to work out the systematic effects of WS governance on WS service provision. The core insti-
tutions structuring the WS sector are those that articulate the actors responsible for policy 
making, regulation and services delivery (3.2.3.1), and those that shape the governance of 
regulators (3.2.3.2) and of service providers (3.2.3.3). In order to work out their systematic 
effects on policies and decision making within the WS sector, it is tried to maintain the same 
perspective as above, i.e. to scrutinise their influence on public-regardedness (allocative effi-
ciency- and equity-orientation) and on the ability to commit to a given policy. 
                                                 
111 On this issue cf. e.g. Smith (1997; 2000); Stern / Holder (1999); Ugaz (2003). 
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3.2.3.1 Horizontal and vertical articulation of roles and actors  
 
Figure 3.3: Horizontal and vertical articulation of roles and actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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ily requires privatisation, which is the strongest form of institutional separation (see discus-
sion below in subsection 3.2.3.3). 
From a governance perspective, the effects of the separation of roles – which always presup-
poses a legal reform of the WS sector – are very similar to those of the separation of powers 
discussed above in the context of political governance: 
i. It is expected that thanks to a separation of roles the horizontal accountability (and 
thus the public-regardedness) of the actors responsible increases because the clear as-
signment of roles to actors and the definition of institutional boundaries between ac-
tors render their actions and the scope of their responsibilities more visible. It limits 
the power of politicians to decide on issues assigned to the responsibility of regulators 
or service providers (like e.g. the technology to be used for wastewater treatment). By 
assigning the responsibility for deciding on the (possibly conflictive) principles of WS 
policy to public officials, the separation of roles can pave the way for more problem-
oriented action of regulators and service providers within the scope of their responsi-
bilities. 
ii. The separation of roles between policy making, regulation and service delivery can 
turn the commitment to a given WS policy or WS sector framework more credible. 
Those responsibilities delegated to the regulator cannot easily be changed by public 
officials because changes would require legislative action – which typically entails 
considerable transaction costs. Moreover, the separation of roles makes it easier for 
regulators and service providers to take a long-term perspective – which is appropriate 
given the durability of assets and given the fact that many policies and measures re-
quire a long time to bear results. Such a desirable long-term perspective contrasts to 
the short-term orientation by the next election date which is common among politi-
cians (Ugaz 2003: 88).  
A further effect of the institutional separation of roles is that regulators and service providers 
are more likely to become professional and specialised organisations – provided that, in addi-
tion, the corresponding monetary and further incentives are in place (e.g. appropriate salary 
and reputation). Without an institutional separation of roles it is likelier that politicians use 
their influence to hire staff which has ties to their political party or clientelistic network, i.e. 
that staff is hired on political grounds instead of on technical and professional grounds.  
However, as Levy and Spiller (1996) underline, these expected effects of WS sector institu-
tions will depend on the surrounding environment of political institutions. If there is no inde-
pendent judiciary, no transparent information and no tradition of rule of law, the legal separa-
tion of roles in the WS sector may be ineffective and encroachment112 a common issue. And if 
there are no effective veto players in a polity, creating a separate regulator may add no credi-
                                                 
112 Encroachment happens if “one state agency trespasses upon the lawful authority of another”; O'Donnell 
(1998: 121). 
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bility to a given WS sector framework because the regulator can very easily be passed over by 
the government. 
Vertical articulation and the principle of user participation 
The vertical relation between citizens and public officials via elections has already been ad-
dressed above in the context of political governance where the importance of the fundamental 
institutions of democracy was highlighted (see subsection 3.2.2.1). The present paragraph 
deals with the relations of users with regulators and users with service providers. In the rele-
vant literature this issue usually is discussed under the heading of user or consumer participa-
tion (e.g. Goetz / Gaventa 2001; Ugaz 2003). 
User participation is a means for enhancing the vertical accountability of regulators and ser-
vice providers and thus for increasing their responsiveness to the user’s interests.113 This short 
route of accountability (users–service providers; users–regulators) complements the long 
route of accountability that links users and service providers (users and regulators) in a 
“roundabout way” via the elected public officials.114 This complementation entails two poten-
tial benefits: 
i. At the election date, citizens vote for candidates that represent very broad policy pack-
ages with no or only limited reference to specific WS policies. The participation in 
regulation and service delivery is a means for users to voice their specific demands re-
garding WS services in an immediate way and on a timely basis. 
ii. Political institutions can show characteristics that detract policy making from public-
regardedness (see subsection 3.2.2.1). User participation can be a means to enhance 
public-regardedness in the provision of WS services and to hold public officials ac-
countable between election dates (Goetz / Gaventa 2001: 3). 
Whether participation is an effective way to enhance the responsiveness of regulators and 
service providers to the interests of users depends on the institutions that govern these vertical 
relations (e.g. are users represented in the regulatory commission or in the service provider’s 
board of directors?) and on the capabilities of the actors involved (e.g. does the representative 
of the users have the educational background and enough information to gasp the issues de-
cided upon in the regulatory commission or the board of directors?). Limited capabilities (or-
ganisational, material, educational) can be an important limitation for poor user groups to en-
gage effectively in participation (e.g. Goetz / Gaventa 2001: 6, 10). In addition, contrary to 
                                                 
113 Users are not necessarily identical with citizens: so long as there is no universal coverage with WS services, 
the number of users is smaller than the number of citizens. 
114 The terms short and long route of accountability in the context of public services have been coined by World 
Bank (2003: chapter 3). 
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e.g. industrial and commercial WS service users, domestic WS service users are a very big, 
disperse and heterogeneous group, characteristics which make the organisation of common 
interests more difficult. 
Goetz and Gaventa (2001: 8-9) distinguish three degrees of intensity in participation with an 
increasing level of user influence on decision making and thus an increasing level of respon-
siveness of officials and managers to user interests: 
i. Consultation means opening arenas for dialogue and information sharing and can take 
the form of one-off consultations or on-going dialogue. 
ii. Representation involves an institutionalisation of the regular access for user groups to 
regulatory decision making or utility management decision making. 
iii. Influence is given if users achieve a tangible impact on regulation and management 
decisions. 
Again, the effects of the WS sector institutions that structure user participation will depend on 
the surrounding environment of political governance. To this respect, the characteristics of 
civil society participation in other policy areas or in local government, the capabilities of civil 
society organisations, as well as the conditions of transparency and the existence of independ-
ent courts seem especially relevant. If there is no tradition of civil society participation and 
civil society organisations are weak, if there is a lack of transparent information and if there is 
no independent judiciary, the influence of user participation is likely to be insignificant. 
In what follows some further details of the institutional design of regulators (3.2.3.2) and of 
service providers (3.2.3.3) are discussed. 
3.2.3.2 Institutional design of regulation 
The governance of regulation has received quite some attention in the policy-oriented litera-
ture during the last decade (e.g. Levy / Spiller 1996; Sappington 1996; Smith 1997; Stern / 
Holder 1999; Ugaz 2003). Many analysts focus on the dimension of horizontal articulation 
and on the problems that result from a lack of independence of regulation. These problems 
are: 
• Low credibility of the commitment to a given regulatory policy which implies a high 
uncertainty and thus (i) low or costly115 private capital investments, or conversely (ii) 
a great need for government financed capital investments; 
                                                 
115 Due to the risk premium private investors charge in order to compensate for the regulatory risk or the risk of 
policy change. 
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• Use of regulation by politicians and public officials to pursue short-term and particu-
laristic benefits to the detriment of long-term efficiency- and equity-orientation (“state 
capture”); 
• Use of regulation by service providers to earn monopolistic rents and other benefits to 
the detriment of efficiency- and equity-orientation (“industry capture”). 
Regulation is often described as being the task of balancing the interests of users, service pro-
viders and governments (e.g. Foster 2005: 10). A major challenge is to design institutions that 
enhance the independence of regulators – in order to prevent the problems listed above – but 
that at the same time hold them accountable to the public – in order to prevent that regulators 
themselves pursue a particularistic agenda. 
Independence and accountability 
Usually, two broad models of institutionalising the regulatory function are distinguished 
(Bakovic / Tenenbaum / Woolf 2003; Joskow 2006: 62-76): 
• The French tradition of regulation by contract which means that the regulatory instru-
ments and procedures are fixed in an explicit concession contract between a national 
or local government and a private service provider; 
• The Anglo-american tradition of an independent regulatory body created by law that 
usually possesses a good degree of discretion with respect to the instruments and pro-
cedures to regulate service providers. 
In the pure version of the regulation by contract – the French case – the responsibility to regu-
late is not delegated to a separate actor but stays with the executive actor that is responsible 
for granting the concession and typically also for WS policy making (for more details con-
cerning the French case cf. Bakovic / Tenenbaum / Woolf 2003: 17). However, the process of 
regulating is in a certain manner “separated” from the policy making process because the in-
struments (e.g. formula for defining and adapting the tariff), procedures (e.g. concerning the 
information regulated firms have to provide), appeals procedures and penalty clauses are fixed 
in a written contract that cannot be changed by any party unless the terms are renegotiated or 
the contract is violated. 
The Anglo-American model of an “independent” regulatory body has been in the focus of the 
literature on regulatory reform. It has been implemented in various transition and developing 
countries (Stern / Holder 1999: 37; Foster 2005: 8-18). Table 3.1 lists important institutional 
design features that influence independence and accountability. Independence means that the 
regulatory body is autonomous in fulfilling its legal mandate. Independence is not only en-
hanced by the institutional separation from governments and service providers but also by the 
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Table 3.1: Factors influencing independence and accountability of regulatory bodies 
Objective Institutional design features Comments 
Independence Institutional separation:  
 • Distinct legal mandate, free of min-
isterial control 
• Degree of independence depends on the 
legal instrument: constitution (high), 
law (medium), decree (low) 
• Degree of discretion depends on the level 
of detail of the mandate, e.g. with re-
spect to price regulation: general crite-
ria like “efficient” and “just” (low level 
of detail), specific tariff formula (high 
level of detail) 
 • Appointment for fixed terms; clearly 
specify causes for removal 
• Prevents arbitrary removal  
 • Involve executive and legislative 
branch in appointment process 
• Prevents the risk of state capture 
 • Staggering terms so that they do not 
coincide with election cycle 
• Prevents the risk of state capture 
 • Autonomous source of finance, e.g. 
levy on the WS industry turnover 
• Prevents the risk of state capture (by rul-
ing out the threat of cutting the budget) 
 • Make regulators responsible for 
various utility sectors (e.g. WS, 
electricity, telecommunications) 
• Prevents the risk of industry capture 
 Resources:  
 • Prescribe professional criteria for 
appointment 
• Regulation is a complex task that re-
quires economic, engineering and legal 
expertise 
 • Provide the agency with reliable and 
sufficient funding 
• Enables the regulatory body to hire well-
trained staff 
 • Avoid high proportion of inspectors 
with a background in WS industry 
• Prevents the risk of industry capture 
 • Exempt the agency from civil ser-
vice salary rules 
• Salaries fixed by civil service rules may 
be too low to attract well-qualified staff
Accountability • Establish mechanisms for appella-
tive review of the agency’s deci-
sions for users/ regulated firms 
• Effectiveness depends on the judiciary’s 
independence and capabilities 
 • Provide for scrutiny/ overview of the 
agency’s budget 
• Prevents embezzlement of funds/ corrup-
tion 
 • Rigorous transparency of decision 
making processes and publication 
of decisions and justifications 
• Prevents industry and state capture as 
well as corruption; enhances participa-
tion 
Source: Own compilation based on Smith (1997:11-12) 
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degree of human (and financial) resources devoted to the regulatory body: “technical exper-
tise can be a source of resistance to improper influences, and organizational autonomy helps 
in fostering (and applying) technical expertise” (Smith 1997: 11). 
While most analysts focus on the independence from governments, independence from regu-
lated service providers is also a relevant issue. The borderline between desirable co-operation 
with the regulator and capture by the WS service industry may be difficult to draw in practice 
(co-operation is necessary and desirable to foster exchange of information and to save on ex-
pensive supervision and monitoring). Ugaz (2003: 90-91) emphasises that the same conditions 
that foster co-operation promote capture of the regulator. Moreover, the author draws the at-
tention to the disequilibrium in bargaining power that exists when a developing country’s 
regulator with limited (technical, financial, human) capabilities has to regulate companies 
owned or operated by one of the powerful multinational corporations that dominate the 
worldwide private WS service industry.116 Such a disequilibrium in bargaining power entails 
a high risk of regulatory capture by the WS service industry. However, this risk is not con-
fined to the interaction of the regulator with private companies. Stern and Holder (1999: 36) 
point out that in developing countries state-owned utilities often dominate the ministries 
which have the responsibility to regulate the utilities but little power and capabilities to do so. 
Independence is not a goal in itself but instrumental for achieving public-regardedness of 
regulatory policy. This is why institutional design features to strengthen the accountability of 
regulatory bodies are so important. Appellative review, budgetary control, transparent regula-
tory processes and the obligation to publish regulatory decisions enable the public to hold the 
regulator accountable (for more details on user participation see below). 
Commitment power 
While both the Anglo-american and the French models seem to work acceptably well in their 
countries of origin, it is not clear whether they will perform similarly when introduced to an-
other country with a different environment of political institutions and with different levels of 
WS service coverage and efficiency achievements. In practice, regulatory reforms in develop-
ing countries have encountered difficulties in achieving the objectives of independence and 
accountability (Stern / Holder 1999; Bakovic / Tenenbaum / Woolf 2003; Foster 2005).117 
One practical problem the literature has insisted in, is the inability of many governments to 
credibly commit to a given regulatory policy. This has involved negative consequences for the 
amount of (private) investments in the WS industries. Stern and Holder (1999: 38) emphasise 
that even if a newly created regulatory agency succeeds in building up a reputation of making 
                                                 
116 On the market concentration in the private international WS service industry and the role of multinational 
corporations cf. Lobina (2005: 56-60); Kessides (2004: 234-35). 
117 For more details concerning practical problems with regulatory governance cf. chapter 5 on Colombia. 
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independent decisions, it stays vulnerable to government intervention. One regulatory deci-
sion that is perceived as being driven by political considerations can suffice to undermine 
credibility. Bakovic, Tenenbaum and Woolf (2003) argue that one part of the problem is the 
regulatory discretion which the Anglo-american model entails. If – due to general weaknesses 
of the political institutions – independence and accountability are weak, the regulator’s discre-
tion is an avenue for politicians to intervene in regulation. Therefore, the authors recommend 
to complement the model of an independent regulator with the model of regulation by con-
tract (see above) in order to restrict the regulator’s discretion.118 However, the commitment 
power of such a combined model still depends on the government’s expected respect for con-
tracts with private parties and on the judiciary’s independence and treatment of private prop-
erty rights. One possibility to overcome doubts with respect to these points is to include inter-
national arbitration into concession contracts. 
Interaction with users and user participation 
User participation in regulation may seem like a contradiction to the principle of independ-
ence of regulation.119 However, this contradiction clears up if we bear in mind that one impor-
tant purpose of regulation is to balance the interests of service providers, governments and 
users in order to achieve equitable and efficient WS services. In this context, the participation 
of users should be conceived as being relative to the participation of other actors, like public 
officials and service providers. These latter actors have closer ties to the regulator and poten-
tially more means to voice their interests. Ideally, by making the bargaining power between 
these actor groups more equal, user participation complements the principles of independence 
and accountability and enhances public-regardedness of regulation (Ugaz 2003: 91-95). 
Whether participation in regulation should take the form of consultation or the form of repre-
sentation (see subsection 3.2.3.1 above) depends on the remaining institutional features. Here, 
it is argued that – as long as the institutions for pursuing independence and accountability 
work acceptably well – participation by consultation is probably preferable. User participation 
by representation means that representatives of the users (together with representatives of the 
service providers and the government) become members of a regulatory commission. This 
entails some potential drawbacks: the regulatory commission may become indecisive with 
regard to conflictive issues (provided that the commission members have veto power), it may 
take predominantly a short-term perspective concentrating on day-to-day WS politics, and its 
                                                 
118 In this case, the implicit regulatory contract between the regulatory body and service providers in the Anglo-
american tradition would be complemented by an explicit contract which specifies e.g. appeals procedures, 
penalty clauses etc. (Bakovic / Tenenbaum / Woolf 2003). However, such a combination requires a careful 
definition of the authority of the independent regulator for amending the conditions and responsibilities set 
in the concession contracts (Stern / Holder 1999: 37-40). 
119 Especially if we consider representation and influence which are stronger forms of participation (the weaker 
form is consultation – see subsection 3.2.3.1 above). 
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technical expertise may suffer. However, if the institutional features suggest that the regula-
tory body is likely to be captured by politicians’ or service providers’ interests, then user par-
ticipation by representation is probably preferable. The potential drawbacks mentioned above 
might be a tolerable “price” for balancing the bargaining power in the regulatory process by 
voicing more strongly the interests of the users. 
Apart from the issue of balancing bargaining power, user participation is an important source 
of information for regulators. Regulation is an activity marked by a pronounced information 
asymmetry between the regulator (who is less informed) and the regulated firms concerning 
the costs and quality of WS services (e.g. Joskow 2006: 94-96). The information basis of the 
regulatory body improves, if – in addition to the information delivered by service providers – 
it receives information from the users. This information provided by users is essential for the 
regulator to monitor the compliance of service providers with tariff rules, service standards, 
user’s rights etc. and to sanction infringements (see also subsection 3.2.3.3 below). 
The effectiveness of user participation depends – in addition to the rules and procedures re-
garding consultation and representation in regulation – on the existence of user advocacy or-
ganisations. While industrial and commercial users are typically relatively well organised 
(e.g. by the local chambers of commerce), the group of domestic users is much bigger, more 
disperse and more heterogeneous and thus more difficult to organise. In general, user partici-
pation in regulation is not very well developed in developing countries. In Latin America – a 
region were regulatory reforms are relatively advanced and widespread – public hearings, 
which are a form of consultation in regulatory decision making, are rather the exception than 
the rule. Moreover, there have been only few attempts to build up user advocacy organisations 
(Foster 2005: 15-18). The complex economic, engineering and legal nature of regulation sug-
gests that strong user advocacy organisations with well-trained staff are key for effective user 
participation. 
3.2.3.3 Institutional design of service delivery 
The institutional reform of service delivery, namely privatisation of service providers, is the 
topic that has dominated the debate on WS service industry reform during the last 15 years 
and has been associated with a marked controversy between supporters and opponents.120 The 
present subsection builds on subsection 2.4.3 which already has entered into this question and 
– among other things – has reviewed the empirical evidence regarding the performance of 
private providers as compared to state-owned providers with respect to internal efficiency – 
which is inconclusive. 
                                                 
120 Cf. e.g. Inkota-Netzwerk e.V./ Brot für die Welt (2004) for a critical perspective on privatisation of WS ser-
vices in developing countries. A survey of the positions and arguments in this polarised debate is provided 
by Urquhart / Moore (2004) and Budds / McGranahan (2003). 
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Institutional design features and independence from public officials 
Subsection 2.4.3 has identified three governance problems of state-owned providers with po-
tential negative impacts on internal efficiency:121 
• Public officials can easily intervene in management on a day to day basis and demand 
to pursue objectives like maximising employment or construction activities or keeping 
tariffs below a financially sustainable level; 
• The incentives of the public owners (and its representatives) to monitor the manage-
ment with respect to returns to capital are low-powered; 
• Public and administrative law constrains the choices of the management to achieve in-
ternal efficiency e.g. with respect to payment of the staff and accommodation of the 
labour force. 
As will be discussed in what follows, these problems depend on whether the service provider 
is private or state-owned but also on additional institutional features like the corporate form of 
the service provider and the question whether public law or private-sector law applies. 
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the whole spectrum of delivery models that exist in the WS 
service industry, from fully public over PSP to fully private delivery models. Privatisation is 
the strictest form of institutionally separating service delivery from the processes of policy 
making and regulation. In its extreme form, privatisation means divestiture, i.e. the complete 
transfer of ownership to private actors and the transformation of the entity into a private cor-
poration that operates under private-sector company law. Privatisation withdraws direct ac-
cess to the service provider’s (financial, technical and human) resources from the sphere of 
political governance (i.e. from public officials and bureaucrats) and shifts it to the sphere of 
private governance (i.e. to private investors). Private investors – due to their profit motive and 
the bankruptcy risk they bear – have strong incentives to monitor the management with re-
spect to internal efficiency achievements. The management is not only monitored by the own-
ers who provide the equity capital but also by lenders that provide the borrowed capital. Pro-
vided that the private corporation receives no subsidies, investment financing has to be raised 
completely on the private capital market. In practice, full divestiture of formerly state-owned 
providers is the big exception in the WS industry (Kirkpatrick/ Parker/ Zhang 2004: 6). 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Cf. also Foster (1996); Irwin / Yamamoto (2004); Spiller / Savedoff (1999). 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of public and PSP delivery models 
Contractual 
arrangement / 
Corporate form 
Ownership 
of assets 
Typical source of 
investment financ-
ing 
Responsi-
bility for 
operations 
Source of 
revenue 
Typical 
contract 
duration 
Type of 
delivery 
model  
Government 
department or 
agency 
Public Public budget Public User tariffs, 
budget 
transfers 
Indefinite Public 
State corporation Public Government guar-
anteed loans 
Public User tariffs Indefinite Public 
Service contract Public Public budget Partially 
private 
Service fee 1-2 years PSP 
Management 
contract 
Public Public budget Private Manage-
ment fee 
3-5 years PSP 
Lease / Affer-
mage 
Public Private capital 
market (rehabilita-
tion) 
Public budget (ex-
pansion) 
Private User tariffs 8-15 years PSP 
Concession Public Private capital 
market 
Private User tariffs 25-30 years PSP 
BOT-type (new 
assets) 
Private then 
public 
Private capital 
market 
Private then 
public 
User tariffs 20-30 years PSP 
Private corpora-
tion / Shared 
ownership 
Private and 
public 
Private capital 
market / Govern-
ment guaranteed 
loans 
Joint User tariffs Indefinite PSP 
Private corpora-
tion / Divestiture 
Private Private capital 
market 
Private User tariffs Indefinite Private 
Source: Own compilation based on Shirley (2000: 150); Budds / McGranahan (2003: 89-90); Foster (1996: 12) 
At the other extreme of the spectrum, there is the model of WS service delivery by a govern-
ment department. Access to the service provider’s resources lies completely within the sphere 
of political governance. The formal institutions that govern WS service management are 
budget and administrative law and the monitoring occurs via the usual procedures of public 
accountability – like expenditure audits and legislative reviews – which just provide low-
powered incentives with respect to internal efficiency. The formal independence of the man-
agement from public officials is very low. The minister of e.g. public services may be both 
the chief officer responsible for WS policy making and the chief officer responsible for WS 
service delivery. Investments have to be integrally financed through transfers from the public 
budget. 
Between these two extremes, there is a spectrum of intermediate PSP models that result from 
a contractual subdivision of ownership of assets, investment and operations. Public operations 
can e.g. be complemented by privately financed investments in new assets via build-operate-
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transfer (BOT) contracts or private operations can be combined with public investment fi-
nance via management or lease contracts. According to Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2004: 
6) the most common form of PSP in the WS service industry has been the concession, where 
public ownership of assets is combined with private investments and private operations. Be-
tween 1990 and 2002, concessions accounted for 40% of the number of worldwide WS pro-
jects with PSP and for 64% of the total amount invested (data form the World Bank’s PPI 
Project Database). 
Private ownership of assets, private investment financing and private operations are institu-
tional design features that are expected to provide strong-powered incentives with respect to 
the internal efficiency problems listed above. Irwin and Yamamoto (2004) discuss further 
institutional design features to address the problems of state-owned providers, apart from pri-
vatisation and PSP. These design features point at commercialisation and corporatisation 
while maintaining state ownership. Important points are the following: 
• Application of private-sector company law which ensures that the company has a legal 
identity separate from the government and which gives more flexibility to the man-
agement; 
• Special law that regulates the relation between the government and the company and 
that prescribes e.g. that companies have to operate as profitably as possible; 
• Regular public reporting of the financial and technical performance of the service pro-
vider; 
• Subject the company to monitoring by lenders by raising borrowed capital on the pri-
vate capital market; 
• Alleviate the government’s conflict of interest as owner and policy maker by splitting 
the responsibility among ministries (e.g. ownership: ministry of finance; policy mak-
ing: ministry of public services). 
It is emphasised that the effects of the institutional design features discussed above will be 
influenced by the characteristics of political governance. Foster (1996: 4-5) writes to this re-
spect: 
“A key question is how far along the spectrum from private to public provision it is necessary 
to go before an effective depoliticization of management is achieved. The answer is likely to 
depend on the nature of the political system in each country.” 
This view is shared by the author of the present study. In a political system marked by effec-
tive systems of checks and balances and by a strong respect for the rule of law, it may suffice 
to just require by law that public service providers are to operate profitably and to publish 
their performance regularly in order to succeed in avoiding negative interferences from public 
officials in the management. Then again, in a political system marked by weak checks and 
balances as well as by a disrespect of the rule of law, far reaching PSP may not improve the 
independence of the management because public officials may use the threat to “expropriate” 
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quasi-rents in order to bargain favours, or the management may offer bribes to prevent inter-
ference or to obtain a special treatment by the regulator. 
Interaction with regulation 
The institutional design of service providers, in particular ownership, corporate form and the 
degree of commercialisation, will influence the effectiveness of regulation (Stern / Holder 
1999: 36-37; Foster 2005: 2-8). For regulation to be effective, regulatory governance and 
regulatory instruments have to be coherent with the institutional design of service providers 
and vice versa. 
In a country where services are provided by government departments, regulatory instruments 
that build on economic incentives (i.e. on the provider’s profit motive) cannot work. Colom-
bia (see section 5.4 for a thorough discussion) is an illustrative example in this context. Due to 
his concerns with financial sustainability and allocative efficiency, the regulator demanded all 
service providers to raise their tariffs to the cost-covering levels ascertained in audited cost 
studies. However, several public providers refused to do so putting forward equity arguments. 
A monopolist refusing an invitation by the regulator to raise tariffs may seem an oddity at the 
first glance, but it is easily explained by the governance features of fully public service pro-
viders. In a fully public WS service industry without notable commercialisation and corpora-
tisation of service providers the most appropriate way of regulating is probably hierarchical 
regulation by the means of command and reporting foreseen in public and administrative law. 
However, given the governance problems of public service delivery mentioned above, inter-
nal efficiency achievements are likely to be low in such a system. 
Conversely, in a country with a high degree of commercialisation, corporatisation or even 
privatisation of the WS service industry, hierarchical regulation by the means of command 
and reporting is not appropriate. Instead, regulatory instruments that build on economic incen-
tives can be used that – given the fundamental problem of asymmetric information between 
the regulator and the regulated firms – are considered to be superior to hierarchical regulation, 
which presupposes complete information. An example for such instruments is the price cap 
regulation that provides an incentive for managers to drive down costs, even in the absence of 
competition.122 So, in a certain way, private or highly commercialised providers are more eas-
ily regulated than public providers because the regulator can use instruments that make it fi-
nancially attractive for the provider to act in the interests of users (Foster 2005: 5). 
                                                 
122 For an in-depth discussion of regulatory instruments, including “price cap” and “cost-of-service regulation” 
cf. Joskow (2006). 
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Interaction with users and user participation 
With respect to the interaction of users with service providers it is reminded here, that the 
mode of interaction in competitive markets – which gives a considerable client power to users 
because they can easily switch the provider (“exit”-option) – shows important limitations in 
the WS service industry. This is why, in order to increase the responsiveness of providers to 
their interests, users have to rely more heavily on the “voice”-option via participation.123 In 
addition, the provider’s responsiveness to the user’s interests will depend on the legal institu-
tions that govern the user’s consumer rights. 
Just like user participation in regulation, user participation in service delivery depends on the 
existence of user advocacy organisations. Participation in service delivery can take a variety 
of forms. Participation via consultation is crucial for the exchange of information between 
users and the service provider e.g. concerning the preferences of households for different 
technical and financial options related to new connections,124 concerning user concerns about 
service and water quality or concerning user education on maintenance of individual water 
tanks or on water saving. The strongest form of user participation via representation is given 
if the service provider is organised as a cooperative where households are at the same time 
owners – and thus choose the management – and users. In state-owned or private companies, 
representation can be achieved by making a representative of the users a member of the board 
of directors of the company. In the case of private companies this would require a special law, 
as – in accordance with private sector logic – the board of directors of private companies is 
usually composed of the representatives of the owners who, in general, will be reluctant to 
accept a director that does not represent owner interests. 
The complaints and sanctioning procedures regarding the provider’s infringements of the 
user’s consumer rights are a further crucial element of the interaction among both. Examples 
for such infringements are undue charges, service interruptions and bad quality service. The 
procedure to bring a charge at the ordinary courts has the drawbacks to be relatively lengthy, 
cumbersome, costly and not easily accessible for poor user groups. This is why often special 
complaints and sanctioning procedures are created in which the regulatory agency typically 
acts as an arbitrator of first instance (Foster 2005: 16-17). Still, even access to these special 
procedures may be difficult for households that live far away from the next complaints office 
or that lack the necessary education. 
Finally, from the point of view of the provider, sanctioning of infractions of the user’s respon-
sibilities, namely the obligation to pay for the service, is a crucial aspect. The effectiveness of 
                                                 
123 Cf. Paul (1992) who applies the concepts of exit and voice coined by Hirschman (1970) to public service 
delivery. 
124 Cf. Foster (2001) for a thorough discussion of the case of La Paz – El Alto (Bolivia) where, thanks to consul-
tations, households could opt for (cheaper) condominial systems instead of individual connections. 
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sanctioning will shape the willingness of the provider to invest in the expansion and im-
provement of the system (this is at least true for private or commercialised providers). 
3.3 Conclusions 
This section summarises the discussion of the present chapter (see also figure A3.1 in the an-
nex which graphically describes the principal relations between political governance, WS 
governance, WS sector roles and WS services treated in this chapter): 
A first thing to note is that governance factors work via the WS sector roles (policy making, 
regulation and service delivery) on WS services. Governance factors influence important as-
pects of these roles like the public-regardedness and the credibility of policy making and 
regulation, the professionalism and problem-orientation of regulators and service providers, 
investment in WS assets and the responsiveness of regulation and service delivery to user 
interests. These aspects of the WS sector roles in turn influence access to and efficiency of 
WS services. E.g. if policy making and regulation in a certain country is marked by private-
regardedness and a low credibility, it is unlikely that the kind of equity- and efficiency en-
hancing policies and regulations deduced in chapter 2 will be implemented and, consequently, 
access to and efficiency of services will be low (as compared to a country marked by public-
regardedness and high credibility of policy making and regulation). 
Second, other things being equal, more democratic governments have greater incentives to 
implement public-regarding WS policies than autocratic governments. 
Third, the effect of the separation of powers on WS services is not fully unambiguous. While 
in combination with a strong respect for the rule of law the separation of powers enhances 
public-regardedness and credibility of policy making (by strengthening the horizontal ac-
countability of the government and the commitment power to given policies), an “excessive” 
separation of powers in combination with an electoral system that underscores separation of 
purpose among elected officials (and thus produces multiple veto players) may drive private-
regardedness of policy making. 
Fourth, the institutional independence of regulators and service providers from politicians 
enhances the problem-orientation and professionalism of these actors. Concerning service 
providers, there is a whole spectrum of delivery models in the WS service industry that entail 
different degrees of institutional independence. Independence is lowest if services are deliv-
ered by a government department and highest if services are delivered by a completely private 
corporation. 
Fifth, the independence of regulators and of service providers is no goal in itself but instru-
mental for achieving widespread access to efficient services. User participation is essential to 
hold regulators and service providers accountable to the broad public and to render them re-
sponsive to the interests of the users. 
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Sixth, it is emphasised that WS governance factors and political governance factors are inter-
related and together influence WS policy making, regulation and service delivery. E.g. in a 
polity that is marked by a separation of powers with a system of mutual oversight among state 
agencies as well as by a strong respect for the rule of law it should be easier to establish a 
regulatory body that is at the same time independent and accountable than in a polity that 
shows a high concentration of government power and a disrespect for the rule of law. And in 
a democracy, where fundamental political rights and civil liberties are respected, user partici-
pation is more likely to succeed in making regulators and service providers responsive to user 
interests than in an autocracy. 
Finally, it shall be pointed out that the given political and WS sector institutions can limit the 
effective regulatory policy choices that are available (Levy / Spiller 1996; Sappington 1996). 
As discussed above, there are various regulatory instruments suited to curb the abuse of mo-
nopolistic power, but not all regulatory instruments are compatible with any given institu-
tional environment. Regulatory instruments aiming at maximising efficiency (e.g. price caps) 
require discretion for the regulator. However, in an institutional environment marked by a 
concentration of government power and the absence of checks and balances, it is likely that 
the regulator’s useful discretion will be confounded with (or displaced by) opportunistic gov-
ernment behaviour. In such cases, given the characteristics of the institutional environment, it 
might be preferable to choose a second-best regulatory instrument (e.g. cost-of-service-
regulation), provided that this second-best policy is more credible – and thus possibly more 
effective. 
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4 Political governance and access to WS services: A cross-country regression 
analysis 
This first empirical chapter analyses the relation between political governance and access to 
WS services for a sample of 69 developing countries using multiple regression analysis. It 
builds on the postulated relations between political governance factors, WS governance fac-
tors, WS sector roles and WS services that have been discussed in detail in chapter 3. This 
first step of the empirical investigation takes a marked bird’s eye perspective. It does not at-
tempt to model the whole complexity of the relations between governance and the provision 
of WS services as analysed in the preceding chapter. It rather concentrates on analysing the 
influence of political governance on access to WS services without explicitly modelling the 
influence of WS governance and WS sector roles (see figure 4.1). 
There are several reasons that justify such a procedure: 
i. It is to suppose that fundamental political institutions, like free and competitive elec-
tions and separation of powers, have an important influence on the access to WS ser-
vices. They not only directly influence public-regardedness of policy making and thus 
access to WS services. They also work via WS governance factors e.g. on investments 
in WS assets and on professionalism and public-regardedness of regulation, which in 
their turn influence access to WS services (figure A3.1). Given this supposed pattern 
of influence and given the need to reduce complexity in order to keep the econometric 
model tractable, it makes sense to concentrate on the influence of fundamental politi-
cal institutions. 
Figure 4.1: Main factors affecting access to WS services considered in the econometric analysis 
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ii. Data restrictions play an important role for econometric analyses. While for political 
institutions and coverage with WS services there is acceptably reliable and compara-
ble data available for a great number of countries, this is not the case for WS govern-
ance factors, WS sector roles and the efficiency of WS services. 
iii. The second step of the empirical investigation – the case study on Colombia in chapter 
5 – takes into account a higher degree of complexity by explicitly considering WS 
governance and WS sector roles. Moreover, in order to assess WS policies and regula-
tions, it applies the normative and problem-oriented framework developed in chapter 
2. Hence, the investigation in chapter 5 complements certain aspects that are ignored 
here, this way enriching the empirical picture of the relation between governance and 
the provision of WS services. 
In order to analyse the influence of political governance, the econometric model controls for 
other plausible variables affecting access to WS services (see figure 4.1). As will be discussed 
below (section 4.2.4), factors like the average income of the country, the abundance of fresh-
water resources, and spatial and social population patterns are expected to have an effect on 
the demand for and the supply of WS services, and thus on access to these services. 
The remainder of the present chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 reviews the relevant 
econometric literature on the subject. Section 4.2 states the hypotheses and discusses the key 
variables and the data. Afterwards the econometric model and the regression estimates are 
presented and discussed in detail (section 4.3). Finally, some concluding remarks are made 
(section 4.4). 
4.1 Review of the relevant econometric literature 
The relevant econometric work for this study comes from three bodies of literature: 
• Studies concerned with the relation between governance and economic growth; 
• Studies concerned with the effects of governance and PSP on the performance of util-
ity services; 
• Studies concerned with the relation between access to WS services on the one hand 
and socio-economic and environmental factors on the other hand. 
4.1.1 Governance and economic growth 
Even though this strand of research does not enter into the subject of WS or other utility ser-
vices it is briefly reviewed in order to get familiar with the operationalisation of governance 
issues for regression analyses and with the use of commonly applied governance indicators. 
Since the mid 1990s the number of articles using econometric procedures to investigate the 
70 
 
relation between institutional or governance factors on the one hand and GDP per capita lev-
els or growth rates on the other hand has increased considerably. Parallel to this trend scholars 
have developed a growing number of indicators to measure in a quantitative and comparable 
way the quality of different aspects of governance, or they have improved the scope and reli-
ability of already existing indicators. This in its turn has further spurred the spreading of 
econometric work on this topic and has contributed to the enlargement of the corresponding 
body of literature.125 
The evidence that some aspects of political and economic governance (security of property 
rights, rule of law, control of corruption) matter for economic growth is strong. Keefer and 
Knack (1997) perform a cross-country regression for a sample of 97 developing and industri-
alised countries. The dependent variable is the average GDP per capita growth rate between 
1960 and 1989. Controlling for the initial GDP per capita gap between countries, human capi-
tal, labour force growth and price changes, they test the effect of several governance indica-
tors126: (i) the aggregate country risk index127 and (ii) the corresponding sub-index for rule of 
law (both from the International Country Risk Guide provided by the PRS Group); (iii) the 
aggregate business risk index128 and (iv) the corresponding sub-index for contract enforceabil-
ity (both provided by the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence); (v) the index for con-
straints on executive action provided by the Polity Project.129 The authors find significant and 
robust impacts on the growth rate for the indexes (i) to (iv) with the expected sign (i.e. the 
stronger rule of law, the lower country and business risks, and the better contract enforceabil-
ity, the higher economic growth). The evidence that more constraints on executive action spur 
growth is less strong – although the direction of the effect is as expected. These results con-
firm findings from earlier work (Knack / Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995) concerning the role of 
property rights, rule of law and corruption.130 
                                                 
125 Cf. Knack (2002) and Butkiewicz / Yanikkaya (2004) for overviews of this body of literature. Cf. Ahlfeld, 
Hemmer and Lorenz (2005) for an assessment of the two competing hypotheses of (i) institutions versus (ii) 
geography being the driving forces for economic development. 
126 For further information on the governance indicators touched in the following cf. Knack (2002) as well as the 
World Bank Public Sector and Governance Webpage: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20773712~menuPK:433525~pageP
K:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:286305,00.html 
127 This index reflects perceptions based on surveys of business, households, public officials and experts. It 
contains the following sub-indexes: 1) Regulatory quality, 2) Government repudiation of contracts, 3) Risk 
of expropriation of private property, 4) Corruption in the political system, 5) Rule of law, 6) Quality of the 
bureaucracy. 
128 This index reflects perceptions based on surveys of business, households, public officials and experts. It 
contains – among others – the following sub-indexes: 1) Risk of nationalisation, 2) Contract enforceability, 
3) Bureaucratic delays, 4) Policy stability. 
129 On the data and indicators published by the Polity Project see below (subsection 4.2.3). 
130 Cf. also Dollar / Kraay (2001) who find a significant positive effect of rule of law on growth but not so for 
democratic institutions. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) analyse the patterns of wealth (and their 
reversal) in former European colonies between 1500 and today. They find that security of property rights 
and constraints on the executive are positively related to economic prosperity. 
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The evidence on the relation between the level of democracy and economic growth is incon-
clusive and more controversial. In an influential paper on this topic Barro (1996) analyses the 
effect of democracy on growth rates for a panel of 100 countries covering the period from 
1960 to 1990. In order to operationalise the level of democracy, the author uses the political 
rights index published by Freedom House.131 He controls for the initial level of real GDP per 
capita, rule of law (from the International Country Risk Guide), the level of market distortion 
(black-market premium on foreign exchange), investment ratio, government consumption and 
human capital. Barro finds no significant linear relation between the level of democracy and 
growth once the control variables are entered into the model.132 However, the author discov-
ers a curvilinear relation between these two variables: the highest growth rates are observed 
for partly free countries, the lowest for both not free and free countries. Moreover, he presents 
some evidence that suggests that economic growth and increasing standards of living exert a 
positive effect on democracy rather than vice versa. 
Two more recent studies (Plümper 2001; Faust 2006) report a significant and positive impact 
of democracy on economic development. Both studies use democracy indicators published by 
the Polity Project. Plümper analyses the effect of increasing levels of democracy on GDP per 
capita growth rates for a sample of 50 “autocratic countries”133 covering the period 1976-
1997. The author controls for the initial GDP per capita level, the investment ratio, foreign 
direct investment, government consumption and the share of services in GDP and performs 
both a cross sectional regression with OLS estimation and a pooled panel data regression with 
fixed effects. He finds a robust and significant positive effect of the democracy variable. Faust 
investigates the effect of democracy on total factor productivity for a sample of 81 developing 
and OECD-countries controlling for initial GDP per capita levels, openness for trade, the 
growth of factor accumulation, the growth of labour force, schooling, ethnic fractionalisation 
and total population. The author performs a cross sectional regression with OLS estimation 
and finds a positive and significant effect of democracy on total factor productivity. 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2004) explore different reasons for the inconclusive evidence 
regarding the effect of democratic institutions on economic development. They find that re-
sults are sensitive to sample selection and estimation techniques. 
                                                 
131 On the data and indicators published by Freedom House see below (subsection 4.2.3). 
132 The author reports significant positive effects of rule of law, low market distortions, low government con-
sumption, and human capital indicators (schooling, life expectancy). He is able to replicate the results of ear-
lier studies that find a significant positive relation between democracy and growth by omitting particular 
control variables from the model. 
133 Plümper (2001: 87) selected those countries that showed a mean value (for the years 1970 to 1998) of < 6 for 
the Polity 98 democracy index (0 = least democratic; 10 = most democratic). 
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4.1.2 The effects of governance and PSP on utility services 
Only a minor group of this body of literature – which is reviewed first – is primarily con-
cerned with the effect of political governance on access to utility services. The majority of the 
studies focus on the effects of PSP and competition on utility services – controlling for some 
political and regulatory governance aspects. As the econometric evidence concerning the ef-
fects of PSP on the performance of utility services has already been reviewed in subsection 
2.4.3, the review below is limited to those papers that explicitly include variables on political 
or regulatory governance when investigating the effects of PSP. 
Political governance and access to utility services  
This is a quite recent strand of research – as far as the econometric work is concerned – with 
relatively few publications. The regression analysis presented in the present chapter intends to 
contribute to this body of research literature. 
In her paper Horrall (2002) explores the effects of institutional, political and cultural factors 
on access to basic telephony for a sample of 37 African countries using pooled panel data and 
a fixed-effects regression model. In order to measure the influence of the institutional quality, 
the author uses the country risk index provided by the PRS Group.134 She reports a positive 
and significant effect on the dependent variable. Unexpectedly, the level of democracy or po-
litical rights (measured alternatively by the democracy index published by the Polity Project 
as well as by the index of political rights published by Freedom House) has a negative impact 
on the access rate in the model tested.135 The study finds positive effects of GDP per capita 
and the degree of urbanisation on access rates. This is confirmed by the econometric work on 
access to WS services (see below). 
Henisz and Zelner (2001) analyse the effect of veto players on changes in the telephone ac-
cess rates for a sample of 147 industrialised and developing countries (period 1975-94) using 
pooled panel data and a fixed-effects model. The sample includes public and private service 
providers. In order to measure the influence of veto players the authors use the index devel-
oped by Henisz (2002).136 They control for the existing levels of telephone access, per capita 
income (annual levels and growth rates) and real investment in telephone assets. Two results 
shall be highlighted here: 
                                                 
134 Besides the aggregate index, the author tests the effects of each of the sub-indexes plugging them simultane-
ously in the regression: unexpectedly the analysis yields a negative impact of the quality of bureaucracy. Cf. 
Horrall (2002: 24-30). 
135 The author does not provide an explanation for this unexpected result. In the regression model presented in 
this chapter the level of democracy is positively related with access to WS services (see below). 
136 See description of variable POLCON below. 
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i. The veto player index has a significant positive effect on the change rate of telephone 
access. The authors explain this result with the positive effect of veto points on gov-
ernment commitment and thus on investment activity.137 
ii. Initial levels of penetration are significantly and negatively correlated with the change 
rate of telephone access, i.e. there is a catch-up effect: access grows faster in countries 
with low initial penetration levels than in countries with high initial penetration levels.  
The effects of PSP and governance on WS and other utility services  
The evidence of this body of literature concerning the effects of governance aspects on utility 
services is inconclusive. Whereas some studies find significant impacts of political and, espe-
cially, regulatory governance on utility services, others do not. 
Estache and Kouassi (2002) and Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2004) investigate the internal 
efficiency of African WS service providers and the relation of internal efficiency to PSP. Both 
use data on the company level (21 companies covering the period 1995-97 in the first case 
and 110 companies covering the year 2000 in the second case) in order to estimate efficiency 
scores. Estache and Kouassi (2002) apply a stochastic and parametric production frontier ap-
proach for estimating efficiency scores followed by a censored tobit regression model in order 
to analyse the effects of PSP, corruption and “governance”138 on internal efficiency. They 
report significant negative (positive) effects of corruption (governance, PSP). Kirkpatrick, 
Parker and Zhang (2004) use both a non parametric data envelope analysis (DEA) and a sto-
chastic and parametric cost frontier approach in order to estimate efficiency scores. In their 
cost frontier analysis – apart from the usual data on outputs, inputs and input prices – the au-
thors include the economic freedom of the world index provided by the Fraser Institute139 in 
order to account for “governance”140 as well as two dummy variables reflecting the existence 
or lack of (i) PSP and (ii) regulation in the water sector. None of the three variables shows a 
significant effect on the costs of WS service providers. 
                                                 
137 The author’s argument for explaining this effect is the following: More veto points (i) limit the discretion of 
the executive power to alter sectoral policies (e.g. regulated tariffs), increasing credibility and commitment 
of the government and thus increasing investments in the telephone sector, and (ii) limit the profitability of 
rent-seeking behaviour and thus provide incentives to invest in infrastructure assets (instead of investing in 
rent-seeking activities). This corresponds to the arguments given in subsection 3.2.2.2. 
138 Unfortunately the authors do not document the source and the characteristics of the corruption index and the 
governance index used which is why it is not possible to judge which aspects of governance are measured. 
139 For the methodology used cf. Gwartney / Lawson / Gartzke (2005). 
140 The aggregate economic freedom of the world index includes very diverse aspects of economic governance 
and neo-liberal macroeconomic policies in one single index. It is not suited to measure political governance 
as defined in this study. 
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For the telecom sector Wallsten (2001) analyses the effects of competition, PSP and inde-
pendent regulation on different performance measures using panel data on the country level 
(30 African and Latin American countries covering the period 1984-97). Among other stan-
dard control variables that were already touched in this review, the author controls for the risk 
of expropriation of private investments.141 The relevant results for the discussion here are that 
PSP by itself is not associated with many benefits, whereas PSP combined with an independ-
ent regulator is positively correlated with performance measures. Besides, a high risk of ex-
propriation has a negative impact on most performance measures. Zhang and Kirkpatrick 
(2002) analyse the same topic for the electricity sector based on panel data from 51 develop-
ing countries covering the period 1985-2000. They reach a very similar conclusion concern-
ing the effect of PSP by itself versus the combined effect of PSP and an independent regula-
tor. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) model the subject of regulatory governance to much more detail than 
the before mentioned articles in order to asses its impact on electricity generation capacity as 
well as on the internal efficiency of providers.142 The authors use panel data from 28 develop-
ing countries covering the period 1980-2001. They build a regulatory governance index with 
the four elements: 1) electricity regulatory law in place versus not in place; 2) autonomous 
versus ministry regulator; 3) regulator’s funding from licence fees versus from government 
budget; 4) staff paid by market pay scales versus by civil service pay scales. Besides control-
ling for standard macroeconomic variables, PSP, and competition, they test the effect of po-
litical governance using the rule of law index and the control of corruption index provided by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004). The authors find a robust and significant positive 
effect of the regulatory governance index on generation capacity. This effect increases with 
the experience of the regulatory agency (years of existence). They also find some – though 
weaker – evidence that (i) internal efficiency (capacity utilisation) improves with regulatory 
governance and that (ii) the better the rule of law, the stronger the regulatory effect. 
4.1.3 Access to WS services and its relation to socio-economic and environmental 
factors 
The body of literature reviewed here, is relevant for the present investigation as it deals with 
the relation between other important variables than governance – control variables from the 
perspective of this study – and access to WS services. An important body of literature analy-
ses the effects of physical infrastructure (WS, electricity, transport and telecommunication) on 
economic output or growth and uses the coverage rate with WS services as an independent 
                                                 
141 Taken from the International Country Risk Guide provided by the PRS Group – see above. 
142 Cf. also Gutiérrez (2003) who analyses the effects of regulatory governance aspects on the telecom sector in 
Latin America using a regulatory governance index similar to the one used by Cubbin and Stern (actually, 
the methodology of the latter is inspired in the work of Gutiérrez). The author finds a positive impact of 
sound regulatory governance on network expansion and internal efficiency. 
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variable143 (in contrast to the regression model presented below where coverage with WS ser-
vices is the dependent variable). From the cross-country studies performed in this context we 
know that there is a strong correlation between per capita income and access to WS services 
(World Bank 1994: 14-17; Estache / Speciale / Veredas 2005: 6-7). 
Mainardi (2003) explores the relationship between macroeconomic and environmental condi-
tions, access to WS services and availability of water resources for a sample of developing 
countries and countries in transition using regression and principal components analysis. As 
far as the regression analysis is concerned, he finds a significant influence of wealth (meas-
ured by both per capita income and poverty incidence) as well as of spatial population pat-
terns (population density) and population dynamics (growth of urban population) on coverage 
rates. Moreover, the results from the principal components analysis suggest that there is a 
trade-off between access to improved water supply service on the one hand and availability of 
internal renewable water resources144 on the other hand (Mainardi 2003: 46-49). 
4.2 Hypotheses, key variables and sample 
Building on the discussion of the expected effects of political governance (chapter 3) and on 
the preceding literature review, this section does the first step in operationalising the research 
question of the present chapter for econometric analysis. First, the main hypotheses to be ana-
lysed are stated (subsection 4.2.1), afterwards the key variables and the respective data 
sources are described (subsections 4.2.2 to 4.2.4), and finally the sample selection is ex-
plained (subsection 4.2.5). The second step – the econometric model – is discussed in section 
4.3. 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
Chapter 3 has argued that political institutions have systematic effects on WS policy making, 
regulation and service provision, and thus on coverage with WS services. The argumentation 
has highlighted two important sets of political institutions (for a thorough discussion see sub-
section 3.2.2): 
1) The institutions that govern the power delegation from citizens to public officials (the 
level of democracy): Other things being equal, the expected effect of a higher level of 
democracy on coverage with WS services is positive (hypothesis 1). The way power is 
delegated influences to whom governments are accountable and to whose interests 
governments respond. Due to institutional characteristics, governments in democratic 
                                                 
143 See e.g. the literature overview provided by Estache (2004). 
144 Internal renewable water resources measure the average annual flow of rivers and the recharge of groundwa-
ter (aquifers) generated from endogenous (internal) precipitation. See also the definition of the variable 
WATRESCAP in table A4.1 (annex). 
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regimes have systematic incentives to respond to broader interests than autocratic 
governments, i.e. they are characterised by a greater public-regardedness. It is thus to 
expect that democratic governments care more for the coverage of their citizens with 
WS services than autocratic governments. 
2) The institutions that govern the separation of powers as well as the number of consti-
tutional veto players: The effect of this set of institutions on coverage with WS ser-
vices is expected to be ambiguous, depending on further governance characteristics: 
a) Together with a system of rule of law, a higher number of constitutional veto play-
ers is expected to have a positive influence on coverage with WS services (i) by 
strengthening the horizontal accountability of governments and thus the respon-
siveness to broad interests and (ii) by increasing the credibility of government 
policies and, therefore, investments in long-lived WS assets (hypothesis 2a). 
b) Together with electoral systems and societal structures that favour a separation of 
purpose among elected officials, a higher number of constitutional veto players is 
expected to increase private-regardedness of policy making and thus counteract 
widespread access to WS services (hypothesis 2b). 
In order to analyse the effects of these fundamental political institutions on the coverage with 
WS services, three classes of variables are included in the regression model (for the model 
specification see section 4.3.1): 
• Variables on coverage with water and sanitation services: COV02: dependent vari-
ables; COV90: control variables for the historical coverage level; 
• Variables on political governance: GOVj: independent variables of interest; 
• Control variables: CONj: further independent variables. 
As will be explained in some detail below, the following fundamental relation between these 
variables is proposed: 
 COV02 → F(COV90, GOVj, CONj)       (E4.1) 
In what follows the key variables used in the regressions are described. The full documenta-
tion of all variables and data sources is given in table A4.1 in the annex. 
4.2.2 Coverage variables (COV) 
Following WHO and UNICEF (2000: Annex A) national coverage with water supply services 
(WATTOT) is defined as the percentage of the population that uses improved water services 
(see discussion in subsection 2.2.2). Correspondingly, national coverage with sanitation serv-
ices (SANTOT) is the percentage of the population that uses improved sanitation services. 
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WATTOT and SANTOT can take values between 0 and 100. The information is taken from 
the database of the Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation of WHO 
and UNICEF145 which is the only up-to-date source of systematic and comparable data on the 
status of WS service coverage for a large number of countries. In December 2005, when the 
calculations for the present chapter were made, information was available for the years 1990 
and 2002. 
Assessing the share of the population of a given country that has access to improved WS ser-
vices poses diverse methodological problems.146 The criteria used by WHO and UNICEF in 
order to judge whether a household is considered to be covered with improved services are 
summarised in table A2.4 in the annex. Coverage rates published by the Joint Monitoring 
Programme are estimates based on the revised information contained in two main types of 
data collection instruments: expert assessment questionnaires and household surveys. One 
problem that arises is that household surveys often use different indicators and (sampling) 
methodologies, posing e.g. difficulties to account for some informal supply solutions 
(Komives / Whittington / Wu 2003: 78-79).147 Moreover, for several countries the information 
available does not suffice to estimate the coverage rate for 1990, and consequently the data-
base includes cases with missing data. The descriptive summary statistics of the coverage 
variables (WATTOT; SANTOT) for the sample analysed is given in table A4.2. 
4.2.3 Political governance variables (GOVj) 
In order to analyse the main hypotheses (1), (2a), (2b) stated in subsection 4.2.1, it would be 
desirable to dispose of four different variables that measure separately (i) the level of democ-
racy, (ii) the number of constitutional veto players, (iii) the level of rule of law, and (iv) the 
degree of separation of purpose among public officials. In what follows five “candidates” for 
measuring the governance aspects (i), (ii) and (iii) are discussed. The variable ETHNIC – that 
can be interpreted as a proxy for measuring the separation of purpose – is discussed below 
together with the remaining control variable (subsection 4.2.4). 
The five governance variables that have been considered in this study – POLITY, 
POLRIGHTS, POLCON, CHECKS, RULAW – are described in detail in box 4.1. These 
variables are commonly used in econometric work in order to account for political governance 
aspects (see also literature review in section 4.1). 
• POLITY and POLRIGHTS are both commonly used as measures for the level of de-
mocracy. They focus on the freedom, competitiveness and fairness of electoral proce-
                                                 
145 Cf. www.wssinfo.org. See also WHO and UNICEF (2000; 2004). 
146 For a description of definitions, data collection methods and coverage estimation procedures see WHO / 
UNICEF (2000: Annex A) and (2004: 22-23). 
147 Cf. also Mainardi (2003: 244) who points out that despite official definitions by WHO the coverage informa-
tion is liable to subjective judgement. 
78 
 
dures, on the right to run for office, on associational autonomy and on the freedom of 
expression. However, they partially consider broader issues that are linked to veto 
players or separation of powers like the constraints on the chief executive (in the case 
of POLITY). 
• POLCON and CHECKS have been both developed for measuring the number of veto 
players in a political system. However, some issues linked to the level of democracy 
are also contained in these indicators. E.g. CHECKS is set on its lowest value if the 
legislature is not competitively elected. 
• RULAW is intended to measure the extent to which public and private actors have 
confidence in and respect the rules of society, i.e. the level of rule of law. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics political governance variables 
Variable 
POLITY 
POLRIGHTS 
POLCON 
CHECKS 
RULAW 
N 
65 
69 
68 
66 
69 
Mean 
0.8396923 
3.542899 
0.232222 
2.543483 
- 0.4773913 
Std. Dev. 
5.577878 
1.631842 
0.173244 
1.384287 
0.5580709 
Min 
- 9 
1 
0 
1 
- 1.87 
Max 
9 
6.38 
0.6617 
8.384615 
1.27 
The values of all variables have been calculated by taking the averages of the available annual 
observations between 1990 and 2002 from the original governance indicators described in box 
4.1. The exception is RULAW which has been calculated by taking the average of the avail-
able observations between 1996 and 2002, since data prior to 1996 is not available (see also 
table A4.1). All five variables are ordinally scaled. 
The summary statistics of the five governance variables is given in table 4.1. It can be seen 
that three of the variables show some missing values for the 69 developing countries included 
in the sample (see subsection 4.2.5 for a description of the sample). From the two variables 
that measure the level of democracy, POLITY shows 4 missing values whereas POLRIGHTS 
shows no missing value. From the two variables that measure the number of veto players, 
CHECKS presents 3 missing values whereas POLCON shows just 1 missing value. RULAW 
presents no missing value. In the regressions performed below those variables are preferred 
that show less missing values, i.e. POLRIGHTS (in order to account for the level of democ-
racy), POLCON (in order to account for the number of veto players) and RULAW (in order to 
account for the level of rule of law), in order to not “waste” degrees of freedom.148 
 
                                                 
148 However, POLITY and CHECKS have been used to check for the sensitivity of the results obtained (see 
subsection 4.3.2 below). 
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Table 4.2: Pairwise Spearman rank correlation selected political governance variables 
Variable 
POLRIGHTS 
POLCON 
RULAW 
POLRIGHTS 
1.0000 
0.7758 
0.4565 
POLCON 
 
1.0000 
0.4375 
RULAW 
 
 
1.0000 
The matrix of the pairwise Spearman rank correlation coefficients of POLRIGHTS, POLCON 
and RULAW is shown in table 4.2. It becomes evident that POLRIGHTS and POLCON are 
highly correlated (the coefficient is 0.7758). The rank correlation between RULAW and the 
remaining two variables is considerably less pronounced (0.4565 in the case of POLRIGHTS 
and 0.4375 in the case of POLCON). The high correlation between POLRIGHTS and 
POLCON indicates either 
• that the two variables do not succeed to measure accurately the two distinct political 
governance aspects of interest (level of democracy on the one hand and number of 
veto players on the other hand) due to measurement problems, or 
• that the two variables do accurately measure the two political governance aspects of 
interest and that there is a strong systematic and positive relation between the level of 
democracy and the number of veto players in a country. 
Both explanations are plausible. Subsection 4.3.2.1 will return to the issue of the high rank 
correlation between POLRIGHTS and POLCON when discussing the regression results. 
4.2.4 Control variables (CONj) 
The main control variables (per capita income, spatial population patterns, availability of wa-
ter resources, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and historical levels of coverage) have been 
chosen based upon a review of the relevant literature (see above), the plausibility of being 
related to coverage with WS services and the results of various test regressions. The idea is to 
capture the main factors affecting the demand for and supply with these services apart from 
political governance. The values of the main control variables described in what follows have 
been calculated by taking the averages over the period 1990 to 2002.149 
 
                                                 
149 See table A4.1 for the exceptions to this rule. 
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Box 4.1: Description of political governance variables 
POLITY 
The values of this variable are taken from the original indicator “POLITY” of the database on regime charac-
teristics provided by the Polity IV project (Jaggers / Gurr 1995; Marshall / Jaggers 2000). The database con-
tains codes for the political authority characteristics of a large number of states in the world from 1800 to date. 
The data is widely used for empirical research and has been applied in econometric work in order to measure 
the level of democracy (see literature cited in section 4.1). The values of POLITY range from –10 to 10 with 
–10 being the value for the most autocratic and 10 the value for the most democratic regime. Coding is done by 
a small group of researchers following a uniform standard. The level of democracy (autocracy) is determined 
by aggregating following sub-indicators: competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political par-
ticipation, openness and competitiveness of the executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive. The 
emphasis of POLITY is on measuring the level of democracy as defined in subsection 3.2.2.1, although it also 
contains elements linked to the separation of powers and veto players (constraints on the chief executive). 
POLRIGHTS 
The values of POLRIGHTS are taken from the original indicator “political rights” published annually by Free-
dom House (various years). This indicator is widely used in empirical research on governance issues and is 
commonly interpreted as a measure of democracy (Knack 2002: 5). The values of POLRIGHTS range from 1 
to 7 with higher scores indicating greater political rights (the values of the original indicator have been trans-
formed – see table A4.1). The coding of “political rights” is done by survey teams made out of experts which 
base their judgement not primarily on legislation (formal institutions) but rather on perceptions of “real-world 
situations caused by state and nongovernmental factors” (Freedom House 2002: 722). In order to do so, survey 
teams rely on different sources of information including news reports, nongovernmental organisation publica-
tions, academic analyses and professional contacts. POLRIGHTS is intended to measure the level of democ-
racy as defined in subsection 3.2.2.1. It focuses on the characteristics of the electoral process, associational 
autonomy and freedom from repression (Freedom House 2002: 744). 
POLCON 
The values of this variable are taken from the original indicator “POLCONIII” published by Henisz (2002). It 
is specifically designed to measure constraints on the executive via veto players by estimating the feasibility of 
policy change. The variable can take values from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more constraints on the 
executive. It is an application of the veto player concept (see subsection 3.2.2.1) to the construction of an indi-
cator. Original values are calculated based on three types of information on veto points and distributions of 
preferences of actors within a political system: (i) first the number of independent branches of government with 
veto power are identified; (ii) in addition, the extent of alignment across branches of government is taken into 
account using information on the party composition of government branches; (iii) finally the heterogeneity of 
preferences within each legislative branch is considered. Data sources are the Polity Database (see above), The 
Political Handbook of the World and The Stateman’s Yearbook, among others. Examples for the application of 
this variable in econometric work are Henisz and Zelner (2001; 2004). 
CHECKS 
The values of this variable are taken from the original indicator “CHECKS” of the Database of Political Institu-
tions (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer / Stasavage 2003; Keefer 2005). The data is compiled and coded by the Devel-
opment Research Group of the World Bank. Important sources of information are The Europa Yearbook and 
The Political Handbook of the World (Knack 2002: 16). The concept underlying the construction of this indica-
tor is similar to the one of POLCON. CHECKS counts “ (…) the number of veto players in a political system, 
adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of each other (…)” (Beck et al. 2001: 170). The vari-
able takes values from 1 to 18 (higher values correspond to more veto points). Countries where legislatures are 
not competitively elected are coded 1 as it is assumed that only the executive holds a veto. 
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RULAW 
The values of RULAW are taken from the original index “rule of law” published by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2004) and provided by the World Bank Institute through its Governance and Anti-Corruption Data-
base. “Rule of law” is an aggregate index constructed from various single indicators which in turn are based on 
surveys of business, households, public officials and experts based on their perception of different dimensions 
of the rule of law in a certain country like the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary and the respect for private property rights. The index is intended to measure “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society” (Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi 2004: 4). In recent 
years, this indicator has been frequently used in econometric work (e.g. Kaufmann / Kraay 2002). The variable 
takes values from –2.5 to + 2.5. Higher values correspond to greater rule of law. 
 
GDP per capita (GDPCAP) is used as a proxy for purchasing power which will influence the 
demand for services (prices for WS services are not included into the model, since there is no 
internationally comparable information available for a great number of countries). Spatial 
population patterns (population density: POPDENS; share of the urban population: POPURB) 
and the availability of internal renewable fresh water resources per capita (WATRESCAP) are 
used as proxies for the cost of providing services. A low availability of water resources per 
capita will ceteris paribus tend to increase the cost of providing water (and sewer-based sani-
tation) services because water will have to be transported over long distances or need costly 
treatment; and a relative concentration of the population (in urban areas) will ceteris paribus 
tend to make it easier to take advantage of economies of scale and of agglomeration and thus 
reduce unit costs.150 
In recent years empirical evidence has been growing that ethno-linguistic fractionalisation 
negatively affects economic growth, institutional quality and public goods provision (Alesina 
et al. 2003). The variable ETHNIC151 is used to control for such effects. Moreover, in this 
study ETHNIC is used as proxy to account for a high degree of separation of purpose as dis-
cussed in subsection 3.2.2.1. The argument is that a high ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is 
typically related with a high heterogeneity of political preferences among citizens which, 
other things being equal, translates into a high degree of separation of purpose among elected 
officials. 
Finally, the coverage levels by the year 1990 (WATTOT90 and SANTOT90) are used to con-
trol for historical factors that have affected coverage prior to the period of investigation as 
well as to account for unobserved factors (see subsection 4.2.2 above for a description of 
these variables). The summary statistics of the key control variables is given in table A4.3 in 
the annex. 
                                                 
150 This is true at least for pipe technologies which are marked by economies of scale. 
151 This variable measures ethnic fractionalisation and can take values between 0 and 1. For more details cf. 
Alesina et al. (2003). 
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4.2.5 Sample 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of governance on the provision of WS 
services in developing countries with coverage levels considerably below 100%. Accordingly, 
all those countries were included in the sample for which coverage with water supply 
(WATTOT90) and sanitation services (SANTOT90) by the year 1990 shows values below 
95%.152 For this country group expanding coverage in order to meet the MDGs is a big chal-
lenge and efforts by governments and development agencies to accomplish this task need to 
be especially strong. The supposition is that political governance factors will make a differ-
ence in mastering this challenge. The countries contained in the sample are listed in table 
A4.4 in the annex. 
The exact sample selection process was as follows. The starting point was the set of countries 
contained in the Joint Monitoring Programme (WHO, UNICEF) database which did not show 
missing data for either WATTOT90,02 or SANTOT90,02 (108 cases). Countries with a popu-
lation below 500,000 (average of the years 1990 and 2002) were dropped (remaining 91 
cases).153 Papua New Guinea presented implausible coverage values and was therefore 
dropped.154 Finally, all countries that presented values above 94% for WATTOT90 or 
SANTOT90 were excluded from the sample as well as those countries that showed missing 
data for the main independent variables discussed above (remaining the 69 cases listed in ta-
ble A4.4). 
4.3 Regression analysis 
4.3.1 Econometric model 
According to Ahlfeld, Hemmer and Lorenz (2005: 3-4) the econometric model used in the 
present study can be classified as an informal regression model since it is not derived from a 
formal mathematic model on the provision of WS services but rather on informal, though 
theoretically based, reasoning.155 The general form of the multivariate linear regression model 
which describes the proposed relation between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables is expressed in the following equation (E4.2): 
 
                                                 
152 Setting the threshold lower would have rendered the sample too small (would have left the model with too 
few degrees of freedom) in order to perform reliable multivariate regression analyses. 
153 With the exception of Andorra all countries with less than 500,000 inhabitant are small island states. These 
countries show very particular geographic and population patterns which suggests that a joint analysis with 
the remaining countries in the sample is not meaningful. 
154 All coverage values – water, sanitation, total, urban, rural and household connections – were identical for the 
years 1990 and 2002. 
155 On the advantages and disadvantages of informal regression models as compared to formal regression mod-
els in the context of economic growth empirics see Hemmer / Lorenz (2004: 173-98). 
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COV02i = β0 + βj COV90i + βj GOVj, i + βj CONj, i + Ui      (i = 1,…m; j = 1,…n) (E4.2)
  
The dependent variable COV02156 stands for WATTOT02 or SANTOT02 (the model is esti-
mated separately for the case of water and the case of sanitation; see below). COV90 stands 
for WATTOT90 or SANTOT90, GOVj is the vector of political governance variables, CONj 
is the vector of all remaining control variables and U is an error term which contains all fac-
tors affecting COV02 other than the independent variables. i is the cross-sectional subscript 
for the country case. β0 is the intercept and βj are the slope parameters that are estimated in 
the regression analysis. Since it is a cross-sectional analysis, for each variable and country 
only one observation over time is entered into the model (the average value for 1990 to 2002, 
see above). The exception is COV which appears measured at two points in time: as depend-
ent variable (COV02) for the year 2002 and as control variable (COV90) for the year 1990. 
Using COV measured by 2002 on the left-hand-side of E4.2 has an important advantage: si-
multaneity157 can be largely precluded. By logic, the coverage level measured in 2002 can 
hardly be jointly determined with the variables on the right-hand-side which are averages for 
a prior period (1990 to 2002). 
One important argument for including COV90 on the right-hand-side of E4.2 is to control for 
“history” (which will explain much of COV02) in order to isolate the effects of the variables 
of interest (GOVj) on the dependent variable as well as to capture inertial effects. COV90 has 
the characteristic of capturing all economic, political, social, cultural, demographic and geo-
graphic factors having affected coverage prior to 1990. It is therefore also suited for account-
ing for unobserved factors that are not explicitly included in the model but that may have an 
effect on COV02 and thus cause an omitted variable bias.158 Another desired aspect is that the 
model can be interpreted as explaining coverage expansion since COV02 is estimated given 
the values of COV90. 
 
                                                 
156 Because the dependent variable COV02 is a percentage (that always takes values between 0 and 100) some 
authors recommend a logit transformation which makes sure that the predicted values also fall between 0 
and 100 (McDowell / Cox 2001). This is not necessary in the present case for the sample analysed: all pre-
dicted values fall within the allowed range. Moreover a logit transformation renders interpretation of the re-
gression results less straight forward. It is therefore preferred to keep the model as simple as possible and not 
to perform a logit transformation. 
157 Simultaneity arises if one or more of the independent variables is jointly determined with the dependent vari-
able (Wooldridge 2006: 552). In this case estimation with OLS is generally biased and inconsistent. For a 
thorough discussion of simultaneity cf. e.g. Wooldridge (2006: chapter 16). 
158 On this quality of lagged dependent variables on the right-hand-side in cross-sectional models cf. 
Wooldridge (2006: 315-17). Omitting a key variable from the model can cause correlation between the error 
term (U) and some of the independent variables which will generally lead to bias and inconsistency of the 
OLS estimators.  
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As far as the functional form of the relation COV02 → F(COV90) is concerned both a linear 
relation with constant returns of COV90 on COV02 as well as a non-linear relation with di-
minishing returns have been tested.159 We would expect diminishing returns as being the ap-
propriate functional form since countries with relatively low initial coverage levels in 1990 
are more likely to expand coverage by X percentage points between 1990 and 2002 than 
countries with relatively high initial coverage levels.160 It turns out that for the sample ana-
lysed in the case of water actually diminishing returns is what best fits the data. This is mod-
elled by using the natural logarithm of WATTOT90: WATTOT02 → F(WATTOT90LN)161. 
However, in the case of sanitation the linear relation SANTOT02 → F(SANTOT90) is what 
seems to best fit the data (see figures A4.1 and A4.2 in the annex). 
The other independent variables (GOVj, CONj) enter the model in level form except for 
GDPCAP, POPDENS and WATRESCAP: these three variables are plugged in in logarithmic 
form (GDPCAPLN, POPDENSLN, WATRESCAPLN).162 
4.3.2 Results and discussion163 
The models discussed below are initially estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). In 
several specifications (especially when regressing WATTOT02) there is strong evidence for 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms.164 In these cases estimation procedures with (White-) 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (HRSE) are performed. Moreover, outlier analysis 
suggests that in several model specifications estimation results may be sensitive to single in-
fluential data points. Therefore, a maximum likelihood-like estimation with iteratively re-
                                                 
159 This has been done by graphical analysis of the bivariate relation as well as by running a bivariate regression 
of COV02 on the level of COV90 and then adding the square of COV90 to the model. If the (i) level and the 
(ii) square of COV90 show both significant (i) positive, (ii) negative effects, then it is deduced that the rela-
tion COV02 → F(COV90) is one of diminishing returns. Cf. also Wooldridge (2006: 304-07). 
160 We get decreasing returns of WATTOT90 if we assume increasing marginal costs of service coverage the 
closer countries move to 100%. This seems plausible as in order to reach 100% even remote and disperse 
settlements and, in general, areas with less favourable geographical and economic conditions have to be pro-
vided with improved WS services, implying typically higher costs than systems in (urban) areas with more 
favourable geographical and economic conditions. 
161 WATTOT90LN = LN (WATTOT90). 
162 In order to test the functional relation of these variables with COV02 the same procedure as for COV02 → 
F(COV90) was applied (see above). 
163 All calculations have been performed with the software STATA/SE 9.0 for Windows. 
164 Heteroscedasticity means that the variance of the unobservable error U changes across different segments of 
countries as defined by different values of the independent variables (e.g. for the sample analysed residuals 
decrease with increasing values of WATTOT90LN and of GDPCAPLN). In the presence of heteroscedas-
tidiy, OLS standard errors are not valid for constructing confidence intervals and t statistics. Cf. e.g. 
Wooldridge (2006: ch. 8) for an introduction to this issue and for a description of estimation procedures with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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weighted least squares165 (“robust regression” = RR) which down-weighs the influence of 
outliers is used to check the sensitivity of the results. 
Results are discussed in four steps. First the base-line regressions for the water case are pre-
sented (4.3.2.1), followed by the base-line regressions for the sanitation case (4.3.2.2). After-
wards the introduction of further institutional factors into the model is discussed (4.3.2.3). 
Finally it is checked if the results are altered when controlling for region-specific effects 
(4.3.2.4). 
4.3.2.1 Political governance and coverage with water supply services 
Results of the base-line regressions 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the base-line regression of WATTOT02. The main hypotheses 
(1), (2a), (2b) have been checked by the following procedure. First, the effect of POLRIGHTS 
together with a core set of control variables has been tested (model W1). This has been re-
peated using POLCON instead of POLRIGHTS (model W2). Afterwards, RULAW (model 
W3) has been added to model W2 and alternatively ETHNIC (model W4). 
The results of models W1 and W2 are very similar. POLRIGHTS and POLCON present sta-
tistically significant positive effects166 (W1a, W2: p < 0.05; W1b: p < 0.1) just as WAT 
TOT90LN (p < 0.01). The effects of the remaining core control variables (GDPCAPLN, 
POPDENSLN, WATRESCAPLN) are not statistically significant. These results appear not to 
be sensitive to potentially influential outliers since estimations with RR (models W1b, W2b) 
largely confirm those with HRSE (models W1a, W2a). The Ř2 (adjusted R2) is 0.857 with 
WATTOT90LN explaining the greatest part of the variance.167  
Adding RULAW or ETHNIC to model W2 does not markedly alter results.168 The effect of 
RULAW is not statistically significant (W3). ETHNIC shows a statistically significant (p < 
0.1) negative effect when slope parameters are estimated with HRSE (W4a). However, when 
estimating with RR the effect is not significant at conventional levels (W4b), indicating that it 
is sensitive to influential data points. Since hypotheses (2a) and (2b) state that the effect of 
veto players is expected to depend on the level of rule of law and on the level of separation of 
purpose, models W3 and W4 have been re-estimated including an interaction term 
(POLCON*RULAW respective POLCON*ETHNIC) that accounts for a dependent relation 
                                                 
165 This option is available in STATA with the rreg command. See Yaffee (2002) for a brief overview and Ham-
ilton (1991) for a detailed description of this procedure. 
166 Using POLITY or CHECKS instead of POLRIGHTS or POLCON yields very similar results. The variable 
RULAW does not have any statistically significant effect on WATTOT02 in any model specification. 
167 Regression with WATTOT90LN and an intercept alone yields an Ř2 of 0.850. 
168 The same is true for adding RULAW or ETHNIC to model W1 (results not reported). 
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between two explanatory variables (see subsection 4.3.2.2 below for a discussion of interac-
tion terms). However, results remained largely the same, not yielding any evidence for an 
interaction of POLCON either with RULAW or with ETHNIC (results not reported). 
As expected, the signs of the slope parameters of WATTOT90LN, GDPCAPLN and GOVj 
(POLRIGHTS, POLCON, RULAW169) are positive and the sign of the slope parameter of 
ETHNIC (which measures ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) is negative. While the interpreta-
tion of the slope parameters in case of the cardinal variables WATTOT90LN and 
GDPCAPLN is immediately meaningful (e.g. the slope parameter of 40.934 in model W1a 
means that a 1% change in WATTOT90 – say from 70.0 to 70.7 – leads to an increase of ap-
proximately 0.4 units of WATTOT02 – say from 80.6 to 81.0), in case of the ordinal variables 
(GOVj, ETHNIC) it is not.170 In the latter cases interpretation of the slope parameters is lim-
ited to the direction (positive or negative) and the statistical significance of the effect. 
The signs of the slope parameters of POPDENSLN (models W2, W3, W4) and WATR 
ESCAPLN are not as expected: other things being equal, a higher population density and 
more water resources per capita lead to a lower coverage with water services in 2002.171 
However, the effects are far from being statistically significant. As with POPURB (share of 
urban population in total population) there is an alternative measure of the spatial population 
pattern available, models W1 to W4 have been re-estimated using POPURB instead of 
POPDENSLN. Nevertheless, results remained very similar (not reported). 
As has been said above (4.3.1), simultaneity can largely be ruled out thanks to the model 
specification chosen. However, it is still possible that the effect of POLRIGHTS (or POL-
CON) on WATTOT02 is due to a third variable that jointly determines both POLRIGHTS (or 
POLCON) and WATTOT02: economic growth. This was tested by adding the average 
growth rate (1990 to 2002) of GDP per capita to the model. The effect of the GDP per capita 
growth rate proved to be statistically not significant whereas the effect of POLRIGHTS 
(POLCON) remained largely the same (results not reported). The same holds for the case of 
sanitation which is analysed below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
169 To be more precise: In model W3a the slope parameter of RULAW is positive, whereas in model W3b it is 
negative. 
170 Cf. e.g. Wooldridge (2006: 241). 
171 Confirming the results obtained here, UN-HABITAT (2003: 136) cites empirical work that does not find any 
statistically significant influence of the availability of water resources on access to water supply services and 
presents further descriptive statistics supporting these findings. 
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Reconsidering the interpretation of the political governance variables 
As has been discussed above, the effects of POLRIGHTS and POLCON are significantly 
positive when entered solely into the model (the same is true for POLITY and CHECKS – 
results not reported). When, however, POLRIGHTS and POLCON are plugged in pairs into 
the model, the effects on WATTOT02 are not significant any more for any of them. The signs 
of the slope parameters remain nonetheless positive and the test for joint influence of 
POLRIGHTS and POLCON is significant (p < 0.05 when estimating with HRSE; p < 0.1 
when estimating with RR). The same pattern holds for the case of sanitation services which is 
discussed below. 
This phenomenon can be explained by the high correlation between POLRIGHTS and 
POLCON (see subsection 4.2.3 above) which means that the two variables are not suited to 
capture two distinct effects when used in the same model. In other words, we are asking ques-
tions that seem to be too subtle for the available data to answer with precision (Wooldridge 
2006: 102-104). From a theoretical point of view it is useful to distinguish between the effect 
of democratic participation via free elections and the effect of the separation of powers or the 
number of veto players (see chapter 3). However, when considering the available data, this 
distinction makes no sense: the available variables POLRIGHTS and POLCON (as well as 
POLITY and CHECKS) seem to measure more or less the same. Therefore, these variables 
should be considered as four alternative measures of one single concept that could be termed 
“democratic participation cum separation of powers”. 
4.3.2.2 Political governance and coverage with sanitation services 
Results of the base-line regressions 
From table 4.4 it becomes evident that the base-line regressions of SANTOT02 yield results 
that are very similar to the water case as far as the historical coverage level (SANTOT90), 
political governance (POLRIGHTS, POLCON, RULAW) and ETHNIC are concerned. In all 
four models (S1 to S4) SANTOT90 has a highly significant (p < 0.01) positive effect on 
SANTOT02 (a change of one percentage point of SANTOT90 leads to an increase of ap-
proximately 0.8 percentage points of SANTOT02). The slope parameters of POLRIGHTS 
and POLCON are positive and statistically significant at p < 0.05. The effects of RULAW 
(positive) and ETHNIC (negative) are not statistically significant. The Ř2 is 0.905.172 
 
                                                 
172 Regression with SANTOT90 and an intercept alone yields an Ř2 of 0.878. 
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As for the other independent variables, there are some differences. First of all, all slope pa-
rameters show the expected sign. Moreover, GDPCAPLN has a higher influence on the de-
pendent variable as compared to the water case but the effect is still small in economic terms 
(e.g. in model S1a a change of GDP per capita by 1% is related with an increase of 
SANTOT02 by approximately 0.036 percentage points). The statistical significance of this 
effect varies between the models (the extrema are model S1a: p < 0.05; and model S4: not 
significant at conventional levels). POPDENSLN shows a statistically significant positive 
effect (except for model S4b) whereas the effect of WATRESCAPLN (positive) is not sig-
nificant at conventional levels. The relatively strong positive effect of the population density 
on SANTOT02 is somewhat surprising, especially as compared to the water case where the 
effect was slightly negative (but not significant). We will briefly return to this point in subsec-
tion 4.3.2.4 below, when discussing the results of the regressions with regional dummy vari-
ables. 
Interaction of political governance and GDP 
In addition to the regressions discussed above, an interaction effect between POLRIGHTS 
(POLCON, POLITY, CHECKS) and GDPCAPLN has been tested. The hypothesis underly-
ing this test is that the effect of democratic participation cum separation of powers on cover-
age may not be independent from the GDP per capita of a given country – as has been as-
sumed in E4.2 – but vary conditional on GDP per capita. An increase in democratic account-
ability in a low-income country may have a greater effect on coverage than in a middle-
income country: Non-accountable governments in poor countries are likely to make a bad use 
of scarce financial resources with respect to the provision of WS services. An improvement in 
accountability may thus make a big difference for a poor country. This effect may become 
less strong the more financial resources per capita are available in an economy because, even 
if governments make a bad use of resources, on average there will be more resources left that 
can be invested in WS. This effect can be modelled by including an interaction term (GOVj 
*GDPCAPLN) into the equation: 
  
COV02i = β0 +β1COV90i +β2GOVj,i +β3GDPCAPLNi +β4GOVj,i*GDPCAPLNi + Ui (E4.3)
(i = 1,…m; j = 1,…n) 
 
In E4.3, the total effect of GOVj on COV02 is: β2 + β4GDPCAPLN (for convenience the vec-
tor CONj of the additional control variables is omitted in E4.3). 
Adding the interaction term to the base-line models discussed above yields some interesting 
results for the case of sanitation (see table 4.5; results are reported just for POLRIGHTS173).  
 
                                                 
173 Results for POLCON, POLITY, CHECKS are similar. 
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Table 4.5: Results of regression estimates (interaction POLRIGHTS and GDPCAPLN): dependent vari-
able SANTOT02 
Independent vari-
ables 
Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model S5a Model S5b## Model S6a Model S6b## Model S7a Model S7b## 
SANTOT90 0.819 
(15.52)*** 
0.817 
(16.13)*** 
0.819 
(15.52)*** 
0.817 
(16.13)*** 
0.819 
(15.52)*** 
0.817 
(16.13)*** 
GDPCAPLN 3.773 
(2.11)** 
3.008 
(1.76)* 
3.773 
(2.11)** 
3.008 
(1.76)* 
3.773 
(2.11)** 
3.008 
(1.76)* 
POPDENSLN 1.608 
(2.24)** 
1.67 
(2.42)** 
1.608 
(2.24)** 
1.67 
(2.42)** 
1.608 
(2.24)** 
1.67 
(2.42)** 
ETHNIC - 3.635 
(- 0.86) 
- 7.819 
(- 1.92)* 
- 3.635 
(- 0.86) 
- 7.819 
(- 1.92)* 
- 3.635 
(- 0.86) 
- 7.819 
(- 1.92)* 
WATRESCAPLN 0.583 
(1.01) 
0.578 
(1.04) 
0.583 
(1.01) 
0.578 
(1.04) 
0.583 
(1.01) 
0.578 
(1.04) 
POLRIGHTS 3.188 
(4.01)*** 
3.552 
(4.66)*** 
1.550 
(2.70)*** 
1.806 
(3.28)*** 
- 0.004 
(- 0.01) 
0.148 
(0.21) 
POLR*GDPCAPQ1 - 2.313 
(- 3.24)*** 
- 2.467 
(- 3.60)*** 
    
POLR*GDPCAPM   - 2.313 
(- 3.24)*** 
- 2.467 
(- 3.60)*** 
  
POLR*GDPCAPQ3     - 2.313 
(- 3.24)*** 
- 2.467 
(- 3.60)*** 
INTERCEPT - 31.892 
(- 2.16)** 
- 25.345 
(- 1.79)* 
- 26.089 
(- 1.81)* 
- 19.157 
(- 1.39) 
- 20.581 
(- 1.44) 
- 13.283 
(- 0.97) 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Ř2 0.917 0.923 0.917 0.923 0.917 0.923 
F 106.41*** 116.01*** 106.41*** 116.01*** 106.41*** 116.01*** 
†) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05, *) p < 0.1. 
##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg in STATA). 
The total effect of democratic participation cum separation of powers is significant at p < 
0.01 (test of joint influence of POLRIGHTS and POLRIGHTS*GDPCAPLN). The slope pa-
rameter of the interaction term is negative which means that the positive effect of 
POLRIGHTS on SANTOT02 is more pronounced the lower GDP per capita. The total effect 
of POLRIGHTS on SANTOT02 (β2 + β4GDPCAPLN) has been calculated by evaluating 
E4.3 at three interesting values of GDPCAPLN: the lower quartile (model S5), the mean 
(model S6) and the upper quartile (model S7).174 The only thing that changes between the 
results of models S5 to S7 is the slope parameter of POLRIGHTS – which captures the total 
effect when evaluating E4.3 at given values of GDPCAPLN. It is greatest for low values of 
                                                 
174 Cf. Wooldridge (2006: 204-206) for a thorough description of this procedure. 
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GDPCAPLN (3.552 in model S5b) and smallest for high values of GDPCAPLN (0.148 in 
model S7b).175 
As for the water case (WATTOT02), adding an interaction term to the base-line models yields 
no statistically significant robust results. 
Preliminary conclusions 
The preliminary conclusions from the base-line models discussed so far are: 
• The hypotheses formulated in subsection 4.2.1 are too subtle for the available data. 
The political governance variables of major interest (POLRIGHTS, POLITY, 
POLCON, CHECKS) are not suited to separate the effects of democratic participation 
on the one hand and separation of powers (veto players) on the other hand. They are 
best interpreted as alternative measures for one single concept democratic participa-
tion cum separation of powers. 
• The results support on a statistically significant level the hypothesis that stronger de-
mocratic participation cum separation of powers is positively related with water and 
sanitation service coverage expansion. 
• For coverage with sanitation services, the results support on a statistically significant 
level the hypothesis that this relation is strongest when GDP per capita in a given 
country is low and becomes weaker with increasing GDP per capita. 
• There is no evidence that the effect of democratic participation cum separation of 
powers depends on the level of rule of law or on the separation of purpose among 
elected officials as measured by approximation by the degree of ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalisation. 
4.3.2.3 Controlling for corruption, security of private property rights and PSP 
From the econometric literature on economic growth (see literature review in 4.1) there is 
quite a strong evidence that the security of private property rights and the control of corrup-
tion have positive effects on growth rates. These institutional factors may therefore also affect 
the expansion of coverage with WS services. As explained above, the variable RULAW, 
which partially measures security of private property rights, yielded no statistically significant 
results. In order to further check for the influence of corruption and security of private prop-
                                                 
175 The slope parameter of POLRIGHTS is even very slightly negative in S7a. 
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erty rights, the variables CORRUPT176 and PROPRIGHTS177 are added to the models. Table 
A4.5 (annex) reports some representative results of this exercise. 
Plugging CORRUPT – which measures the degree of control of corruption – into the model 
together with the core set of control variables yields no statistically significant effect for 
CORRUPT (results not reported). Combining CORRUPT with POLRIGHTS and the core set 
of control variables does not alter markedly the results of the base-line regressions (see mod-
els W5 and S8 in table A4.5). The influence of POLRIGHTS remains positive at the conven-
tional levels of significance.178 Unexpectedly, the coefficients of CORRUPT are negative. 
This does not seem plausible as it means that a better control of corruption is related to a 
lower coverage with water and sanitation services. However, these effects are not statistically 
significant. 
One problem linked to the variable PROPRIGHTS is that because of missing values for 13 
countries contained in the sample, the degrees of freedom drop to a level that can be consid-
ered as critical. Therefore, the control variable WATRESCAPLN, which has not shown sig-
nificant effects so far, is dropped from the model when testing PROPRIGHTS. The results of 
the reduced model and the reduced sample are comparable to the base-line regressions (see 
models W6 and S9 in table A4.5). Again the slope parameters of POLRIGHTS stay positive 
at conventional levels of significance.179 However, in the water case this effect seems to be 
sensitive to influential data points (model W6b). The effects of PROPRIGHTS are far from 
being statistically significant.180 
In addition, the effect of PSP in the WS sector was tested which proved to be insignificant in 
any chosen specification (results are not reported). It has been analysed both the influence of 
the total volume (1990 to 2002) of investments with PSP in the WS sector as well as the in-
fluence of per capita investments.181 One problem is that the available data on PSP in the WS 
sector from the PPI Database provided by the World Bank and PPIAF presents many missing 
values (47) for the countries contained in the sample. The influence of PSP has therefore been 
tested by choosing two different specifications: (i) Variables were coded as “missing” for the 
47 countries for which no data was available; (ii) variables were assigned the value of “0” for 
                                                 
176 The values of CORRUPT are taken from the orignial indicator „control of corruption“ published by Kauf-
mann / Kraay / Mastruzzi (2004). See also the description of variables in table A4.1. 
177 The values of PROPRIGHTS are taken from the original indicator “legal structure and security of property 
rights” published by the Fraser Institute. See also the description of variables in table A4.1. 
178 The same is true when using POLCON, POLITY or CHECKS instead of POLRIGHTS. 
179 Results are similar when using POLCON, POLITIY or CHECKS instead of POLRIGHTS. 
180 Similar to the case of CORRUPT, the sign (=negative) of the slope parameter of PROPRIGHTS in model S9 
is not as expected, since it means that more secure private property rights are related to a lower coverage 
with sanitation services. 
181 See table A4.1 for the variable descriptions of PSP and PSPCAP and the data source used. 
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the 47 countries for which no data was available, supposing that there have not occurred in-
vestments with PSP in these countries. 
4.3.2.4 Controlling for region-specific effects 
In order to further check the sensitivity of the results, regional dummy variables182 that cap-
ture region-specific effects have been introduced into the models. In the case of sanitation the 
results are very clear (see table A4.6 in the annex). The two variables that show statistically 
significant and robust effects are SUBSAFRICA (Subsahara-Africa: negative) and 
EASTSEASIA (Eastern and Southeast Asia: positive). Regional dummies were plugged into 
the base-line models first solely and then by pairs. In all cases the two regional dummies men-
tioned show significant effects. The influence of the four political governance variables meas-
uring democratic participation cum separation of powers (POLRIGHTS, POLCON, 
POLITY, CHECKS) remains positive on a statistically significant level (in table A4.6 just 
POLRIGHTS is reported). The positive effect of POPDENSLN, which was significant in the 
base-line models (S1 to S4; see table 4.4), loses significance after introducing regional 
dummy variables. 
The fact that the influence of the two regional dummy variables is significant suggests that 
although the base-line models control for economic, geographic and demographic factors they 
do not seem to capture important further influences that work in the specific regional contexts 
of Subsahara-Africa and Eastern and Southeast Asia. One possible explanation for the posi-
tive (EASTSEASIA) and negative (SUBSAFRICA) regional effects could be economic 
growth dynamics (average annual change of GDP per capita) that has differed markedly be-
tween these two regions during the period 1990-2002 (4.13% for Eastern and Southeast Asia 
versus 0.15% for Subsahara-Africa; regional averages for those countries included in the 
sample).183 However, substituting GDPCAPLN for the average annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita does not change the results reported in a substantial manner (regional dummy vari-
ables stay significant). 
Plugging regional dummies into the base-line models for water services yields less clear and 
less conclusive results (not reported). Still, there is some though weak and not robust evidence 
that NAFRICAMEAST (Northern Africa and the Middle East) has a negative influence on 
WATTOT02 just as EASTSEASIA, and that LAAMERCARI (Latin America and the Carib-
bean) has a positive effect. The negative influence of NAFRICAMEAST could be related to 
the relative scarceness of water resources in Northern Africa and the Middle East. However, 
introducing the interaction effect NAFRICAMEAST*WATRESCAPLN into the model, in 
                                                 
182 Coding has been done relying on the regional codes of the Penn World Tables Version 6.1. See also table 
A4.1 (variable description). 
183 Author’s calculations with data from the World Development Indicators 2005 (CD-ROM): Average of an-
nual percentage change of GDP per capita in PPP (constant 2000 $) 1990 to 2002. 
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order to check whether the regional effect depends on the quantity of water resources avail-
able, does not yield any meaningful results. 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the effect of political governance (focusing on democratic partici-
pation and separation of powers) on the coverage with (i) water and (ii) sanitation services, 
using a multivariate regression model and cross-sectional data from 69 developing countries. 
To the best knowledge of the author this question has not been treated in econometric re-
search literature so far. The following findings are highlighted: 
• Results from the regressions show that there is a significant and surprisingly robust 
positive effect of higher levels of democratic participation and stronger separation of 
powers on coverage with both water and sanitation services. 
• By contrast, results do not support the same for higher levels of rule of law. 
• For the case of sanitation services there is statistically significant support of the hy-
pothesis that the positive effect of democratic participation and separation of powers is 
strongest for countries with low GDP per capita and becomes weaker the higher GDP 
per capita of a given country. 
• No evidence was found that the effect of democratic participation and separation of 
powers depends on the (i) level of rule of law or on the (ii) degree of separation of 
purpose among officials (as measured by approximation by the degree of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation). 
• The results do not change substantially when regional dummy variables are included 
in the regression in order to account for region-specific effects. 
• The effect of PSP proved to be not statistically significant. However, this result could 
be biased since the available data on PSP in the WS sectors of developing countries 
seems to be rather incomplete. 
The chapter is concluded with two short remarks concerning the interpretation of the results. 
As the sample is restricted to developing countries with a coverage of less than 95% in 1990 
(with both water supply and sanitation), so is the scope of the results, i.e. the results do not 
necessarily apply to industrialised countries with a higher WS service coverage. Moreover, 
although the data has been checked for plausibility, measurement errors can not be precluded. 
In case the data should be plagued with measurement errors, estimations reported in this chap-
ter are likely to be distorted. 
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5 The role of governance and PSP for the provision of WS services: Case study 
on Colombia 
This second empirical chapter gives up the bird’s eye perspective of the preceding chapter and 
plunges deeper into the complexity of the empirical world. It does so by investigating the role 
of governance and PSP for the provision of WS services in Colombia. The chapter has two 
complementary purposes: 
i. To apply the framework developed in chapters 2 und 3 to Colombia in order to de-
scribe and assess the key elements of political governance (section 5.2), WS govern-
ance (section 5.3) and WS policies (section 5.4) – this way laying the foundations for 
the second purpose; 
ii. To explore the determinants of sub-national variation in WS service provider perform-
ance by focusing on two different explanatory factors: PSP and local governance. 
a. Section 5.5 analyses whether the variation in provider performance can be ex-
plained by the variation in the delivery model (PSP versus purely public). It per-
forms a quantitative analysis based on a data set comprising 30 Colombian provid-
ers. 
b. Section 5.6. analyses whether the variation in provider performance can be ex-
plained by the variation in the quality of local governance. It performs an in-depth 
qualitative comparison of the four cities of Manizales, Santa Marta, Tunja and Vil-
lavicencio. 
By exploring both, the influence of local governance and of PSP on the performance of WS 
services, it is expected to learn more about the relation between these two factors and about 
how they affect the different dimensions of service performance. 
Before starting with the main investigation, the following introduction to chapter 5 explains 
the motivation for choosing Colombia as subject of investigation (5.1.1). Moreover, in order 
to set the context for the subsequent analysis, it gives a brief overview of the overall WS ser-
vice situation in Colombia (5.1.2). Finally, it describes the further procedure of the present 
chapter as well as the methodology followed (5.1.3). 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Motivation for performing a case study on Colombia 
The present case study on Colombia is an important complement to the cross-country regres-
sion in chapter 4 for several reasons. 
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First, cross-country regressions rely on aggregate national data and the results are, therefore, 
applicable to the national level only. Thanks to the evidence obtained in chapter 4 we know 
that countries with higher national levels of democracy show a higher average coverage with 
WS services than countries with lower national levels of democracy. This is a highly valuable 
information that underscores the importance of democracy for human development. However, 
the results do not necessarily apply to the sub-national level. It cannot be taken for granted 
that the sub-national variation in service performance of a given country can be explained by 
differences in the quality of sub-national political governance. Empirical evidence about the 
determinants of sub-national variation in service performance is crucial for national WS pol-
icy, if coverage gaps and low quality services in certain regions are to be overcome. In order 
to analyse this question, it is necessary to perform country studies. 
Second, due to data restrictions, the influence of WS governance on service performance 
could not be tested in chapter 4 and the analysis had to concentrate on access to services, ne-
glecting the aspect of efficiency. The heuristic framework developed in chapters 2 and 3 pos-
tulates that access to and (allocative and internal) efficiency of services depend on a whole set 
of factors including the quality of political governance, of WS governance and of WS roles 
(see figure 3.2). A country study offers the possibility to dig deeper into these postulated cau-
sality mechanisms and to gain information about their empirical plausibility. 
Third, the complementary research question of this study – the influence of PSP on service 
performance – could not be addressed in a wholly satisfactorily manner in chapter 4, since the 
available data on PSP in the WS sectors of developing countries is rather incomplete. There-
fore, it is necessary to select a country for the case study that offers PSP as well as purely 
public delivery models in order to be able to analyse the influence of PSP on service perform-
ance and to assess its interaction with governance features. 
Colombia is very well suited as subject of a case study for the first and the third reason given 
above. The country is characterised by a political and administrative decentralisation. Citizens 
elect their local governments which are responsible, among other things, for the provision of 
WS services. This decentralised structure enhances differences in local governance that could 
explain the sub-national variation in service performance. Moreover, thanks to the wave of 
PSP in infrastructure that began to spread over Latin America since around 1990 and that also 
reached Colombia in the early 1990s, PSP in the WS service industry is in a relatively ad-
vanced stage in Colombia, as compared to many other developing countries.184 Within a uni-
fied regulatory and legal framework, one can find a diversity of delivery models in Colom-
bian cities, including PSP and purely public delivery models. This makes it possible to con-
sider both the delivery model and the quality of local governance when attempting to explain 
the variation in the performance of Colombian WS service providers. 
                                                 
184 For a worldwide overview of PSP in infrastructure cf. Izaguirre (2004: chapter 1). For an overview of PSP in 
the WS service industry in Latin America cf. Foster (2005: 1-14).  
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5.1.2 Overview of the overall WS service situation in Colombia 
Coverage with WS services 
Table 5.1 presents total, urban and rural coverage levels for Colombia. It can be seen that total 
coverage has been considerably expanded from 79.7% (water185) and 73.2% (sanitation) re-
spectively in 1993 to 90% (water) and 82% (sanitation) respectively in 2003. Another thing 
that becomes evident from the table is that coverage levels in rural areas in 2003 are still well 
below those in urban areas. The coverage gap between rural and urban areas in the case of 
water services has been reduced as compared to 1993. By contrast, in the case of sanitation 
services it has slightly widened, not least thanks to the huge increase in coverage with urban 
sewerage services (90.2% in 2003 as compared to 81.8% in 1993). Concerning the number of 
new beneficiaries between 1993 and 2003 (19.1 million in total), 14.4 million corresponded to 
urban population and 4.7 million to rural population. Of those households who were lacking 
access to improved water services in 2003 (approximately 4.5 million persons),186 86.5% 
lived in rural areas and 13.5% in urban areas (Meléndez 2004: 51). 
 
Table 5.1: Colombia – Coverage with water and sanitation services 1993-2003 
Type of Service 1993 
(share of population 
served) 
2003 
(share of population 
served) 
New beneficiaries 
1993-2003 (mil-
lion habit.) 
Increase in popu-
lation served  
Urban 
Piped water 94.6 % 97.4 % 6.7 2.8 % 
Sewerage 81.8 % 90.2 % 7.7 8.4 % 
Rural 
Piped water and other 
improved technologies* 
41.1 % 66.0 % 3.4 24.9 % 
Total sewerage and on-
site technologies 
50.8 % 57.9 % 1.3 7.1 % 
Total 
Piped water and other 
improved technologies 
79.7 %** 90.0 % 10.1 10.3 % 
Total sewerage and on-
site technologies 
73.2 % 82.0 % 9.0 8.8 % 
Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2005d: 3) based on the 1993 census and the 2003 household 
survey by DANE 
* Wells, cisterns and public standpipes 
** Includes piped water only; information not available for other types of technologies 
                                                 
185 Excludes on-site improved technologies. See table 5.1. 
186 Own calculation with the data reported by DANE (population estimate for 2003), www.dane.gov.co (ac-
cessed on 14/11/06). 
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Coverage with WS services varies with household income. Table A5.3 (annex) presents cov-
erage levels with improved water and improved sanitation services for the year 2003 by in-
come quintiles and by rural, urban and total areas. On the aggregate level (total of rural and 
urban areas), there are considerable differences between households belonging to the lowest 
income quintile (water: 83.5%; sanitation: 83%) and those belonging to the highest income 
quintile (water: 96.8%; sanitation: 99.1%). When looking at the disaggregate figures for rural 
and urban areas only, it becomes evident that variance of coverage levels is high in rural areas 
(lowest income quintile: 62.7% and 63.4%; highest income quintile: 72.4% and 88.6% for 
water and sanitation respectively) and relatively low in urban areas (lowest income quintile: 
97.5% and 96.2%; highest income quintile: 98.3% and 99.8% for water and sanitation respec-
tively). 
All in all it can be stated that coverage levels have evolved positively during the last decade. 
Considerable coverage gaps persist in rural areas, especially among low-income households. 
Service quality 
The coverage figures presented above are not corrected for deficiencies in service quality, like 
frequent service interruptions or the delivery of contaminated or polluted water and, thus, give 
only a partial picture of the service situation. 
Continuity 
According to the available data, the continuity of water services seems to be guaranteed in the 
major Colombian cities. For the year 2000, Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domi-
ciliarios (2002: 53) reports an average continuity of 90% (sample of 42 providers). The conti-
nuity of services roughly decreases with the size of the city: 
• Cities above 600,000 habitants: 100%; 
• Cities between 100,000 and 600,000 habitants: 97%; 
• Cities between 50,000 and 100,000 habitants 77%.187 
This pattern is confirmed by a recent study for the year 2005 (Superintendencia de Servicios 
Públicos Domiciliarios 2006: section 5.3.2). There are, however, notable exceptions to the 
rule that users from bigger cities enjoy more continuous water services. The Empresa Indus-
trial y Comercial from Cúcuta, the sixth biggest Colombian city with more than 700,000 habi-
tants, in 2005 presented a continuity of 43.75% only, which corresponds to 10.5 hours per 
day. 
 
                                                 
187 Cities between 25,000 and 50,000 habitants: 78%; cities below 25,000 habitants: 88%. 
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Drinking water quality 
The standards for drinking water quality every WS service provider has to meet are defined in 
Decreto 475 de 1998 (Ministry of Health). These standards refer to the physical, chemical, 
and microbiologic parameters of the water delivered and set thresholds below which water is 
considered not suitable for human consumption. 
Based on the data reported by the provincial and district health authorities, Superintendencia 
de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2006: chapter 6) informs that in 2005 in 64% of the dis-
tricts for which information was available (312 in total), the water delivered did not meet the 
legal standards. Similar to the situation with respect to service continuity, drinking water 
quality is in general lower in smaller districts. Since the bulk of the population is concentrated 
in big districts with typically higher levels of drinking water quality, the share of the popula-
tion that received water considered not suitable for human consumption was “only” 32% (to-
tal sample size: 28,500,787 which corresponds to the population of the 312 districts for which 
information was available).188 
Internal efficiency indicators 
Common indicators for the internal efficiency of WS service providers are the following: 
• Share of unaccounted-for water189 (UFW) which is defined as: 
UFW = (WP – WB) / WP (E5.1)
[WP = amount of drinking water produced (m3); WB = amount of drinking water 
billed (m3)] 
• Collection rate (CR) which is defined as: 
CR = CL / BL (E5.2)
[CL = amount of money collected from customers ($); BL = amount of money billed 
to customers ($)] 
Average UFW in Colombia has remained on a high level, as compared to the national stan-
dard set by the Regulatory Commission for Water and Sanitation (Comisión de Regulación de  
 
                                                 
188 Some WS service providers have called into question the quality of the information on drinking water quality 
reported by the Superintendency of Public Utility Services (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos 
Domiciliarios – SSPD). See subsection 5.4.4. 
189 Technical and / or commercial water losses. 
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Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico – CRA), which is 30%.190 According to the data pre-
sented by Fernández (2004: 36), average UFW has not improved between 1990 (40.6%) and 
2001 (40.3%).191 The information for 2001 is largely confirmed by Domínguez Torres and 
Uribe Botero (2005: 55) who report an average UFW of 39.43%192 and by Superintendencia 
de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002: 57) who reports 43%.193 According to a recent 
publication by Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2006: section 5.3.1), 
UFW in 2005 was 39% on average for the three major providers, 51% for a sample of 7 big to 
intermediate providers, and 53% for a sample of 19 intermediate providers. 
Just like UFW, CR is one of the indicators defined by CRA in order to assess the internal effi-
ciency of WS service providers. According to the data presented by Fernández (2004: 99-
100), the CR (water services) for a sample of service providers from big and intermediate 
cities in 2001 was on average 80.9% (in 2002: 85.7%).194 However, CR varies largely among 
WS service providers. Some firms show a CR of (close to) 100% and others show a CR of 
below 60%. CR and UFW of Colombian WS service providers are investigated to more detail 
in section 5.5 when assessing the influence of PSP on the internal efficiency of providers. 
All in all, with respect to service quality and internal efficiency indicators, it can be stated that 
there persist major deficiencies, particularly in smaller and rural districts. The concentration 
of deficiencies regarding service quality in smaller districts could be related to the atomised 
industry structure195 (on the industry structure see subsection 5.3.4). Moreover, it is especially 
remarkable that average UFW has not improved since 1990 and that even the major providers 
show relatively high water losses. This could be related to the fact that regulation until 2005 
did provide only very weak incentives to improve internal efficiency (for more details see 
subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.5). 
The types of delivery models existing in the Colombian WS service industry with an empha-
sis on the scope of PSP are described in detail in subsection 5.3.4. 
5.1.3 Procedure and methodology 
The procedure followed in the present chapter results from the two complementary purposes 
stated above. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 serve the first purpose, i.e. to describe and assess the key 
factors on the national or sectoral level that according to the framework developed in chapters 
                                                 
190 The maximum UFW recognised by CRA for tariff regulation is 30% (see subsection 5.4.1). 
191 Average of a sample of 7 cities above 500,000 habitants and 8 cities between 100,000 and 500,000 habitants. 
192 Sample consisting of the 4 major capitals and 26 big and intermediate cities. 
193 Average for a sample of 37 service providers from big, intermediate and small cities. 
194 Own calculation based on the data reported by Fernández (2004: 99-100). Big cities: above 500,000 habi-
tants; intermediate cities: 100,000 to 500,000 habitants. 
195 There are many small service providers that serve only a small number of users each (see subsection 5.3.4). 
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2 and 3 affect service delivery that takes place at the local level. The perspective taken in this 
first step is a national or sector-wide perspective. In detail, the following dimensions are de-
scribed and assessed: 
• Key elements of the political governance, i.e. main actors and institutions of the pol-
icy-making process (section 5.2); 
• Key elements of WS governance, i.e. horizontal and vertical articulation, institutional 
design of regulation and institutional design of service delivery (section 5.3); 
• Key elements of the regulatory, subsidy and public investment policies (section 5.4). 
The main sources of information used in this first step are academic papers and policy papers 
(mainly produced by government organisations) as well as in part the interviews196 conducted 
by the author with government organisations, experts, service providers and user representa-
tives in Bogotá and the four provincial capitals of Manizales, Santa Marta, Tunja and Vil-
lavicencio in June and July 2005. 
This first step lays the foundations for the second purpose (sections 5.5 and 5.6) which is to 
explain the sub-national variation in WS service provider performance by focusing on two 
different explanatory factors: PSP and the quality of local governance. This is done in two 
steps using both quantitative and qualitative empirical approaches.197 
• The quantitative analysis in section 5.5 focuses on capturing the effect of the delivery 
model (PSP versus purely public) on internal efficiency and coverage expansion. It 
uses a data set that comprises 30 urban WS service providers from 30 districts and 
contains cross-sectional data for the years 1998 to 2003. The procedures applied are (i) 
the comparison of sub-sample (PSP versus purely public) averages of performance in-
dicators as well as (ii) multivariate regression analysis. The dataset has the drawback 
that it does not include data on local governance because comprehensive and reliable 
information on governance characteristics is not available for the local level. There-
fore, the influence of the quality of local governance on provider performance cannot 
be analysed by quantitative means. 
• The qualitative analysis in section 5.6 attempts to capture the influence of local gov-
ernance factors on WS service performance while “controlling” for the effect of PSP. 
The main portion of the information used was gained in the interviews mentioned 
above. The centre-piece is a comparison of the WS service providers of the four pro-
vincial capitals of Manizales, Santa Marta, Tunja and Villavicencio. These four cases 
                                                 
196 In total, the author of this study conducted 38 interviews in Colombia. See table A5.6 in the annex for the 
organisations interviewed. 
197 For an in-depth discussion of the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in empirical research cf. King / Keohane / Verba (1994); Creswell (1994); Neubert (2003). 
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were purposefully selected so that they were compatible with the main supposition 
that local governance factors can dominate the expected positive effects of PSP on in-
ternal efficiency and thus contribute to explain well performing public delivery mod-
els as well as badly performing PSP delivery models. 
The methodological details regarding the two empirical approaches are explained in the re-
spective sections 5.5 and 5.6. 
5.2 Brief history and key features of political governance 
5.2.1 Brief political and economic history 
While this is a sweeping simplification, it is reasonable to say that recent Colombian political 
and economic history is marked by a turning point in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 
turning point is characterised by three major reforms (Edwards / Steiner 2000; Cárdenas / 
Junguito / Pachón 2006): 
• The initiation of the decentralisation process in 1986; 
• The enactment of the new Constitution in 1991; 
• The implementation of market-oriented economic reforms, including trade liberalisa-
tion, between 1989 and 1991. 
Political context of the reform period 
While Colombia showed quite a remarkable macroeconomic stability during and before this 
reform period (at least as compared to many other Latin American countries198) the country 
was undergoing a political and institutional crisis in the late 1980s (Edwards / Steiner 2000: 
461-65; Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón 2006: 8-11): 
In 1958, as a reaction to one decade of political violence (the so-called violencia) between the 
two traditional parties (Liberal Party and Conservative Party), the parties’ leaders agreed to 
share government power. This agreement considerably restricted the competitiveness of de-
mocratic elections. The period of power sharing, the so-called Frente Nacional, lasted for-
mally from 1958 to 1974. However, many elements of the logic of power sharing between the 
Liberal and the Conservative Party remained in place even after the formal end of the agree-
ment. One consequence of the Frente Nacional was the exclusion of the left from the political 
process. Thanks to the exclusionary nature of the system and the lack of authority of the state 
in some regions of the country, guerilla groups and social movements gained momentum and 
                                                 
198 See figure 5.1. For details concerning Colombia’s macroeconomic performance as compared to other Latin 
American countries cf. Edwards / Steiner (2000: 457, 461-62). 
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the popular support of the two traditional parties eroded, as became evident from high rates of 
abstention. The growth of drug trafficking activities in the 1980s went hand in hand with an 
escalation of the crisis at the end of that decade. Figure A5.1 (annex) depicts the evolution of 
the political rights and civil liberties indexes (Freedom House) which both show a trend to 
deteriorate. The level of violence increased steeply199 and the political system further lost 
credibility due to the entrance of drug money into the political process, to patronage and cor-
ruption. After the assassination of three presidential candidates in 1989, the idea of a Consti-
tutional Assembly in order to reform the political system and to enhance broader popular par-
ticipation gained support. This support was further spurred by the students’ initiative200 to cast 
an additional extra-legal ballot (the so-called séptima papeleta) in favour of a Constituent 
Assembly during the presidential elections in 1990. After a positive referendum and the elec-
tion of a Constituent Assembly, the new Constitution was adopted on July 4, 1991. The adop-
tion of the Constitution did, however, not halt drug trafficking or guerilla and paramilitary 
groups201 operations (in what follows guerrilla and paramilitary groups are referred to as non-
state armed groups). 
The Constitution of 1991 contains two elements that shape governance structures with respect 
to the provision of WS services and which are going to be further discussed below: 
i. Comprehensive administrative and political decentralisation; 
ii. The groundwork of a public services regime based on the principles of equity, effi-
ciency and PSP. 
The bulk of the market-oriented economic reforms were implemented at the beginning of the 
administration of President César Gaviria – an economist from the Liberal Party who was 
advised by an economic team of technocrats, the so-called technopols (Edwards / Steiner 
2000: 458-73). In 1990, Gaviria comfortably had won the presidential elections, and, also in 
1990, 87% of the voters had responded with “yes” to the convening of the Constituent As-
sembly. This provided the new President with a major mandate for change. Gaviria used the 
window of opportunity (reform mood prevalent; high popular support of the President; dis-
credited Congress; public attention focused on the political reforms and on the government’s 
negotiations with the guerrilla and the drug cartels) to pass a broad economic reform pro-
gramme through Congress: foreign exchange statute, financial sector, tax and labour reform. 
In addition, trade liberalisation was enhanced through presidential decrees. 
                                                 
199 The homicide rate more than doubled between 1984 (40 per 100,000 inhabitants) and the peak in 1991 (90 
per 100,000 inhabitants); cf. Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón (2004: figure 3, p. 83). According to another 
source (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, www.dnp.gov.co, accessed on 10/10/2006), the homicide 
rate rose from 32 (1984) to 78 (1991). 
200 For more information concerning the role of the students’ movement cf. Dugas (2001). 
201 Paramilitary groups have developed from the drug cartels’ private armies. Cf. Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón 
(2004: 9-10). 
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Macroeconomic performance before and after the reform period 
Cárdenas, Junguito and Pachón (2006) call attention to the change in behaviour of macroeco-
nomic indicators since the reform period and analyse the relation between this change in be-
haviour and the new rules of the political game prevalent since the enactment of the Constitu-
tion in 1991. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of government deficit, government consumption 
expenditure, real GDP growth rate and inflation rate between 1980 and 2003. It becomes evi-
dent that government deficit and government consumption expenditure show a clear trend to 
increase since 1991 (the “small” peak of the central government deficit between 1982 and 
1984 can be explained by the Latin American debt crisis which affected Colombia much less 
than other countries of the region202). At the same time, GDP growth has been on average 
lower and more volatile since the mid 1990s, showing a remarkable recession in 1999. The 
inflation rate, finally, shows a clear tendency to fall since 1991. 
The 1991 Constitution includes very detailed rules concerning key components of public ex-
penditures, above all earmarked fiscal transfers from the central government to subnational 
governments for public services, such as education, health and WS services (see subsection 
5.4.3). According to Cárdenas, Junguito and Pachón (2006: 5-8) the structural fiscal deficit 
since the mid 1990s is related to this “hard-wiring” of public expenditures in the Constitution 
which provides the central government with little flexibility to adapt fiscal policy to changes 
in macroeconomic conditions. In particular, the structural deficit restricts the adoption of a 
countercyclical fiscal policy. This fact may partially explain the severity of the recession in 
1999. Changing public expenditure rules is very hard because it involves a high number of 
effective vetoes: (i) changes require a Constitutional amendment; (ii) subnational govern-
ments typically will oppose a reduction or flexibilisation of fiscal transfers. According to the 
data made available by Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), transfers from the cen-
tral government to subnational governments have increased from around 30% (1990) to 
around 40% (2002) of total central government receipts.203 
                                                 
202 Cf. Edwards / Steiner (2000: 461-62). 
203 Cf. www.dnp.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=42 (accessed on 15/10/2006). 
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5.2.2 Key features of the policy-making process 
Subsection 3.2.2.1 argued that democratic political institutions compared favourably with 
autocratic political institutions with respect to their effect on the public-regardedness of policy 
making. It did, however, also mention that among democracies there are differences and that 
many democratic regimes show “deficiencies”204 that diminish public-regardedness of policy 
making and commitment power of governments to given policies. In what follows, the key 
elements that shape the general policy-making process in Colombia are reviewed, putting 
special emphasis on working out such “deficiencies”. 
First, key actors and institutions of the formal policy-making process on the national level are 
discussed. Then, the phenomenon of clientelism is addressed, followed by a brief characteri-
sation of political decentralisation. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
                                                 
204 There is a vast literature on „defective democracies“. Cf. e.g. Collier / Levitsky (1997); Merkel (2004); 
O'Donnell (1994); Zakaria (1997). In this context cf. also the economic rent-seeking literature: Krueger 
(1974) and Olson (1965; 1982). 
Figure 5.1: Colombia - macroeconomic indicators 1980-2003
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Key actors and institutions of the policy-making process205 
Key actors of the formal policy-making process on the national level addressed below are the 
President, the Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional), the bicameral Congress (consisting 
of the Senate – Senado – and House of Representatives – Cámara de Representantes), the 
political parties, the technocracy and civil society organisations. 
As typical for presidential systems, the President of Colombia – who is both head of the state 
and chief executive – is the main agenda-setter in most policy areas. Although the 1991 Con-
stitution reduced the presidential powers in a number of dimensions, the President is provided 
with powers that make him the proactive force in the Colombian policy-making process. E.g. 
he can use extraordinary legislative powers by declaring (for a predetermined limited period 
in time) a state of internal commotion or of economic emergency.206 However, the Constitu-
tional Court may revoke the presidential decrees issued during that period (including the dec-
laration of commotion or emergency) if they are deemed unconstitutional. Further noteworthy 
powers of the President are (i) the control over the Congress agenda using the discharge or 
urgency petition, (ii) the exclusive right to introduce bills concerning some important policy 
areas (e.g. salaries of public employees, national budget), and (iii) the right to veto legislation 
(which, however, can be overrun by Congress with a simple majority). The president is di-
rectly elected in national elections for a four-year office term (majority run-off rule). Since the 
constitutional amendment achieved by the President Álvaro Uribe in 2004, the President can 
be re-elected for consecutive terms. 
As has become evident, the presidential powers are checked by the Constitutional Court and 
the Congress. The Constitutional Court is considered an important veto player in the Colom-
bian policy-making process since its creation in 1991 with the new Constitution. This is due 
to its extensive powers to review important statutes, treaties and bills (Cárdenas / Junguito / 
Pachón 2006: 24-25). Since 1991, the Constitutional Court has issued 2,923 rulings, the ma-
jority of which have resulted from citizens’ use of their right to demand a constitutional re-
view (acción pública de inconstitucionalidad). The powers of the Constitutional Court are 
further enhanced by the fact that many policy issues have been elevated to the constitutional 
rank through the 1991 Constitution. The nomination procedure grants the Constitutional Court 
a good degree of independence. The magistrates are elected by the Senate from lists presented 
by the President, the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema) and the High Administrative Court 
(Consejo de Estado), for an eight-year office term. 
 
                                                 
205 This subsection draws on Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón (2006) and Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
(2005a). 
206 Before 1991, presidents widely used their extraordinary legislative powers to pass legislation. This has dra-
matically changed with the greater restrictions contained in the 1991 Constitution. Cf. Cárdenas / Junguito / 
Pachón (2006: 30-32). 
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The Colombian Congress can be considered as being fragmented and showing a tendency to 
push private- rather than public-regarding policies (Kugler / Rosental 2000; Cárdenas / Jun-
guito / Pachón 2006: 17-23). This is related to the (i) candidate-centred electoral system and 
(ii) the characteristics of political party organisation. 
i. Congress is made out of two symmetric chambers. Both senators and representatives 
are elected for a four-year office term. The electoral formula applied is one of largest 
remainders (or “Hare system”) without representation thresholds.207 This system con-
tributes to a proliferation of lists that compete in congressional elections. The candi-
dates from the bigger parties have incentives to fragment into various factions with 
separate lists because this enhances their chance to win a seat. This system encourages 
the election of candidates who have either narrow geographical bases or narrow spe-
cial interest bases (Kugler / Rosental 2000: 14) and makes it hard for the government 
to push public-regarding policies (see the discussion of candidate-centred electoral 
systems in subsection 3.2.2.1). Candidate-centredness is further reinforced by state 
electoral campaign funding that is given directly to candidates (and not to the parties) 
as well as by the tradition of clientelism in Colombia (see below). 
ii. Although the party structure is still marked by the two traditional parties (Liberal 
Party and Conservative Party), there is a high degree of intra-party competition or fac-
tionalisation within these two parties (there are several “movements” that compete in 
elections with separate lists). In general, there is a trend to an increasing fragmentation 
of the party structure which several analysts attribute to (i) the electoral system de-
scribed above in combination with (ii) political decentralisation (see below). “The de-
gree of fragmentation has increased largely because regional and local political ma-
chines do not require centralized political parties, and parties no longer have the 
means to control the career paths of their local leaders in the local areas” (Cárdenas / 
Junguito / Pachón 2006: 21). This means that the political parties in Colombia manage 
only partially to aggregate the preferences of elected legislators in Congress (i.e. to 
achieve a certain degree of “unity of purpose” – see subsection 3.2.2.1). 
According to various analysts, technocrats208 – who are typically not directly linked to a po-
litical party – have had some influence on policy formulation in the economic policy areas 
(Edwards / Steiner 2000: 458-461; Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón 2006: 25-26). Important or-
ganisations or actors shaped by the technocracy are the Ministry of Finance, the National 
Planning Department (DNP) – the head of which has a cabinet level position – and the Central 
Bank. 
                                                 
207 Cf. Roland / Zapata (2000) and Cárdenas / Junguito / Pachón (2006: 17-19) for a detailed description and 
analysis of the Colombian electoral rules and their effects. 
208 I.e. state employees or advisors with a technical or academic profile, typically trained in the United States or 
Europe, who usually do not embark on successful political careers but stay within the state administration or 
return to an academic organisation after their employment. 
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The 1991 Constitution defines the Colombian state as “democratic, participative and plural-
ist” (article 1). Accordingly, it includes several formal institutions for the participation of citi-
zens and the civil society. Concerning participation via elected representatives, the most im-
portant element that complements national elections are sub-national elections (see political 
decentralisation below). In addition, the Constitution and further legislation define a whole set 
of mechanisms for direct participation in (i) political decision making (e.g. referendums and 
plebiscites) and in (ii) controlling the activities of the public administration and the respect of 
the citizens’ rights (e.g. tutelary action – acción de tutela, civic oversight committees – 
veedurías) (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública 2003). However, several 
analysts conclude that these mechanisms have not been widely used and that civic participa-
tion remains limited in Colombia, among other things due to the rigidity of these mechanisms 
and to weaknesses in civil society organisation (Maldonado / Vargas Forero 2001: 288-93; 
Nickson 2001: 9-11; Transparencia por Colombia 2004: 65-70). 
The tradition of clientelism 
One prominently discussed issue in the Latin American context that is related to deficiencies 
in emerging democracies is the tradition of clientelism.209 According to many scholars, the 
Colombian policy-making process has been clearly marked by clientelism.210 Clientelism can 
very briefly be characterised as a vertically structured exchange relation between a politician 
(patron) and his electoral supporters (clients) in which the patron secures his political support 
by delivering particularistic benefits or private goods to its clients (instead of public goods 
that would benefit the broad majority of citizens) (Wills Herrera 2002: 392; Robinson 2005: 
8-9). 
Consequently, clientelism typically diminishes public-regardedness of policy making: (i) par-
ticularistic benefits are allocated to rather narrow constituencies (the clients) and (ii) public 
goods are undersupplied. Keefer (2002) establishes a relation between clientelism and the 
ability of politicians to make credible commitments. The author argues that clientelism is a 
rationale strategy for politicians and voters in institutional environments in which candidates 
can make no credible pre-electoral promises to all voters. In such an institutional environment 
patrons – thanks to their personal ties to their clients and thanks to the particularistic benefits 
they offer – can make credible agreements with their clients. 
                                                 
209 Cf. e.g. Fox (1994); Keefer (2002); Roniger (1990). 
210 On this issue cf. Carey / Shugart (1995); Leal / Dávila (1990); Maldonado Copello (2002); Martz (1997); 
Robinson (2005); Urrutia (1991). 
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Moreover, Keefer (2002: 26-27) argues that the relatively high level of corruption211 in 
emerging democracies is linked to clientelism. The close relation between clientelism and 
corruption is confirmed by Wills Herrera (2002) in a study on Colombia. 
The clientelistic system in Colombia has consequences for the local public administration 
(which is responsible for delivering WS services) and for public service providers (Nickson 
2001: 7).212 The case study literature reports that commonly elected mayors (patrons) use the 
posts in the public administration and in the service company to reward their clients. This 
practice implies frequent staff rotation in tandem with political leadership and prevents estab-
lishing a career civil service. Moreover, at the end of his office the incumbent mayor may 
target WS investments to those parts of the city where votes are most needed in order to pro-
vide support for its chosen successor (mayors cannot be re-elected). This renders a long-term 
investment planning unfeasible and, in the worst case, means that “white elephants” (i.e. un-
workable infrastructure) are built instead of useful infrastructure. In this study it is argued that 
the prevalence of such clientelistic interventions varies with the ownership of the provider 
(PSP delivery models make such interventions more difficult) and with the quality of local 
governance (transparency and participation in local administration also prevent clientelistic 
interventions).213 
Political decentralisation 
Regarding the concept of decentralisation, literature often distinguishes between political and 
administrative decentralisation (e.g. Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2002: 15-17): 
• Political decentralisation means the transfer from the national government to sub-
national entities of the rights (i) to elect their governments and (ii) to formulate and 
implement policies within the scope of their sub-national responsibility. 
• Administrative decentralisation means the transfer from the national government to 
subnational entities of (i) functions (e.g. the provision of public services like WS), (ii) 
resources (the transfer of financial resources is often conceived as a separate dimen-
sion and termed fiscal decentralisation) and (iii) decision making power. 
The Colombian state is characterised by both dimensions of decentralisation. The fundamen-
tal norms to this respect are fixed in the 1991 Constitution. The next section 5.3 will discuss 
                                                 
211 A legalistic definition of corruption is given by O'Donnell (1998: 121): “… a public official obtains illegal 
advantages, whether for personal use or for the benefit of associates”. Cf. Robinson (1998) for a compila-
tion of work on corruption in developing countries. A discussion of the concept of corruption in the Colom-
bian context is provided by Wills Herrera (2002: 374-79). 
212 On the prevalence of clientelistic practices of local governments in Colombia cf. also Maldonado Copello 
(2002: 293). 
213 For more details see the empirical investigation in section 5.6. 
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to some detail the administrative decentralisation within the WS sector. Here, the political 
decentralisation is briefly touched. 
The political decentralisation in Colombia comprises basically two sub-national levels 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2005a: 63-74): (i) provinces (departamentos) and (ii) 
districts (municipios)214 (see map A5.1 in the annex for the Colombian provinces). At the pro-
vincial level, citizens directly elect the governor (gobernador) and the representatives of the 
provincial assembly (asamblea departamental). At the district level, citizens directly elect the 
mayor (alcalde) and the representatives of the district council (concejo municipal). The Con-
stitution of 1991 (article 311) defines the districts as the “fundamental territorial entities” of 
the sub-national division. Mayors and representatives of the district assemblies are elected for 
four-year office terms. Unlike district council members, mayors cannot be re-elected for con-
secutive terms. Among other things, the district governments have the responsibilities 
• to deliver WS and other public services with an emphasis on eliminating unsatisfied 
needs, 
• to further local development via territorial planning and investment in local infra-
structure, and 
• to promote the participation of citizens. 
In addition, democratic participation via representation can occur on a sub-district level. Dis-
trict governments can further subdivide their territory (into so-called comunas in urban areas 
and so-called corregimientos in rural areas). Citizens in comunas and corregimientos elect 
Local Administrative Councils (Juntas Administradoras Locales)215 that carry out administra-
tive functions delegated by the district government and that shall participate in the enhance-
ment of local economic and social development. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion from the review above the following general “deficiencies” that affect the po-
litical governance in Colombia shall be highlighted: 
• Until the 1980s democratic participation was restricted to a certain degree due to the 
agreement between the two traditional parties to share government power (Frente Na-
cional) which limited competitiveness and plurality of the political process. This re-
striction has been overcome at the latest with the 1991 Constitution that enhanced 
competitiveness and plurality. 
                                                 
214 There are 32 provinces and 1,098 districts in Colombia (as of 2005); cf. Departamento Nacional de Planea-
ción (2005a). 
215 Unlike the mayor and the councillors, the members of the Local Administrative Councils (ediles) are not 
remunerated. 
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• Since the 1980s democratic participation has become to a certain degree restricted due 
to periodical escalations of the armed conflicts amongst non-state armed groups and 
between non-state armed groups and the state security forces. In this context civilian 
authorities have not always managed to effectively control state security forces that in 
some instances have acted in violation of state policy (United States Department of 
State 2006). This general situation has had negative consequences for civil liberties 
(e.g. intimidation and homicide of journalists and members of civic organisations) and 
political rights (e.g. intimidation and homicides of electoral candidates and workers’ 
union leaders) as shown by the deterioration of the political rights and civil liberties 
indexes (see figure A5.1) as well as by the deterioration of the freedom of the press 
index.216 
• In addition, corruption is considered to be endemic in Colombia in both the public and 
the private sector (Wills Herrera 2002; United States Department of State 2006). Fig-
ure A5.2 (annex) shows the evolution of the corruption perception index (Trans-
parency International). In 2005, according to that index, Colombia occupied rank 55 
(out of 158 countries). 
• Some elements of the political governance (candidate-centred electoral system, tradi-
tion of clientelism) suggest that policy making is biased towards private-regardedness 
rather than towards public-regardedness. 
5.3 Key features of WS governance 
Two major reforms have shaped the governance structure of the Colombian WS sector in the 
recent past: (i) Administrative decentralisation and (ii) public utilities reform (Maldonado / 
Vargas Forero 2001; Fernández 2004): 
i. Through the decentralisation process – initiated in 1986 and enhanced by the 1991 
Constitution – the responsibility for WS service delivery and the ownership of infra-
structure assets were transferred to districts. Before, there had been a mixed responsi-
bility: the major cities typically had been served by district-owned public enterprises 
and the remaining urban and rural areas by national government-owned providers 
managed by the National Institute for District Promotion (Instituto Nacional de Fo-
mento Municipal – INSFOPAL). 
ii. Based on the principles of a public services regime contained in the 1991 Constitution 
(articles 365 to 370), the Public Utilities Law (no. 142 from 1994) introduced major 
institutional changes in the WS sector. The most important changes were (a) the estab-
lishment of regulatory agencies at the national level with the mandate to regulate tar-
                                                 
216 The assessment of the freedom of the press has changed from “free” (1980-1990) to „partially free“ (1991-
2002) to „non free“ (2003-2006). Cf. www.freedomhouse.org (accessed on 20/10/2006). 
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iffs and enhance competition, (b) the introduction of the principle of cost covering tar-
iffs, (c) corporatisation of service providers and promotion of PSP, as well as (d) the 
creation of institutions for consumer participation. The Public Utilities Law confirmed 
(e) the principle of solidarity prescribing cross-subsidies between socio-economic 
groups and declaring the covering of unmet needs for WS services a priority. 
The remaining subsections describe and briefly assess the key features of the Colombian WS 
governance: horizontal articulation of roles and actors (5.3.1), vertical articulation (5.3.2), 
institutional design of regulation (5.3.3) and institutional design of service delivery (5.3.4). 
For this purpose it is referred to the respective concepts developed in chapter 3. 
5.3.1 Horizontal articulation of roles and actors 
Table 5.2 shows the horizontal articulation (see subsection 3.2.3.1) of roles and actors in the 
Colombian WS sector. Thanks to administrative decentralisation, the three horizontal roles of 
(a) policy making, (b) regulation (control)217 and (c) service delivery are distributed among 
the three levels of territorial organisation: (i) nation, (ii) province and (iii) district (Fernández 
2004: 27-30). 
Policy making 
i. The Ministry of Environment, Housing and Development (Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial – MAVDT) is responsible for defining the national 
policies regarding WS service provision (e.g. institutional structure, national priorities, 
allocation of national funds, enhancement of PSP, technical assistance) as well as the 
national environmental policies. This task is partially complemented by the National 
Planning Department (DNP), especially with respect to the allocation and monitoring 
of national funds. 
ii. Within the legal and policy framework set on the national level, the Autonomous Re-
gional Bodies (Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales– CARs)218 set the policies re-
garding the water resource management of river basins. For this purpose, they dispose 
of own budgets and sources of revenues. Policy instruments that immediately affect 
WS service providers are permits and fees for water abstraction and waste water dis-
charge. 
                                                 
217 Literature typically does not distinguish between regulation on the one hand and control (and sanctioning) on 
the other hand. However, since Colombian legislation makes this distinction, it is maintained here. 
218 The CARs are not part of the provincial administration but are autonomous. Their jurisdiction is not always 
identical to provinces: some CARs have supra-provincial jurisdictions (Fernández 2004: 27). 
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Table 5.2: Horizontal articulation of roles and actors in the Colombian WS sector 
Role Nation Province District 
Policy making Ministry of Environment, 
Housing and Development 
(MAVDT): 
Strategic WS service policy; 
Allocation of national funds; 
Environmental policy 
Autonomous Regional 
Body (CAR): 
Environmental policy 
Mayor / District council: 
Urban planning; WS in-
vestment priorities; Own-
ership of assets; Alloca-
tion of district funds for 
investments and of user 
subsidies 
Regulation Regulatory Commission for 
Water and Sanitation (CRA): 
Economic regulation 
Autonomous Regional 
Body (CAR): 
Environmental regulation 
Mayor:  
Socio-economic stratifica-
tion 
Control Superintendency of Public 
Utility Services (SSPD): 
Economic control 
Autonomous Regional 
Body (CAR): 
Environmental control 
District health authority: 
Health-related control of 
drinking water quality 
Service delivery − Provincial administration: 
Technical assistance; 
Provincial enterprise: 
Service delivery (excep-
tion) 
District administration or 
District enterprise or 
Private enterprise: 
Service delivery (rule) 
Source: Based on Fernández (2004: 28), modified by the author 
iii. At the district level, it is the mayor (partially with approval of the district council) who 
is responsible for urban (and rural) planning, defining local WS investment priorities, 
deciding on the allocation of district funds and guaranteeing the subsidisation of 
households from low socio-economic groups. Moreover, he decides on the delivery 
model, i.e. whether services are delivered directly through the district administration, a 
public district-owned enterprise or a PSP delivery model. In case of the former two 
delivery models, the mayor also appoints the manager and the board of directors and 
bears, thus, responsibility for important management decisions. 
Regulation and control 
i. The economic regulation of WS services is accomplished by two national regulatory 
agencies. Colombia is a special case as compared to international practice because re-
sponsibility for economic regulation is split. The task of defining tariff and quality of 
service levels is done by the Regulatory Commission for Water and Sanitation (Co-
misión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico – CRA), whereas control 
and sanctioning is accomplished by the Superintendency of Public Utility Services 
(Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios – SSPD). 
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ii. It is the CARs at the provincial level that are responsible for regulating and controlling 
the environmental policies set by themselves. This involves e.g. defining and monitor-
ing discharge parameters and setting abstraction and discharge fees. 
iii. Relying on the standards for drinking water quality defined by the Ministry of Social 
Protection (Ministerio de Protección Social), the district health authorities are respon-
sible for controlling whether the water delivered by service providers meets these 
standards. Test results are reported to SSPD which makes the national reporting of 
drinking water quality (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2005c: 
8-9). Moreover, the mayor is responsible for classifying neighbourhoods into socio-
economic groups. Classification decides on whether a certain household will benefit 
from cross-subsidies or whether it will have to pay a surcharge (for more details on the 
cross-subsidy-scheme see subsection 5.4.2). 
Service delivery 
i. The central state bears no direct responsibility for delivering WS services. 
ii. Provinces play just a minor role in service delivery. Provincial administrations have 
created WS support units that provide technical assistance to districts. Moreover, three 
provincial enterprises (owned by provincial governments), that deliver WS services to 
various districts within their province have “survived” the decentralisation process 
(provinces of Caldas, Quindío and Valle). 
iii. It is the districts that are responsible for delivering WS services to their citizens. This 
is done either directly through the district administration, a public district-owned en-
terprise or a PSP delivery model.219 
Besides the key actors listed in table 5.2, there are some further noteworthy public actors re-
sponsible for upholding the rule of law within the public sector – including the WS sector: (i) 
The Procurator General (Procurador General),220 through its regional and local offices is re-
sponsible for controlling the respect for the Constitution and the laws, protecting the public 
interest against abuses from public officials, disciplinary control of public officials, and 
watching over the duly and effective functioning of public administration. (ii) The Auditor 
General (Contralor General) is responsible for the fiscal control of the funds of the Nation.  
 
                                                 
219 In urban areas, these are the common three delivery models. In rural areas, services are predominantly deliv-
ered through community organisations (Fernández 2004: 9-11). 
220 The Procurator General is a peculiarity of the Colombian Constitution that is not commonly found in other 
countries. The Procurator’s functions are distinct from those of the Prosecutor General (Fiscal General). The 
latter belongs to the judiciary branch of government and is responsible for criminal prosecution before the 
court. 
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This is a relevant function in the context discussed here, since the national budget is a sub-
stantial source of finance for the WS service industry, especially in smaller districts (see sub-
section 5.4.3). Provincial and district auditors accomplish the same function but with respect 
to provincial funds and district funds (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2005a: 53-58). 
In general, it can be said that the institutional design of the WS sector respects to some degree 
the principle of horizontal separation of roles. However, the separation of roles is absent or 
weak at the district level in case of public service delivery. More details regarding the institu-
tions that govern regulation and service delivery are addressed in the subsections on institu-
tional design of regulation (5.3.3) and institutional design of service delivery (5.3.4). 
5.3.2 Vertical articulation: user participation 
There are only few academic and policy papers available that treat user participation in WS 
services in Colombia. Therefore, the information gained in interviews with user representa-
tives and experts is rather important for this subsection. 
Main organisations and institutions of user participation 
Comités de Desarrollo y Control Social (CDCSs) 
In the same tenor of the formal mechanisms for civic participation included in the Constitu-
tion, the Public Services Law (articles 62 to 66) defines to some detail the mechanisms for 
user participation in public services.221 The main vehicle for user participation – which was 
newly created by the law – are the Committees for Social Development and Control (CDCSs). 
CDCSs are formed via a constituent assembly of (actual and potential) public services users. 
The constituent assembly elects the members of the CDCS (minimum number of members: 
50; in the case of Bogotá: 200) and a spokesman (Vocal de Control) who represents the 
CDCS. In every district has to exist at least one CDCS. The election of the CDCS and of the 
spokesman has to be recognised by the mayor and is notified to the local service provider and 
to SSPD. The main functions of the CDCS and the spokesman according to legislation are the 
following (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2004c; Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2004d): 
• Facilitate the exchange of information between service users and the service provider, 
represent the interests of the users and make propositions to the service provider how 
to improve services; 
                                                 
221 The Public Services Law applies to the following services: WS services, waste disposal services, telecom-
munication services, electricity and gas services. 
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• Support the users in the exercise of their consumer rights and regarding complaint 
procedures (including communication with SSPD which is the second instance for re-
solving complaints – the first instance is the service provider); 
• Monitor the decisions taken by the Committee for Stratification (Comité Permanente 
de Estratificación – CPE); the CPE is responsible for reviewing and monitoring the 
classification of neighbourhoods into socio-economic strata carried out by the mayor 
(the WS tariffs of low socio-economic strata are subsidised whereas high socio-
economic strata pay a surcharge – see subsection 5.4.1); 
• Monitor the delivery of the subsidies the district provides to users from low socio-
economic strata; 
• Spokesman: Be member of the board of directors of district-owned service providers 
(so-called Empresas Industriales y Comerciales del Estado – EICEs) and of the CPE, 
provided he is appointed by the mayor among the eligible user representatives.222 
Spokesmen are not remunerated and they and their family members are not allowed to be em-
ployees or maintain a contractual relationship neither with the service provider they monitor 
nor with the national regulatory agencies (SSPD, CRA). 
According to an empirical investigation, by the year 2000 there existed active CDCSs in just 
40% of the districts (Maldonado / Vargas Forero 2001: 291). Buitrago Restrepo (2001) and 
Consumidores Colombia (2005) point at the barriers that exist for creating a CDCS: (i) many 
users and local leaders do not know about their right to form a CDCS and (ii) the creation is a 
quite complicated and bureaucratic act. In the recent past, SSPD has put emphasis on provid-
ing information (e.g. brochures and manuals) and proactively encouraging the formation of 
CDCSs through workshops. According to SSPD, by 2005 there existed 632 CDCSs covering 
WS services.223 
Others 
Besides the formal mechanism of user participation via CDCSs introduced by the Public Ser-
vices Law, participation of users in service delivery (e.g. exchange of information, user edu-
cation, coordination of construction activities, settlement of disputes) occurs in practice224 
also via other mechanisms. These mechanisms build on the existing structures of civil society 
                                                 
222 Legal regulations: (i) Board of directors of EICEs: One third of the board members have to be spokesmen 
whom the mayor has to elect among the registered spokesman within the district (Maldonado / Vargas 
Forero 2001: 312). (ii) The CPE consists by equal parts of representatives (a) of the local service providers 
and (b) of the service users (not spokesmen!). In addition, one spokesman of the local CDCSs shall partici-
pate in the CPE, however, without the right to vote (Departamento Nacional de Planeación without year-b). 
223 Information provided by Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domicilarios at the public hearing “Ren-
dición de Cuentas”, in Bogotá on 29/06/2005. 
224 Information gained in interviews with representatives of service providers and with spokesmen in Manizales, 
Santa Marta, Tunja and Villavicencio. 
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organisation, above all on the Committees for Community Action (Juntas de Acción Comunal 
– JACs). JACs are the most widespread form of local community organisations in Colom-
bia.225 
Assessment 
The main area of the existing structures for user participation is clearly the local level: 
• Participation in services delivery (relation users – local service provider): This is the 
main area of participation regulated in the law. With respect to the degrees of partici-
pation defined in subsection 3.2.3.1 (consultation, representation, influence), it can be 
said that the emphasis lies on consultation. In practice, it seems that the bulk of work 
for spokesmen is to assist users in managing their complaints,226 i.e. to carry out ac-
tivities in the field of consumer protection. In the case of public district-owned service 
providers (EICEs) participation takes, in addition, the form of representation in the 
board of directors via the spokesmen. 
• Participation in local regulation (relation users – local authorities engaged with regu-
latory functions regarding tariffs and subsidies): Although the main regulatory func-
tions are carried out by the national agencies (CRA, SSPD), the mayor plays a certain 
role in this context. He is responsible for carrying out the socio-economic stratification 
and assuring the delivery of subsidies to low socio-economic strata: 
o The stratification study – which is the basis for classifying neighbourhoods 
into socio-economic strata – has to use the methodology provided by the Na-
tional Statistics Department (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística – DANE). This methodology is based on “objective” criteria related 
to the characteristics of the dwelling (Meléndez 2004: 25-26). The participa-
tion of users, via their representatives in the CPE, is limited to reviewing the 
application of the methodology and the results of the stratification study. 
Moreover, CPEs are the second instance for complaints against classification 
decisions (the first instance is the mayor). 
o CDCSs are supposed to monitor the delivery of subsidies to low socio-
economic strata. The Colombian subsidy scheme is based on cross-subsidies 
which means that subsidies are not directly paid to users but delivered indi-
rectly through tariff discounts (see section 5.4). The resources to cover the tar-
iff discounts of low socio-economic strata come partially from the surcharge 
paid by high socio-economic strata and partially from funds transferred from  
 
                                                 
225 For the role of JACs in the organisation of civil society in Colombia cf. Villar (2001). 
226 Information gained in interviews with spokesmen in Manizales, Tunja, Villavicencio, Santa Marta. Cf. also 
Buitrago Restrepo (2001). 
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the district to the service provider. Monitoring the amount of subsidies deliv-
ered is complicated because it requires detailed accounting information as well 
as legal and accounting knowledge. This means that in practice, CDCSs and 
their spokesmen are not able to carry out this monitoring. 
Participation of users in regulation on the national level is in general weak. This is especially 
true for the activities carried out by CRA, i.e. the development of new and the adaptation of 
existing regulatory norms. The main mechanisms for participation in this context are public 
hearings (consultas públicas) carried out by CRA (Consumidores Colombia 2005). While the 
big service providers, either through their own staff or through the staff of their National As-
sociation (ANDESCO)227 manage to dialogue with the staff of CRA on a technical level in 
such events228 and to make propositions to change regulatory projects, this is not the case for 
the spokesmen of the CDCSs or other user representatives. User representatives generally 
lack the necessary legal, technical and economic knowledge to do so. This has to do with the 
low degree of organisation of user representatives in Colombia who lack a strong national 
association with the financial and technical means to effectively participate in regulation.229 
5.3.3 Institutional design of regulation230 
In Colombia, regulation of WS services follows the Anglo-american model of an own special-
ised regulatory body that acts within a set of general rules (Public Services Law) and that en-
joys a certain level of discretion with respect to the formulation of the detailed regulatory 
norms it issues.231 As has been said above, there are two regulatory agencies in Colombia: 
CRA232 is responsible for the definition of the norms regarding monopoly regulation and 
SSPD233 is responsible for controlling and sanctioning the compliance with these norms as 
well as with further legal regulations. 
                                                 
227 Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios y Actividades Complementarias e 
Inherentes. 
228 Dialogue between CRA and the big service providers is not limited to public hearings but occurs continu-
ously. 
229 Recently, some committed user representatives are making efforts to build up national user associations that 
in the future may enhance participation on the national level, provided that they obtain the necessary re-
sources. By the end of 2005, there existed at least two incipient national user associations: (i) Asociación 
Comunera Distrital de Comités de Desarrollo y Control Social de los Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios y 
Vocales de Control (ASCOM); (ii) Confederación Nacional de Vocales de Control. 
230 The present subsection draws on the following sources: Araque (2004); Fernández (2004: 79-85); interviews 
with representatives of CRA, SSPD, experts. 
231 See subsection 5.4.1 for the details on tariff regulation. 
232 In addition to water and sewerage, CRA is responsible for regulating solid waste disposal. 
233 SSPD is responsible for control and sanctioning with respect to all public services regulated in the Public 
Services Law: water, sewerage, solid waste disposal, electricity, telecommunication and liquefied petroleum 
gas. 
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Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico (CRA) 
CRA, which is based in Bogotá, was created by the President in 1992 but started to work ef-
fectively only after the enactment of the Public Services Law in 1994 which set the legal 
framework for its functioning and responsibilities. The tutelary oversight of CRA is accom-
plished by the responsible ministry – the MAVDT. 
The decision-making body of CRA is a board consisting of seven members in 2005. The 
board takes its decisions by simple majority vote. All members are appointed by the Presi-
dent: 
• 4 “experts” in regulation appointed for a four-year office term 
• 2 ministers (MAVDT and Ministry of Social Protection) 
• the director of DNP 
There are no specific legal requirements concerning the experts’ professional qualification or 
working experience and posts are not awarded via public advertisements. According to infor-
mation gained in an interview, political criteria prevail over technical criteria for the appoint-
ment of experts in regulation. According to Consumidores Colombia (2005), it is common 
that ex-managers of WS service providers are appointed as regulatory experts. There exist no 
legal restrictions concerning the causes for removal of the experts. Moreover, like with all 
other ministers, the President is free to remove the three members of the regulatory board that 
represent the government at any time (i.e. the two ministers and the director of DNP). 
CRA is financed by a levy on the turnover of the regulated service providers. Since CRA has 
no own legal identity (unlike SSPD), its budget is a part of the budget of MAVDT and thus 
subject to revision by this ministry. However, according to information given by a representa-
tive of CRA, the budgets approved so far always have been sufficient to cover the costs asso-
ciated with its functioning. As of July 2005, CRA had a staff of 56 persons including support 
staff. 
Concerning transparency and participation procedures, the justifications of the norms issued 
are not regularly published. The instrument of public hearings for the discussion of new regu-
lations is not legally prescribed. Since a decision of the Constitutional Court in 2003 that de-
manded to embody participation into the regulatory process, public hearings have been used 
more regularly, in particular in order to prepare the introduction of the new tariff regulation 
methodology which has become effective in 2005234 (Comisión de Regulación de Agua Pota-
ble y Saneamiento Básico 2005: 25). 
                                                 
234 For more details see subsection 5.4.1. 
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Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) 
Unlike CRA, SSPD was created by the 1991 Constitution (article 370), and just like CRA, the 
legal framework for its functioning and responsibilities is given basically by the Public Ser-
vices Law and complementary regulation. The director of SSPD is appointed by the President 
and can be removed at any time. Similarly to CRA, SSPD is financed through a levy on the 
turnover of the regulated enterprises. 
SSPD is divided into three departments: (a) water, sanitation and waste disposal, (b) tele-
communications, and (c) electricity and liquefied petroleum gas. Moreover, besides its head-
quarters in Bogotá, SSPD has branch offices in the most important regional capitals. The 
technical department for WS services by 2005 had a staff of 25 professionals (exclusive of 
support staff). In addition, in the department for investigation 10 professionals were taking 
care of WS services.235 
In order to accomplish its functions of (i) control and (ii) sanctioning, SSPD has a series of 
faculties: among other things (i) to require information from the regulated providers and to 
conduct investigations as well as (ii) to levy fines and to intervene in the management of ser-
vice providers in order revitalise or liquidate them (see the cases of Cúcuta and Cali for recent 
interventions of SSPD in the WS sector).236 Moreover, as has been said in subsection 5.3.2, 
SSPD is the second instance for resolving the complaints of users. Due to the considerable 
volume of work associated especially with this latter function, SSPD has been absolutely 
overloaded with work in 2002 and 2003, which has implied enormous delays in the process-
ing of the complaints. By 2005, the situation regarding the processing of complaints had im-
proved considerably.237 
Assessment 
The review of the literature on institutional design of regulation in subsection 3.2.3.2 has 
yielded a list of typical recommendations regarding design characteristics that support the 
independence and the accountability of regulatory agencies (see table 3.1). While some of the 
institutional characteristics of CRA and SSPD are in line with these recommendations: 
• “Autonomous source of finance” via a levy on the industry turnover, “responsibility 
for various utility sectors” (in the case of SSPD only), “distinct legal mandate” defined 
in the Public Services Law – 
 
                                                 
235 Information gained in an interview with a representative of SSPD. 
236 Cf. the information provided by SSPD on its webpage www.superservicios.gov.co (accessed on 11/11/2006). 
237 Information provided by SSPD at the public hearing “Audiencia Pública de Rendición de Cuentas”, in Bo-
gotá on 29/06/2005. 
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others are not: 
• “Freedom of ministerial control”; “appointment for fixed terms”; “specify causes of 
removal”; “involve execute and legislative branch in appointment process”; “prescribe 
professional criteria for appointment”; “publication of decisions and justifications”. 
From these latter design characteristics it can be concluded that formal independence from the 
executive is at best partial and that, therefore, there is a risk of state capture. There is also 
some risk of industry capture due to shortcoming regarding transparency (justifications are 
not regularly published) and due to the weakness of user advocacy organisations. The risk of 
industry capture may be compounded if regulatory experts are appointed primarily amongst 
professionals that have an WS industry background. 
On the other hand, there are two factors that may reduce somewhat the risk of state capture: 
(i) Thanks to the system of separation of powers, the two institutional veto players (Congress 
and Constitutional Court) are in principle able to control the capture of the regulator by the 
executive. (ii) The public officials that have the greatest incentives to influence regulatory 
decisions are the mayors, since they are responsible for WS service delivery. However, per-
haps with the exception of the mayor of Bogotá, mayors have only little political influence on 
CRA and SSPD, since the agencies depend directly on the President and the National Minister 
(MAVDT). 
In what concerns the credibility of the regulatory framework of the WS sector, there is one 
element that enhances credibility and commitment power: the fundamental norms for regula-
tion are defined in the Public Services Law that cannot very easily be changed, not least 
thanks to the existence of institutional veto players like the Constitutional Court. However, 
according to Fernández (2004: 81-83), the practical performance of CRA in the past has di-
minished the credibility of regulation. CRA has remarkably delayed the revision of the old 
methodology for tariff regulation which should have been completed by 2001 but actually 
was implemented only in 2005.238 The way the revision of the tariff methodology was han-
dled raised some doubts concerning the professionalism and the political independence of 
CRA. 
Finally, both regulatory agencies are confronted with the structural problem of information 
asymmetry. This problem is compounded in Colombia by the atomisation of the provider 
structure (there are many small providers – see subsection 5.3.4) and the low reliability of the 
information provided by many, especially smaller, service providers due to low accounting 
standards. Both agencies have made big efforts during the last years to improve information. 
                                                 
238 On the details of the tariff regulation methodologies see subsection 5.4.1. 
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5.3.4 Institutional design of service delivery and industry structure 
The reforms of the WS sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s had two somehow opposing 
consequences for the structure and organisation of service providers: 
• The decentralisation of the WS sector led to an atomisation of the enterprise structure 
and to a proliferation of service delivery directly by the district administrations, since 
many district administrations in small urban centres began to operate the existing sys-
tems – which formerly had been operated by INSFOPAL – with their own staff 
(Fernández 2004: 9-11). 
• The Public Services Law put strong emphasis on the aspect of internal efficiency of 
public service providers prescribing a corporatisation of the entities delivering public 
services as the norm (articles 6 to 20), and, in general, the Law paved the way for PSP 
in service delivery. 
The regulations contained in the Public Services Law meant that many districts had to engage 
in a process of corporatisation.239 The two options of corporate organisation defined as the 
norm – which are, by the way, also the two most relevant ones with respect to the share of the 
population served – are  
i. the public enterprise (Empresa Industrial y Comercial del Estado – EICE) which is 
always entirely owned by the district and 
ii. the stock corporation (Sociedad Anónima / Empresa de Servicios Públicos – ESP) 
which can either be public (0% of the shares owned by the private sector), mixed (1% 
to 49% owned by the private sector) or private (50% or more owned by the private 
sector).240 
In what follows, first the industry structure with respect to corporate form, ownership and size 
is characterised, then the institutional design of EICEs and ESPs is compared and, finally the 
institutional design and the scope of PSP are discussed. 
                                                 
239 This applies, above all, to districts with intermediate or small urban centres, since the big cities had been 
generally served by district-owned public enterprises even before decentralisation. The respective transition 
period ended in January 1998 (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2001: 11). The Public 
Services Law defines exceptions for which direct service delivery through the district administration can be 
maintained. 
240 These definitions of “public”, “mixed” and “private” are the ones established in the Public Services Law 
(article 14). 
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Industry structure regarding corporate form, ownership and size 
The structure of the WS industry regarding the corporate form of service providers is de-
scribed in table 5.3. It becomes evident that the most frequent corporate form is the (i) author-
ised organisation (which is a generic term that mainly applies to user associations, coopera-
tives etc.), followed by (ii) districts, (iii) EICEs and (iv) ESPs. The figures are limited to those 
entities that were officially registered with SSPD by the end of 2003 (817 entities). It is esti-
mated that the total number of entities providing WS services in Colombia is far bigger: 
around 1,500 in urban areas and 12,000 in rural areas (Fernández 2004: 10). 
If, however, the corporate form of service providers is looked at in relation to the inhabitants 
potentially241 served, the picture is the following (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos 
Domiciliarios 2002: 35-39; Fernández 2004: 9-11): 
• Regarding the big and intermediate urban areas it can be said that all of the big cities 
(over 600,000 inhabitants)242 and almost all of the intermediate cities (between 
100,000 and 600,000 inhabitants) are served either by EICEs or by ESPs (see also ta-
ble A5.1 in the annex).243 The cities from these two groups (60 in total) concentrate 
approximately 75% of the urban and 55% of the total population of Colombia. Since 
some of the service providers (e.g. Empresas Públicas de Medellín), in addition to 
their “home district” serve the population of neighbouring districts, the market share at-
tended by service providers based in the big and intermediate cities is even greater.244 
• Concerning the smaller urban areas (cities below 100,000 inhabitants), it can be said 
that the smaller the cities the more frequently WS services are delivered directly 
through the district administration. 
• Finally, the majority of the rural population is served by user associations, coopera-
tives etc. (authorised organisations). 
The figures presented here illustrate a concern raised by several analysts (e.g. Foster 2001; 
Fernández 2004), which is the atomisation of the enterprise structure in the Colombian WS 
sector. There are many small service providers (mainly districts and authorised organisations) 
that serve only a small number of users each (mainly in small urban centres and in rural ar-
eas). The major concerns to this respect are that (i) organisational economies of scale are lost 
                                                 
241 The number of inhabitants actually served depends on the coverage level. 
242 There is no uniform criterion for the distinction between big and intermediate cities in the context of analyses 
of the Colombian WS industry. Fernández (2004) uses the threshold of 500,000 inhabitants whereas Super-
intendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002) draws the line at 600,000 inhabitants. 
243 These two groups consist of 60 cities in total (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2002: 
39). From the 30 cities of these groups for which data on the corporate form was available, all are either 
served by a EICE or a ESP. Cf. also Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico (2006: 
69). 
244 The 22 main providers attend approximately 75% of the actual users. Information gained during an interview 
with a representative from SSPD. 
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driving up costs of service and compromising quality of service and that (ii) it is practically 
infeasible for the two national agencies CRA and SSPD to regulate the large number of small 
providers.245 The discussion of these two important concerns is, however, beyond the scope of 
this study.246 
 
Table 5.3: Structure of the WS industry: Corporate form of entities providing water and / or sanitation 
services 
Corporate form Number % 
Authorised Organisations (user associations, cooperatives, etc.) 339 41.5 
District 190 23.2 
Public Enterprise (Empresa Industrial y Comercial del Estado – EICE) 179 21.9 
Stock Corporation (Sociedad Anónima/ Empresa de Servicios Públicos – 
ESP)  
97 11.9 
Others 12 1.5 
Total* 817 100 
*) Total of entities registered with SSPD by 31/12/2003 
Source: Fernández (2004: 10); modified by the author 
Comparison and assessment of the institutional design of EICEs and ESPs247 
The features EICEs as well as public, mixed and private ESPs have in common are (i) an own 
legal identity, (ii) administrative autonomy and (iii) an own budget (Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación without year-a: 3). Moreover, the Public Services Law is applicable to all of 
them which, for instance, in article 27 prescribes: “The authorities of the territorial entities 
(…) guarantee administrative autonomy to the public enterprises of public services as well as 
continuity to effective and efficient managements. No other interests shall be given priority to 
managerial continuity except the delivery of good services.”248 
However, EICEs, public, mixed and private ESPs also show some important institutional dif-
ferences which are listed in table 5.4 and which, especially in the cases of EICEs and public 
ESPs, partially contradict the spirit of the law: 
• The political independence depends on who appoints the board of directors and the 
general manager. In the case of the EICEs it is the mayor who appoints directly both 
                                                 
245 CRA and SSPD have begun to implement simplified procedures to regulate and control small providers (< 
2,500 connections / points of service). 
246 To this respect cf. e.g. Fernández (2004) and Foster (2001). 
247 Cf. the conceptual discussion in subsection 3.2.3.3. 
248 Translation by the author. 
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the board members249 and the general manager. In the case of ESPs in which the dis-
trict holds all or nearly all the shares, the mayor directly appoints the board of direc-
tors which then appoints the general manager.250 I.e. in both cases the mayor has full 
or nearly full control of the appointment of the most important positions. This fact to-
gether with the tradition of clientelism (see subsection 5.2.2) raises doubts regarding 
the political independence of the management in these cases. 
• The importance of the profit motive is closely related to the balance of ownership be-
tween public and private shareholders and with the political independence. It is strong 
in private ESPs and typically absent in public ESPs and EICEs where other (political) 
objectives are very likely to dominate the profit motive. 
• Regarding the relation between autonomy on the one hand and responsibility and ac-
countability on the other hand, Departamento Nacional de Planeación (without year-a: 
18-19) concludes that in the cases of EICEs and public ESPs this relation is character-
ised by imbalance. The managers of these enterprises have much more autonomy than 
e.g. directors of the public administration with respect to wage negotiations with 
workers’ unions and credit operations but bear only little responsibility for the eco-
nomic consequences251 of their management decisions since deficits are often covered 
with transfers from the public budgets (i.e. the enterprise faces no hard budget con-
straint as long as budget transfers are available). Such a behaviour which disregards 
economic sustainability may even be encouraged by the mayor who may want to use 
posts and contracts to reward its political clients. 
• While in the case of EICEs and public ESPs the applicable labour law is the one for 
public employees, in the case of mixed and private ESPs it is the private sector labour 
law (Código Sustantivo de Trabajo) (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domi-
ciliarios 2004a). Regarding this point it is interesting to note that the Constitutional 
Court has ruled that the salaries of public employees have to be adjusted upward at 
least equivalently to the increase of the consumer price index (Cuéllar 2005: 18-21). 
To sum up, it can be said that the institutional characteristics of EICEs, public ESPs, and par-
tially also of mixed ESPs, compromise (a) the incentives and the ability of the management to 
pursue the profit motive and thus internal efficiency and (b) the susceptibility of the manage-
ment to respond to regulatory instruments that build on the profit motive (see also subsection 
5.4.5). 
                                                 
249 In the case of EICEs, legal regulations prescribe that one third of the board members have to be spokesmen 
of the local CDCSs (see subsection 5.3.2). 
250 Cf. Fernández (2004: 76). 
251 Debt overload and generous but onerous wage and pension agreements are common for Colombian public 
enterprises. The cases of Cúcuta and Cali are examples from the WS industry; cf. the information provided 
by SSPD on its webpage www.superservicios.gov.co (accessed on 11/11/2006). 
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Table 5.4: Comparison of institutional characteristics of EICEs and ESPs 
Corporate form 
(ownership) 
Political independ-
ence? 
Profit motive? Balance between autonomy 
and accountability? 
Applicable La-
bour Law 
EICE Low: Mayor appoints 
directly the board of 
directors and the gen-
eral manager 
No No (high autonomy but low 
accountability) 
Public sector 
labour law 
Public ESP (0% 
privately owned) 
Low: Mayor appoints 
the board of directors; 
the latter appoints the 
general manager 
No (depends on the 
character of the 
public share hold-
ers) 
Limited Public sector 
labour law 
Mixed ESP (1% -
49% privately 
owned) 
To an increasing de-
gree: Depends on the 
balance of share hold-
ers 
Partially/ Yes 
(depends on the 
balance of share 
holders) 
To an increasing degree Private sector 
labour law 
Private ESP (≥ 
50% privately 
owned) 
Almost completely/ 
completely: Depends 
on the balance of share 
holders 
Yes Yes (management is held 
accountable by private 
share holders) 
Private sector 
labour law 
Source: Inspired by Foster (2001: 307); largely modified and supplemented by the author based on Superin-
tendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2004a); Departamento Nacional de Planeación (without year-a) 
Institutional design and scope of PSP 
Institutional design 
Although the majority of the substantive PSP experiences in Colombia have been initiated 
after the enactment of the Public Services Law in 1994, there have been some prior PSP ex-
periences (Ochoa 1996). Amongst them is the case of Barranquilla (initiated in 1990) which is 
the most important PSP delivery model in relation to the number of population served. PSP in 
the Colombian WS sector has taken basically three forms: 
• Concession contract implying privately financed expansion investments (less frequent 
– one of the cases is Tunja; see section 5.6); 
• A combination of lease and management contract (the so-called empresa mixta) im-
plying no privately financed expansion investments but privately financed rehabilita-
tion investments (more frequent – one of the cases is Santa Marta; see section 5.6); 
• Service contract (common). 
In this study just the former two PSP delivery models are considered. The details of these two 
models are described in section 5.6 when addressing the cases of Tunja and Santa Marta. 
Here, it shall suffice to clarify that the fact that mixed ESPs are quite common in the Colom-
bian WS sector does not necessarily imply that the capital contributed by the private share 
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holders to these mixed ESPs can be used to finance expansion investments. The typical model 
is the combination of a lease and a management contract in which an ESP (major sharehold-
ers: (i) district and (ii) specialised private operator) with a rather small amount of equity capi-
tal is founded that leases the assets from the district. The ESP is responsible for the operation 
and the rehabilitation of the infrastructure but not for its expansion, a responsibility which 
stays with the district. The management is subcontracted via a management contract to the 
specialised private operator who earns a management fee.252 
Scope 
Table A5.1 (annex) shows the corporate form and the ownership of the WS service providers 
serving the most important Colombian cities. Out of the 34 providers listed, 18 are fully pub-
lic-owned (13 EICEs and 5 public ESPs), 7 are mixed ESPs (of which only Aguas de Cart-
agena presents a substantial (≥ 25%) portion of privately owned shares) and 9 are private 
ESPs (> 50% privately owned shares). It is to note that the three big capitals with populations 
above 2 millions (Bogotá, Cali and Medellín) are all served by EICEs. The three most impor-
tant PSP delivery models with respect to the population potentially served are the providers of 
the Caribbean cities of Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta which all correspond to the 
model that combines a lease and a management contract. 
According to Fernández (2004: 31, 74-76), the private sector in Colombia has shown a clear 
preference for these lease and management contracts, i.e. models that do not entail the responsi-
bility for major expansion investments to be financed on the private capital market and, thus, 
bear less risk than concession models. Still, depending on the initial conditions of assets, a lease 
contract may require notable private rehabilitation investments in order to improve services and 
thus increase collection of tariffs – which is the source of revenue for the leaseholder. 
Nevertheless, there are some noteworthy concessions in intermediate and smaller cities imply-
ing privately financed expansion investments that are, however, to a substantial part co-
financed by the public sector. Examples are the contracts of Montería, Riohacha, Maicao and 
Tunja, among others (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2005c: 29-34). According to this 
latter source, between 1993 and 2003 investment projects in the WS sector253 have reached 
financial closure involving private investments for an amount of 1,180 billion Colombian 
Pesos (approximately 518 million US Dollars).254 This corresponds to 15% of the total vol-
ume of investment projects in the sector. 
                                                 
252 Information gained in interviews with experts and representatives from service providers. Cf. also Beato / 
Díaz (2003) who describe the model of lease and management contract in Cartagena. 
253 Includes waste disposal. 
254 Exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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5.4 Regulatory, subsidy and public investment policies 
The present section describes and assesses the key policies that, besides the political and WS 
governance factors treated above, influence WS service performance: tariff regulation, cross-
subsidy policy and public investment policy. In order to describe and assess these policies, the 
section draws on the categories developed in chapter 2. 
A good introduction to these issues is a brief review of important principles set in the Public 
Services Law to this respect. The Public Services Law (article 87) prescribes that CRA and 
the further involved government actors have to respect the following principles for tariff regu-
lation:255 
• (i)“Economic efficiency”256 and (ii) “financial sufficiency”257 which according to the 
Public Services Law means (i) that tariffs shall approximate to those that would result 
in a competitive market and (ii) that tariffs shall cover the full costs, i.e. operation, 
replacement and expansion costs of an efficient provision. 
• “Solidarity and redistribution” which according to the Public Services Law means 
that the tariff regulation has to implement a system which via the tariff contributions 
made by residential users from higher socio-economic strata and by commercial and 
industrial users shall contribute to lower the tariffs which users from low socio-
economic strata have to pay for their basic needs (cross-subsidy system). 
• (i) “Simplicity” and (ii) “transparency” which according to the Public Services Law 
means (i) that tariff formulae shall be designed in a way that eases comprehension, 
application and control and (ii) that the tariff regime shall be explicit and the related 
information easily available to the broad public. 
Moreover, regarding the expansion of services the Public Services Law (article 2) says that 
the state has to ensure 
• (i) that the coverage of services is continuously expanded and (ii) that priority is 
given to covering unmet needs for WS services. 
                                                 
255 Cf. also Beato / Díaz (2003: 3-4); Ángel Gómez / Aguilera (2002: 13-14). 
256 By “economic efficiency” article 87 seems to refer to the concept of allocative efficiency, however implicitly 
to a scenario without externalities (cf. “Optimal tariff policy if external costs equal zero”, subsection 2.3.4). 
To this respect it shall be noted that environmental regulation with the objective to internalise external costs 
lies in the responsibility of the CARs and is not touched in the Public Services Law. However, according to 
the new tariff formula applied by CRA since 2005 (see below), the fees charged by the CARs are recog-
nised. This means that tariff regulation de facto accounts for external costs. 
257 The concept of “financial sufficiency” referred to in article 87 is similar to the long-term version of the con-
cept of financial sustainability discussed in subsection 2.4.2. However, in addition to replacement invest-
ments, the concept used in the Public Services Law includes expansion investments (expansion investments 
were not considered in subsection 2.4.2 since demand was set fix). This means that the necessary tariff level 
needs to be even higher. 
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Taking all together, this means that policies shall be guided by the three normative principles 
discussed in sections 2.2 to 2.4: equity, allocative efficiency and internal efficiency. 
The remainder of this section describes and assesses the key WS policies. Subsection 5.4.1 
deals with tariff regulation, subsection 5.4.2 with the cross-subsidy policy, subsection 5.4.3 
with public investment and subsection 5.4.4 with control and sanctioning. Finally, subsection 
5.4.5 draws some conclusions. 
5.4.1 Tariff regulation 
Initial situation regarding the relation of tariffs and costs 
The tariff regulation by CRA within the new legal framework was initiated in 1995. The gen-
eral picture with respect to WS tariffs and costs at the beginning of the 1990s was as follows: 
(i) Tariffs were “too” low since average tariffs of all main service providers were far lower 
than average full costs (according to the definition of financial sufficiency given in the Public 
Services Law). (ii) Costs were “too” high because they reflected inefficiencies in the produc-
tion of services. 
On average, the service providers of the 12 main cities in 1996 presented tariffs that were 
46% below the reference costs258 recognised by CRA. Tariffs for residential users from low 
socio-economic strata were especially low, reaching implicit subsidy levels of 70% to 90% in 
relation to reference costs. Related to the imbalance of tariffs and costs, many of the service 
providers were financially strained, did not sufficiently invest in expansion, rehabilitation and 
maintenance of the systems and showed high levels of water losses and a low service quality 
with respect to continuity, pressure and drinking water quality (Ángel Gómez / Aguilera 
2002: 16-23). Related to the low tariffs, water consumption was irrationally high: on average, 
more than 200 litres per capita per day in 1992. Ten years later (2002), after substantial tariff 
increases, average water consumption had fallen to 135 litres per capita per day (Domínguez 
Torres / Uribe Botero 2005: 15).259 
Based on the tariff formulae that have been applied by CRA since 1995, tariff regulation can 
be divided into two periods (cf. e.g. Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento 
Básico 2006): 
• 1996 to 2005: Pure cost-of-service regulation with gradual tariff increases in order to 
meet the reference cost level. 
                                                 
258 See below for an explanation of the term reference costs. 
259 For the sake of comparison: In OECD-countries water use per day and capita varies between 129 litres 
(Germany) and 382 litres (United States); cf. Levin et al. (2002: 44). The normative benchmark used in 
German development co-operation for assessing sound water use per day and per capita is 120 litres (in-
house connections); cf. KfW (2004: 5). 
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• Since 2005: Gradual incorporation of elements of incentive regulation into the cost-of-
service regulation in order to target inefficiencies in the production of services.260 
Tariff regulation 1996 to 2005: Pure cost-of-service regulation 
To come to the point right away, it can be said that, regarding the balance between the two 
legal principles of “economic efficiency” and “financial sufficiency”, during the first period, 
CRA put a clear emphasis on the latter principle. This contributed to close the gap between 
tariffs and costs but (i) did not address the problem of low internal efficiency presented by 
many service providers and (ii) was associated with considerable tariff increases, especially 
for the residential strata 1 and 2 (figure 5.2 below). With the initiation of the second regula-
tory period in 2005, CRA has started to target the internal inefficiencies in the production of 
services and to incorporate mechanisms that are designed to avoid that these inefficiencies are 
passed-on to consumers. 
In this context, it shall be noted that a problem for regulating WS services in Colombia is that 
CRA and SSPD used to dispose of only little reliable information on the regulated firms. In 
fact, the level and quality of information has improved only very recently thanks to, among 
other things, the efforts made by SSPD in establishing an online information system.261 In-
formation nowadays is relatively good for the providers of the major capitals and more or less 
acceptable for most cities above 100,000 habitants. Information is, however, generally poor 
for smaller cities and providers. The limited reliable information has complicated the timely 
adoption of more demanding regulation techniques. 
 
Tariff formula 
The discussion here concentrates on the first regulatory period, since the data analysed and 
discussed below (sections 5.5 to 5.6) falls within this first period. The “old” tariff formula 
(from now on the tariff formula) requires tariff receipts to be equal to total reference costs. 
The methodology for calculating the authorised tariffs262 for the different user classes, which 
                                                 
260 The period since 2005 is not discussed in detail here. The new tariff formula contains upper limits for compa-
rable cost components. These limits were estimated by using a data envelope analysis (cost frontier ap-
proach); cf. Resolución CRA No. 287 de 2004. For the terms cost-of-service regulation and incentive regula-
tion cf. Joskow (2006). 
261 Sistema Único de Información de Servicios Públicos. Cf. www.sui.gov.co. Another factor that has contrib-
uted to improve information is the fact that the annual accounts service providers have to report to the regu-
latory agencies have to be audited. However, according to the information gained from an expert, there is a 
lack of professional auditors specialised in WS service providers, a fact which compromises the quality of 
audits. 
262 Here only the calculation of the tariffs for water is illustrated. The sewerage tariff is calculated similarly. 
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became effective in 1996, can be divided into three steps.263 (A) Calculation of total reference 
costs, (B) calculation of the individual reference tariff, (C) adaptation of the individual refer-
ence tariff for the various user classes in order to account for cross-subsidies. 
A) Total reference costs were calculated as follows: 
RC = ADC + OC + IC (E5.3) 
[RC = reference costs; ADC = administrative costs; OC = operation costs; IC = investment 
costs] 
• IC were calculated for a perspective of at least 15 years and include the following 
(fixed) costs: (i) investment costs for the replacement of the existing system assets, (ii) 
investment costs for necessary system expansions estimated relying on a least-cost in-
vestment plan to attend the projected future demand, (iii) interests on the inverted 
capital in the order of 9% to 14% p.a. 
• OC include all variable costs incurred to operate the system 
• ADC include the fixed administrative and commercialisation costs. 
With the exception of the investment costs for future expansions, RC correspond to historical 
or actual costs. RC were authorised by CRA based on the audited cost studies (base year 
1994) presented by the service providers. 
B) RC were converted into a two-part individual reference tariff t (m3) which depends on the 
amount of cubic metres (m3) consumed: 
t (m3) = f + v * m3 (E5.4) 
[f = ADC / number of users; v = OC / m3 + IC / m3] 
The individual reference tariff allows the service provider to pass total reference costs on to 
the users, i.e. the formula contains no incentives for the service provider to reduce those costs 
that are due to internal inefficiencies. The only exception is the maximum percentage of unac-
counted-for water264 (30%) that is allowed to be discounted in order to calculate v. 265 
C) Finally, the individual reference tariff was adapted in order to account for the legally pre-
scribed system of cross-subsidisation. There are four user classes: Industrial, commercial, 
official and residential. Residential users are divided in up to six socio-economic strata with 1 
                                                 
263 Cf. Resolución CRA No. 151 de 2001; Beato / Díaz (2003: 3-4); Public Services Law (Ley No. 142 de 
1994). Here a simplified version of the process of tariff calculation is presented. For more details cf. the 
sources indicated. 
264 Share of technical or commercial water losses. For a precise definition see subsection 5.1.2. 
265 All providers serving the main cities showed higher water losses than 30%. On average, unaccounted-for 
water was 45% in 1994 (Ángel Gómez / Aguilera 2002: 17). 
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being the lowest and 6 the highest.266 According to legislation, the “basic consumption”267 (20 
m3 per month per connection) of residential users of the strata 1, 2, 3 shall be subsidised via 
surcharges paid by (i) industrial and commercial users and (ii) residential users of the strata 5 
and 6. The legal upper limits for the subsidies are set at 70% (stratum 1), 40% (stratum 2) and 
15% (stratum 3) of the average reference costs (see table 5.5 – first row). Legislation – and 
even more practice – is ambiguous with respect to the limits of surcharges that can be lev-
ied268 to finance these subsidies (see subsection 5.4.2). 
Table 5.5: Cross-subsidy scheme 
User class (stratum) Maximum legal surcharge 
Public Services Law (+) or 
Maximum legal discount 
Public Services Law / Law 
No. 812 (2002) (–) 
Actual surcharge (+) or 
discount (–) 
1996* 
Actual surcharge (+) or 
disount (–) 
2002* 
Industrial +20 % n.a. n.a. 
Commercial +20 % n.a. n.a. 
Official 0 % n.a. n.a. 
Residential (stratum 6) +20 % +1 % +61 % 
Residential (stratum 5) +20 % –23 % +30 % 
Residential (stratum 4) 0 % –51 % –12 % 
Residential (stratum 3) –15 % –72 % –30 % 
Residential (stratum 2) –40 % –85 % –55 % 
Residential (stratum 1) –70 % –91 % –73 % 
Source: Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004: 22). *) Data sample: 10 major cities 
“n.a.”: not available 
Tariff transition period 
Since the tariffs charged by service providers in 1996 were well below reference tariffs ad-
justed for maximum subsidies allowed, it was politically unfeasible to increase tariffs to the 
reference levels in one go. Therefore, it was established that reference tariffs had to be 
reached by each service provider only by the end of a transition period in 2001 (law no. 286 
                                                 
266 The socio-economic stratification is the responsibility of the mayors. See subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
267 With 20 m3 per month per connection the level of “basic consumption” defined by CRA seems to be rela-
tively high. It is more or less equal to the actual national average consumption (Superintendencia de Servi-
cios Públicos Domiciliarios 2005b: section 1.1). 
268 The Public Services Law (article 89) sets the maximum limits for surcharges at 20% of average reference 
costs (see table 5.5). This has recently been changed by Decreto No. 57 de 2006 (Ministerio de Ambiente, 
Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial). The new legislation requires surcharges to be set at minimum at 30% (in-
dustrial), 50% (commercial and residential stratum 5) and 60% (residential stratum 6). 
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of 1996). However, the transition period was prolonged until December 2005 (law no. 632 of 
2000), since in 2000 actual tariffs charged were still well below the reference levels adjusted-
for maximum subsidies allowed. In addition, real incomes of households had been hit by the 
economic recession of the year 1999, which meant that considerable tariff increases would 
have had further diminished real incomes and, thus, would have been associated with high 
political costs (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2002: 81-82). Figure 5.2 
shows average tariff increases between 2001 and 2004 for a sample of the major service pro-
viders. It becomes evident that stratum 1 has been faced with the highest increases. 
 
5.4.2 Cross-subsidy policy 
User structure: relation between subsidees and contributors 
The cross-subsidy scheme briefly described above is characterised by a considerable financial 
deficit since the amounts of contributions raised via tariff surcharges systematically fall short 
of the amounts of subsidies granted via tariff discounts (Superintendencia de Servicios Públi-
cos Domiciliarios 2005a). One of the roots of this problem is the user structure in Colombia 
which is such that there are much more users that are eligible for receiving subsidies than us-
ers that can be surcharged in order to finance these subsidies. Table A5.2 (annex) shows the 
relation between the user classes for different district classes. It becomes evident that the rela-
tion between subsidees and contributors is very asymmetric even for the four major capitals 
(69.4% to 17.4%). In small districts, however, almost all users are subsidees (the relation is 
92.7% to 6%). The relevant geographical area for balancing contributions and subsidies is the 
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area served by the respective service provider. For small districts this means that the portion 
of subsidies that can be financed via tariff contributions is practically insignificant. 
In this context, some actors269 of the WS sector have argued that mayors are not applying the 
methodology for socio-economic stratification (see subsection 5.3.2) in an objective way but 
that they are using the socio-economic classification to pursue short-term political goals. In a 
press report the Superintendent for Public Services Evamaría Uribe Tobón stated that mayors 
were discretionally reclassifying residential users from high strata to low strata, contributing 
this way to widen the gap between tariff contributions and tariff subsidies (Federación Co-
lombiana de Municipios 2005). In a statistical analysis based on data from household surveys 
Meléndez (2004: 27-30) confirms that the proportion of non-subsidees (strata 4, 5 and 6) 
among urban residential users has fallen during the last decade (1993: 25%; 2003: 12%). 
However, she finds no statistically significant evidence, that actual classifications are system-
atically contradicting the objective “need criteria” established in the methodology, i.e. that 
mayors use their discretion for classification.270 
Deficits between tariff contributions and tariff subsidies 
District governments are not only responsible for the socio-economic stratification but also 
for determining the tariff subsidy and surcharge levels and for administrating the balance of 
contributions and subsidies (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2001). For 
this purpose each district administration has to create a balance account called Solidarity Fund 
(Fondo de Solidaridad y Redistribuición de Ingresos) in which the amount of subsidies 
granted and the amount of contributions levied are registered. However, until recently there 
were still many districts that had not even created Solidarity Funds, and, amongst the Solidar-
ity Funds created, only a minority was operating (Meléndez 2004: 17). 
According to the laws and regulations, Solidarity Funds have to be in balance.271 Only if the 
Solidarity Fund is in balance, the respective service provider earns a tariff that covers the full 
reference costs. However, since only very few Solidarity Funds have been operating, this le-
gal norm has been of limited practical relevance so far. The imbalance and inoperation of the 
Solidarity Funds is related to three factors: 
                                                 
269 Cf. the Superintendent of Public Services, Evamaría Uribe Tobón, as cited in Federación Colombiana de 
Municipios (2005). 
270 Cf. Meléndez (2004: 25-26) for a description of the methodology. 
271 At least as of December 2005, the end of the tariff transition period (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos 
Domiciliarios 2005a: 8). With regard to the legal norms that require a balance in the Solidarity Funds cf. 
Decreto No. 1013 de 2005 (Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarollo Territorial). 
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i. District governments have been reluctant to cut tariff discount levels for the residential 
users of the strata 1 to 3 to the maxima allowed,272 and even more to reduce discounts 
below these maxima. 
ii. They have also been reluctant to transfer funds from the district budget to the Solidar-
ity Fund in order to compensate for the deficit.273 Instead, district governments have 
preferred to allocate their spending for WS services directly and not via the Solidarity 
Fund (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2004: 11-15). 
iii. The possibility to compensate for the deficit by raising more contributions via tariff 
surcharges is limited due to various reasons: (a) The small portion of contributing us-
ers (see above). (b) Legal restrictions: The maximum surcharge allowed in the Public 
Services Law was 20%.274 (c) Economic reasons: The demand for WS services – and 
thus the amount of contributions that can be collected – decreases with price in-
creases.275 By the way, a considerable number of industrial users – 55,000 – have al-
ready exited the regulated market and have opted for self-supply with WS services 
(Echeverri 2001: 287). 
Figure 5.3 shows the overall deficit (2001 to 2004) between (i) tariff subsidies, (ii) tariff con-
tributions and (iii) district government spending for WS services for a sample of 42 districts. 
The deficit amounts to a sum of 1,310,647 million Colombian pesos.276 It is emphasised here 
that the district government spending considered in figure 5.3 (274,968 million Colombian 
pesos) corresponds only to a very small portion to transfers to Solidarity Funds.277 The bulk of 
the district government spending corresponds to direct investments in WS assets (for more 
details see subsection 5.4.3). Thanks to the gradual tariff increases that have been imple-
mented during the last years, the annual deficits have shown a clear trend to diminish between 
2001 and 2004: 488,100 million Colombian pesos in 2001 versus 181,774 million in 2004 
(Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2005a: 69). 
                                                 
272 Maximum discounts allowed: Stratum 1: 70%, stratum 2: 50%, stratum 3: 15%. 
273 Transfers to Solidarity Funds in order to finance tariff subsidies are only a minor item within district gov-
ernment spending for WS services: 4% for the period 1993 to 2004. Cf. Departamento Nacional de Planea-
ción (2004: 11). 
274 However, this rule has recently been changed by Decreto 57 de 2006 (MAVDT) which sets minimum sur-
charges for the contributing user classes (see footnote above). 
275 This could be an explanation for the fact that surcharges levied on the fixed part of the tariff usually are con-
siderably higher than those levied on the variable part of the tariff. In Bogotá the actual tariff surcharge for 
the fixed part of the tariff is 305% (water) and 368% (sewerage) for residential users of the stratum 6. For 
the variable part of the tariff the surcharge is 38% (water) and 43% (sewerage). Cf. Alcaldía de Bogotá: Pro-
yecto de Acuerdo 378 de 2006, http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur//normas/Norma1.jsp?i=21496 (ac-
cessed on 06/11/2006). 
276 575.86 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
277 4% for the period 1993 to 2004. Cf. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004: 11). 
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Source: Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2005a: 68). Sample: 41 big, intermediate and 
small districts  
Targeting quality and distributive impact 
Meléndez (2004: 22-23) investigates the ability of the existing cross-subsidy scheme to target 
subsidies to those households in need and to redistribute income. As the criterion for assess-
ing the targeting quality, she assumes that only the poorest 40% of the country shall be eligi-
ble for a discount in WS tariffs. This criterion of eligibility corresponds to the national pov-
erty line in Colombia. According to the results of the study, the targeting quality of the cross-
subsidy scheme can be considered low because the error of inclusion is high: 51% of consum-
ers that receive a tariff subsidy have an income that lies above the national poverty line. The 
positive thing about the scheme is that the error of exclusion is extremely low: only 0.7% of 
the connected households with an income below the poverty line do not receive a tariff sub-
sidy. The share of income paid in 2003 by the poorest quintile for water and sanitation ser-
vices together is estimated in around 7% (Meléndez 2004: 53). It thus exceeds the interna-
tionally recommended threshold of 5%. Concerning the distributive impact, the study finds 
that the cross-subsidy scheme does not redistribute income from rich to poor households but, 
instead, is slightly regressive. 
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The high error of inclusion does not seem desirable, since considerable amounts of subsidies 
are allocated to non-poor278 households, a situation that hardly can be justified on equity 
grounds. From an equity point of view it would seem preferable to improve the targeting qual-
ity of the cross-subsidy scheme and to use the funds “saved” for subsidising coverage expan-
sion to those households that lack access to improved WS services and that, due to the fact 
that they are not served by an official service provider, do not receive WS subsidies at all. The 
price per m3 of water paid by households that have to rely on informal water vendors is be-
tween 8 and 25 times higher than the price paid by households from stratum 1 served by an 
official provider (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2004: 24; Superintendencia de Servi-
cios Públicos Domiciliarios 2005b: 3). In Santa Marta, the former pay approximately 45,000 
Colombian pesos279 for 2 m3 per month whereas the latter pay between 15,000 and 18,000 
Colombian pesos for 18 to 20 m3 per month. 
5.4.3 Public investment policy 
According to the Public Services Law, public officials have to prioritise the satisfaction of 
unmet basic WS service needs which means to prioritise coverage expansion to households 
that lack access to improved WS services. This priority is in line with the normative discus-
sion in section 2.2 which has identified the lack of access to improved WS services as the 
most pressing problem from an equity perspective. In accordance to the logic of political and 
administrative decentralisation in Colombia, the main responsibility for prioritising and coor-
dinating coverage expansion lies with district governments (see subsections 5.2.2 and 5.3.1). 
The two key policy areas to this respect are (i) territorial planning and (ii) public investment 
policy. 
Territorial planning 
Investment projects in WS services and the eventual allocation of public funds to these pro-
jects occur within a context of territorial planning. In practice, this context can be more or less 
orderly and more or less goal-oriented, depending on the local circumstances. The question 
whether the district government will give a high priority to WS service expansion, especially 
to poor households, will, in general, depend on the magnitude of the problem, the financial 
resources available and the institutional and political factors affecting the planning process. 
According to legislation, the two main instruments for territorial planning are (i) the district 
development plan (plan de desarrollo municipal) and (ii) the land use plan (plan de orde-
namiento territorial): 
                                                 
278 The indicator for poverty here is income. 
279 19.77 US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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i. The district development plan shall express the priorities for local development and 
address relevant local development problems. Moreover, the plan shall be elaborated 
with the participation of citizens and civil society organisations. 
ii. The land use plan can be seen as the translation of the development plan into the (ur-
ban) space. It guides all construction activities and e.g. delimits residential and indus-
trial zones, zones of urban expansion and risk zones. Like the development plan, the 
land use plan shall be elaborated in a participative manner (Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación 2005b: 39-44). 
From a legal perspective, there are several links between the territorial planning process and 
the construction of WS assets. In order to benefit from funds stemming from the national 
budget (see below), WS investment projects have to be part of the district development plan 
(Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios 2005a: 6). Moreover, they have to fol-
low the standards established in the technical regulation for the WS sector (Reglamento 
Técnico para el sector de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico – RAS).280 The RAS demands 
that WS constructions have to comply with land use plans and prioritises the expansion of the 
water system over the expansion of the sewer system. 
The land use plan281 is also important for another reason. It is the basis for defining the ser-
vice perimeter and, thus, for defining the responsibilities of the WS service provider in terms 
of coverage. This is of special relevance in PSP delivery models that require a very clear defi-
nition of responsibilities in terms of rehabilitation, reposition and expansion investments and 
their deployment in space. In this context it is important to realise that coverage expansion in 
the context of “orderly” urban growth is not related to major investments in water and sewer 
pipes for the WS service provider, since these costs are borne by the company that develops 
the new construction plots.282 By contrast, system expansions into existing squatter settle-
ments are related to major expenses for water and sewer pipes, which makes a big difference 
from the perspective of a service provider or a district government that has to bear these costs. 
This means that there are special (financial) obstacles for expanding improved WS services to 
poor urban areas and that these obstacles require a targeted strategy to be overcome. 
Concerning the state of affairs of territorial planning in Colombia, González Salas (2002) re-
ports in an empirical study that the introduction of district development plans and land use 
plans has helped to render the territorial planning process on the district level more syste-
matic. However, the author finds that this process, in general, is plagued with several weak-
nesses: (i) Low qualification and reduced number of the district staff responsible for planning 
                                                 
280 Cf. Resolución No. 1096 de 17 de Noviembre de 2000 (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico). 
281 Or the plan used instead in case no land use plan has been enacted. 
282 It may, however, be related to major investments for the WS service provider e.g. in dams or in drinking 
water treatment plants in order to increase the drinking water production capacity in case production capac-
ity is a limiting factor. This depends on the relation between the installed production capacity and the growth 
of demand. 
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activities. (ii) Low importance given to citizen participation in practice. (iii) Deficiencies in 
implementation: from a representative sample of 162 districts, by 2001 55% had elaborated a 
land use plan but only 3.5%, in addition to having elaborated the plan, had approved it. 
Weaknesses are greater or more numerous in smaller districts. 
Public investments in WS services 
Important amounts of public funds283 are allocated to the WS sector by district governments 
(the vast majority) and by the national government (a smaller fraction) that, in principle, could 
be used to pursue the objective of expanding WS services, especially to low-income house-
holds. The bulk of these resources stems from the national budget284 (Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación 2004: 7-11). 
Table 5.6 shows the funds stemming from the national budget that have been allocated to the 
environmental services sector (WS services, waste water treatment, solid waste disposal) be-
tween 1998 and 2002. It can be seen that earmarked regular transfers285 from the nation to 
districts within the framework of the Decentralisation Law No. 715 (2001) are by far the most 
important source with a share of 86%. These transfers are earmarked to be used for the envi-
ronmental services sector but the administration of these funds and the spending decision is 
made by district governments. The formula for distributing transfers among the 1,098 districts 
considers poverty and unsatisfied basic needs as important criteria. This means that in practice 
poorer and smaller districts receive higher transfers per capita than richer and bigger districts. 
These regular earmarked transfers are not only the most important source of public spending 
in the sector, they are important even when compared to the value added of the whole sector: 
33.5% on average as measured in current prices for the years 1994-2003.286 
At the first glance it seems incoherent and contradictory to allocate grants to the WS sector, 
given the fact that tariff regulation is designed such that service providers earn a tariff that 
covers the full costs, including the investment costs for system expansion. However, as has 
been explained above, in practice tariffs have been below reference costs. So, as long as defi-
cits between subsidies and contributions persist, assuming that deficits are not due to internal 
 
                                                 
283 The term public funds, here, refers to funds from general income sources like taxes, royalties and loans. The 
term excludes WS tariff receipts of public service providers. 
284 Other noteworthy “non-WS-tariff sources” are district receipts, above all (i) royalties from the exploitation of 
fossil and mineral resources (which are, however, concentrated in the departments Arauca, Casanare and 
Meta), (ii) local taxes, and (iii) loans. An overview of the sources of public spending in the WS sector is 
given by Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004: 6-11). 
285 Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004) provides a description of the fiscal transfer system from na-
tional to district governments with a focus on the WS sector. 
286 Own calculation with the figures reported by Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004: 8). 
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Table 5.6: Public spending for WS, waste water treatment and solid waste disposal 
stemming from the national budget (1998-2002) 
Thousands US Dollars 2003 Source 
Total amount 5 
years 
Average per 
year 
Proportion 
(%) 
Transfers to districts 
(Decentralisation Law) 1195716 239143 86 
National Royalties Fund 56234 11247 4 
Ministry for Economic Development 84410 16882 6 
Other 54220 10843 4 
Total 1390579 278116 100 
Source: Fernández (2004: 62) 
inefficiencies, and accepting the logic of the tariff regulation and the cross-subsidy scheme, 
allocating grants to the sector in order to cover these deficits is coherent with the overall sys-
tem.287 
The focus in the following is on public investment policy of districts. District governments 
are allowed to use the earmarked transfers from the national budget (i) either for financing the 
deficits between contributions and subsidies (ii) or for investments in WS assets288 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2004: 6-7). These two alternative uses typically corre-
spond with two alternative channels for allocating the public funds to the WS sector: 
i. In the first case, public funds are allocated via the WS service provider (if the solidar-
ity fund is operating, funds are transferred to the provider and enter its balance). This 
is probably an effective way to allocate public funds in order to achieve coverage ex-
pansion if the service provider is professionally and efficiently managed, if it has a 
problem-oriented investment plan that focuses on coverage expansion and if the in-
vestment plan is coordinated with the priorities defined in the territorial planning 
process (e.g. system expansion to poor neighbourhoods); otherwise probably not. 
ii. In the second case, funds are allocated directly by the district administration. This re-
quires a very close coordination with the investment plan of the service provider since 
investments have to be compatible with the existing system and the new components 
have to be operated by the provider after the completion of construction. If this condi-
tion as well as the conditions mentioned above hold, this might be an effective way to 
                                                 
287 Not to cover deficits means to extract quasi-rents (see 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) from service providers with the likely 
consequence that reposition and expansion investments are not undertaken.  
288 Furthermore, they are allowed to use the funds for the repayment of debt from prior investments in the WS 
sector (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2004: 11). 
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allocate public funds in order to expand coverage – otherwise probably not. Districts, 
in general, have preferred to allocate their spending for WS services directly. 
In an evaluation of the public spending of districts in the WS sector, Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación (2004) reaches the following findings: 
• There is a positive correlation between the amounts transferred within the framework 
of the Decentralisation Law and the coverage gap of districts, i.e. districts with lower 
coverage receive higher per capita transfers. 
• There are indications that public funds have not been effectively used for expanding 
services in order to satisfy unmet WS needs. Assuming standard expansion costs, the 
coverage in 2003 with piped water connections should have been 92% (instead of ac-
tually 88%) and with sewer connections 76% (instead of actually 74%), given the total 
amount of public spending for the WS sector between 1996 and 2003.289 The authors 
offer several explanations for this result, among others: 
o In many cases in which the districts allocate the funds directly, there is a lack 
of coordination with the investment plan of the provider; moreover, investment 
projects in several cases do not meet the necessary economic and technical cri-
teria which means that unworkable or useless assets are built; 
o Several providers, especially those that have not undergone a process of corpo-
ratisation and commercialisation, may lack the capacities to execute expansion 
investments effectively (refers to cases in which the funds are channelled via 
the provider); 
o If, in addition, tariff levels are low when compared to inefficiently high admin-
istrative and operation costs, the public funds transferred to these service pro-
viders are consumed and cannot be used for investments; 
o In districts where there is a substantial investment backlog, public funds may 
have to be used for necessary replacement investments first, in order to keep 
the system going, before they can be used to expand coverage; 
o The atomisation and dispersion that characterises the provider structure for the 
smaller districts implies that economies of scale in the development of invest-
ment projects as well as in construction supervision are wasted which means 
that more funds than necessary are consumed in overheads. 
Finally, an additional point not raised in the above mentioned study is made: 
                                                 
289 Cf. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (2004: 17-18). 
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• Awarding construction contracts is an activity which is prone to be used for rewarding 
clients within a clientelistic strategy and which is prone to corruption. If these are im-
portant forces at work when awarding construction contracts, formal criteria like cost 
effectiveness, needs-orientation and prioritisation of service expansion for poor parts 
of the town may loose their practical importance.290 
5.4.4 Control and sanctioning 
The main organisation responsible for control and sanctioning in the WS sector is SSPD (see 
subsections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3). Control and sanctioning is complemented by the Procurator 
General and the Auditor General that monitor the compliance with public sector laws and the 
effective use of public funds. Control and sanctioning are important in order to render the 
regulations issued by CRA and other authorities effective. 
To this respect it is important to note that CRA has not only issued regulations concerning 
tariffs (see subsection 5.4.1). CRA has also defined internal efficiency and service quality 
indicators and has authorised investment plans. Defining, controlling and sanctioning service 
quality indicators and investment targets together with tariffs makes sense, since a profit-
oriented monopolist in the Colombian context has an incentive to earn the full-cost-covering 
tariff (that presumes certain authorised investments for system expansion and for raising ser-
vice quality) but, in practice, to save on quality improvements and system expansion in order 
to increase the profit rate. Concerning the monitoring of internal efficiency indicators by the 
regulatory authorities, this may make sense for two reasons: (i) As long as tariff regulation 
follows a pure cost-of-service-logic based on historical costs, incentives to improve internal 
efficiency may be too weak and require a special monitoring. (ii) This may be especially rele-
vant for public providers that lack a profit motive and thus show even weaker incentives to 
improve internal efficiency. 
The problem, however, is that the regulation issued by CRA has not established an explicit 
relation between tariffs authorised on the one hand and service quality, internal efficiency and 
investment targets required on the other hand (Fernández 2004: 82-84). According to 
Fernández, SSPD therefore has not been able to adequately control and sanction service pro-
viders. Another factor that has hampered effective control by SSPD is the low quality of in-
formation (especially regarding smaller providers) and the atomisation of the provider struc-
ture. Still another factor that has complicated control and sanctioning is that for most service 
providers, tariffs actually earned have been well below their reference tariff because tariff 
levels have not been increased or because the cross-subsidy schemes have generated deficits. 
This situation makes it difficult to call the providers to attention and to sanction them for 
missing service quality standards or investment targets. The main responsible actors for the 
                                                 
290 Corruption has repeatedly been an issue in the awarding of construction awards in the WS sector. This seems 
to hold for both mixed ESPs (case of Cartagena; information gained in an interview with a representative 
from Transparencia por Colombia) and EICEs (case of Villavicencio; see subsection 5.6.5 below). 
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low tariff levels and for the deficits of the Solidarity Funds are the mayors. This means that, 
in many cases, SSPD should sanction the mayors for not complying with the tariff regulation 
and for not covering the deficits of the Solidarity Funds. However, SSPD lacks the authority 
and the capacity to do so. Recently, SSPD and the Procurator General have established a 
closer collaboration in order to render control and sanctioning of district governments more 
effective. 
Control of drinking water standards in practice also shows some weaknesses. SSPD is not 
directly responsible for controlling drinking water standards. Nevertheless, SSPD reports the 
results of the controls carried out by district and provincial health authorities and possibly 
sanctions providers that do not meet the standards. WS service providers have repeatedly 
called into question the quality of the tests carried out by health authorities and the quality of 
the information reported by SSPD.291 
5.4.5 Conclusions 
This subsection tries to summarise the most relevant characteristics and assessments of the 
WS policies discussed above and to draw some conclusions. It is biased in so far as it high-
lights those aspects identified as problems and it ignores positive aspects. With respect to the 
policies aiming at the equity goal the following points are emphasised: 
• A substantial amount of public funds are allocated to the WS sector that can in princi-
ple be used for expanding services to those households that lack access to improved 
WS services.292 However, there is evidence that a portion of these funds is not effec-
tively used for expanding services. Factors that seem to be related to this problem are 
(i) reduced territorial planning capacities of districts as well as lacking civic participa-
tion in the planning process; (ii) lack of coordination between the service provider’s 
investment plan and the investments carried out by the district; (iii) lack of transpar-
ency and control in the awarding of construction contracts; (iv) atomisation of the 
provider structure ending up in high overheads for investment projects; (v) financially 
strained or internally inefficient service providers that require the available public 
funds to keep the existing systems running. 
• The poorest quintile spends a slightly higher proportion of income on WS services 
than 5%, which is the common threshold used to judge affordability. The cross-
subsidy system shows the well-known defect that it reaches only those households that 
are connected to a regulated service provider. Furthermore, the targeting quality of the 
system can be considered low, since more than half of the households that are subsidised 
                                                 
291 Criticism refers to the way of taking samples. Samples have to be taken directly from the water distribution 
network (and not from inside the dwelling); health authorities do not always seem to comply with this. Cf. 
Empresas Públicas de Medellín E.S.P. (2006); ANDESCO (2006). 
292 This problem is more widespread in rural than in urban areas – see subsection 5.1.2. 
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have an income that lies above the national poverty line. Finally, contributions raised 
through tariff surcharges systematically have been falling short of subsidies granted 
through tariff discounts, a situation which generates deficits. These deficits have com-
plicated regulation aimed at improving efficiency and financial sustainability. 
• An option for overcoming some of the problems related to the subsidy system, is to 
abolish cross-subsidies and to introduce a Chilean-like subsidy system in which 
means-tested subsidies are given directly to users.293 
Concerning the policies aiming at allocative and internal efficiency the following aspects are 
highlighted: 
• Until 2005 tariff regulation has unilaterally focused on improving financial sustain-
ability of service providers by increasing tariff levels to cost levels. Until 2005 tariff 
regulation did not include mechanisms designed to avoid that internal inefficiencies 
which manifested in high historical costs could to a great extent be passed on to users. 
• The low level and the low quality of information provided by especially the smaller 
service providers has hampered regulation. This problem has been exacerbated by the 
big number of small providers existing in Colombia. The information deficit of the 
regulatory authorities partially explains why more demanding regulation techniques 
have not been adopted earlier. 
• The structure of the WS service industry renders regulation extremely demanding. 
Bigger and profit-oriented providers should be treated differently from smaller non-
profit providers. 
• The articulation of roles between district governments that are responsible for defining 
cross-subsidies and public investments and SSPD that is responsible for sanctioning 
WS service providers does not seem to be perfect. By not cutting down tariff discounts 
to the legally prescribed maximum levels, district governments can compromise fi-
nancial sustainability and probably performance of WS service providers. However, 
SSPD lacks the authority to sanction district governments for this behaviour. 
• Tariff regulations in combination with the regulations concerning cross-subsidies are 
far from being “simple” and “transparent” as required in the Public Services Law and 
thus complicate comprehension and monitoring by the broad public. 
                                                 
293 For the Chilean WS subsidy system cf. Gómez-Lobo / Contreras (2003) and Serra (2000). 
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5.5 The influence of PSP on WS service provider performance: a quantitative 
analysis 
In accordance with the first purpose of this chapter, sections 5.2 to 5.4 have characterised 
from a national perspective the political governance (5.2), the WS governance – including the 
institutional design of service delivery – (5.3) and the main WS policies (5.4) in Colombia. 
Building on these preceding sections, the present section starts to work on the second purpose 
of this chapter which is to explore the determinants of the sub-national variation in WS ser-
vice provider performance. Drawing on data from a sample of 30 Colombian providers, it 
analyses by econometric means the influence of the delivery model (PSP versus purely pub-
lic) on provider performance. The quantitative analysis of the present section is comple-
mented by the qualitative analysis of section 5.6 which investigates the importance of the 
quality of local governance for explaining sub-national variation in provider performance. 
To the best knowledge of the author as of the drafting of this document there have no studies 
been published that investigate by econometric means the influence of PSP on provider per-
formance for Colombia. A notable paper that analyses a related question with descriptive sta-
tistical procedures is the one of Sotomayor (2003). The author compares the performance of 3 
providers with PSP (Barranquilla, Cartagena and Tunja) and 3 public providers (Bogotá, 
Manizales and Medellín) with respect to expansion of services in low-income areas for the 
years 1995 to 1999. She finds no evidence for the hypothesis that providers with PSP dis-
criminate low socio-economic strata with respect to service expansion. Of the new water users 
connected, in all cities more than 50% corresponded to users from the strata 1 and 2, with the 
exception of the public provider of Bogotá. 
The specific purpose of the present section is to investigate the relation of PSP and 
• the evolution of coverage with piped water and sewerage connections, as well as 
• the evolution of the internal efficiency indicators unaccounted-for water (UFW) and 
collection rate (CR).294 
Unfortunately, the author could not gather sufficient and reliable data in order to investigate 
the relation of PSP and service quality (continuity and drinking water quality). 
The analysis is conducted in two steps by (i) comparing the averages of the performance indi-
cators for providers with PSP and public providers (5.5.3) and by (ii) performing a multivari-
ate regression analysis using the econometric model presented in chapter 4 with slight modifi-
cations (5.5.4). But first of all the data (5.5.1) and the hypotheses (5.5.2) are briefly discussed. 
                                                 
294 See subsection 5.1.2 for the definition of these indicators. 
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5.5.1 Data 
The data set comprises 30 urban service providers from 30 districts. It contains district-level 
cross-sectional data for the years 1998 and 2003 (table A5.1 in the annex lists the service pro-
viders and districts contained in the sample). The 30 districts contained in the sample have a 
total population of 20,266,535 (by 2003) which corresponds to almost half of the population 
of Colombia. The main portion of the data was made available by the regulatory agencies 
SSPD and CRA: coverage levels for piped water and sewerage, number of connections, UFW, 
CR, corporate form and ownership. This information was complemented with data from 
DANE (population), DNP (poverty indicator),295 and the National Institute of Hydrology, 
Meteorology and Environmental Studies – IDEAM (water resources vulnerability index) (see 
table A5.4 in the annex for a description of the variables used and the respective data 
sources). The dataset has the drawback that it does not include information on local govern-
ance because such indicators are not available on the district level. This means that govern-
ance has to be neglected in the quantitative analysis performed here, although it is supposed to 
influence WS service performance (see the following qualitative analysis in section 5.6 which 
focuses on the effects of local governance). 
The available time series are not long enough to analyse the effects of the delivery model by 
comparing performance before and after the introduction of PSP. Instead, a cross-sectional 
analysis is performed which, according to Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten (2004: 4), is princi-
pally able to provide a rigorous test of the effect of PSP. PSP is modelled as a dummy vari-
able (for more details on the model see subsection 5.5.4). All service providers contained in 
the sample are either ESPs or EICEs. In order to draw a line of distinction between “public” 
(variable PRIVATE = 0) and “private” delivery models (variable PRIVATE = 1), the follow-
ing criteria have been used: 
• Private: All ESPs with a share held by the private sector of ≥ 25% 
• Public: (i) All ESPs with a share held by the private sector of < 25%; (ii) all EICEs 
PSP delivery models were not further differentiated in concession, lease or management con-
tracts. The sample contains 10 cases classified as private and 20 cases classified as public (see 
table A5.1 for more details). Concerning the year of PSP engagement, in 8 cases engagement 
occurred prior to 1998 and in two cases (Montería and Tuluá) it falls within the period ana-
lysed (the year 2000 for both cases). 
5.5.2 Hypotheses 
What are the expected effects of PSP on internal efficiency and coverage indicators in the 
Colombian context? 
                                                 
295 “Índice de necesidades básicas insatisfechas”. For more details see below as well as table A5.4. 
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• Internal efficiency indicators: It is to expect that PSP delivery models will show a bet-
ter performance with respect to internal efficiency indicators than public providers. 
o The managements of EICEs and public ESPs depend on the district govern-
ment and are likely to give a relatively low priority to internal efficiency im-
provements because, in general, they have no strong profit motive. Moreover, 
mayors may use posts in the company for rewarding clients in the context of a 
clientelistic strategy which negatively affects internal efficiency (for more ar-
guments see subsection 5.4.3). 
o In addition, internal efficiency amongst public providers is expected to be low 
because tariff regulation so far has not provided strong incentives for improv-
ing internal efficiency (subsection 5.4.1) and control and sanctioning has 
proved to be especially difficult when dealing with public providers (see sub-
section 5.4.4). 
o Although tariff regulation also did not entail strong incentives for improving 
internal efficiency of private providers, thanks to the monitoring of private 
shareholders, the managements of private providers have incentives to improve 
CR and UFW, whenever this improves the cash flow of the provider. Private 
providers are, therefore, expected to show a better performance with respect to 
internal efficiency indicators. 
• Coverage indicators: The expected effect of PSP on the expansion of coverage is not 
clear: 
o The first argument is a methodological one: In principle, PSP can contribute 
directly and indirectly to spur coverage expansion. A direct effect can occur 
only in case of PSP models that entail private expansion investments (conces-
sions).296 Lease and management contracts can contribute only indirectly to 
spur coverage expansion (see second argument). The empirical approach cho-
sen here is not able to capture the direct effect because (i) the data set does not 
include information on investments, and (ii) the ownership variable does not 
distinguish between concession models and further PSP models in order to 
keep the regressions as simple as possible.297 
o A potential indirect effect of PSP on coverage expansion occurs if (i) the man-
agement of private providers is more effective in planning system expansions 
and in awarding and supervising construction activities than the management 
                                                 
296 With respect to this direct effect, PSP is expected to compare positively with public delivery models if pro-
viders with PSP have easier access to financial capital than purely public providers and therefore can invest 
more in the expansion of systems. 
297 See the next section 5.6 that investigates four cases to more detail. The two PSP models analysed are the one 
in Tunja and the one in Santa Marta. The former is a concession contract while the latter is a combination of 
lease and management contract. 
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of public service providers, and / or if (ii) the PSP engagement gives rise to in-
ternal efficiency gains (relative to public providers) and thus to higher cash 
flows that are used for financing replacement investments298 which, by conse-
quence, means that a higher proportion of the external financing can be used 
for expansion investments. These indirect effects depend, among other things, 
on the channel used for allocating the public funds (via the provider versus via 
the district government) and on the coordination between the district govern-
ment and the service provider (see subsection 5.4.3). 
5.5.3 Comparison of average performance indicators for 1998 and 2003 
 
Table 5.7: Coverage with piped water and sewerage for a sample of 30 service providers (1998-2003) 
Piped water household connections Sewer household connections  
Coverage 1998 
(a) 
Coverage 2003 
(b) 
(b/a) Coverage 1998 
(c) 
Coverage 2003 
(d) 
(d/c) 
Average total sam-
ple (30 obs.) 
91.02 % 94.63 % 1.040 83.91 % 85.18 % 1.015
Average providers 
w/ PSP (10 obs.) 
87.21 % 93.74 % 1.075 75.37 % 77.15 % 1.024
Average public 
providers (20 obs.) 
92.93 % 95.09 % 1.023 88.18 % 89.19 % 1.011
Source: Own calculations based on data provided by SSPD; CRA 
Table 5.7 shows the average coverage with piped water and sewer connections for the provid-
ers contained in the sample (years 1998 and 2003). Figures are presented (i) for the total sam-
ple, (ii) for private providers only and (iii) for public providers only. 
It can be seen that for the total sample, average coverage with piped water connections has 
increased by the factor 1.04 between 1998 and 2003, and average coverage with sewer con-
nections by the factor 1.015. When comparing the figures of private and public providers it is 
striking that for the sample of private providers (i) the initial average coverage with piped 
water and sewer connections is considerably lower and (ii) increases in average coverage be-
tween 1998 and 2003 are considerably higher (especially piped water). 
Table 5.8 has the same structure like table 5.7. It presents average UFW and average CR for 
the years 1998 and 2003. It is remarkable that for the total sample average UFW has wors-
ened from 42.23% (1998) to 44.24 (2003). Average CR, by contrast, has improved by the 
factor 1.039 and was 84.79% in 2003. Again, the figures of private and public providers differ 
                                                 
298 I.e. the higher cash flow (internal financing) is not exclusively used to increase the short-term profit of pri-
vate investors but is reinvested. 
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considerably. For the sample of private providers both indicators have evolved into the de-
sired direction: UFW has decreased by the factor 0.902 to a level of 43.16% and CR has in-
creased by the factor 1.138 to a level of 87.85%. By contrast, for the sample of public provid-
ers, both indicators have worsened between 1998 and 2003. 
 
Table 5.8: Internal efficiency indicators for a sample of 29 service providers (1998-2003) 
Unaccounted-for water Collection rate  
1998 (a) 2003 (b) (b/a) 1998 (c) 2003 (d) (d/c) 
Average total 
sample  
42.43 % 
(29 obs.) 
44.24 % 
(29 obs.) 
1.043 81.58 % 
(26 obs.) 
84.79 % 
(26 obs.) 
1.039
Average provid-
ers w/ PSP  
47.87 % 
(10 obs.) 
43.16 % 
(10 obs.) 
0.902 77.18 % 
(8 obs.) 
87.85 % 
(8 obs.) 
1.138
Average public 
providers  
39.56 % 
(19 obs.) 
44.81 % 
(19 obs.) 
1.133 83.53 % 
(18 obs.) 
83.42 % 
(18 obs.) 
0.999
Source: Own calculations based on data provided by SSPD; CRA 
To sum up: 
• For all four indicators, private providers show less favourable initial levels in 1998 
than their public counterparts; 
• Private providers show greater improvements between 1998 and 2003 with respect to 
all four indicators; 
• By 2003, private providers have “overtaken” their public counterparts with regard to 
the levels of UFW and CR, have considerably reduced the coverage gap with respect 
to piped water connections, and still show a clear coverage gap with respect to sewer 
connections. 
These results should be interpreted with special care. The comparison of sample averages is a 
very crude method and should be taken as a merely descriptive picture. In what follows it is 
tested by means of a multivariate regression model whether the apparent better performance 
of private providers with respect to internal efficiency indicators (and coverage indicators) 
can be confirmed when controlling for other plausible influencing factors. 
A final remark: The less favourable initial indicator values for the sample of private providers 
may be explained by the following. Several mayors seem to have engaged in a PSP process 
only after the formerly public service provider had reached a very critical situation in which it 
was close to bankruptcy, was delivering bad quality services and showed a considerable in-
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vestment backlog.299 This means that private providers typically took over enterprises and 
systems that were characterised by particularly bad performance indicators. 
5.5.4 Multivariate regression analysis300 
The models 
In what follows, two very similar econometric models are used: 
• UFW is regressed using the model described in E5.5. The structure of the model is 
identical to the one used in chapter 4 (see subsection 4.3.1 for a thorough discussion). 
The dependent variable is the value of UFW by 2003 (UFW03). UFW03 is regressed 
on UFW98 (the value of UFW by 1998), PRIVATE (“0” in case of public providers; 
“1” in case of private providers) and a vector of control variables (see below for the 
control variables used). CR is not regressed due to several missing values for the year 
1998. 
  
UFW03i = β0 + βj UFW98i + βj PRIVATE i + βj CONj, i + Ui     (i = 1,…m; j = 1,…n) (E5.5)
  
• For estimating the evolution of coverage with piped water (WAT) and sewer connec-
tions (SEW), the model is slightly modified (see E5.6). Unlike the model used in 
chapter 4, the dependent variable is not COV03 (which stands for both WAT03 and 
SEW03) but CHCOV. CHCOV is the change in coverage between 1998 and 2003 
(CHCOV = COV03 / COV98).301 The independent variables are COV98, COV98SQ 
(which is the square of COV98),302 PRIVATE, and further control variables (CONj). 
                                                 
299 Information gained in an interview with a sector expert. For an example documented in literature see the case 
of PSP in Cartagena analysed by Beato / Díaz (2003) and Nickson (2001). 
300 All calculations have been performed with the software STATA/SE 9.0 for Windows. 
301 Because COV03 is a proportion (that always takes values between 0 and 1) it is desirable that the predicted 
values also fall between 0 and 1. With the data used in chapter 4, it was no problem to use the coverage level 
directly as dependent variable because all predicted values actually fell into the allowed range (see subsec-
tion 4.3.1). This was like this because the values of the initial coverage level used as independent variable 
lay all considerably below 1 (or 100%). In the data sample used here, by contrast, some providers present 
initial coverage levels of 1. This implies that the predicted values would lie above 1 when using COV03 as 
dependent variable. In order to avoid this, instead of COV03, CHCOV is used as dependent variable – which 
is an equivalent procedure. 
302 Just like in subsection 4.3.1, the functional form of the relation CHCOV → F(COV98) has been explored by 
graphical analysis and by running a bivariate regression of CHCOV on the level of COV98 and then adding 
the square of COV98 to the model. For both, water and sewer connections, the results suggest that the rela-
tion is not linear. This is modelled by including both COV98 (level) and COV98SQ (square) on the right-
hand side of the model. For a discussion of such a procedure cf. Wooldridge (2006: 304-07). 
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CHCOVi = β0 + βj COV98i + βj COV98SQi + βj PRIVATE i + βj CONj, i + Ui  (E5.6)
(i = 1,…m; j = 1,…n)  
Just like in chapter 4, the models are initially estimated using OLS. In case of evidence for 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms, estimation procedures with (White-) heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors (HRSE) are used. Outlier analysis suggests that the results may be sen-
sitive to single influential data points. Therefore, all models are re-estimated using the “robust 
regression” (RR) procedure in order to check the sensitivity of the results (see subsection 
4.3.2 for more details). The summary statistics of all variables used in the regression analysis 
is given in table A5.5 (annex). 
Results for UFW03 
The results for the regression of UFW03 are reported in table 5.9. The independent vari-
ables303 included in the model, besides UFW98 and PRIVATE that were already touched 
above, are 
• CR, which is the average collection rate for the period 1998 to 2003 
• POP, which is the population growth of the district calculated by dividing the popula-
tion in 2003 by the population in 1998, and 
• VULWAT, which is an ordinally scaled indicator that expresses the vulnerability of 
water resources at the district level and which takes values between 1 – low vulner-
ability – and 5 – high vulnerability (see table A5.4 for a description of all variables 
used in the analysis). 
In addition, the variable POV has been tested which, however, proved not to be statistically 
significant and has been dropped from the model. POV (Índice de Necesidades Básicas Insat-
isfechas)304 is a multidimensional poverty index that measures the share of persons whose 
basic needs (housing, public services, education, income generation capacity) are not satisfied 
(the higher the index the higher the incidence of poverty). The values used correspond to the 
year 1993 which is the most recent year for which the index is available at the district level.  
 
                                                 
303 Apart from the independent variables mentioned, the influence of the size of the system (number of connec-
tions) was tested for all models discussed here. This variable proved to have no significant effects (results 
not reported). 
304 For a description and discussion of this index cf. Rodríguez del Gallego / Carvajal (2004). 
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Table 5.9: Results of regression estimates: dependent variable UFW03 
Independent Variables Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model UFWa Model UFWb## 
UFW98 0.617 
(5.11)*** 
0.630 
(6.78)*** 
PRIVATE - 0.069 
(- 2.83)*** 
- 0.053 
(- 2.83)*** 
CR - 0.389 
(- 3.85)*** 
- 0.475 
(- 6.11)*** 
POP 0.297 
(1.06) 
- 0.027 
(- 0.12) 
VULWAT - 0.035 
(- 2.13)** 
- 0.011 
(- 0.84) 
INTERCEPT 0.321 
(0.88) 
0.654 
(2.34)* 
N 29 29 
Ř2 0.736 0.806 
F 16.6*** 24.24*** 
   †) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05; *) p < 0.1. 
   ##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg in STATA). 
Model UFWa has been estimated using OLS and yielded an Ř2 of 0.736. The estimations for 
UFW98, PRIVATE, CR and VULAGUA are statistically significant and the slope parameters 
show the expected sign: UFW98 has a positive effect (the lower the initial value of UFW the 
lower UFW03), PRIVATE has a negative effect (PSP is associated with a lower UFW03), CR 
is also negative (the higher the collection rate the lower UFW03), just like VULWAT (the 
higher the vulnerability of water resources the lower UFW03). Population growth (POP) 
shows no statistically significant effect.305 
Results for CHWAT 
The case of “Villavicencio” is dropped for regressing coverage expansion with piped water 
connections (CHWAT) because it shows an unplausibly high decrease in coverage.306 The 
                                                 
305 The “robust regression” estimation procedure largely confirms the results (see model UFWb). The exception 
is VULWAT whose effect loses statistical significance. This result is largely due to the influential case of 
“Villavicencio” that shows an extremely high value for UFW03 (0.73) and a low vulnerability of water re-
sources (VULWAT = 2). Dropping “Villavicencio” from the OLS estimation renders the effect of VUL-
WAT statistically not significant (the results for the remaining independent variables remain largely the 
same). 
306 This strong decrease in coverage is due to a change in the definition of how to measure coverage in Vil-
lavicencio – see section 5.6.2. 
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results for CHWAT are reported in table 5.10. Besides the independent variables already 
touched above, UFWAV (average unaccounted-for water for the period 1998 to 2003) is in-
cluded in the model. 
 
Table 5.10: Results of regression estimates: dependent variable CHWAT 
Independent Variables Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model CHWATa Model CHWATb## 
WAT98 - 3.220 
(-3.65)*** 
- 4.649 
(2.87)*** 
WAT98SQ 1.382 
(2.62)** 
2.173 
(2.37)** 
PRIVATE - 0.001 
(- 0.10) 
- 0.013 
(- 1.00) 
UFWAV - 0.212 
(- 1.98)* 
- 0.168 
(- 1.75)* 
POP - 0.379 
(- 2.11)** 
- 0.211 
(- 1.27) 
POV 0.0007 
(0.55) 
0.0003 
(0.23) 
INTERCEPT 3.324 
(9.71)*** 
3.778 
(5.67)*** 
N 28 27 
Ř2 0.896 0.842 
F 39.71*** 24.12*** 
   †) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05, *) p < 0.1. 
   ##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg in STATA). 
OLS estimation (model CHWATa) yields an Ř2 of 0.896. A large portion of the high R2 is 
explained by the two variables that stand for the initial coverage level in 1998 (WAT98 and 
WAT98SQ).307 The estimated overall effect of the initial coverage level on CHWAT is nega-
tive and convex (see figure A5.3 in the annex for a depiction of the estimated functional 
form). The test of joint significance of WAT98 and WAT98SQ yields an F of 85.11 (highly 
significant). In addition to the reported variables, the influence of VULWAT and CR was 
tested which proved, however, to be not statistically significant. 
The slope parameter of PRIVATE is negative (which means that PSP is associated with a 
lower coverage expansion) but the effect is far from being statistically significant. In order to 
preclude that this lack of significance is due to multicollinearity308 problems, the model has 
                                                 
307 Regressing CHWAT on WAT98, WAT98SQ and an intercept yields an Ř2 of 0.734. 
308 On the effect of multicollinearity on estimation results cf. Wooldridge (2006: 101-104). 
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been re-estimated after dropping UFWAV, POP and POV. Nevertheless, the effect of PRI-
VATE remained statistically not significant. 
By contrast, the variables UFWAV and POP show significant effects: the higher unac-
counted-for water the lower coverage expansion and the greater population growth the lower 
coverage expansion. These results seem to be partially sensitive to influential data points 
(compare with model CHWATb estimated with RR): the statistically significant result is con-
firmed for UFWAV only. 
Results for CHSEW 
 
Table 5.11: Results of regression estimates: dependent variable CHSEW 
Independent Variables Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model CHSEWa# Model CHSEWb## 
SEW98 1.641 
(2.58)** 
1.80 
(2.33)** 
SEW98SQ - 1.373 
(- 3.27)*** 
- 1.245 
(- 2.79)** 
PRIVATE - 0.043 
(- 1.18) 
- 0.017 
(- 0.61) 
UFWAV - 0.329 
(- 2.48)** 
- 0.290 
(- 1.67) 
POP - 0.928 
(- 3.13)*** 
- 0.826 
(- 2.29)** 
POV 0.0031 
(1.73)* 
0.0023 
(1.03) 
INTERCEPT 1.759 
(4.23)*** 
1.541 
(4.04)*** 
N 29 29 
Ř2 0.540 0.481 
F 6.74*** 5.33*** 
   †) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05, *) p < 0.1. 
   #) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (HRSE); ##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg 
in STATA). 
For CHSEW (coverage expansion with sewer connections) estimation procedures with 
(White-) heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (HRSE) are used. Results (see model 
CHSEWa in table 5.11) are similar to those for piped water connections. However, it is re-
markable that the Ř2 is considerably lower (0.540), just as the F value for the whole model 
(6.74) which is, however, still significant at p < 0.01. 
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Again the joint effect of SEW98 and SEW98SQ is highly significant (F = 11.44). The esti-
mated functional form of the relation CHSEW → F(SEW98, SEW98SQ) is depicted in figure 
A5.4 (annex). The overall effect of the initial coverage on CHSEW is positive until a value of 
0.6 and then becomes negative (i.e. it is negative for the vast majority of the cases contained 
in the sample, since the vast majority shows values > 0.6 for SEW98). Just like for CHWAT, 
the negative effect of PRIVATE is not statistically significant, although the modulus is greater 
than above. This “relatively great” negative effect is explained by the strong influence of 
“Villa del Rosario” which shows an extremely great coverage expansion and has a public ser-
vice provider. Dropping Villa del Rosario renders the negative effect of PRIVATE very 
small. 
The remaining variables UFWAV, POP and POV are statistically significant and the slope 
parameters have the same sign like above. Again, these results are not integrally confirmed by 
the RR estimation procedure (see model CHSEWb). The effect of POV loses statistical sig-
nificance, just like the effect of UFWAV. The result is confirmed for POP which shows a 
robust and statistically significant negative effect on CHSEW. 
5.5.5 Conclusions 
The results of the regressions presented above should be interpreted with care. First, as has 
been mentioned in subsection 5.4.1, the data quality of the performance indicators has im-
proved only recently and reliability is still not very high for smaller districts. This means that 
the data quality, especially for the year 1998, could be lower than desirable. Second, some 
independent variables that are supposed to have an influence on the dependent variables could 
not be included in the models because data at the district level is not available or could not be 
gathered (e.g. governance, per capita income). Supposing that these variables – for instance 
governance – matter, the results are likely to be biased. These are quite important limitations 
and the points summarised in what follows should, therefore, be taken as preliminary results 
to be confirmed with new and more reliable data: 
• PSP shows a robust and statistically significant positive influence on the reduction of 
UFW. This result supports the hypothesis that PSP delivery models perform better 
than public delivery models with respect to internal efficiency achievements. 
• PSP shows a slightly negative effect on coverage expansion with piped water and 
sewer connections which is, however, not statistically significant. Interestingly, low 
UFW shows a statistically significant positive effect on coverage expansion (this ef-
fect is robust for piped water only). Since PSP is related to lower UFW, there could be 
an indirect positive effect of PSP on coverage expansion via higher internal efficiency. 
This seems to be an interesting supposition that would require further research. 
• As it is to expect, population growth is negatively associated with coverage expansion 
(this effect is robust for sewer connections only). 
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Finally, the main result of the regression analysis – the higher internal efficiency of PSP de-
livery models – is interpreted, drawing on the findings of the preceding sections 5.2 to 5.4. 
Households do not immediately benefit from a higher internal efficiency of service providers, 
as explained in the following: 
• Benefits for households that are already connected to the service emerge only if the 
higher internal efficiency (lower UFW, higher CR) translates into better and / or 
cheaper services. Whether this happens depends a lot on tariff and quality-of-service 
regulation. However, as has been discussed in section 5.4, tariff regulation until re-
cently did not include mechanisms designed to spur internal efficiency and to pass on 
efficiency gains to households. Moreover, control and sanctioning mechanisms remain 
weak and the quality of services with respect to continuity and drinking water stan-
dards shows considerable deficiencies, especially in intermediate and small districts 
(subsection 5.1.2). This means that in the Colombian context it cannot be taken for 
granted that connected households actually benefit notably from internal efficiency 
gains achieved through PSP. 
• Benefits for households that lack access to services emerge only if the higher internal 
efficiency and the associated higher cash-flow translate into higher replacement in-
vestments and thus – given a fixed amount of public funds to be allocated in the sector 
– into higher total investments (private and public together). Higher total investments 
mean that a higher portion can be used for expansion investments. Again this effect 
depends on the characteristics of regulation and on the coordination between the pub-
lic investment policy of the district and the investment plan of the service provider 
(see section 5.4). Since 86.5% of the population without services live in rural areas, it 
would be desirable for this effect to materialise especially in rural areas. However, 
conditions in rural areas are especially adverse: private providers are typically not in-
terested in serving rural areas, among other things due to the high atomisation of the 
industry and to especially low tariff levels. Moreover, capacity of district governments 
to conceive and implement (i) well designed PSP delivery models and (ii) sensible 
public investment policies are typically limited in rural areas. 
It makes therefore a difference whether policy succeeds in spurring internal efficiency by en-
couraging PSP (which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for welfare improvements 
of households) or whether, in addition, policy succeeds in translating these internal efficiency 
gains into better or cheaper services and into a greater coverage with services, by using pub-
lic-regarding regulatory and investment promotion instruments. The present section has pre-
sented some evidence that the former effect takes place in Colombia. However, bearing in 
mind the weaknesses worked out in the preceding sections 5.2 to 5.4, it can be doubted that 
governance structures and WS policies in Colombia are fully appropriate to bring around the 
second effect. 
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5.6 The influence of local governance on WS service provider performance: a 
comparison of Manizales, Santa Marta, Tunja and Villavicencio 
Since there is no comprehensive and reliable governance data available on the local level, the 
role of local governance for explaining the variation in WS service provider performance 
could not be tested in the preceding quantitative analysis. Therefore, the present section inves-
tigates with a qualitative approach the influence of local governance for a sample of four 
cases for which the author has collected information on WS service performance, local gov-
ernance and further important dimensions that can affect local service performance. The main 
hypothesis analysed is that the quality of local governance affects the performance of both 
public and private WS service providers. 
The main portion of the information was collected by the author during interviews in the four 
cities of Manizales, Santa Marta, Tunja and Villavicencio in July 2005 (see below for the se-
lection criteria). The interviews were conducted with representatives of the main organisa-
tions involved in the provision and consumption of WS services in each city: service provid-
ers, district governments, spokesmen of CDCSs and other user representatives, chambers of 
commerce, CARs, experts. The complete list of the organisations interviewed is given in table 
A5.6 (annex). The interviews as well as the additional material (e.g. annual reports of the ser-
vice providers) provided by the interview partners are the main sources of information used 
for the present section. Whenever other sources of information are used in the following 
analysis, this is made explicit by citing the respective source. In order to validate the informa-
tion gained in interviews or from the additional material provided by interviewees, this infor-
mation has been cross-checked with other sources – whenever possible. 
5.6.1 Selection of the four cases and procedure 
Selection of the four cases 
The sample has been purposefully selected: 
i. The four cases have been chosen on the dependent variable so that there is variation in 
service performance (i.e. two good performers and two bad performers have been cho-
sen). This procedure prevents a selection bias which is common in qualitative re-
search.309 
                                                 
309 If the causes of good provider performance are to be explained, there have to be chosen good as well as bad 
cases. If only good cases are investigated, the sample chosen presents a selection bias. On the problem of se-
lection bias in the context of intentional selections of small samples cf. King / Keohane / Verba (1994: 128-
149). The authors also discuss the pros and cons of intentional selection on the explanatory variables versus 
intentional selection on the dependent variables. For the present investigation, the latter procedure was pre-
ferred. 
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ii. The ownership of the providers has been intentionally selected so that it is unrelated to 
the variation in the performance. I.e. amongst the two good providers chosen there is 
one public and one private just as amongst the two bad providers there is one public 
and one private. 
iii. The four cases are relatively similar with respect to the size of the cities (they have 
been chosen amongst the group of intermediate cities). This precludes largely a sys-
tematic effect of system size on service performance. 
The intention behind this selection procedure is to avoid that the variation in two important 
control variables (ownership, size) causes variation in service performance. This eases the 
endeavour of capturing the supposed effect of local governance on service performance. Such 
a selection procedure is well suited to explore the supposed causal relation between two vari-
ables and to gain information about the empirical plausibility of such a causal relation (King / 
Keohane / Verba 1994: 141-142). 
The exact selection procedure was the following: Relying on the data on WS service perform-
ance and ownership available in advance of the field stay, the four cases have been selected 
amongst the group of intermediate cities contained in the data set described in subsection 
5.5.1310 (see table A5.7a in the annex for the 24 cities considered). Besides the intention of 
“holding the city size fix”, there was also a pragmatic reason for concentrating on intermedi-
ate cities. Interviewing the relevant stakeholders and representatives from the organisations 
involved in the provision and consumption of WS services within the limited time available 
seemed easier to be accomplished when avoiding the big capitals where there are more actors 
involved and the institutional structures are more complex. 
Eight indicators have been considered for assessing the quality of performance:311 (i) average 
coverage with piped water connections 1998-2003, (ii) average coverage with sewer connec-
tions 1998-2003, (iii) average UFW 1998-2003, (iv) average CR 1998-2003, (v) change in 
coverage with piped water connections between 1998 and 2003, (vi) change in coverage with 
sewer connections between 1998 and 2003, (vii) change in UFW between 1998 and 2003, 
(viii) change in CR between 1998 and 2003. The 24 cases were ranked for each indicator, 
ranking the “best” performer highest and the “worst” performer lowest. For each indicator, 
cases received scores equal to their rank position (i.e. the case ranked first received one score 
and the case ranked last received 24 scores). After, total scores for each case were calculated 
by adding the scores for the eight indicators. Finally, cases were ranked according to their 
total scores yielding the rank order listed in table A5.7a. The 8 cases ranked highest were con-
                                                 
310 I.e. all 30 cities contained in the sample (see table A5.1) except the four capitals above 1 million habitants 
(Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali, Medellín). Moreover, due to missing values the cases of Sincelejo and Tuluá 
have not been considered for the selection procedure. This means that the four cases have been selected 
amongst a sample of 24 cities. 
311 See also table A5.4 for the data sources. 
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sidered “good” performers and the 8 cases ranked lowest were considered “bad” performers 
(the remaining 8 cases were considered “average” performers).312 
Amongst the eight good performers the cases of Manizales (public provider “Aguas de Mani-
zales”) and Tunja (private provider “Sera QA”) were selected and amongst the eight bad per-
formers the cases of Santa Marta (private provider “Metroagua”) and Villavicencio (public 
provider “Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Villavicencio – EAAV”) were selected. 
Besides the intentional selection on ownership addressed above, the following additional se-
lection criteria have been applied in this second step: (i) security recommendations of GTZ 
(German Agency for Technical Co-operation) in Colombia that advised not to travel to certain 
regions of the country and (ii) availability of contacts to the main actors involved in the local 
provision and consumption of WS services. The four cities are on the map A5.1 in the annex. 
Question and procedure 
The hypothesis explored in the present section is that the variation in service performance of 
public as well as private providers can be explained by the variation in the quality of local 
governance. Or, to put it differently, the section tries to solve the following puzzle: Why is the 
performance shown by Aguas de Manizales relatively good (in spite of being a public pro-
vider), and why is the performance shown by Metroagua Santa Marta relatively bad (in spite 
of being a private provider)? Can the pattern in the performance of the four cases selected be 
explained by local governance factors? 
Resuming the hypotheses formulated above (see subsection 5.5.2 for the detailed argumenta-
tion) concerning the effects of ownership on internal efficiency and coverage with services it 
can be said what follows: 
1. Internal efficiency: Private providers are expected to show a better performance with 
respect to internal efficiency indicators. The preliminary statistical results obtained in 
5.5.2 support this hypothesis. 
2. Coverage: The effect of ownership on coverage expansion is more ambiguous and is 
expected to depend on the specifics of the delivery model, on the local public invest-
ment policy and on the local political governance. 
                                                 
312 An alternative procedure to distinguish between „good“ and „bad“ performers would have been to group 
cases according to the magnitude of the total score differences between them (see table A5.7b in the annex 
for the results). Grouping the cases according to the five highest score differences yields 6 performance 
groups: “very good” (1 case), “good” (8 cases), “average” (4 cases), “bad” (9 cases), “very bad” (1 case) and 
“extremely bad” (1 case). The four cases that have been selected would have fallen within the groups “good” 
(Manizales and Tunja), “bad” (Santa Marta) and “very bad” (Villavicencio). This means that the alternative 
procedure roughly confirms the case selection actually made, the limitation being that Villavicencio shows 
an especially bad performance, even if compared to Santa Marta. 
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Thanks to the purposeful case selection, the ownership of the provider is unrelated to the 
variation in performance, i.e. amongst the four cases chosen there are (i) two cases that clearly 
contradict the first statement and (ii) two cases that confirm it: 
i. Aguas de Manizales (public) shows good internal efficiency (as well as coverage) in-
dicators and Metroagua Santa Marta (private) shows bad internal efficiency (as well as 
coverage) indicators; 
ii. Sera QA Tunja (private) shows good internal efficiency (as well as coverage) indica-
tors and EAA Villavicencio (public) shows bad internal efficiency (as well as cover-
age) indicators. 
The proposition is that (a) the unexpected performance of Aguas de Manizales and Metroagua 
Santa Marta with respect to internal efficiency can be explained by local governance factors 
and (b) that the same governance factors that dominate the ownership effect on internal effi-
ciency can explain the good (respective bad) performance with respect to coverage. 
This section proceeds in the following way. It describes the patterns of variation amongst the 
four cases for the dependent variables (performance indicators), the explanatory variables of 
interest (local governance) as well as further explanatory variables that are likely to affect the 
service performance and, finally, draws conclusions regarding the proposition formulated 
above. 
Subsection 5.6.2 describes in detail the service performance of the four companies. This is 
done by using the information provided by the companies themselves (instead of the informa-
tion given by SSPD and CRA). Moreover, some basic characteristics of the respective WS 
systems are described, in order to identify technical reasons that may contribute to explain the 
variation in the performance indicators. Subsection 5.6.3 briefly discusses the variation in 
socio-economic conditions which may be related to the variation in the performance. Subsec-
tion 5.6.4 enters into the details of the four delivery models in order to check whether the 
variation in the performance amongst the two public (two private) cases are rooted in institu-
tional differences between the two public (two private) delivery models. For instance, Aguas 
de Manizales is an ESP whereas EAA Villavicencio is an EICE, and Sera QA Tunja is a con-
cession model whereas Metroagua Santa Marta is a lease model. After having assessed the 
technical and socio-economic context as well as the delivery model characteristics, subsection 
5.6.5 concentrates on analysing the main proposition stated above, i.e. whether the variation 
in the performance can be explained by local governance factors. Finally, subsection 5.6.6 
concludes. 
5.6.2 WS service performance and system characteristics 
Table 5.12 summarises important performance indicators for the four cases as well as some 
basic system characteristics. The information reported stems from the service companies and 
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was either provided on request of the author or taken from the companies’ annual and moni-
toring reports. This information partially differs from the information provided by SSPD and 
CRA on which the case selection was based. 
The information gathered largely confirms the classification in underperforming and “over-
performing” cases as far as the levels of the four indicators used for the case selection are 
concerned (coverage with water and sewer connections, UFW and CR). Aguas de Manizales 
and Sera QA Tunja show clearly313 better values than EAA Villavicencio and Metroagua 
Santa Marta with respect to these indicators. The picture is not that clear cut with respect to 
change over time of these indicators and as far as some additional indicators reported in the 
table are concerned. In the following service performance, basic system characteristics and 
main investment needs are discussed for each of the cases. 
One important context information is given in advance. Relatively recent environmental legis-
lation provides environmental authorities (CARs) with the authority to levy considerable 
wastewater discharge fees on WS service providers. Fees depend on the degree of contamina-
tion of the effluents. This explains why investments in wastewater collection and treatment 
are given a great attention in the cities discussed. 
Aguas de Manizales 
Amongst the four cases chosen, the public service provider Aguas de Manizales was ranked 
highest according to the data of SSPD and CRA (see table A5.7a). This relative position is 
confirmed by the information reported in table 5.12 according to which Aguas de Manizales 
outperforms the other three cases. 
Between 2000 and 2004 the company has maintained or improved performance indicators on 
a high level, notably coverage with water and sewer connections which is close to 100%.314 
Aguas de Manizales presents the lowest UFW and the highest CR. Coverage with meters is 
100%. Labour efficiency (number of workers per 1,000 connections) is comparable to the two 
private providers (3.5 in 2004). The continuity of water service reported is 24 hours per day 
and, according to the information given by the company, the water delivered has continuously 
met legal drinking water quality standards. This latter point is corroborated by the reports on 
drinking water quality published by SSPD (2004b; 2005c) and by the statements of two user 
representatives who judge the service quality as good. 
 
 
                                                 
313 The difference between Sera QA Tunja and EAA Villavicencio with respect to the collection rate is only 
moderate. 
314 The only exception is coverage with sewer connections which has slightly fallen from 98.8% to 98.2%. 
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Table 5.12: Main indicators and characteristics of the four cases (information given by enterprises) 
 Aguas de Manizales Sera QA Tunja EAA Villavicencio Metroagua S. Marta
 2000 2004 1998 2004 2001 2004 1999 2004 
Performance indicators 
Coverage* water 99.5% 99.5% 98% 100% 53.3%** 58.5% 79% 88% 
Coverage* sewer 98.8% 98.2% 95.8% 98.2% 57.6%** 60.5% 69% 74% 
UFW 32.3% 29.7% 48% 42% 77.5% 67.5% 62% 48% 
Collection rate 97.7% 99.4% 87% 93% 86% 91% n.a. 70%# 
Continuity water 24h/day 24h/day 17.7h/day 24h/day 20.5h/day 23.7h/day n.a. 22h/day# 
Coverage meters 100% 100% 98% 100% 48.3% 82.7% n.a. 62% 
Workers/ 1,000 
water connections 
3.6 3.5 n.a. 3.5 6.8 4.2 4 3.2 
Production data and system characteristics 
Water connections 76,637 80,737 25,353 30,993 53,547 63,922 56,724 69,231 
Water produced/ 
connection 
(m3/month)† 
n.a. 30.5 n.a. 25.8 n.a. 58.0 n.a. 41.5 
Vulnerability of 
water resources†† 
High High Low High 
Pumping required No Yes Most part of the year/ 
main system: No 
Yes 
Sewer system Wastewater and 
stormwater  
(partially separate) 
Wastewater and 
stormwater  
(combined) 
Wastewater and 
stormwater  
(combined) 
Wastewater only  
(no stormwater) 
Wastewater treat-
ment 
No No No Yes (submarine 
wastewater diffuser) 
Ownership Public Private Public Private  
n.a. = not available 
*) Refers to urban areas 
**) Estimated by the author based on the available coverage figures (new definition of measurement) for 2004, 
the number of water and sewer connections (2001, 2004) and population (2001, 2004). Coverage in 2001 accord-
ing to the old definition of service area was: 77% (water); 85% (sewer). 
#) May 2005 
†) Author’s calculations based on water production data 
††) Source: IDEAM (without year: cuadro 5); scale of the indicator: very low, low, middle, high, very high 
Source: Information provided directly by the enterprises or contained in their annual reports 
 
These very positive figures have to be judged considering the initial situation as well as the 
technical characteristics of the system. Unlike the other three cases, Aguas de Manizales 
shows very favourable initial values for all performance indicators. The high initial coverage 
levels could be maintained by expanding the number of water connections by a very moderate 
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annual growth rate of 1.3%.315 Moreover, water consumption per connection has been de-
creasing during the last years and installed drinking water production capacity lies well above 
the capacity needed to meet demand.316 Taken altogether, this means very low or even absent 
investment needs for system expansion. The management could, thus, concentrate efforts and 
financial means on improving the already high technical and commercial efficiency. An addi-
tional advantage is rooted in the water distribution system which is integrally gravity fed. This 
implies lower production costs because no investments in pumps are required and no energy 
costs for pumping have to be incurred. 
The most pressing problems and investment needs are related to the environmental dimen-
sion. Except for a very small pilot plant, wastewater is not treated. The wastewater includes 
industrial effluents which are an important source of contamination of the Chinchiná River. 
The construction of interceptor sewers for the collection of wastewater is in progress. The fact 
that the sewer system partially separates storm and wastewater eases this endeavour. The 
technology to be used for wastewater treatment had still to be defined by end of 2005. 
According to IDEAM (without year: cuadro 5), the vulnerability of water resources in Mani-
zales (conditions of a dry year) is high,317 just like in Tunja and Santa Marta but unlike in Vil-
lavicencio (low). The environmental authority CORPOCALDAS has engaged in a strategy for 
the management and conservation of the up-river water sources which feed the city of Mani-
zales. There seems to be a close cooperation between CORPOCALDAS, Aguas de Manizales 
and the district government to this respect. 
Sera QA Tunja 
The private service provider Sera QA Tunja is the second company classified as good per-
former. By 2004, it shows values for the indicators coverage with water and sewer connec-
tions, coverage with meters, continuity of water service and labour efficiency that are just as 
good as those shown by Aguas de Manizales. UFW (42%) and CR (93%) are worse but still 
the second best of the sample. As far as drinking water standards are concerned, the company 
states that the water delivered meets legal standards. However, according to the information 
published by SSPD (2004b; 2005c), during 2003 and 2004 the water did not meet legal stan-
dards. These reports have been called into question by Sera QA Tunja. In this context it has to 
be reminded that the reliability of the information on drinking water quality reported by SSPD 
has been repeatedly disputed by service providers (see subsection 5.4.4). 
                                                 
315 Annual growth rate corresponding to the increase of water connections from 76,637 (2000) to 80,737 (2004). 
316 Installed drinking water production capacity is 2,066 litres per second whereas the actual water production is 
950 litres per second. 
317 The values of the ordinally scaled indicator are: very low, low, middle, high, very high. 
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Sera QA Tunja presents less favourable initial values with respect to the values of the indica-
tors UFW, CR and continuity of service than Aguas de Manizales. The company managed to 
improve these indicators and to maintain the high levels of coverage during the period in 
question while facing a growth of water connections corresponding to an annual rate of 
3.4%.318 The improvement of the continuity of the water service seems especially remarkable, 
since for decades Tunja has had a bad reputation in Colombia for the discontinuity and lack of 
water service (Tunja shared this bad reputation with Villavicencio). The improvements have 
been associated with important intellectual and physical investments during the period in 
question e.g. in an inventory of pipes, a sectorisation of the water distribution network, the 
interconnection of the two main water sources of the city (superficial source and aquifer), the 
replacement of old water pipes, and the construction and installation of additional storage 
tanks and pumps. Unlike Manizales, which integrally relies on (up to now reliable) superficial 
water sources, Tunja faces a shortage of superficial water sources and has to use both superfi-
cial sources and the aquifer. This means that the company has to rely on pumping during the 
whole year. 
Similar to Manizales, by 2005 the most important problems and future investment needs are 
related to wastewater collection and treatment and to the management and protection of water 
sources. Construction activities with respect to separating storm and wastewater sewers and to 
installing interceptor sewers for the collection of wastewater are in an advanced stage and the 
project for the construction of the first module of a wastewater treatment plant is ready. Con-
cerning protection and management of the up-stream superficial water sources, according to 
information gained in an interview with a representative of the responsible environmental 
authority (CORPOBOYACÁ), the district of Tunja and Sera QA are not willing to financially 
support necessary conservation activities planned by CORPOBOYACÁ. 
EAA Villavicencio 
Based on the data reported by SSPD and CRA (years 1998 and 2003), the public service pro-
vider EAA Villavicencio had been ranked worst of the four cases because it not only showed 
unfavourable average values but also worsening of some indicators. This gloomy picture is 
not integrally confirmed by the information available from the company according to which 
performance indicators have improved between 2001 and 2004. 
Nevertheless, all indicators show a poor performance by 2001, particularly UFW (77.5%), 
labour efficiency (6.8 workers per 1,000 connections), and coverage with water (53.3%) and 
sewer (57.6%)319 connections. The situation with respect to coverage with water and sewer 
services is very particular in Villavicencio and needs to be commented on. Since for many 
                                                 
318 Annual growth rate corresponding to the increase of water connections from 25,353 (1998) to 30,993 (2004). 
319 The coverage figures by 2001 according to the “new” coverage definition (see below) were estimated by the 
author based on the available coverage figures for 2004, the number of water and sewer connections (2001, 
2004) and population (2001, 2004). 
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years the company has been delivering a discontinuous and bad water service, in the context 
of the construction of new neighbourhoods, there have been founded several private water 
providers which typically exploit the aquifer and serve their neighbourhood only.320 This his-
tory partially explains the ambiguity of the available information on service coverage. Ac-
cording to the “old” coverage definition, these neighbourhoods were not considered when 
calculating coverage since they did not belong to the service area of EAA Villavicencio. 
However, by request of SSPD since 2003 the whole urban area has to be considered when 
calculating coverage which explains the extremely low figures reported in table 5.12. Accord-
ing to the “old” definition, coverage in 2001 was 77% (water) and 85% (sewer). The appar-
ently low coverage with services in Villavicencio implies that many households have to rely 
on unsafe or expensive sources for their domestic water supply. 
Starting from a low level and according to the data presented in the table, the company has 
achieved major improvements between 2001 and 2004, particularly with respect to continuity 
of service, coverage with meters and labour efficiency. The annual growth rate of water con-
nections (6.1%)321 is the highest amongst the four cases. However, the biggest portion of the 
increase in connections does not correspond to new connections but to the acquisition of two 
private water providers in 2002 and 2003 by EAA Villavicencio. The improvements in conti-
nuity have only become possible since the completion of a new surface water captation sys-
tem in 1998. This has considerably increased raw water availability and has made it possible 
to feed the system most time of the year by gravity without having to rely on pumping from 
the Guaitiquía River. Before 1998, service interruption was rather the rule than the exception 
for the users of EAA Villavicencio. 
However, UFW is still on a very high level in 2004 (67.5%) pointing at major incentive prob-
lems with regard to internal efficiency. The great technical and commercial322 water losses 
imply unnecessary drinking water treatment costs (EAA Villavicencio produces more than 
double of drinking water per connection than Sera QA Tunja). Similar to the case of Tunja, 
the available information regarding the water quality is ambiguous: according to the reports of 
EAA Villavicencio, the water delivered has been meeting the legal standards, whereas accord-
ing to the report published by SSPD (2005c) it did not in 2004. Doubts concerning the water 
quality are corroborated by a report of the district auditor of Villavicencio in 2005 who estab-
lishes the bad condition and maintenance of the main drinking water treatment plant.323 
Moreover, according to information reported by Veeduría de Servicios Públicos (2003), there 
                                                 
320 According to the information gained from EAA Villavicencio, there are 57 private water companies in the 
city. 
321 Annual growth rate corresponding to the increase of water connections from 53,547 (2001) to 63,922 (2004). 
322 The commercial water losses are related to the low coverage with meters. Residential users without meters 
are billed based on an assumed monthly consumption of 20 m3. There are indications that many users with-
out meters consume considerably more water. 
323 Cf. “Conclusiones de visita fiscal realizada a la planta de tratamiento de aguas de La Esmeralda”, www.con 
traloriavillavicencio.gov.co (accessed on 29/11/2006). 
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have been major service interruptions in 2002 and 2003 of more than 2 weeks in each case. 
This in spite of the abundance and low vulnerability of water sources in the district of Vil-
lavicencio which presents the most advantageous natural conditions of the four districts. 
The problems sketched show that there is a major need for improvements and suggest that 
efforts and investments should be concentrated on reducing the existing coverage gap and on 
improving UFW, continuity and quality of service. Besides, there seems to be a need for start-
ing to face the problem of wastewater effluents that until today are released into the water 
body without any treatment. By 2005, the management of EAA Villavicencio and the district 
government were clearly prioritising the latter point, concentrating attention and financial 
means on a very ambitious project comprising the construction of interceptor sewers for 
wastewater collection and the construction of a wastewater treatment plant with a planned 
investment volume (2003-2010) of 233,350 million Colombian Pesos.324  
Metroagua Santa Marta 
The private provider Metroagua Santa Marta is the second company classified as bad per-
former. Similar to EAA Villavicencio, the company shows very unfavourable initial values 
for coverage with water (79%) and sewer (69%) connections and UFW (62%) in 1999.325 The 
company managed to improve these indicators considerably until 2004, particularly coverage 
with water connections (88%) and UFW (48%). Consistent with the increase in coverage, the 
annual growth rate of water connections is the second highest of the sample (4.1%).326 How-
ever, the coverage gap by 2004 is still great implying that many families, especially those 
living in the poor peri-urban settlements of Santa Marta, are without safe water and sewer 
services (see below). Moreover, continuity of water service (22 hours/day) and coverage with 
meters (62%) present low values. The collection rate (70%) is remarkably poor for a private 
provider and is by far the worst of the four cases. Only the indicator for labour efficiency pre-
sents a favourable value (3.2 workers per 1,000 connections). Unlike in the other three cities, 
in Santa Marta there is no stormwater sewer system implying frequent flooding of the streets 
during the rainy season. 
Again, the information on drinking water quality is ambiguous, with the company stating that 
the water released into the distribution network meets legal standards, but SSPD (2005c) re-
porting that it did not in 2004. The statements of several users corroborate problems with 
drinking water quality. Moreover, according to these users the discontinuity of service and the 
lack of pressure seems to be considerably more pronounced than the value of the continuity 
indicator suggests. In various neighbourhoods it is common that the water service is available 
                                                 
324 102.53 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). On the wastewater 
investment project cf. also BRC Investor Services S.A. (2004). 
325 Unfortunately the indicators collection rate, continuity and coverage with meters were not available for 1999. 
326 Annual growth rate corresponding to the increase of water connections from 56,724 (1999) to 69,231 (2004). 
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only during some hours between midnight and the early morning. In other cases, when the 
water service is interrupted for longer periods, households have to rely on water vendors or 
tanker trucks. These deficiencies may partially explain the extremely low collection rate of 
Metroagua Santa Marta.327  
With regard to the deficiencies in service quality, it has to be commented on the particular 
social conditions in Santa Marta. Unlike in Manizales and in Tunja and to a greater extent 
than in Villavicencio, in Santa Marta there is a growing number of poor peri-urban settle-
ments. These settlements typically have been built on state property without any regulation 
and without any WS or other infrastructure. In order to have access to water, the dwellers of 
many of these settlements have connected themselves illegally and in a non-professional way 
to the water network operated by Metroagua (approximately 10,000 dwellings are connected 
in such conditions according to information given by the company). Several of the settlements 
have been built on the hills above the storage tanks of the distribution system and dwellers use 
motor pumps to transport the water to their homes. According to Metroagua Santa Marta, 
apart from causing high UFW, the illegal connections and the use of motor pumps give rise to 
a drop in pressure in the distribution network and to a contamination of the water, which 
negatively affects the quality of service for all users. 
A further problem that is related to the discontinuity and low quality of service is the low cap-
tation capacity from superficial water sources (water flows have been shrinking during the 
last years). This means that raw water production has to rely heavily on the aquifer (60% of 
the water produced during the dry season and 40% during the rest of the year) and thus im-
plies relatively high energy costs for pumping and service interruptions in case of power fail-
ures (which are relatively common in Santa Marta). The limited raw water availability is 
compounded by the relatively low drinking water production capacity (1,080 litres per sec-
ond) and the high UFW. 
The problems explained make clear that there are big challenges that need to be faced which 
involve major investments, above all expanding coverage with services and improving their 
continuity and, related to this, reducing UFW and possibly expanding raw as well as drinking 
water production capacity. By 2005, the district and the company were working on these is-
sues. The major investment projects planned or recently initiated were the construction of new 
domestic water and sewer connections, a project for augmenting surface water captation ca-
pacity and the construction of a major rainwater collector sewer in order to prevent flooding. 
However, it is likely that the problems regarding the service quality will persist unless there is 
found an integral solution for the peri-urban settlements. Finally, there is an urgent need for 
designing and implementing an integrated management of the up-stream water resources 
stemming from the Sierra Nevada because quality and quantity of these resources have con-
siderably diminished during the last years. 
                                                 
327 Another explanation given by the management of Metroagua is that many users in Santa Marta are not used 
to pay for WS services because they rarely had to do it in the past. This is why their willingness to pay for 
these services is low. 
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Summary 
Summing up and neglecting the aspects related to wastewater treatment and up-stream water 
resource management and protection, it can be stated that in the period of analysis 
• Aguas de Manizales (i) maintained all performance indicators on a high level, (ii) pre-
sented a low growth rate in the number of connections, (iii) benefited from favourable 
technical conditions (no pumping); 
• Sera QA Tunja (i) maintained coverage with services and coverage with meters on a 
high level, (ii) improved the remaining indicators, particularly continuity of water ser-
vices, (iii) showed an intermediate growth rate in the number of connections, (iv) op-
erated a system that relies on pumping during the whole year; 
• EAA Villavicencio (i) improved performance indicators starting from low levels, (ii) 
presented a high growth rate in the number of connections which is, however, mainly 
explained by the acquisition of existing private providers, (iii) by 2004 still showed 
important performance deficiencies, particularly with respect to UFW (which is ex-
tremely high), coverage with meters and coverage with services, (iv) operated a sys-
tem that relies only partially on pumping; 
• Metroagua Santa Marta (i) improved performance indicators starting from a low level, 
(ii) showed relatively high growth in new connections, (iii) by 2004 still showed im-
portant performance deficiencies, particularly with respect to the collection rate, cov-
erage with services, coverage with meters and continuity, (iv) operated a system that 
relies on pumping during the whole year. 
5.6.3 Socio-economic conditions 
Before it is turned to describing and analysing the institutional design of service delivery 
(5.6.4) and local governance factors (5.6.5), the socio-economic context of the four cities is 
briefly touched. 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 list some basic indicators that illustrate the socio-economic context of 
the four districts in question. Unfortunately, data like GDP per capita, health and literacy in-
dicators are not available on the district level. This is why these indicators are reported for the 
province level (see table 5.14), i.e. for Caldas (capital Manizales), Boyacá (capital Tunja), 
Meta (capital Villavicencio) and Magdalena (capital Santa Marta). Since the values for the 
provinces are to an important portion determined by their capitals, these indicators are used as 
proxies for describing the relative conditions in the capitals. 
The demographic, health and housing indicators present a pattern according to which Maniza-
les shows the most favourable values, followed by Tunja, Villavicencio and finally by Santa 
Marta (see annual population growth, number of displaced people as share of the population, 
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neonatal mortality, share of households with housing deficits). Santa Marta received by far 
the greatest number of displaced328 people between 1999 and 2005 (measured as share of the 
population in 2004) and presents the highest share of households with housing deficits. These 
indicators are in line with the information gained in the interviews according to which in 
Manizales and Tunja there were no families living in squatter settlements, in Villavicencio a 
considerable number and in Santa Marta even more. 
The remaining indicators listed show a more diverse picture. As far as illiteracy is concerned, 
Manizales (most favourable) and Santa Marta (least favourable) maintain their rank positions 
whereas Villavicencio (second most favourable) and Tunja (second least favourable) change 
their positions. The GDP per capita is greatest in Villavicencio (which is to a good degree 
explained by the oil production that occurs in the Province of Meta), followed by Manizales, 
Tunja and Santa Marta. The pattern with respect to the WS user structure is remarkable in so 
far as Santa Marta, which is one of the “bad” performers, presents the most favourable pro-
portion of subsidees to contributors. It is followed by Manizales and Villavicencio. Finally, 
Tunja presents by far the most unfavourable user structure: there are 8.74 subsidees per con-
tributor. This is mainly explained by the fact that in Tunja there is no residential stratum 6. 
 
Table 5.13: Socio-economic indicators (district level) 
 Manizales Tunja Villavicencio Santa Marta 
Population (2004)* 355,368 116,420 314,015 418,630 
Annual population growth (1998-
2004)** 
1.04 % 1.20 % 2.83 % 3.14 % 
No. of displaced people received 
1999-2005 as share of the population 
in 2004*** 
2.25 % 3.12 % 8.79 % 16.73 % 
Total annual receipts of district gov-
ernment per capita (thousands Co-
lombian Pesos)# 
351.85 394.39 354.81 308.14 
User structure (proportion of sub-
sidees per contributor by 2004)# # 
3.67 8.74 4.76 2.95 
*) DANE; www.dane.gov.co (accessed on 11/11/2006): Urban area (“cabecera”) 
**) Own calculations with data from DANE 
***) Own calculations with data published in CODHES (2005) 
#) Average of the years 2001 to 2004 (current Col. Pesos); own calculations with data provided by DNP 
##) Own calculations with data provided by the WS service providers 
                                                 
328 The term displaced people in Colombia refers to those persons that have to leave their home (and possibly 
their land) due to threats by non-state armed groups or due to conflicts among these groups or between these 
groups and the state security forces. 
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With regard to the financial situation of the districts, the figures reported in table 5.13 show 
that total district government receipts329 per capita are highest in Tunja, followed by Vil-
lavicencio and Manizales, that show very similar amounts, and finally by Santa Marta. More-
over, the district of Santa Marta is highly indebted. Under the mediation of the Ministry of 
Finance, in 2004 the district government has subscribed an agreement with its creditors in 
order to restructure its debt.330 This agreement restricts the district’s ability to issue new debt 
and demands for fiscal austerity. 
 
Table 5.14: Socio-economic indicators (provincial level) 
 Caldas 
(Manizales) 
Boyacá 
(Tunja) 
Meta  
(Villavicencio) 
Magdalena 
(Santa Marta) 
GDP per capita (2001)* 1,473,030 1,382,306 2,058,516 936,466 
Neonatal mortality (2000) 
(deaths /100,000 habitants) 
14.9 15.8 19.4 22.7 
Illiteracy (2002)  7.3 % 9.9 % 8.4 % 11.9 % 
Share of households with 
housing deficit (2000) 
14.4 % 22.5 % 29.0 % 39.2 % 
*) Constant million Col. Pesos 1994 
Source: DNP, Información básica regional, Datos generales,  www.dnp.gov.co/paginas_detalle.aspx?idp=197 
(accessed on 8/11/2006) 
 
To sum up, it can be said that the pattern of the demographic, health and housing indicators 
corroborates the pattern of the WS performance indicators described above, according to 
which Manizales and Tunja are the good performers and Villavicencio and Santa Marta the 
bad performers, and suggests that the WS performance may be related to these socio-
economic dimensions. The picture for the remaining indicators is a little more diverse. Never-
theless, there is one striking feature: except for the user structure, Santa Marta shows the least 
favourable values for all indicators discussed, and, in addition, its district government had to 
subscribe an agreement for restructuring its unsustainable debt. 
5.6.4 Institutional design of service delivery and financing 
The present subsection describes and compares the main aspects of the institutional design of 
service delivery as well as the related aspect of financing. The question to be asked here is 
whether the variation in the performance between the two public cases (between the two pri-
                                                 
329 The biggest portion of the receipts corresponds to transfers from the national government. 
330 Cf. “Acuerdo de reestructuración de pasivos celebrado entre el Distrito Turístico, Cultural e Histórico de 
Santa Marta (Magdalena) y sus acreedores con base en la Ley 550 de 1999”, http://www.minhacienda. 
gov.co/pls/portal30/docs/PAGE/DAF/ACUERDOSLEY550/ACUERDOS_MUNICIPIOS/SANTA%20MA
RTA.ZIP (accessed on 31/11/2006). 
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vate cases) can be explained by differences in the specifics of the two public (of the two PSP) 
delivery models. 
All four companies are members of the National Association of Public Service-Providing 
Companies (ANDESCO) which is the most important lobby organisation for service provid-
ers. Table 5.15 summarises important characteristics related to the institutional design (own-
ership, corporate form, contractual arrangement), the tariff level and the profitability which 
are discussed to more detail in what follows. First the two public, then the two PSP delivery 
models are treated. 
Aguas de Manizales 
Institutional design of service delivery 
Aguas de Manizales is a stock corporation (ESP) founded in 1996 in reaction to the Public 
Services Law (1994) that prescribed a corporatisation of service providers (see subsection 
5.3.4). 99.8% of the shares are held by Instituto de Financiamiento, Promoción y Desarrollo 
de Manizales (INFIMANIZALES) which is a public enterprise that acts as a holding company  
 
Table 5.15: Institutional characteristics of service providers, tariffs and returns on sales 
 Aguas de Manizales EAA Villavicencio Sera QA Tunja Metroagua S. Marta
Ownership and 
corporate form 
Public ESP (99.8%) Public EICE (100%) Private ESP (100%) Private ESP (65%) 
Contract (duration: 
end of contract) 
Concession (30 years: 
2026) 
– Concession (30 
years: 2026) 
Lease & management 
(20 + 6 years: 2017) 
Foundation/ change 
in corporate form 
(change of investor) 
1996 1996 1996 1989 (1997, 2002) 
Number of general 
managers 1998-
2005 
6 6 1 4 
Members board of 
directors 
3 public / 2 private 4 public / 1 private / 
1 user 
All private 3 public / 6 private 
Monthly water + 
sewerage tariff by 
December 2004 
(Colombian Pesos)* 
961+628=1,589 1,032+1,062=2,094 1,521+761=2,282 1,416+799=2,215 
Return on sales, 
average 2003 / 2004 
28.8% 26.2% 12.5% 16.1% 
*) Tarifa media básica aplicada estrato 4 / m3: monthly amount per m3 paid by residential stratum 4 supposing a 
monthly consumption of 20 m3 (the amount comprises fixed and variable charge components). 
Sources: Companies; supplemented with information provided by SSPD or taken from SSPD (2005b). 
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owned to 100% by the district of Manizales. INFIMANIZALES is also the owner of all 
physical assets of the water and sewer system of Manizales. These assets are given in conces-
sion to Aguas de Manizales that is responsible for the operation, rehabilitation and expansion 
of the system and that pays a royalty of 10% of the turnover to INFIMANIZALES. The con-
cession has a duration of 30 years and ends in 2026. INFIMANIZALES uses the royalties for 
up-stream water resource conservation and management activities through the programme 
Procuenca. Since the transformation of the district water works into a stock corporation in 
1996, the company has no workers’ union and no important pension or labour liabilities. 
The board of directors of Aguas de Manizales consists of five members which are appointed 
by the mayor acting as representative of the district government and owner of INFIMANI-
ZALES. Since the 1990s – i.e. since the local business elite has come to local political power 
in Manizales (see subsection 5.6.5) – there has been maintained an agreement between the 
respective mayor and the local business associations to appoint three directors amongst public 
officials representing the district government and two directors amongst the local business 
representing the private sector. Formally, it is the board of directors who chooses the general 
manager but de facto he is chosen by the mayor. The general manager of Aguas de Manizales 
has been changing in tandem with the mayor, i.e. there has been a great fluctuation. Between 
1998 and July of 2005 the company has been directed by 6 general managers. 
Financing  
As has been said, Aguas de Manizales is responsible for the operation, rehabilitation and ex-
pansion of the system and thus for arranging the corresponding finance. By December 2004 
Aguas de Manizales offered the lowest water and sewerage tariff of the four companies (see 
table 5.15). In spite of this, during the last years the company has been able to almost inte-
grally finance its “traditional” activities331 by tariff receipts (internal financing) and credit 
(external financing) and to achieve the highest return on sales (28.8%) of the sample. The 
cash flow has enabled it to build reserves and to sustain access to the private capital market. 
Aguas de Manizales has been assigned a very favourable credit risk rating of AA+ and thus 
enjoys privileged conditions in the capital market. Therefore it can be stated that the company 
is in a financially sustainable situation (see subsection 2.4.2). This is in so far remarkable, as 
the district government has only recently begun to cover a small portion (12.4%) of the accu-
mulated deficit between subsidies and contributions in the Solidarity Fund.332 The fact that the 
deficit is not covered by transfers implies either that the company has to cut down its invest-
ment plan on which the reference tariff authorised by CRA was based on or that actual costs 
lie well below reference costs which means that deficits between subsidies and contributions 
                                                 
331 I.e. raw water extraction, treatment, drinking water distribution and wastewater collection excluding water 
body rehabilitation activities: construction of interceptor sewers and wastewater treatment plant. 
332 The accumulated deficit (sum of annual deficits 2000 to 2004) amounts to 20,131 million Col. Pesos (8.85 
million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006)). By July 2005, the 
district government has transferred a total amount of 2,500 million Col. Pesos in order to compensate for this 
deficit. 
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are covered by the company’s surplus. The relatively low tariffs and the good financial per-
formance of Aguas de Manizales have to be judged in the context of the favourable technical 
conditions (no pumping required) and the relatively low investment needs. 
The significant investments associated with the “non-traditional” activities of the company, 
i.e. the construction of collector and interceptor sewers in the context of the planned wastewa-
ter treatment, are financed relying on grants from CORPOCALDAS. The environmental au-
thority agreed to retransfer the fees for wastewater discharges paid by Aguas de Manizales so 
that the company can use this money for the construction of sewers. 
EAA Villavicencio 
Institutional design of service delivery 
Just like Aguas de Manizales, EAA Villavicencio was founded in 1996. But unlike the for-
mer, EAA Villavicencio has the corporate form of an Empresa Industrial y Comercial del 
Estado (EICE) which means that its equity capital is not divided into shares and that it is to-
tally owned by the district of Villavicencio. There is no explicit concession contract between 
the district and the company. The general manager and the members of the board of directors 
are appointed directly by the mayor. Just like in the case of Aguas de Manizales, there has 
been a great fluctuation in the general management (six general managers between 1998 and 
2005). By July 2005, the board of directors consisted of six members: four representatives of 
the district government (amongst them the mayor), one local representative of the business 
association FENALCO333 and one user representative. Until 2004 the President of the Cham-
ber of Commerce of Villavicencio had also been a member of the board of directors. The 
President left the board in 2004 because she did not agree with the way the company was di-
rected and in order to arrange for an investigation of EAA Villavicencio by SSPD. 
The workers of the company are public employees and there is a workers’ union. According 
to BRC Investor Services S.A. (2004) the company was not faced with important pension or 
labour liabilities by 2004. The mayor regularly intervenes in the management of the company 
regarding staff decisions in order to arrange for posts for his clients. This creates uncertainty 
regarding career opportunities for the staff members. Employee motivation and identification 
with the company appeared to be low (see more below). 
Financing 
Table 5.15 shows that EAA Villavicencio has charged the second lowest water and sewerage 
tariff and has achieved the second highest return on sales of the sample. According to BRC 
Investor Services S.A. (2004), the company has lately shown satisfactory though erratic fi-
nancial results. The financial results could be even better if they were not compromised by the 
                                                 
333 Federación Nacional de Comerciantes. 
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technical deficiencies described in subsection 5.6.2. The district government regularly has 
been transferring funds to cover the deficit between subsidies and contributions via the Soli-
darity Fund, notably increasing the operating income of the company. In 2004 the transfers 
from the Solidarity Fund amounted to 5,800 million Colombian Pesos334 corresponding to 
19.8% of operating income. EAA Villavicencio has been assigned a credit risk rating of BBB 
(the lowest grade for which an investment is recommended).335 This means that EAA Vil-
lavicencio has access to the private capital market but enjoys less favourable conditions than 
Aguas de Manizales. 
The financing scheme of EAA Villavicencio is shaped by the important investments in collec-
tor and interceptor sewers recently undertaken and projected for the future (see above). In 
2004 total expenditures almost doubled operating income. The wastewater investments exe-
cuted so far have been financed by credits raised by the company (16,000 million Colombian 
Pesos)336 as well as by public grants from the district government (granted in addition to the 
funds transferred via the Solidarity Fund), the provincial government and the national gov-
ernment. 
Sera QA Tunja 
Institutional design of service delivery 
Sera QA Tunja is a stock corporation (ESP) owned to 94 % by Proactiva Medioambiente 
SA,337 the headquarters of which are in Madrid (Spain), and to 5.8% by Proactiva Colombia 
SA. The members of the board of directors and the general manager are appointed by Proac-
tiva Medioambiente SA. Since the foundation of Sera QA Tunja in 1996, the general manager 
has not been changed. The staff members seemed to be motivated and appeared to have a 
great feeling of identity with the company. This could partially be related to the training and 
career opportunities that an international group like Proactiva Medioambiente SA can offer. 
Sera QA Tunja has no workers’ union. 
The concession contract with a duration of 30 years was awarded through a public tender in 
which two competitors participated. The concession ends in 2026. The detailed and compre-
hensive concession contract includes the responsibility for operation, rehabilitation and ex-
pansion of the system. It stipulates that the necessary investments associated with these activi-
ties are to be co-financed by the district of Tunja. In 2005 there were legal proceedings pend-
ing concerning the validity of the concession contract. 
                                                 
334 2.55 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
335 For more details cf. BRC Investor Services S.A. (2004). 
336 7 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
337 Proactiva Medioambiente SA is owned to 50% by Veolia Environnement (France) and to 50% by Fomento 
de Construcciones y Contratas (FCC – Spain). 
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Financing 
Sera QA Tunja charges the highest water and sewerage tariff of the sample and, at the same 
time, shows the lowest return on sales. The relatively high tariff level should be judged taking 
into consideration that the user structure of Tunja is the least favourable and that operating the 
system requires pumping. In order to finance its expenses for the operation, rehabilitation and 
expansion of the water and sewer system, Sera QA Tunja relies on tariff receipts and on cred-
its. During the first five years of the concession, the company has invested own funds to an 
amount of approximately 7,000 million Colombian Pesos338 in pipes, sewers, pumping sta-
tions, tanks and master plans. 
The district does not transfer money via the Solidarity Fund to the company in order to cover 
the deficit between subsidies and contributions. Instead, the district has made important com-
mitments for financing investment activities, which are fixed in an agreement with Sera QA 
Tunja on the investment obligations of each party. These commitments exceed the transfers 
earmarked for WS the district receives in the context of the decentralisation law. This means 
that the district has to arrange for additional funds. During the first five years of the conces-
sion the district government has invested an amount of approximately 11,000 million Colom-
bian Pesos339 and the national government a sum of 4,000 million Colombian Pesos.340 The 
financing of investment activities by the district government has not always been problem-
free. The predecessor of the mayor in office by July 2005 had delayed the committed financ-
ing by two years, hampering this way progress of construction activities. 
By 2005 the investment activities are marked by the wastewater treatment project. The design 
and supervision of construction activities are made by Sera QA Tunja. The financing of the 
collector and interceptor sewers (16,473 million Colombian Pesos341) is provided by the dis-
trict government and the national government whereas Sera QA Tunja concentrates on in-
vestments in the water and sewer network and related assets. The project for the construction 
of the first module of a wastewater treatment plant is ready and a financial agreement (finan-
ciers: CORPOBOYACÁ, district, provincial and national governments) is about to be signed. 
By 2005, Sera QA Tunja had important liabilities with CORPOBOYACÁ originated in the 
non-payment of wastewater discharge fees – there was a court decision pending on this issue. 
 
 
                                                 
338 3.08 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
339 4.83 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
340 1.76 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
341 7.24 million US Dollars; exchange rate 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Colombian Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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Metroagua Santa Marta 
Institutional design of service delivery 
Metroagua Santa Marta is one of the pioneer PSP experiences in Colombia. The company was 
founded in 1989, i.e. well before the public services reform. There was no public tender but 
the contract was awarded by direct negotiations. At the beginning, the contractual scheme was 
a pure lease contract. This changed in 1997 when a specialised operator (Aguas de Barcelona) 
invested in Metroagua Santa Marta and started to operate the system. In 2000, AAA de Servi-
cios SA342 replaced Aguas de Barcelona as investor and operator. Since 1997 the contractual 
arrangement has been characterised by the combination of a lease and a management contract 
explained in what follows. 
Metroagua – which is a stock corporation (ESP) owned to 43% by AAA de Serivcios SA, to 
22% by local private investors and to 35% by the district of Santa Marta – leases the system 
assets from the district. The leasing fee paid by Metroagua to the district amounts to 2% of 
annual turnover. The responsibilities from the leasing contract include operation and rehabili-
tation of the system but exclude expansion investments. Besides this leasing contract between 
Metroagua and the district of Santa Marta, there is a management contract between Metro-
agua and the operator AAA de Servicios SA. The operator earns a monthly management fee 
amounting to 4% of the turnover plus 12% of the profit before taxes. 
The board of directors of Metroagua consists of three members that are appointed by the 
mayor and that represent the district (amongst them the mayor himself who is the chair of the 
board), two members that represent the local private investors and four members that repre-
sent the operator AAA de Servicios SA. The general manager is proposed by the operator. 
Between 1998 and 2005 the company has been directed by 4 general managers. Metroagua 
Santa Marta has no workers’ union. 
Financing 
Metroagua Santa Marta charges the second highest water and sewerage tariff (only slightly 
lower than the tariff charged by Sera QA Tunja) and shows the second lowest return on sales 
(16.1 % on average for the years 2003 and 2004). Returns of the company have been positive 
since the engagement of AAA de Servicios SA in 2000. Between 1997 and 1999 the company 
had suffered losses. There is a contractual arrangement between Metroagua Santa Marta and 
the district to assure that the funds destined to cover the deficit between subsidies and contri-
butions are transferred to the company (nevertheless, between 2001 and 2003 under the 
predecessor of the mayor in office by 2005, the district government failed to transfer a guar-
anteed amount of 15,000 million Colombian Pesos343). Besides the tariff receipts and the 
transfers from the Solidarity Fund, Metroagua uses credits to finance its current and invest-
                                                 
342 Which is the operator of the WS system of Barranquilla. 
343 6.59 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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ment expenditures associated with the operation and rehabilitation of the system. The com-
pany has elaborated a comprehensive study of the aquifer of Santa Marta and has invested in 
the modernisation or reposition of drinking water treatment plants, pumping stations, tanks, 
pipes and sewers. Between 2001 and 2004 investments with own funds amounted to 3,233 
million Colombian Pesos.344  
As has become evident from the deficiencies of the system described above, there are not only 
required major investments in the rehabilitation but also in the expansion of the system. As of 
2004, the projected expansion investments amounted to a total sum of 73,668 million Colom-
bian Pesos.345 Since the district is highly indebted, it is constrained in arranging for the neces-
sary financial resources. Noteworthy expansion investments (water service and rainwater col-
lection) for an amount of approximately 10,000 million Colombian Pesos346 have been fi-
nanced by resources stemming from the national government. The planned investments for 
augmenting the capacity for surface water captation as well as the capacity of the drinking 
water treatment plants for a total amount of 17,630 million Colombian Pesos347 are to be fi-
nanced by the national government and by the district’s transfers via the Solidarity Fund 
(years 2005 to 2008). According to Metroagua, there is no urgent need to invest in wastewater 
treatment in Santa Marta since the system is provided with a submarine wastewater diffuser. 
Summary and conclusions 
The purpose of the present subsection was to analyse whether differences between the two 
public (the two private) delivery models may contribute to explain the variation in their per-
formance. The two public delivery models show institutional differences with respect to the 
following characteristics: 
First of all, Aguas de Manizales is an ESP whereas EAA Villavicencio is an EICE. However, 
this makes no big difference concerning the influence of the mayor on the choice of the board 
of directors and the general manager which in both cases is very strong. The indicator for the 
political independence or stability of the management shows the same unfavourable value for 
both cases (6 general managers between 1998 and 2005). Nevertheless, there is a difference 
between the two companies in so far as only in the case of EAA Villavicencio there are indi-
cations that the mayor regularly intervenes in employee selection and staffing decisions and 
that motivation and feeling of identity with the company amongst employees seem to be low. 
On the one hand, this difference could be due to the influence of local political governance 
which in the case of Manizales seems to favour a business logic in the way public companies 
are managed by the district government whereas in Villavicencio it seems to favour the pur-
                                                 
344 1.42 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
345 32.37 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
346 4.39 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
347 7.75 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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sue of clientelistic strategies and corruption (see 5.6.5). On the other hand, the apparently low 
motivation and low identification with EAA Villavicencio could also be related to the fact 
that workers are public employees (unlike in Aguas de Manizales were they are private sector 
workers). 
Another institutional difference is that, unlike in Villavicencio, in Manizales there is an ex-
plicit concession contract between the district348 and the service provider. This explicit con-
cession contract may contribute to strengthen the separation of roles between the district gov-
ernment and the company and thus the independence of management. 
Regarding the financing scheme, a difference between the two public providers is that in Vil-
lavicencio the district government has been covering the deficit between subsidies and contri-
butions whereas in Manizales it has not. This could contribute to explain the variation in the 
performance if Aguas de Manizales was the bad performer. But, the way things are, it makes 
the good performance of Aguas de Manizales even more remarkable. Another important dif-
ference is that EAA Villavicencio relies to a greater degree on external financing which has to 
do with the ambitious investment plan of the company. Still another difference is the better 
credit risk rating of Aguas de Manizales rooted in its sound financial track record. 
The two PSP delivery models show institutional differences with respect to the following 
characteristics: 
Sera QA Tunja is totally private whereas Metroagua Santa Marta is owned to 35% by the dis-
trict. In the former case the principal shareholder (the Proactiva Group) owns 99.8% whereas 
in the latter case the principal shareholder (AAA de Servicios) owns 43%. Metroagua Santa 
Marta has been directed by 4 general managers between 1998 and 2005. By contrast, Sera QA 
Tunja in 2005 still was directed by its first general manager. The fluctuation in the case of 
Metroagua is partially explained by the change in the principal shareholder and operator in 
2000. There could be gathered no indications that changes in the management were due to 
interventions of the district government. 
An even more important difference seems to be the contractual arrangement: a concession 
awarded in a public tender in the case of Tunja and a lease (excluding the responsibility for 
system expansion) awarded in direct negotiations in the case of Santa Marta. Concerning the 
way of awarding the contracts, it can be argued that a public tender shows some advantages 
compared to direct negotiations. The public tender process in Tunja – which was supported 
with technical assistance by the Ministry of Development and accompanied by consultancy 
and transaction advisory services – may have contributed to unfold competitive forces, to im-
prove the informational basis, the transparency and the quality of the concession contract and 
thus the soundness of the investment and financial plans. Moreover, this process may have 
contributed to increase the commitment of the private investor. 
                                                 
348 More precisely: INFIMANIZALES. 
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Both contractual arrangements require a close cooperation between the district government 
and the service provider regarding urban planning and financing. Here, only the latter point is 
touched. Although the delivery model of Tunja also involves important sums of public co-
financing, it relies to a greater extent on private financing arranged by the provider than the 
delivery model of Santa Marta. This implies a greater responsibility and thus a greater risk 
borne by Sera QA as compared to Metroagua (or AAA de Servicios). But, at the same time, 
this implies a greater independence for achieving improvements e.g. in service continuity be-
cause the company directly controls a greater portion of the investments. In both cases there 
have been problems with public investment financing promised by the district (delay in the 
case of Tunja and default in the case of Santa Marta – see above). Santa Marta seems to be the 
more problematic case. The required investments for expanding coverage and improving ser-
vice depend to a great extent on the availability of public finance. However, the main public 
financier – the district – has shown to be unreliable in the past and, in addition, is highly in-
debted which constrains its ability to raise finance. Moreover, service improvements in Santa 
Marta do not depend only on investments in physical assets but also hinge on solving the 
problem of the water service in the squatter settlements. This is beyond the control of Metro-
agua and requires a coordinated action of the district government, Metroagua, civil society 
organisations and the population of the squatter settlements. 
5.6.5 Local governance factors 
The purpose of the present subsection is to identify local governance factors that contribute to 
explain the variation in the performance of the four cases. This is perhaps the dimension 
which is most difficult to investigate empirically. Unfortunately, there are no standard indica-
tors available that capture the level of democratic participation, the degree of separation of 
powers, the quality of the local bureaucracy or the incidence of corruption for the subnational 
level in Colombia. In order to try to capture the dimension of local governance, here the pro-
ceeding is the following. Building partially on the categories developed in sections 5.2 and 
5.3, the analysis concentrates on describing and qualifying the following dimensions: 
i. User and civil society participation in WS services 
ii. Security situation and activities of non-state armed groups 
iii. Clientelistic strategies as well as corruption affecting the provision of WS services 
The investigation has to deal with the problem that the latter two dimensions are sensitive and 
could not be directly addressed in the interviews. Corruption, by definition, is an illegal phe-
nomenon which, in addition, in Colombia seems to be partially linked to the activities of non-
state armed groups involved in drug trafficking and other criminal activities (see subsections 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2). The information gained in interviews and informal conversations is thus 
likely to be fragmentary and biased. Therefore, apart from the information gained in inter-
views and informal conversations, the present subsection relies on the available quantitative 
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indicators on the security situation as well as on reports and news articles on non-state armed 
groups activities and corrupt practices (see the sources cited below). 
The remainder of this subsections proceeds as follows. First, user and civil society participa-
tion is discussed, after the dimension of the security situation and non-state armed groups’ 
activities is described and, finally, clientelistic strategies and corruption affecting WS services 
are addressed. 
User and civil society participation 
During the field stay the attention has been concentrated on the role of the CDCSs. In each 
city there have been conducted interviews with at least one CDCS spokesman. Information on 
the role of additional civil society organisations has been collected in a cursory manner. For a 
description of the functions and a general assessment of the CDCSs see subsection 5.3.2. 
In neither of the four cities the CDCSs seemed to have a significant impact on (i) monitoring 
the subsidies delivered by the district to users from low socio-economic strata and (ii) further-
ing the cooperation between users and the provider or making propositions for service im-
provements. In none of the cities there was a close cooperation between the CDCS and the 
district administration on the one hand or between the CDCS and the service provider on the 
other hand. The most important function of the spokesmen was to assist users in managing 
their complaints (bad service, undue charges, differences with respect to metering) with the 
provider and with SSPD. With the exception of the spokesman of Villavicencio, all spokes-
men interviewed were unemployed. 
At the time of the field stay there existed 3 CDCSs in Manizales, 4 in Tunja, 4 in Villavicen-
cio and 11 in Santa Marta (these numbers include not only the CDCSs responsible for WS but 
also those responsible of fixed-line telecommunication, electricity and gas). 
Manizales 
In Manizales CDCSs seemed to keep a low profile. The district government did not support 
the work of the spokesmen. CDCSs received some support of the Personero Municipal.349 
Concerning user representation in the Committee for Stratification (CPE), according to the 
information given by a user representative who participated in the CPE, the district govern-
ment has refused to pay the legally prescribed fee to the user representative for participating 
in the CPE sessions. The user representative has not been able to influence any decision of the 
CPE regarding user complaints against their socio-economic classification in favour of the 
complainant. 
                                                 
349 The Personero Municipal is a decentralised agent of the Procurator General. He is elected by the district 
assembly and his function is to protect the human rights and the public interest (Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación 2005a: 55). 
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A distinctive element of Manizales is that, as compared to the other three cities, the degree of 
organisation of the civil society appeared to be strong. Local entrepreneurs dominate civil 
society organisation in Manizales and shape local politics. Entrepreneurs were the driving 
force for the creation of the civic watchdog organisation Corporación Cívica de Caldas 
(CCC) in the 1980s. In the 1980s there was the perception that local governments in Maniza-
les were embezzling public funds and badly managing public enterprises. CCC was founded 
in order to act as an organ of the civil society that could denounce this state of affairs and 
claim more transparency and civic participation. CCC now is an established organisation. 
Besides, there are strong business organisations in Manizales.350 Since the 1990s, local entre-
preneurs have entered formal party politics. Several mayors, including the one in office dur-
ing the time of the field stay and his two predecessors, have come from the local business elite 
since then. 
Tunja 
Just like in Manizales, CDCSs in Tunja seemed to keep a low profile. There has not been 
maintained a close communication or even co-operation between the spokesman and Sera QA 
Tunja.351 According to the spokesman and user representative interviewed, the district gov-
ernment has supported the last two assemblies of the CDCSs with the intention to influence 
the elections of the spokesmen and to place its favourite candidates. Besides the CDCSs there 
is a so-called “user committee” in Tunja that has been created as a reaction against privatisa-
tion of WS services and that has repeatedly organised public protests against tariff hikes. 
However, according to the spokesman and the user representative interviewed, the protago-
nists of this user committee have not been really concerned with the problems and interests of 
users but have used the committee to make their marks for their personal political career. In-
terestingly, the spokesman and the user representative as well as the representative from Sera 
QA Tunja agreed that the politicisation of user representation, which has been common in 
Tunja, has harmed the users’ cause. 
Villavicencio 
According to the information gained from a spokesman, CDCSs in Villavicencio had been 
created only recently (in 2004). EAA Villavicencio – since it is an EICE – is the only com-
pany that has a spokesman representing the users’ interests in the board of directors. How-
ever, the spokesman interviewed could not tell in what kind of assembly or election this board 
member representing users had been elected. It was for sure not the same assembly in which 
the interviewee was elected which, according to himself, was organised as prescribed by law 
(see subsection 5.3.2). According to the interviewee, communication and co-operation with 
                                                 
350 Asociación Nacional de Industriales, Asociación Colombiana de Pequeñas y Medianas Industrias, Comité 
Departamental de Cafeteros de Caldas, Comité Intergremial de Caldas. 
351 According to the information given by the representatives of the service providers, all companies maintained 
a closer co-operation with the presidents of the Juntas de Acción Comunal (see subsection 5.3.2) than with 
the spokesmen of the CDCSs. 
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the service provider was good, since, in addition to being spokesman, he was a member of the 
Junta de Acción Comunal of his neighbourhood and therefore could use his network of per-
sonal relations within the company. In general he succeeded in arranging agreements between 
users and the company when the former were not able to pay a bill or were billed an atypi-
cally high consumption. According to the spokesman, the company has shown to be co-
operative in such cases. 
The Chamber of Commerce of Villavicencio, due to concerns regarding the way EAA Vil-
lavicencio has been managed and in order to establish an organ for controlling the company’s 
investment activities in the area of wastewater collection and treatment, in 2004 established 
two civic watchdog committees (veedurías) which have produced various reports on the ser-
vice situation and on the state of affairs of the construction activities. In addition, the Cham-
ber of Commerce has arranged for an investigation of EAA Villavicencio by SSPD. 
Santa Marta 
As has been said above, the number of CDCSs in Santa Marta (11) is higher than in the re-
maining cities. One possible explanation for the high number of CDCSs is the low quality of 
service in Santa Marta (see above). As compared to his colleagues from the remaining cities, 
the spokesman interviewed in Santa Marta seemed to be best informed, most engaged and 
best organised.352 Nevertheless, according to the interviewee, his influence on improving the 
service situation of users has been very low. He worked on informing users on their rights and 
regularly assisted users in submitting their complaints to SSPD. However, complaints with 
SSPD are laborious and success is uncertain. The district government has not been supporting 
spokesmen in Santa Marta. They have received some support (workplace) from the Personero 
Municipal and have received political support from the workers’ unions movement. 
At request of the President of Colombia, around the year 2003 the Chamber of Commerce of 
Santa Marta engaged in a process of mediation between users and Metroagua Santa Marta. At 
that time, there were frequent public protests due to service interruptions and tariff hikes. In 
this mediation process, that had come to an end by mid 2005, users had been represented by 
local community leaders (presidents of Juntas de Acción Comunal etc.). The spokesmen of 
the CDCSs had not been involved in the mediation process. 
Security situation and activities of non-state armed groups 
The urban security situation can be described by the urban security index published by Fun-
dación Seguridad y Democracia (2006: 51-54) which ranks the Colombian cities above 
200,000 habitants (27 in total) according to the incidence rates of homicides, kidnapping and  
 
                                                 
352 The spokesman interviewed in Santa Marta was, in addition, President of the National Association of CDCS 
spokesmen (Confederación Nacional de Vocales de Control). 
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Table 5.16: Security and risk of corruption indicators 
 Manizales  
(Caldas) 
Tunja 
(Boyacá) 
Villavicencio 
(Meta) 
Santa Marta 
(Magdalena) 
Rank position of the city in 2005: 
Urban Security Index; Subindex: 
Extortion and Kidnapping (best 
rank=27; worst rank=1)* 
9 n.a. 1 8 
Average annual homicide rate for 
the respective province (homi-
cides per 100,000 habitants)** 
98.2 (1998-2002)
61.2 (2002-2006)
18.9 (1998-2002)
18.1 (2002-2006)
65.2 (1998-2002) 
91.2 (2002-2006) 
52.7 (1998-2002) 
36.6 (2002-2006) 
Value of the Risk of Corruption 
Index of the Provincial Govern-
ment; Average 2003/ 2004 
(1=high risk; 5=low risk)*** 
3 3.5 2.5 2.5 
Sources: *) Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (2006); **) Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (2004); ***) 
Transparencia por Colombia (2005; without year) 
“n.a.” = not available 
extortion, and crime against property. The subindex which is most relevant for the present 
section is the one on kidnapping and extortion because it is an indicator for the intensity of the 
criminal activities of non-state armed groups. A high intensity of these activities is likely to 
compromise the autonomy of the local governments as well as democratic participation and, 
in addition, is likely to be linked with higher levels of corruption.353 
Table 5.16 lists two indicators for the security situation and one for the risk of corruption. It 
shows that Villavicencio occupies rank 1 in the kidnapping and extortion index which means 
that the city showed the highest incidence rate in 2005 of all 27 Colombian cities considered. 
Santa Marta occupies rank 8 and Manizales rank 9. Unfortunately, this index is available only 
for the year 2005 and does not include Tunja (because Tunja has less than 200,000 habitants). 
A look at the long-term averages of the homicide rates – which is another indicator that can 
be used as a proxy for the activities of the non-state armed groups – for the respective prov-
inces shows very low values for Boyacá (capital Tunja). The highest rates are registered for 
Caldas (capital Manizales) and Meta (capital Villavicencio) followed by Magdalena (capital 
Santa Marta). 
The additional sources of information354 checked corroborate and complement the picture 
regarding the security situation and non-state armed groups’ activities given by the two indi-
cators discussed so far in the following sense: 
                                                 
353 On the relation of violence, the presence of non-state armed groups, democratic participation and extortion in 
Colombia cf. Sarmiento / Becerra (1998) and Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos 
y DIH (2006b). 
354 Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (2004); Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y 
DIH (2005; 2006b; 2006a); República de Colombia (2004; 2005). 
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• There are neither indications for a significant presence of non-state armed groups in 
the surroundings of Tunja nor indications for significant security problems in Tunja 
during the last years. 
• There is evidence for the presence of non-state armed groups in the surroundings of 
Manizales (Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH 
2006a), Santa Marta (Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y 
DIH 2006b) and Villavicencio (Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos 
Humanos y DIH 2005) as well as for the influence355 of these groups in the urban 
zones of the three districts. The pattern of the security indicators varies slightly be-
tween the three cities. Manizales has for years shown high homicide rates (varying be-
tween 90 per 100,000 habitants in 2002 and 50 in 2005) but a relatively low incidence 
of kidnapping. Santa Marta has also shown relatively high homicide rates (varying be-
tween 67 per 100,000 habitants in 2001 and 41 in 2004) and a rising incidence of kid-
napping (12 incidents in 2000 and 56 in 2004). Villavicencio has lately shown a homi-
cide rate similar to Santa Marta (54 per 100,000 habitants in 2003 and 49 in 2004) and 
a high incidence of kidnapping (48 incidents in 2003 and 68 in 2004). 
• Since 2004, the situation in Villavicencio seems to have worsened. In 2004 four local 
politicians have been assassinated, amongst them Omar López Robayo, the predeces-
sor of the mayor in office at the time of the field stay. The assassinations are attributed 
to demobilised paramilitary groups.356 In March 2006, the procurator Tomas Garzón 
Roa, who was investigating criminal activities in the areas of drug trafficking, para-
militarism and corruption in Villavicencio, was assassinated.357 
• The migratory pressure on Santa Marta that drives the uncontrolled growth of squatter 
settlements is due to an important degree to the activities of non-state armed groups, 
confrontations amongst these groups or between them and the state security forces in 
the surroundings of Santa Marta. 
Unfortunately, the indicator for the risk of corruption published by Transparencia por Colom-
bia (2005; without year) is only available for the provincial governments.358 A value of 1 de-
notes the highest risk whereas a value of 5 denotes the lowest risk of corruption. The average 
of the indicator for the years 2003 and 2004 reported in table 5.16 shows the most favourable 
value for Tunja (3.5), followed by Manizales (3) and by Santa Marta and Villavicencio (both 
2.5), i.e. the two good performers show better indicators than the two bad performers. 
                                                 
355 An example for this influence is the practice of extortion of the local business in Santa Marta by paramilitary 
groups (Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH 2006b: 39). 
356 Cf. article without author „El Meta, a la deriva“, published in El Espectador, 14/11/2005, available at 
www.acnur.org/index.php?id_pag=4296 (accessed on 11/11/2006). 
357 Cf. communication of the Procuraduría General de la República from 14/3/2006, available at www.procura 
duria.gov.co/html/noticias_2006/noticias_095.htm (accessed on 18/9/2006). 
358 On the methodological aspects of this index cf. the cited sources. 
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Clientelistic strategies and corruption affecting WS services 
The information collected on these dimensions yields the following overall picture: There is 
evidence that EAA Villavicencio has been negatively affected by clientelistic and by corrupt 
practices during the last years, whereas for the remaining cases there is no such clear evi-
dence. Still, from this statement it cannot be concluded that in the remaining cases clientelism 
and corruption have not occurred. Such practices are quite common in the whole country.359 
What can be concluded is that in Manizales, Tunja and Santa Marta the magnitude of the 
problem in the area of WS services is at least less evident. The details are presented in what 
follows. 
Villavicencio 
Concerning clientelistic strategies and as has already been mentioned in the preceding subsec-
tion 5.6.4, the mayor has regularly been intervening in staffing decisions of EAA Villavicen-
cio (at least the mayor in office in July 2005 and his predecessor). This does not only concern 
the post of the general manager but also middle and lower management posts. An important 
criterion in order to obtain a post in the company, is to be a political supporter of the mayor in 
office. Consequently, career opportunities do not mainly depend on qualification and working 
performance. Moreover, it is common that staff members are asked to quit their job by the 
incoming mayor. These are adverse incentives that are likely to negatively affect the quality 
and the motivation of the personnel. The observation that the motivation of the staff members 
seemed to be relatively low and that the feeling of identity with the company seemed to be 
weak corroborates this. 
Concerning corrupt practices, the author has gained information from sources not listed in 
table A5.6 that the mayor in office at the time of the field stay, Franklin Germán Chaparro 
Carrillo, has been intervening in the awarding of construction contracts (wastewater infra-
structure) for his personal benefit. This seems to be a trustworthy information because in the 
meanwhile the mayor has been faced with around 20 disciplinary charges by the Procurator 
General360 and has been convicted in one case (irregularities in awarding health service con-
tracts) with the consequence that he has been removed from office and is not allowed to hold 
public office for 10 years.361 Taking together the information from these different sources, the 
author estimates that the mayor has been taking bribes in the range of 10% to 15% of the re-
spective construction contract volumes. In 2004, EAA Villavicencio awarded contracts for the 
construction of wastewater interceptor sewers for a total amount of 17,170 million Colombian 
                                                 
359 Cf. United States Department of State (2006); Wills Herrera (2002). 
360 Cf. article without author „El Meta, a la deriva“, published in El Espectador, 14/11/2005, available at 
www.acnur.org/index.php?id_pag=4296 (accessed on 11/11/2006). 
361 Cf. Boletín 353 of the Procuraduría General de la República from 26/10/2005, available at www.procura 
duria.gov.co/html/noticias_2005/noticias_353.htm (accessed on 18/9/2006). 
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Pesos.362 Assuming a bribe share of 10% this would mean that the mayor would have received 
a sum of 1,717 million Colombian Pesos363 in one year. The consequence for the investment 
projects is not only that there are 10% less of the total amount available for construction ac-
tivities and that thus less assets are built. In addition, the infrastructure built is in risk to be 
unworkable because unqualified contractors are chosen or because contractors use cheaper but 
unsuited materials or machines in order to compensate for the lower “net” contract volume. 
Moreover, there is evidence that business and accounting practice of EAA Villavicencio has 
been intransparent and irregular. According to information given by the President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, when she was still a member of the board of directors, she has been 
denied financial and accounting information she has asked for. Besides, the board – by major-
ity of the members representing the district – has augmented the contract volumes that could 
be awarded without a public call for tenders. Furthermore, EAA Villavicencio in 2005 has 
been investigated by the District Auditor (Contraloría Municipal de Villavicencio 2006: 14-
15). The Auditor found irregular financial transactions for a total amount of 1,780 million 
Colombian Pesos364 implying disciplinary and criminal offences. 
Santa Marta 
There have been gathered no indications for clientelistic practices in Metroagua Santa Marta 
similar to those described for EAA Villavicencio. It is plausible that massive interventions by 
the mayor in staffing decisions have not occurred since the institutional structure of the PSP 
delivery model in place in Santa Marta prevents such a practice. Neither there have been 
gathered indications for corrupt practices directly affecting WS services during the district 
government in office at the time of the field stay. However, corrupt district governments have 
been common in Santa Marta in the recent past. The predecessor of the mayor in office in July 
2005, Hugo Gnecco Arregocés, had been involved in the embezzlement of public funds and 
had been removed from office in 2003.365 The mismanagement and corruption under the gov-
ernment of Hugo Gnecco Arregocés has affected the provision of WS services in so far as the 
district failed to transfer 15,000 million Colombian Pesos366 earmarked for investment in WS 
infrastructure to Metroagua (see above). The history of mismanagement and corruption of 
district governments in Santa Marta raises certain doubts concerning the soundness of the 
lease and management contracts held by Metroagua and AAA de Servicios SA which were 
awarded not in a public call for tenders but in direct negotiations. 
                                                 
362 7.54 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
363 754 thousand US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
364 782 thousand US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
365 Information gained in interviews. Cf. also Instituto Prensa y Sociedad, “Corrupción en la alcaldía de Santa 
Marta”, available at www.ipys.org/investigaciones/investigacion.php?id=154 (accessed on 11/11/2006). 
366 6.59 million US Dollars; exchange rate: 1 US Dollar = 2,276 Col. Pesos (29/11/2006). 
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The perhaps most striking feature of Santa Marta, as compared to the remaining three cities 
(especially Manizales and Tunja), is the lack of control of the urban space by the district ad-
ministration. This is quite a complex issue which is common in many cities of the developing 
world and which in the case of Santa Marta has been driven to an important degree by mi-
grants that have been displaced due to non-state armed groups activities in the region of Santa 
Marta (see above). However, it is to suppose that a part of this lack of control is related to 
corrupt practices in real estate speculation and is in some way “functional” for speculators 
that benefit from it. According to two different sources of information, it is quite common in 
Santa Marta that migrants are used by speculators in order to take advantage from the illegal 
occupation of plots owned by the district or provincial governments: The speculator “ar-
ranges” the occupation of a certain area. After a while, either the plots are regularised by the 
district (and possibly equipped with infrastructure) and can thus be sold with high profit; or 
the district makes a deal with the occupants in order to evacuate the area and possibly has to 
offer a compensation. This means that those deficiencies of the WS system that are related to 
illegal connections in squatter settlements (see above) are partially enhanced by corrupt prac-
tices in real estate speculation. 
Tunja 
According to the information gained in the interviews, the district government has not inter-
vened in staffing decisions of Sera QA Tunja which is, in fact, hardly possible since the com-
pany is totally owned by the Proactiva group. Nevertheless, according to the general manager 
of the company, at the beginning of the concession during election campaigns several local 
politicians or persons with political ambitions have tried to obtain “gifts-in-kinds” (e.g. pipes, 
construction works) from the company for certain neighbourhoods. According to the general 
manager, resisting these proposals proved to be relatively easy thanks to the independence of 
Sera QA. 
According to information given by Sera QA, the co-operation between the district govern-
ment and the company has passed through various tense periods. Both mayors who succeeded 
in office the one who awarded the concession in 1996, had made an election campaign against 
the privatisation of WS services and had thus a negative attitude towards the concessionaire. 
The second successor delayed the promised investment financing for two years (see above). 
Nevertheless, all in all the two parties always managed to continue co-operating and working 
on the improvement and expansion of the system. One factor that might have contributed to 
the stability of the co-operation could be the transparent way the concession was awarded, the 
support of the awarding process by the Ministry of Development and the thorough and careful 
concession contract itself. 
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The district government of Tunja has not been spared corruption in the past years.367 How-
ever, the author could not gather information on corrupt practices related to the provision of 
WS services in the past years. 
Manizales 
There have been obtained no indications for massive clientelistic interventions by the latest 
mayors in Aguas de Manizales. Certainly, the incoming mayors have changed the general 
manager, but they seem not to have intervened in the middle and lower management posts (or, 
at least, interventions seem to have been less massive and obvious than in Villavicencio). If 
we suppose that massive interventions have not occurred, the interesting question is why? As 
said above (subsection 5.6.4) one reason could lie in the explicit concession contract between 
the company and INFIMANIZALES which may contribute to strengthen the independence of 
the management. Other plausible reasons are: 
i. What could be called an “entrepreneurial policy approach” of the business elite from 
Manizales which has been in local political power since the late 1990s. Public officials 
from the business elite may regularly apply business principles they are familiarised 
with from the private sector to the management of the district-owned companies and 
thus put emphasis on the internal efficiency and the financial performance of these 
companies. 
ii. The level of organisation and capacities of the civil society (including the business as-
sociations) of Manizales and the experience of mismanagement and corruption made 
in the 1980s. These factors may contribute to raise awareness of clientelistic practices 
in public companies and to denounce them publicly. 
This latter point would also be an important factor for preventing corruption. The author has 
gathered no evidence for recent major cases of corruption linked to the provision of WS ser-
vices in Manizales. However, there seem to have occurred irregularities in the awarding of 
contracts by Aguas de Manizales in 2003. This becomes evident in the results of a survey on 
the transparency of the district administration of Manizales (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime without year). The information has been corroborated by a representative from the 
Comité Cívico de Caldas, who stated that the former general manager of Aguas de Manizales 
has been investigated by the District Auditor because of irregular practices in contract award-
ing. 
                                                 
367 Cf. e.g. charges against an ex-mayor of Tunja: Boletín 125 of the Procuraduría General de la Nación from 
27/4/2006 available at www.procuraduria.gov.co/html/noticias_2005/noticias_125.htm (accessed on 11/11/ 
2006). 
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Conclusions 
Comparing and assessing the available information on the four cases regarding the local gov-
ernance dimensions analysed – (i) user and civil society participation; (ii) security situation 
and non-state armed groups’ activities; (iiia) clientelistic and (iiib) corrupt practices – yields 
the following results: 
1. Tunja compares positively with the remaining three cases concerning dimension (ii) 
and is neutral with respect to dimensions (i), (iiia) and (iiib). 
2. Manizales compares positively with the remaining three cases with respect to dimen-
sion (i) due to the relative strength of civil society organisations; it is neutral with re-
spect to dimension (iiia) and slightly negative with respect to dimension (iiib).368 
Manizales shows negative indicators with respect to dimension (ii). 
3. Santa Marta is neutral with respect to dimensions (i) and (iiia); it shows slightly negative 
characteristics with respect to dimension (iiib) due to corrupt practices in real estate 
speculation and the widespread corruption under the predecessor of the mayor in office 
in 2005. Santa Marta shows negative characteristics with respect to dimension (ii). 
4. Villavicencio is neutral with respect to dimension (i) and shows negative characteris-
tics with respect to the remaining dimensions (ii), (iiia) and (iiib). 
This sort of ranking (1 to 4) of the four cities with respect to their local governance character-
istics is roughly in line with the main supposition that local governance contributes to explain 
the variation in the performance of the four service providers: The two good performers are 
ranked higher than the two bad performers. 
What about the more precise proposition formulated in 5.6.1 that the same governance factors 
that contribute to explain the unexpectedly good (bad) performance of Aguas de Manizales 
(of Metroagua Santa Marta) with respect to internal efficiency contribute to explain the good 
(bad) performance with respect to coverage expansion? This seems to be a too sophisticated 
question to be precisely answered with the available information and with the qualitative em-
pirical method used in the present section. What can be said when comparing the influence of 
governance in these two cases is the following: 
• The relative strength of civil society organisations in Manizales together with an “en-
trepreneurial policy approach” of the local business elite, which has been in local po-
litical power during the last years, may have contributed to curb clientelistic interven-
tions in Aguas de Manizales and to encourage a professional management. This insti-
tutional setting seems to have been triggered by a negative experience with wide-
spread corruption and mismanagement in local government in the late 1980s that has 
                                                 
368 The irregularity in the awarding of contracts in 2003 by Aguas de Manizales can be considered a minor issue 
when compared to Villavicencio. 
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been mastered. It can be supposed that these institutional characteristics may also con-
tribute to curb the potentially negative influence on local governance of the non-state 
armed groups’ presence in the area (see below). 
• WS service provision in Santa Marta is overwhelmed with various problems of which 
weaknesses in local governance seem to be one important factor. Low coverage and 
low quality of WS services are partially explained by the uncontrolled growth of 
squatter settlements driven by migrants displaced by non-state armed groups’ activi-
ties and by the lack of control of the urban space. This lack of control of the urban 
space by the district administration seems to be in part functional to corruption in real 
estate speculation. Moreover, in the past substantial amounts of public funds that 
could have been used for improving and expanding WS infrastructure have been with-
drawn due to corruption and mismanagement of the local government. 
Finally, in the present subsection there have been gained indications that the presence and 
influence of non-state armed groups negatively affect local governance by undermining the 
rule of law and encouraging corrupt practices e.g. through extorting and coopting local public 
officials. This is quite obvious in the case of Villavicencio and seems also to be an issue in 
Santa Marta. In Manizales a supposed negative influence of non-state armed groups’ presence 
is less obvious. 
5.6.6 Conclusions 
This section has analysed the influence of local governance on WS service performance by 
comparing two PSP and two public delivery models. The main hypothesis was that differ-
ences in the quality of local governance can explain the variation in performance amongst the 
public cases (Aguas de Manizales: “good”; EAA Villavicencio: “bad”) and the PSP cases 
(Sera QA Tunja: “good”; Metroagua Santa Marta: “bad”). Besides governance, the dimen-
sions technical characteristics, socio-economic conditions and institutional design of service 
delivery and financing have been considered in order to get a complete picture of the local 
factors that potentially contribute to explain the variation in the performance. 
The overall result is that there is some evidence that local governance factors contribute to 
explain the variation in the performance of the four cases. However, it is not possible to assess 
the strength or magnitude of this relation. Several aspects of the further dimensions consid-
ered also contribute to explain the variation in the performance which is why it is not possible 
to establish a hierarchy amongst local governance and further influencing factors. 
This overall result is illustrated for the two particularly interesting cases of (i) Aguas de 
Manizales – which shows positive internal efficiency indicators in spite of being a public pro-
vider – and (ii) Metroagua Santa Marta – which shows negative internal efficiency indicators 
in spite of being a provider with PSP. Aguas de Manizales compares positively with Metro-
agua Santa Marta regarding local governance factors. However, in addition Aguas de Maniza-
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les compares positively with Metroagua Santa Marta with respect to several remaining factors 
considered, like historical performance levels, technical conditions (which do not require 
pumping), investment backlog and socio-economic conditions (particularly the low preva-
lence of squatter settlements and illegal connections). This means that the local governance 
and the further local factors together seem to dominate the ownership effect. 
The section is concluded by highlighting some more specific policy lessons for Colombia: 
• PSP (concession or lease contracts) seems to be effective in preventing harmful clien-
telistic interventions of local governments in the company. In none of the two PSP 
cases there were gained indications for massive interventions. This result supports the 
hypothesis that the institutional characteristics of PSP, which limit the politicians’ ac-
cess to the financial and human resources of the company, make clientelistic interven-
tions more difficult. 
• Nevertheless, local governance is still relevant for successful PSP. Weaknesses such 
as intransparent and non-professional awarding of PSP contracts, default of delivering 
promised public finance due to mismanagement or embezzlement and lack of orderly 
territorial planning can seriously compromise the performance of PSP delivery mod-
els. 
• Neutralising clientelistic interventions in companies and encouraging internal effi-
ciency can also be achieved in public service providers as shown by the case of Mani-
zales. Important aspects of the institutional design of public service delivery, like cor-
poratisation and explicit concession contracts, as well as important aspects of good lo-
cal governance, like strong civil society organisations and the involvement of business 
organisations in the control of the company, appear to contribute to these achieve-
ments. This result supports the hypothesis that clear institutional boundaries of public 
providers and good local governance can prevent harmful clientelistic interventions. 
However, it seems that such a particular institutional setting cannot easily be copied or 
transplanted to a different local context. Moreover, the institutional setting appears to 
be vulnerable to changes in the local political power constellation.369 
• User participation, which up to now builds almost exclusively on local CDCSs, is 
weak. CDCSs should be complemented by a national user advocacy organisation that 
(i) disposes of sufficient human and financial resources to effectively dialogue with 
CRA, SSPD, MAVDT and ANDESCO and thus to participate in regulation and that 
(ii) provides technical backstopping and support for local spokesmen. 
                                                 
369 The question is whether the “model” Aguas de Manizales will continue to work well if the local business 
elite loses political power. 
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6 Summary and conclusions 
The present study has investigated the influence of governance on the performance of WS 
services in developing countries. The motivation for choosing this subject was the insight that 
the focus on provider ownership (private versus public), which has dominated the academic 
and the political debate, was too narrow in order to explain success or failure in the provision 
of WS services. By shifting the attention towards the influence of governance, the present 
study has worked out those political and sectoral institutions that are essential for the provi-
sion of WS services and has found empirical evidence for their influence on the access to and 
the internal efficiency of services. Democratic participation and checks and balances have a 
statistically significant positive impact on the coverage with WS services in developing coun-
tries. Moreover, for the Colombian context there was found some evidence that low quality 
governance of sub-national governments compromises the internal efficiency of service deliv-
ery and the widespread access to services. With regard to the role of provider ownership it can 
be said that PSP is just one important institutional design characteristic of the WS sector 
among others. The results obtained have yielded some evidence that PSP contributes to en-
hance the internal efficiency of service providers. However, the results also suggest that PSP 
is not necessary and even less sufficient for achieving widespread access to low-cost and 
good-quality services. 
In what follows the results of the different chapters are summarised and some overall conclu-
sions are drawn. 
6.1 Summary of the results 
Chapters 2 and 3 make up the conceptual framework for the investigation. 
Chapter 2 has introduced the normative categories for assessing typical problems related to 
the provision of WS services and for justifying general policies that are conducive to equity, 
allocative efficiency and internal efficiency. 
From an equity perspective, it is a priority to strive for a situation where anybody is able to 
use adequate essential WS services, irrespective of his economic situation. This implies focus-
ing policies on expanding WS services to those households that lack access and justifies sub-
sidising expansion costs related to the connection of poor households. Furthermore, it can also 
justify subsidising the expenses of poor households for the consumption of WS services if 
society judges these expenses unaffordable. 
From an allocative efficiency perspective it is desirable to correct the market failures associ-
ated with the provision of WS services (natural monopoly, external effects). This requires the 
use of regulatory policies that are able to compensate for the lack of competition, such as 
competitive bidding procedures for allocating the right to serve a certain area or price and 
quality regulation. Moreover, this entails the use of environmental regulation in order to ac-
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count for the external costs associated with the production and consumption of WS services, 
e.g. by levying or limiting the abstraction of raw water or the discharge of wastewater. 
The internal efficiency of WS service providers is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for achieving allocative efficiency. Promoting internal efficiency can be achieved by reducing 
the scope for public officials to appropriate the quasi-rents of WS service providers and by 
increasing the accountability of the management to clients and financiers, e.g. through PSP or 
corporatisation and commercialisation under public ownership. 
Chapter 3 has developed the political-economic framework for explaining the effect of po-
litical governance (democratic participation, checks and balances, rule of law) and WS gov-
ernance (institutional characteristics of the WS sector roles) on the performance of WS ser-
vices. Governance factors – by shaping the WS sector roles of policy making, regulation and 
service delivery – influence the equitability and the efficiency of WS services. 
Concerning political governance, it is postulated that the fundamental institutions of democ-
ratic participation (competitive elections, political rights and alternative information) have 
systematic effects on policy making. Other things being equal, democratic governments have 
greater incentives to design policies in response to the interests of the broad majority than 
autocratic governments. Democratic governments are thus more likely to implement the kind 
of public-regarding WS policies deduced in chapter 2. A system of checks and balances and 
rule of law further enhances the accountability of public officials to the broad majority and 
therefore public-regardedness of policy making. 
Important elements of WS governance are (i) the horizontal separation and the institutional 
design of the roles of WS policy making, regulation and service delivery, and (ii) the level of 
user participation. 
i. Horizontal separation of roles means that WS policy making, regulation and service 
delivery are accomplished by different sets of actors with own responsibilities. The 
separation of roles enhances the accountability and the professionalism of the actors 
responsible for regulation and service delivery because day-to-day intervention of 
politicians in the technicalities of regulation and service delivery becomes more diffi-
cult. While regulation is a public role, service delivery can be delegated to the private 
sector. The more comprehensive PSP in service delivery is, the stronger is the institu-
tional separation of service delivery and policy making. 
ii. User participation in regulation and service delivery is important in order to make 
regulators and service providers responsive to the interests and needs of users. User 
participation can take the forms of consultation, representation or influence and de-
pends on the existence of strong user advocacy organisations. 
It is important to note that political and WS governance factors jointly affect WS policy mak-
ing, regulation and service delivery and thus the performance of WS services. In a polity 
marked by a well functioning system of checks and balances and rule of law it is easier to 
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establish an independent and accountable regulatory body and to prevent harmful interven-
tions of politicians in the management of public service providers than in a polity marked by a 
high concentration of government power and by a disrespect for the rule of law. Furthermore, 
user participation is more likely to succeed in making regulators responsive to user interests in 
a democracy, where fundamental political rights are respected, than in an autocracy. 
Building on this conceptual framework, chapters 4 and 5 have empirically analysed different 
aspects of the influence of governance on the performance of WS services, using both quanti-
tative and qualitative empirical approaches. 
Chapter 4 has investigated the influence of political governance on coverage with WS ser-
vices, using a multivariate regression model and cross-sectional data from 69 developing 
countries. The dimensions of political governance tested were (i) democratic participation, (ii) 
checks and balances (veto players) and (iii) rule of law. Following the literature the analysis 
has controlled for variables that are likely to have an impact on coverage with WS services, 
such as GDP per capita, spatial population patterns and availability of water resources. The 
regression estimates have yielded the following main results: 
• There is a significant and robust positive effect of higher levels of democratic partici-
pation and more checks and balances on coverage with both water and sanitation ser-
vices. This largely confirms the hypotheses developed in chapter 3 regarding the ex-
pected effects of democratic participation and checks and balances. The results do not 
change substantially when regional dummy variables are included in the regression in 
order to account for region-specific effects. 
• For the case of sanitation services the results show that the positive effect of democ-
ratic participation and checks and balances is strongest for countries with low GDP per 
capita and becomes weaker for countries with high GDP per capita. A possible expla-
nation for this result is that non-accountable autocratic governments in poor countries 
are likely to make a bad use of scarce financial resources with respect to the provision 
of services. An improvement in democratic accountability may thus make a big differ-
ence for a poor country. This effect may become less strong the more financial re-
sources per capita are available in an economy because even if governments make a 
bad use of resources, on average there will be more resources left that can be invested 
in WS services. 
These results underline the manifold benefits that arise from key elements of good political 
governance, such as democratic participation and checks and balances. Besides being crucial 
achievements that permit citizens to freely elect their governors and that provide protection 
against despotism, democratic participation and checks and balances seem to enhance the ma-
terial well-being of the broad citizenry in an essential dimension such as access to WS ser-
vices. 
Chapter 5 has investigated the provision of WS services in Colombia with two purposes. 
First, it has described and assessed the key elements of political governance, WS governance 
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and WS policies in Colombia from a national perspective. Second, and building on the results 
of the first purpose, it has analysed the factors on the sub-national level that are able to ex-
plain the variation in the performance of Colombian WS service providers. The focus was set 
on the two factors local governance and delivery model (PSP versus purely public). 
With regard to the first purpose, the analysis has focused on identifying potential weaknesses 
(and not so much the strengths) of governance characteristics and WS policies that may com-
promise equity and efficiency of WS services in Colombia. 
As far as the political governance is concerned, certain features such as the candidate-centred 
electoral system and the tradition of clientelism suggest that policy making is biased towards 
private-regardedness rather than towards public-regardedness. Political rights and civil liber-
ties have to a certain degree been compromised as a result of the influence of non-state armed 
groups and the periodical escalations of the armed conflicts amongst non-state armed groups 
and between these groups and the state security forces. Moreover, corruption is a widespread 
phenomenon in Colombia, which is likely to diminish the effectiveness of public spending in 
the WS sector. 
Concerning WS governance, the institutional design of the roles of WS policy making, regula-
tion and service delivery respects to a certain degree the principle of horizontal separation. 
However, at the district level, separation of roles between the actors responsible for local WS 
policy making, local regulation and service delivery is weak – or even absent in case of public 
providers. Mayors have a strong influence on the decision making of public providers even 
when these are incorporated firms. This increases the probability of political interference in 
the management and tends to compromise the ability of the managers of public providers to 
improve internal efficiency and to respond to the regulatory instruments applied by the na-
tional regulatory authorities. At the same time, this aspect underlines the importance of the 
quality of local governance, because user participation and the availability of transparent in-
formation may prevent the mayors from misusing their strong influence for clientelistic or 
corrupt practices. 
Another noteworthy result is that, in general, user participation in the area of WS services 
remains weak. This is especially true for user participation in regulation. Colombia lacks a 
strong user advocacy organisation on the national level that has the necessary human and fi-
nancial resources to participate in regulation by maintaining a dialogue with the regulatory 
authorities on a technical level and that gives technical and logistic support to local user rep-
resentatives for their daily work with service providers. 
As far as the analysis of WS policies is concerned, the following results with respect to (i) 
public investment policy, (ii) subsidy policy, and (iii) tariff regulation are highlighted: 
i. There is some evidence that a portion of the substantial public funds allocated to the 
WS sector is not effectively used for service expansion. The following factors contrib-
ute to this problem: Weak territorial planning capacities of districts and lacking civic 
participation in the planning process; lack of coordination between the service pro-
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vider’s investment plan and the investments carried out by the district; lack of trans-
parency and control in the awarding of construction contracts; atomisation of the ser-
vice provider structure ending up in high overheads for investment projects; finan-
cially strained or internally inefficient providers that consume the available public 
funds in order to keep the existing systems running. 
ii. The cross-subsidy system has generated systematic deficits, which have complicated 
regulatory policies that aim at internal efficiency improvements and financial sustain-
ability. Besides, the cross-subsidy system has the weakness that it reaches only those 
households that are connected to a regulated provider. Moreover, the targeting quality 
of the cross-subsidy system is low, since more than half of the households that are 
subsidised have an income that lies above the national poverty line. 
iii. Until 2005, tariff regulation has unilaterally focused on improving financial sustain-
ability of service providers by increasing tariff levels to cost levels. It has largely dis-
regarded instruments that aim at improving internal efficiency and at avoiding that in-
efficiencies are passed on to users. The delay in introducing more sophisticated regula-
tory instruments is partially explained by the low level and the poor quality of the in-
formation provided especially by the smaller service providers. 
The second purpose of chapter 5 was to analyse those determinants on the sub-national level 
that can explain the variation in service performance which is observed in Colombia. Since 
Colombia is marked by decentralisation and PSP in the WS sector, it offers the possibility to 
investigate both the influence of the delivery model (PSP versus purely public) and of local 
governance on service provision. 
First, the effect of the delivery model on internal efficiency improvements (unaccounted-for 
water) and on coverage expansion (piped water and sewerage) has been analysed by means of 
a multivariate regression analysis using cross-sectional data from 30 Colombian WS service 
providers. Due to the lack of comprehensive data on governance on the local level, the analy-
sis could not account for the quality of local governance. The regression estimates have 
yielded the following main results: 
• PSP shows a significant positive influence on the reduction of unaccounted-for water. 
This result supports the hypothesis that PSP delivery models are superior to public 
ones with respect to internal efficiency. 
• Low unaccounted-for water shows a significant positive effect on coverage expansion 
(this effect is robust for piped water only), whereas population growth is negatively 
associated with coverage expansion (this effect is robust for sewer connections only). 
The effect of PSP on coverage expansion is not statistically significant. 
These results are in line with the argumentation followed in this study that PSP typically con-
tributes to improve internal efficiency, but that more far-reaching effects such as significant 
contributions to coverage expansion or to improvements in allocative efficiency (i.e. to low-
cost and good-quality services) depend on the quality of governance. 
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Second, the effect of local governance on the performance of WS service providers has been 
analysed by a qualitative approach, comparing the providers of the four provincial capitals of 
Manizales (public), Santa Marta (private), Tunja (private) and Villavicencio (public). The 
main supposition investigated was that the quality of local governance can dominate the ex-
pected effect of ownership and, therefore, explain unexpected results, such as a public pro-
vider with outstanding internal efficiency indicators (Manizales) or a private provider with 
poor internal efficiency indicators (Santa Marta). Based on the findings of the political and 
WS governance analysis reported above, the dimensions used for assessing the quality of lo-
cal governance were (i) user and civil society participation, (ii) security situation and influ-
ence of non-state armed groups and (iii) prevalence of clientelistic as well as corrupt prac-
tices. Besides local governance, additional local factors (technical characteristics, socio-
economic conditions, institutional design of service delivery and financing) have been consid-
ered. The following results are highlighted: 
• The overall result is that the quality of local governance is able to partially explain the 
variation in the service performance of the four cases with respect to internal effi-
ciency and coverage indicators. However, it is not possible to establish a hierarchy be-
tween the influence of governance and the influence of further local factors, which are 
also able to partially explain the variation in performance. 
• In none of the two PSP cases there were found indications for massive clientelistic in-
terventions of local governments in the management of the companies. This result 
supports the hypothesis that the institutional characteristics of PSP (concession or 
lease contracts) make the politicians’ access to the financial and human resources of 
the company more difficult and thus prevent clientelistic interventions. 
• Nevertheless, local governance is still highly relevant for successful PSP since weak-
nesses such as intransparent and non-professional awarding of PSP contracts, embez-
zlement of public funds earmarked for WS investments and discontrol of the urban 
space combined with corruption in real estate speculation can seriously compromise 
the performance of PSP delivery models. 
• As evidenced by the case of Manizales, neutralising clientelistic interventions and en-
couraging internal efficiency can also be achieved in public companies. Good local 
governance (strong civil society organisations and involvement of business organisa-
tions in the control of the company) and the institutional design characteristics of ser-
vice delivery (corporatisation, explicit concession contracts) appear to contribute to 
these achievements. This result supports the hypothesis that good local governance 
and clear institutional boundaries of public providers can prevent harmful interven-
tions of politicians in the management. 
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6.2 Conclusions  
What are the overall conclusions that can be drawn from the present study and what are the 
open issues that require further research? 
The econometric results from the cross-country regression based on data from 69 developing 
countries have yielded evidence that higher levels of democratic participation and more 
checks and balances, which are key elements of good political governance, have a statistically 
significant positive effect on the access to WS services in developing countries. To the best 
knowledge of the author, this is an innovative result that has not been reported in research 
literature so far. By contrast, the variable used to measure the influence of PSP showed no 
statistically significant effect. It thus appears that good political governance is more relevant 
to achieve coverage expansion with WS services than PSP. However, the results regarding the 
influence of PSP may be biased because the available data on PSP in the WS sectors of de-
veloping countries seems to be rather incomplete. A task for further research is therefore to 
replicate the analysis with new and more complete data on PSP in the WS sectors of develop-
ing countries. Moreover, since the arguments for the influence of political governance on 
coverage with WS services also apply to other public services, the econometric approach used 
in the present study could be extended to analyse the coverage with other public services in 
developing countries, e.g. in the electricity or health sector. 
The case study on Colombia has found some evidence that the quality of governance also 
plays a role for explaining the variation in service performance on the sub-national level. 
Strong civil society organisations, control of corruption and low levels of non-state armed 
groups’ activities seem to further the efficiency of service delivery and the widespread access 
to WS services. A low quality of local governance appears to be able to dominate the positive 
effect of PSP on internal efficiency, for which statistical evidence was found in a regression 
analysis with data from 30 Colombian providers. Or, to put it differently, a good local gov-
ernance and a sound institutional design of service delivery can be able to compensate for the 
disadvantages of public providers with respect to internal efficiency achievements. It thus 
appears that PSP is not a necessary condition for achieving internal efficiency improvements. 
Further research on this issue is desirable in order to confirm the results obtained here and to 
investigate whether the local governance factors identified as key also apply to different local 
contexts or whether they are location-specific. 
This study is concluded by emphasising two lessons that emerge from the investigation: 
First, democratic participation and checks and balances do not “only” grant free elections and 
protection against despotism, but also seem to enhance the material well-being of citizens in 
an essential dimension such as the widespread access to WS services. 
Second, the results from the Colombian case study show that successful WS sector reform 
requires much more than sound PSP. The analysis has found some evidence that PSP contrib-
utes to a higher internal efficiency of providers. This can be regarded as a partial success. 
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However the analysis has also identified several weaknesses in governance characteristics and 
in WS policies that seem to hamper the translation of internal efficiency improvements into 
more far-reaching achievements such as significant coverage expansions. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that sound political and WS governance are necessary conditions to unfold and to 
reap the potential benefits of PSP. For policy makers, this means to keep in mind that adverse 
governance factors are likely to go against well-intentioned policies aiming at improving WS 
services and to render them useless in the end. 
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A) Tables 
 
Table A2.1: Network and on-site supply technologies 
 Water Sanitation 
Network supply • Piped connection (in-house; yard) 
• Public standpipe 
• Sewer connection 
On-site supply • Borehole, well, spring 
• Rainwater collection 
• River, pond 
• Connection to septic tank 
• Latrine 
• Open defecation 
Source: Own 
 
Table A2.2: Typical investment costs per capita for WS improvements 
Initial investment cost per capita (US Dollars year 2000) 
Improvement 
Africa Asia Latin America and the Caribbean 
Water improvement 
House connection 102 92 144 
Stand post 31 64 41 
Borehole 23 17 55 
Dug well 21 22 48 
Rainwater 49 34 36 
Sanitation improvement 
Sewer connection 120 154 160 
Small bore sewer 52 60 112 
Septic tank 115 104 160 
Pour-flush 91 50 60 
Ventilated improved pit 
latrine 57 50 52 
Simple pit latrine 39 26 60 
Source : World Health Organization / United Nations Children’s Fund (2000: 18-19) 
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Table A2.3: Estimations for price and income elasticity of water demand 
 Price elasticity Income elasticity 
Customer class Median (no. of 
observations) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Median (no. of 
observations) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Residential - 0.38 
(155) 
- 0.38 0.22 0.35 
(155) 
0.36 0.22 
Industrial - 0.54 
(17) 
- 0.54 0.32 − − − 
Source: (Komives et al. 2005: 18) 
Note: Residential values are based on data from 18 countries and 155 separate estimates of elasticities 
“−” = not applicable 
 
Table A2.4: Improved and unimproved WS technologies 
 Improved Unimproved a 
Water  - Household connection (in-
house or yard) 
- Public standpipe 
- Borehole 
- Protected dug well or spring 
- Rainwater collection 
- Unprotected well or spring 
- Rivers or ponds 
- Vendor-provided water 
- Bottled water 
- Tanker truck water 
Sanitation - Connection to public sewer 
- Connection to septic tank 
- Pour-flush latrine 
- Ventilated improved pit latrine 
- Simple pit latrine 
- Public latrine 
- Open pit latrine 
- Bucket latrine 
Source: WHO / UNICEF (2000: annex A) 
a) Water: Due to concerns about the quality or quantity of water supplied. Sanitation: Due to concerns about the 
privacy of the service or the hygienic separation of human excreta from human contact. 
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Table: A2.5: Coverage with improved WS services in developed and developing countries 
1990 population (thousands) 2002 population (thousands) 
Region 
Total 
population 
Population 
served 
Population 
unserved 
% 
served 
Total 
population 
Population 
served 
Population 
unserved 
% 
served 
Developed countries 
Urban 
water 672,490 672,490 0 100 744,791 744,791 0 100 
Rural 
water 261,524 258,909 2,615 99 248,264 233,368 14,896 94 
Total 
water 934,014 931,399 2,615 100 993,055 978,159 14,896 98 
Urban 
sanitation 672,490 672,490 0 100 744,791 744,791 0 100 
Rural 
sanitation 261,524 258,909 2,615 99 248,264 228,403 19,861 92 
Total 
sanitation 934,014 931,399 2,615 100 993,055 973,194 19,861 98 
Developing regions 
Urban 
water 1,424,474 1,320,960 103,514 93 2,060,413 1,902,698 157,715 92 
Rural 
water 2,623,297 1,548,319 1,074,978 59 2,890,437 2,008,347 882,090 70 
Total 
water 4,047,771 2,869,279 1,178,492 71 4,950,850 3,911,045 1,039,805 79 
Urban 
sanitation 1,424,474 965,399 459,075 68 2,060,413 1,505,023 555,390 73 
Rural 
sanitation 2,623,297 426,492 2,196,805 16 2,890,437 897,196 1,993,241 31 
Total 
sanitation 4,047,771 1,391,891 2,655,880 34 4,950,850 2,402,219 2,548,631 49 
Source: World Health Organization / United Nations Children’s Fund (2005: 37) 
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Table A2.6: Morbidity or mortality caused by water-related diseases 
Diseases 
Estimated Morbidity 
(episodes per year or 
people infected) 
Estimated Mortality 
(deaths per year) 
Relationship of Disease to 
Water and Sanitation 
Conditions 
Diarrheal diseases 1,000,000,000 2,200,000 to 5,000,000 
Strongly related to 
unsanitary excreta 
disposal, poor personal 
and domestic hygiene, 
unsafe drinking water 
Intestinal helminths 
1,500,000,000  
(people infected) 
100,000 
Strongly related to 
unsanitary excreta 
disposal, poor personal 
and domestic hygiene 
Schistosomiasis 
200,000,000  
(people infected) 
200,000 
Strongly related to 
unsanitary excreta 
disposal and absence of 
nearby sources of safe 
water 
Dracunculiasis 
150,000  
(in 1996) 
- Strongly related to unsafe drinking water 
Trachoma 
150,000,000  
(active cases) 
- 
Strongly related to lack of 
face washing, often due to 
absence of nearby sources 
of safe water 
Poliomyelitis 114,000 - 
Related to unsanitary 
excreta disposal, poor 
personal and domestic 
hygiene, unsafe drinking 
water 
Trypanosomiasis 275,000 130,000 
Related to the absence of 
nearby sources of safe 
water 
Source: Gleick (2002: 3) 
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Table A2.7: Improved water service coverage and the Millennium Development Target 
Population served and 
unserved in 2002 
(thousands) 
Projected population served 
and unserved in 2015 
(thousands) 
Region 
Coverage in 
1990 (%) 
Coverage in 
2002 (%) 
Projected 
Coverage in 
2015 (%) 
MDG 
attained 
target (%) Served Unserved Served Unserved 
Annual 
increase in 
people served 
1990-2002 
(thousands) 
Annual increase 
needed in people 
served 2002-
2015 to reach the 
MDG drinking 
water target 
(thousands) 
World 77 83 90 89 5,150,169 1,074,706 6,442,043 755,208 90,836 96,568 
Developed 
countries 100 98 96 100 978,159 14,896 997,505 41,563 3,897 4,685 
Eurasia 92 93 94 96 260,965 20,005 257,217 16,418 126 133 
Developing 
regions 71 79 88 86 3,911,045 1,039,805 5,187,321 697,227 86,813 88,436 
Developing regions 
Northern 
Africa 88 90 92 94 132,941 14,378 168,395 14,643 2,383 3,009 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 49 58 68 75 396,824 287,944 613,022 288,481 12,524 21,485 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
83 89 96 92 475,422 60,204 603,131 25,130 9,135 7,891 
Eastern Asia 72 78 85 86 1,072,374 302,464 1,264,065 223,070 16,086 15,889 
South Asia 71 84 98 86 1,246,402 233,885 1,769,174 36,106 34,350 23,549 
South-eastern 
Asia 73 79 86 87 421,044 114,567 540,374 87,968 8,208 9,663 
Western Asia 83 88 93 92 161,628 22,333 223,515 16,824 4,034 4,576 
Oceania 51 52 53 76 4,410 4,030 5,645 5,005 93 283 
Source: World Health Organization / United Nations Children’s Fund (2005: 36) 
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Table A2.8: Improved sanitation service coverage and the Millennium Development Target 
Population served and 
unserved in 2002 
(thousands) 
Projected population 
served and unserved in 
2015 (thousands) 
Region 
Coverage in 
1990 (%) 
Coverage in 
2002 (%) 
Projected 
Coverage in 
2015 (%) 
MDG 
attained 
target (%) Served Unserved Served Unserved 
Annual 
increase in 
people served 
1990-2002 
(thousands) 
Annual increase 
needed in people 
served 2002-2015 
to reach the MDG 
sanitation target 
(thousands) 
World 49 58 68 75 3,606,595 2,618,280 4,918,571 2,278,680 87,164 137,796 
Developed 
countries 100 98 96 100 973,194 19,861 997,505 41,563 ID ID 
Eurasia 84 83 82 92 231,182 49,788 224,381 49,254 ID ID 
Developing 
regions 34 49 63 67 2,402,219 2,548,631 3,696,685 2,187,863 84,193 118,494 
Developing regions 
Northern 
Africa 65 73 82 83 108,485 38,834 150,091 32,947 2,632 3,341 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 32 36 40 66 247,544 437,224 360,601 540,902 7,011 26,727 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
69 75 82 85 398,506 137,120 515,174 113,087 8,053 10,424 
Eastern Asia 24 45 68 62 626,926 747,912 1,011,252 475,883 27,613 22,700 
South Asia 20 37 55 60 541,785 938,502 992,904 812,376 25,875 41,645 
South-eastern 
Asia 48 61 75 74 328,330 207,281 471,257 157,085 9,778 10,511 
Western Asia 79 79 79 90 145,991 37,970 189,868 50,471 3,151 5,409 
Oceania 58 55 52 79 4,652 3,788 5,538 5,112 80 289 
Source: World Health Organization / United Nations Children’s Fund (2005: 36); “ID” = insufficient data 
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Table A2.9: Key problems, underlying reasons, policy implications and complementarities or trade-offs 
Normative perspective Key problem Underlying reason Broad policy implication Plausible complementarities (+) 
/ trade-offs (–) 
Households lack the income / 
creditworthiness to incur the 
necessary investment costs 
Subsidise investment costs / 
connection costs for low-
income households 
Allocative efficiency (+) if social 
benefits from increased access to 
adequate WS services > social 
costs from increased costs of 
public funds 
Allocative efficiency (–) if vice 
versa 
Internal efficiency (–) if subsidy 
mechanism negatively affects the 
financial sustainability of service 
providers 
Households do not have 
access to adequate WS 
services 
Households do not have access to 
property markets 
Improve urban planning 
procedures; lower access 
barriers to property markets 
and improve transparency in 
these markets 
Allocative efficiency (+) 
The optimal tariff in place 
(reflecting total social costs) for 
using adequate WS services is high 
relative to the willingness to pay 
Subsidise consumption of an 
essential amount of adequate 
WS services for low-income 
households 
Allocative efficiency (–) 
Internal efficiency (–) if subsidy 
mechanism affects negatively the 
financial sustainability of service 
providers 
Equity 
Households have access to 
WS services but do not use 
them 
The non-optimal tariff in place for 
using adequate WS services is high 
relative to the willingness to pay due 
to the abuse of monopolistic pricing 
Introduce / improve tariff 
regulation 
Allocative efficiency (+) 
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WS services have a poor quality 
(continuity, pressure, water quality) 
Introduce / improve 
regulation 
Allocative efficiency (+)   
Households are not aware of the 
private benefits of adequate WS 
services (especially sanitation) 
Raise awareness for the 
private benefits of using 
adequate WS services 
(especially sanitation) 
Allocative efficiency (+) 
Service providers take 
advantage of their market 
power by charging tariffs that 
are higher than private costs 
and / or providing bad quality 
services 
Natural monopoly markets due to 
economies of scale (scope) and high 
sunk costs 
Economic regulation: 
competitive bidding 
procedures; tariff and quality 
of service regulation 
Equity (+) if the number of low-
income households that use 
adequate WS services increases 
thanks to regulation 
Water is not put to its socially 
most valuable use i.e. the 
resource is wasted / 
excessively contaminated 
WS tariffs are below total social 
costs 
Environmental regulation; 
increase WS tariffs 
Internal efficiency (+) if WS 
tariffs were below private costs 
Equity (–) if WS tariffs rise 
above the willingness to pay of 
low-income households 
Use of sanitation services is 
low relative to its social 
benefits 
Households are not aware of the 
external benefits of sanitation 
services 
Raise awareness for external 
benefits, subsidise sanitation 
services 
Equity (+) if low-income 
households benefit from the 
external benefits of increased use 
of sanitation services 
Allocative efficiency 
Underinvestment in WS 
services by private investors 
Availability of quasi-rents and 
inability of public officials to 
commit to abstain from capturing 
them 
Reform political institutions 
that make commitments 
credible (e.g. independent 
judiciary; regulatory 
authority) 
Internal efficiency (+) 
Equity (+) if the number of low-
income households that use 
adequate WS services increases 
thanks to additional investments 
Internal efficiency Service providers do not 
produce a given quantity and 
quality at a minimum private 
cost 
Managerial slack due to absent 
competition 
Economic regulation: 
competitive bidding 
procedures; tariff and quality 
of service regulation 
Equity (+) if the number of low-
income households that use 
adequate WS services increases 
thanks to regulation 
Allocative efficiency (+) 
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 Improve monitoring by 
owners through privatisation 
or corporatisation under 
public ownership 
Allocative efficiency (+) if users 
benefit from improvements in 
internal efficiency (presupposes 
regulation / competition) 
Equity (+) if the number of low-
income households that use 
adequate WS services increases 
thanks to improved quality / 
lower private costs (presupposes 
regulation) 
Managers of public service providers 
lack legal means to improve internal 
efficiency 
Privatisation or 
corporatisation under public 
ownership 
Idem 
 
Public officials induce managers to 
follow goals like the maximisation 
of employment, construction etc. 
Privatisation or 
corporatisation under public 
ownership; improve 
regulation by public 
accounting offices; increase 
transparency of management 
decisions 
Idem 
 
Receipts of the service 
provider are too low to cover 
private costs and thus the 
situation is financially 
unsustainable 
Tariffs are set below private costs Increase WS tariffs Allocative efficiency (+) 
Equity (–) if WS tariffs rise 
above the willingness to pay of 
low-income households 
Source: Author 
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Table A3.1: Roles and actors in the WS sector 
Role Type of actor responsible Level of provision 
Policy making: 
• WS sector strategy 
• Social policy (e.g. subsidies) 
 
• Public 
• Public 
 
• Central 
• Central or local 
Regulation: 
• Tariffs and quality of service  
• Drinking water quality 
 
• Public 
• Public 
 
• Central or local 
• Central or local 
Service delivery: 
• Ownership of assets 
• Investment 
• Operations 
 
• Public or private 
• Public or private 
• Public or private 
 
• Central or local 
• Central or local 
• Central or local 
Source: Adapted from Foster (1996: 3) 
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Table A4.1: Variables and data sources used in the statistical analysis of chapter 4 
Variable name Variable description Data source; additional information 
Coverage variables (COV) 
WATTOT90; 
(WATTOT02) 
Population using improved water supply services in 1990 
(in 2002); percentage of total population 
WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme Database, 
http://www.wssinfo.org (accessed on 14/11/2005); 
WHO / UNICEF (2000) 
SANTOT90; 
(SANTOT02) 
Population using improved sanitation services in 1990 (in 
2002); percentage of total population 
WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme Database, 
http://www.wssinfo.org (accessed on 14/11/2005); 
WHO / UNICEF (2000) 
WATTOT90LN LN( WATTOT90) = Natural logarithm of WATTOT90  
Political governance variables (GOV) 
POLITY Index that measures the level of democracy (autocracy); 
original indicator “Polity”; average of available values 1990 
to 2002; range of values: - 10 to 10 (higher scores 
correspond to greater levels of democracy) 
Polity IV Database, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm 
(accessed on 31/10/2005); 
Marshall / Jaggers (2000), Jaggers / Gurr (1995) 
POLRIGHTS Index that measures the political rights situation; original 
indicator “political rights”; average of available values 1990 
to 2002; range of values: 1 to 7 (higher scores correspond to 
greater political rights); the original indicator “political 
rights“ has been transformed as follows: transformed values 
= original values * (-1) + 8 
Freedom of the World Database provided by Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2005 
(accessed on 16/11/2005); 
Freedom House (various years) 
POLCON Index that measures political constraints on the executive; 
original indicator “POLCONIII”; average of available 
values for 1990 to 2002; range of values: 0 to 1 (higher 
scores correspond to more constraints) 
Database provided by W.J. Henisz, http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ (accessed on 02/01/2006); 
Henisz (2002) 
CHECKS Index that measures the number of effective veto points; 
original indicator “CHECKS”; average of available values 
1990 to 2002; range of values: 1 to 18 (higher scores 
correspond to more veto points) 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI2004), 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESE
ARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~
theSitePK:469382,00.html (accessed on 06/02/2006); 
Beck et al. (2001); Keefer (2003; 2005) 
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RULAW Index that measures the respect of and the confidence in the 
rule of law; original indicator “rule of law”; average of 
available values 1996 to 2002; range of values: – 2.5 to 2.5 
(higher scores correspond to “better” performance) 
Database of the World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls 
(accessed on 22/11/2005); 
Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi (2004) 
Control variables (CON) 
GDPCAP Mean of annual GDP per capita in PPP (constant 2000 
international $) (available values 1990 to 2002) 
World Development Indicators 2005, World Bank (CD-ROM) 
GDPCAPLN LN (GDPCAP) = Natural logarithm of GDPCAP  
POPTOT Average of total population in 1990 and total population in 
2002; measured in persons 
WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme Database, 
http://www.wssinfo.org (accessed on 14/11/2006) 
LAAREA Land Area (in 2002); measured in sq. km World Development Indicators 2005, World Bank (CD-ROM) 
POPDENS Division of POPTOT by LAAREA; measured in persons 
per sq. km 
 
POPDENSLN LN (POPDENS) = Natural logarithm of POPDENS  
POPURB Average of the population living in urban areas (1990 and 
2002); percentage of total population 
WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme Database, 
http://www.wssinfo.org (accessed on 14/11/2006) 
WATRESCAP Internal renewable water resources, long term average; 
measured in cubic meters per person per year 
World Resources Institute Database 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchable_db/index.php?theme=2 (accessed 
on 31/01/2006) 
WATRESCAPLN LN (WATRESCAP) = Natural logarithm of WATRESCAP  
ETHNIC Index of ethnic fractionalisation; data measured between 
1979 and 2001; range of values: 0 to 1 (greater values 
correspond to greater fractionalisation) 
Data provided by William Easterly, 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/fractionalization.xls (accessed on 
16/02/06); 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
CORRUPT Index that measures control of corruption; original indicator 
“control of corruption”; average of available values 1996 to 
2002; range of values – 2.5 to 2.5 (higher scores correspond 
to “better” performance) 
Database of the World Bank Institute, Governance & Anti-Corruption, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls 
(accessed on 22/11/2005); 
Kaufmann / Kraay / Mastruzzi (2004) 
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PROPRIGHTS Index that measures the integrity of the legal system and the 
security of private property rights; original indicator "Legal 
Structure and Security of Property Rights”; average of 
available values 1990 to 2002; range of values: 1 to 10 
(higher scores correspond to “better” performance) 
Economic Freedom of the World Database provided by the Fraser 
Institute. http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html#efw (accessed 
on 21/11/2005); 
Gwartney / Lawson / Gartzke (2005) 
PSP Sum of total investments with private sector participation in 
water and sewerage (1990 to 2002, US Dollars) 
PPI Data Base, World Bank & PPIAF, http://ppi.worlbank.org (accessed 
on 16/01/2006) 
PSPCAP Sum of total investments with private sector participation in 
water and sewerage per capita (1990 to 2002, US Dollars): 
PSPCAP=PSP/POPTOT 
 
SUBSAFRICA Variable = 1 if country belongs to the region “Africa, West” 
or “Africa, East” or “Africa, Central” or “Africa, South”; 
(otherwise variable = 0) 
Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
EASTSEASIA Variable = 1 if country belongs to the regions “Asia, East” 
or “Asia, Southeast”; (otherwise variable = 0) 
Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
SOUTHWASIA Variable = 1 if country belongs to the region “Asia, 
Southwest”; (otherwise variable = 0) 
Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
NAFRICAMEAST Variable = 1 if country belongs to the region “North Africa 
and Middle East”; (otherwise variable = 0) 
Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
LAAMERCARI Variable = 1 if country belongs to the region “America, 
North” (=Mexico) or “America, South” or “Caribbean”; 
(otherwise variable = 0) 
Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
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Table A4.2: Summary statistics coverage variables 
Variable 
WATTOT90 
WATTOT02 
SANTOT90 
SANTOT02 
N 
69 
69 
69 
69 
Mean 
65.63768 
74.97101 
42.81159 
51.24638 
Std. Dev. 
19.09494 
16.71647 
22.99762 
23.05582 
Min 
20 
22 
4 
6 
Max 
94 
98 
87 
99 
 
Table A4.3: Summary statistics key control variables 
Variable 
GDPCAP 
POPDENS 
POPURB 
WATRESCAP 
ETHNIC 
N 
69 
69 
69 
69 
68 
Mean 
2999.824 
93.74667 
40.86232 
8725.596 
0.5491074 
Std. Dev. 
2449.342 
138.3943 
18.78573 
13680.87 
0.2464875 
Min 
509.4144 
2.046739 
8 
24.5 
0 
Max 
12166.89 
972.6168 
85 
58620.8 
0.9302 
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Table A4.4: Countries contained in the sample 
1. Angola 
2. Bangladesh 
3. Benin 
4. Bolivia 
5. Botswana 
6. Brazil 
7. Burkina Faso 
8. Burundi 
9. Cameroon 
10. Central African Republic 
11. Chad 
12. Chile 
13. China 
14. Colombia 
15. Comoros 
16. Cote d’Ivoire 
17. Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
18. Djibouti 
19. Dominican Republic 
20. Ecuador 
21. Egypt 
22. El Salvador 
23. Eritrea* 
24. Ethiopia 
25. Ghana 
26. Guatemala 
27. Guinea 
28. Haiti 
29. Honduras 
30. India 
31. Indonesia 
32. Iran 
33. Jamaica 
34. Kazakhstan 
35. Kenya 
36. Madagascar 
37. Malawi 
38. Mali 
39. Mauritania 
40. Mexico 
41. Morocco 
42. Namibia 
43. Nepal 
44. Nicaragua 
45. Niger 
46. Nigeria 
47. Oman 
48. Pakistan 
49. Paraguay 
50. Peru 
51. Philippines 
52. Russian Federation 
53. Rwanda 
54. Senegal 
55. South Africa 
56. Sri Lanka 
57. Sudan 
58. Syrian Arab. Republic 
59. Tanzania 
60. Thailand 
61. Togo 
62. Tunisia 
63. Turkey 
64. Uganda 
65. Uzbekistan 
66. Vietnam 
67. Yemen** 
68. Zambia 
69. Zimbabwe 
*) Missing data for POLCON;    )** Missing data for ETHNIC 
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Table A4.5: Results of regression estimates (corruption and property rights): dependent variables WATTOT02; SANTOT02 
Independent variables Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model W5a
# Model W5b## Model W6a# Model W6b## Model S8a Model S8b## Model S9a Model S9b## 
WATTOT90LN 40.175 
(10.54)*** 
39.899 
(11.13)*** 
39.493 
(8.55)*** 
39.459 
(12.04)*** 
    
SANTOT90     0.817 
(14.47)*** 
0.831 
(13.44)*** 
0.772 
(13.39)*** 
0.797 
(12.95)*** 
GDPCAPLN 2.502 
(1.41) 
3.408 
(2.03)** 
1.019 
(0.48) 
2.027 
(1.07) 
4.419 
(2.35)** 
3.861 
(1.87)* 
4.53 
(2.66)** 
3.739 
(2.06)** 
POPDENSLN 0.048 
(0.08) 
0.211 
(0.32) 
0.338 
(0.45) 
0.262 
(0.32) 
1.758 
(2.56)** 
1.978 
(2.63)** 
1.982 
(2.74)*** 
2.075 
(2.69)** 
WATRESCAPLN - 0.306 
(- 0.58) 
- 0.332 
(- 0.58) 
  0.051 
(0.08) 
- 0.057 
(- 0.08) 
  
CORRUPT - 2.252 
(- 1.34) 
- 2.132 
(- 1.07) 
  - 2.314 
(- 1.03) 
- 2.074 
(- 0.84) 
  
PROPRIGHTS   0.999 
(0.81) 
0.068 
(0.07) 
  - 0.93 
(- 0.90) 
- 1.009 
(- 0.92) 
POLRIGHTS 1.372 
(2.86)*** 
1.272 
(2.19)** 
0.922 
(1.79)* 
0.965 
(1.64) 
1.668 
(2.55)** 
1.867 
(2.61)** 
1.372 
(2.29)** 
1.555 
(2.43)** 
INTERCEPT - 114.055 
(- 8.34)*** 
- 120.236 
(- 11.44)*** 
- 104.552 
(- 7.24)*** 
- 108.181 
(- 9.04)*** 
- 31.84 
(- 2.40)** 
- 28.89 
(- 1.99)* 
- 24.007 
(- 2.05)** 
- 19.898 
(- 1.59) 
N 69 69 56 56 69 69 56 56 
Ř2 0.858 0.868 0.821 0.825 0.905 0.889 0.906 0.895 
F 45.45*** 75.58*** 41.96*** 52.91*** 109.28*** 91.92*** 106.99*** 94.94*** 
†) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05, *) p < 0.1. 
#) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (HRSE); ##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg in STATA). 
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Table A4.6: Results of regression estimates (regional dummies): dependent variable SANTOT02 
Independent variables Coefficients and t-statistics † 
 Model S10a# Model S10b## Model S11a# Model S11b## Model S12a# Model S12b## 
SANTOT90 0.806 
(14.98)*** 
0.834 
(14.63)*** 
0.848 
(14.26)*** 
0.865 
(15.12)*** 
0.824 
(15.46)*** 
0.859 
(15.68)*** 
GDPCAPLN 1.214 
(0.63) 
- 0.0827 
(- 0.04) 
2.121 
(1.11) 
1.325 
(0.68) 
0.604 
(0.30) 
- 0.943 
(- 0.49) 
POPDENSLN 0.918 
(1.07) 
0.697 
(0.85) 
1.124 
(1.29) 
0.993 
(1.23) 
0.553 
(0.61) 
0.166 
(0.21) 
WATRESCAPLN 0.098 
(0.14) 
- 0.266 
(- 0.42) 
0.225 
(0.30) 
- 0.018 
(- 0.03) 
- 0.080 
(- 0.11) 
- 0.614 
(- 1.01) 
ETHNIC - 0.585 
(- 0.13) 
- 2.607 
(- 0.55) 
- 3.781 
(- 0.72) 
- 5.996 
(- 1.32) 
- 0.807 
(- 0.18) 
- 2.851 
(- 0.64) 
SUBSAFRICA - 6.711 
(- 2.56)** 
- 7.554 
(- 2.84)*** 
  - 6.149 
(- 2.46)** 
- 7.228 
(- 2.86)*** 
EASTSEASIA   7.199 
(2.36)** 
7.896 
(2.16)** 
6.143 
(2.07)** 
7.708 
(2.23)** 
POLRIGHTS 1.511 
(2.14)** 
1.943 
(3.17)*** 
1.695 
(2.35)** 
1.979 
(3.14)*** 
1.753 
(2.39)** 
2.307 
(3.89)*** 
INTERCEPT 1.286 
(0.07) 
13.260 
(0.76) 
- 11.918 
(- 0.70) 
- 4.118 
(- 0.26) 
6.143 
(0.33) 
21.672 
(1.29) 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Ř2 0.912 0.909 0.908 0.906 0.915 0.919 
F 113.27*** 96.37*** 120.77*** 93.65*** 115.26*** 96.21*** 
†) t-statistics in brackets;  ***) p < 0.01; **) p < 0.05, *) p < 0.1. 
#) Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (HRSE); ##) Robust regression (RR) (command rreg in STATA). 
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Table A5.1: Corporate form and ownership of WS service providers serving the main cities; the 30 districts and providers contained in the data 
sample used in section 5.5 are underlined 
City Inhabitants 
2003 
WS service provider Corporate 
form 
Coding of the 
variable 
PRIVATE 
% private 
shares 
Year of PSP 
engagement 
Ownership according to 
Public Services Law 
definition 
BOGOTA 6,865,997 Empresa de Acueducto y 
Alcantarillado de Bogotá 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
CALI 2,316,655 Empresas Municipales de Cali EICE Public 0 - Public 
MEDELLIN 2,049,131 Empresas Públicas de Medellín EICE Public 0 - Public 
BARRANQUILLA 1,332,454 Sociedad de Acueducto, Alcan-
tarillado y Aseo de Barranquilla 
ESP Private 80 1991 Private 
CARTAGENA 978,187 Aguas de Cartagena ESP Private 45 1994 Mixed 
CUCUTA 702,325 Empresa Industrial y Comercial 
de Cúcuta 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
BUCARAMANGA 558,784 Cia. del Acueducto 
Metropolitano de Bucaramanga 
(water) 
Corp. de la Denfensa de la 
Meseta de Bucaramanga 
(sewerage) 
ESP 
ESP 
- 
- 
5 
5 
n.a.  
n.a. 
Mixed 
Mixed 
PEREIRA 499,771 Aguas y Aguas de Pereira ESP Public 0 - Public 
IBAGUE 439,785 Empresa Ibaguereña de 
Acueducto y Alcantarillado 
ESP Public 0 - Public 
SANTA MARTA 422,460 Cia. de Acueducto y 
Alcantarillado Metropolitano de 
Santa Marta 
ESP Private 65 1989/ 1997 Private 
PASTO 413,557 Empresa de Obras Sanitarias de 
Pasto 
ESP Public 0 - Public 
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MANIZALES 375,652 Aguas de Manizales ESP Public 1 1996 Mixed 
VALLEDUPAR 362,816 Empresa de Servicios Públicos 
de Valledupar 
ESP Public 0 - Public 
NEIVA 358,279 Empresas Públicas de Neiva EICE Public 0 - Public 
VILLAVICENCIO 349,374 Empresa de Acueducto y 
Alcantarillado de Villavicencio 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
MONTERIA 339,080 Proactiva Aguas de Montería ESP Private 100 2000 Private 
ARMENIA 311,000 Empresas Públicas de Armenia EICE Public 0 - Public 
PALMIRA 287,261 Acuaviva ESP Private 60 1997 Private  
SINCELEJO 255,122 Empresa de Acueducto y Aseo 
de Sincelejo  
EICE Public 0 - Public 
POPAYAN 233,100 Acueducto y Alcantarillado de 
Popayán 
ESP Public 1 n.a. Mixed 
TULUA 186,882 Centroaguas Tuluá ESP Private 100 2000 Private 
SOGAMOSO 158,647 Cia. de Servicios Públicos de 
Sogamoso 
ESP Public n.a. n.a. Mixed 
FLORENCIA 142,681 Empresa de Servicios de 
Florencia 
ESP Private 51 1995 Private 
CARTAGO 136,758 Empresas Municipales de 
Cartago 
ESP Public 0 - Public 
BUGA 130,104 Aguas de Buga ESP Public n.a. n.a. Mixed 
GIRARDOT 127,667 Empresa de Aguas de Girardot, 
Ricaurte y la Region 
ESP Private 70 1997 Private 
TUNJA 124,122 Sera Q.A. Tunja ESP Private 100 1996 Private 
FUSAGASUGA 107,918 Empresa de Servicios Públicos 
de Fusagasugá 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
PIEDECUESTA 100,687 Empresa Municipal de Serv. 
Públ. Dom. de Piedecuesta 
EICE - 0 - Public 
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OCAÑA 100,620 Empresa de Servicios Públicos 
de Ocan ̃a 
ESP Private 100 1994 Private 
FACATATIVA 97,673 Empresa de Acueducto, Alcan-
tarillado y Aseo de Facatativa 
EICE - 0 - Public 
IPIALES 94,853 Empresa de Obras Sanitarias de 
la Provincia de Obando 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
VILLA DEL 
ROSARIO 
64,210 EIC de Servicios Públicos Dom. 
de Villa del Rosario 
EICE Public 0 - Public 
Total inhabitants: 21,023,612*       
Sources: Data on inhabitants: DANE (www.dane.gov.co). Remaining data: SSPD; Fernández (2004). All information as of end of 2003. 
* Approx. 47.2% of total population; the share of population potentially served by the listed providers is bigger, since several providers serve, in addition to 
their “home district”, further districts. 
“n.a.” = not available; “-“ = not applicable 
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Table A5.2.: User Structure 
User Class Capitals > 1 million 
habitants (4) 
Districts 70,000 – 1 
million hab. (49) 
Districts 12,500 - 
70,000 hab. (171) 
Districts < 12,500 
habitants (858) 
Residential stratum 1 7.8 % 11.0 % 16.2 % 13.8 % 
Residential stratum 2 30.5 % 28.0 % 34.1 % 47.0 % 
Residential stratum 3 31.1 % 31.8 % 37.8 % 31.9 % 
Residential stratum 4 12.6 % 13.5 % 4.8 % 1.3 % 
Residential stratum 5 7.3 % 4.5 % 0.4 % 0.1 % 
Residential stratum 6 3.4 % 3.2 % 0.6 % 0.0 % 
Commercial 6.5 % 4.7 % 2.2 % 3.7 % 
Industrial 0.6 % 2.5 % 2.9 % 0.0 % 
Official and Special 0.2 % 0.8 % 1.0 % 2.2 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Subsidees 69.4 % 70.8 % 88.1 % 92.7 % 
Neutral 12.8 % 14.3 % 5.8 % 3.5 % 
Contributors 17.4 % 13.2 % 4.2 % 6.0 % 
Source: Domínguez Torres / Uribe Botero (2005: 45) 
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Table A5.3: Coverage 2003 by income quintiles 
 Urban Rural Total 
Water 
Quintile 1 97.5 % 62.7 % 83.5 % 
Quintile 2 98.1 % 66.0 % 86.3 % 
Quintile 3 98.2 % 67.3 % 90.3 % 
Quintile 4 98.8 % 66.8 % 94.2 % 
Quintile 5 98.3 % 72.4 % 96.8 % 
Total 98.2 % 65.6 % 90.2 % 
Sanitation 
Quintile 1 96.2 % 63.4 % 83.5 % 
Quintile 2 98.3 % 71.2 % 88.3 % 
Quintile 3 98.3 % 78.9 % 93.3 % 
Quintile 4 99.6 % 80.8 % 96.9 % 
Quintile 5 99.8 % 88.6 % 99.1 % 
Total 98.6 % 72.2 % 92.1 % 
Source: Meléndez (2004: 49) 
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Table A5.4: Variables and data sources used in the statistical analysis of chapter 5 
Variable name Variable description Data source; additional information 
WAT98 Coverage with piped water connections in 1998; if data for 
1998 was not available, data for 1999 was taken (values are 
proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) and Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002) 
WAT98SQ WAT98SQ = WAT98 * WAT98  
WAT03 Coverage with piped water connections in 2003; if data for 
2003 was not available, data for 2002 was taken (values are 
proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) 
CHWAT CHWAT = WAT03 / WAT98  
SEW98 Coverage with sewer connections in 1998; if data for 1998 
was not available, data for 1999 was taken (values are 
proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) and Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002) 
SEW98SQ SEW98SQ = SEW98 * SEW98  
SEW03 Coverage with sewer connections in 2003; if data for 2003 
was not available, data for 2002 was taken (values are 
proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) 
CHSEW CHSEW = SEW03 / SEW98  
PRIVATE Ownership of the WS service provider; PRIVATE = 1 if 
shares held by the private sector ≥ 25%; PRIVATE = 0 if 
shares held by the private sector < 25% 
Information provided by SSPD in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) 
UFW98 Proportion of unaccounted-for water in total drinking water 
produced in 1998; if data for 1998 was not available, data for 
1999 was taken (values are proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) and Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002) 
UFW03 Proportion of unaccounted-for water in total drinking water 
produced in 2003; if data for 2003 was not available, data for 
2002 was taken (values are proportions between 0 and 1) 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) 
UFWAV Proportion of unaccounted-for water in total drinking water 
produced; average for the years 1998 to 2003 for which data 
was available 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) and Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2002) 
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CR Collection rate for water services; average for the years 1998 
to 2003 for which data was available 
Information provided by SSPD and CRA in 2005; complemented with 
information taken from Fernández (2004) 
VULWAT Vulnerability of water resources of the district; conditions of 
a dry or average year; index takes values from 1 (very low 
vulnerability) to 5 (very high vulnerability). 
Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales 
(IDEAM): Estudio Nacional del Agua, Cuadro 5: Índice de escasez y 
vulnerabilidad por disponibilidad de agua en cabeceras municipales de 
Colombia. Condiciones hidrológicas de año medio y seco; 
www.ideam.gov.co (accessed on 10/09/2006) 
POV Value of the Index of Unsatisfied Basic Needs in 1993; 
multidimensional index that measures the share of persons 
whose basic needs (housing, public services, education, 
income generation capacity) are not satisfied (values are 
percentages between 0 and 100) 
Information provided by Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) 
in 08/2005: Índice de Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas 
POP Change in the population of the district expressed as 
proportion: POP = population in 2003 / population in 1998 
Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE): Series y 
proyecciones de población, proyecciones municipales; 
www.dane.gov.co (accessed on 10/09/2006) 
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Table A5.5: Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis of section 5.5 
Variable 
WAT98 
WAT98SQ 
CHWAT 
SEW98 
SEW98SQ 
CHSEW 
PRIVATE 
UFW98 
UFW03 
UFWAV 
CR 
VULWAT 
POV 
POP 
N 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
29 
29 
29 
29 
30 
30 
30 
Mean 
0.9102567 
0.8390176 
1.050098 
0.8390733 
0.7299146 
1.02326 
0.3333333 
0.4242931 
0.4423621 
0.4427957 
0.8349455 
3.433333 
27.623 
1.108022 
Std. Dev. 
0.1039748 
0.1735711 
0.1107293 
0.1635928 
0.2407628 
0.0973636 
0.4794633 
0.1020432 
0.10836 
0.097011 
0.1124618 
0.727932 
9.071521 
0.0408561 
Min 
0.5778 
0.3338528 
0.768 
0.37 
0.1369 
0.795 
0 
0.2461 
0.262 
0.3053667 
0.462725 
2 
15.58 
1.04794 
Max 
1 
1 
1.413984 
1 
1 
1.342032 
1 
0.7 
0.734 
0.71432 
0.9883333 
5 
49.72 
1.178743 
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Table A5.6: List of organisations interviewed 
City Organisation Date 
Bogotá German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ): Prodespaz; Programa 
Ambiental 
20/06/2005 
22/06/2005 
28/06/2005 
Bogotá Asociación Colombiana de Ingenería Sanitaria y Ambiental (ACODAL) 21/06/2005 
Bogotá Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (SSPD): 
Superintendencia Delegada para Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo 
22/06/2005 
Bogotá Departamento Nacional de Planeación: Subdirectoría Agua y Ambiente 23/06/2005 
Bogotá B y P Servicios Ltda. (expert) 23/06/2005 
Bogotá Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Sanemiento Básico (CRA) 24/06/2005 
27/06/2005 
Bogotá Asociación Comunera Distrital de Comités de Desarrollo y Control Social 
de los Servicios Públicos Domicilarios y Vocales de Control 
25/06/2005 
Bogotá Ministerio de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial (MAVDT): 
Directoría Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico; Programa de 
Modernización Empresarial; Programa de Microempresas; Grupo 
Regulación y Normatividad 
27/06/2005 
28/06/2005 
01/08/2005 
Bogotá Transparencia por Colombia 28/06/2005 
Bogotá Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo 29/06/2005 
Bogotá Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Servicios Públicos Domiciliaros y 
Actividades Complementarias e Inherentes (ANDESCO): Cámara de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado 
30/06/2005 
Manizales Alcaldía de Manizales: Despacho del Alcalde 05/07/2005 
Manizales CDCS spokesman 05/07/2005 
Manizales Aguas de Manizales S.A. 06/07/2005 
Manizales Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas (CORPOCALDAS) 07/07/2005 
Manizales User representative, member of the CPE 07/07/2005 
Manizales Corporación Cívica de Caldas 08/07/2005 
Santa Marta Alcaldía Santa Marta: Despacho del Alcalde 12/07/2005 
Santa Marta Metroagua S.A. 12/07/2005 
13/07/2005 
Santa Marta Cámara de Comercio de Santa Marta 13/07/2005 
Santa Marta Corporación Autónoma Regional del Magdalena (CORPAMAG) 13/07/2005 
Santa Marta CDCS spokesman; Asociación de Vocales de Control de Santa Marta y 
Magdalena 
13/07/2005 
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Corregimiento de 
Bonda, Santa Marta 
Junta de Acueducto de Bonda 14/07/2005 
Santa Marta Consultor particular (expert) 15/07/2005 
Tunja Sera Q.A. Tunja S.A. 21/07/2005 
22/07/2005 
Tunja Alcaldía de Tunja: Secretaría de Desarrollo 21/07/2005 
Tunja Cámara de Comercio de Tunja 21/07/2005 
Tunja CDCS spokesman; Asociación de Comerciantes Mercados Móviles de 
Boyacá 
21/07/2005 
Tunja Corporación Autónoma Regional de Boyacá (CORPOBOYACA) 22/07/2005 
Villavicencio Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Villavicencio  27/07/2005 
Villavicencio Alcaldía de Villavicencio: Secretaría de Planeación; Secretaría de Medio 
Ambiente 
27/07/2005 
Villavicencio Cámara de Comercio de Villavicencio 28/07/2005 
Villavicencio Corporación Autónoma Regional CORMACARENA 28/07/2005 
Villavicencio CDCS spokesman 28/07/2005 
Bogotá Económica Consultores (expert) 01/08/2005 
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Table A5.7a: Ranking of 24 cities according to the overall WS service performance (intermediate cities) 
 Good   Average   Bad  
Rank/ 
Scores 
City Delivery 
model 
Rank/ 
Scores 
City Delivery 
model 
Rank/ 
Scores 
City Delivery 
model 
1/ 44 
2/ 67 
3/ 69 
3/ 69 
4/ 75 
4/ 75 
5/ 79 
6/ 82 
Palmira 
Buga 
Manizales 
Girardot 
Ocaña 
Pereira 
Cartago 
Tunja 
Private 
Public 
Public 
Private 
Private 
Public 
Public 
Private 
7/ 83 
8/ 92 
9/ 95 
10/ 96 
10/ 96 
11/ 106 
12/ 107 
13/ 114 
Pasto 
Fusagasugá 
Valledupar 
Armenia 
Ibagué 
Montería  
Sogamoso 
Cartagena 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
14/ 117 
15/ 118 
16/ 123 
17/ 128 
17/ 128 
18/ 130 
19/ 148 
20/ 159 
Popayán 
Ipiales 
Santa Marta 
Neiva 
Florencia 
V. del Rosario 
Villavicencio 
Cúcuta 
Public 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Private 
Public 
Public 
Public 
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Table A5.7b: Grouping of 24 cities according to the overall WS service performance (intermediate cities) 
Score difference to 
case ranked next 
City Delivery model Performance group 
23 Palmira Private Very good 
2 Buga Public Good 
0 Manizales Public  
6 Girardot Private  
0 Ocaña Private  
4 Pereira Public  
3 Cartago Public  
1 Tunja Private  
9 Pasto Public  
3 Fusagasugá Public Average 
1 Valledupar Public  
0 Armenia Public  
10 Ibagué Public  
1 Montería  Private Bad 
7 Sogamoso Public  
3 Cartagena Private  
1 Popayán Public  
5 Ipiales Public  
5 Santa Marta Private  
0 Neiva Public  
2 Florencia Private  
18 V. del Rosario Public  
11 Villavicencio Public Very bad 
– Cúcuta Public Extremely bad 
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B) Figures 
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Figure A3.1: Expected influence of governance on WS services 
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Figure A4.1: Bivariate regression of WATTOT02 on WATTOT90LN – fitted values 
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Figure A4.2: Bivariate regression of SANTOT02 on SANTOT90 – fitted values 
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Source: Freedom House 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5.1: Political rights and civil liberties in Colombia
 (1973-2004)
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Source: Transparency International (worst value of the indicator = 1; best value = 10) 
(www.transparency.org; accessed on 11/11/2006) 
Figure A5.2: Corruption Perception Index Colombia 1995-2005
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Figure A5.3: Estimated functional relation CHWAT → F(WAT98, WAT98SQ) 
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Figure A5.4: Estimated functional relation CHSEW → F(SEW98, SEW98SQ) 
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C) Map A5.1: Colombia - Provinces 
Source: http://www.luventicus.org/mapas/colombia.html (accessed on 9/1/2007) 
Amazonas 
Caquetá Putumayo 
Nariño 
Cauca 
Vaupes 
Guaviare 
Meta 
Guainía 
Vichada 
Huila 
Casanare 
Arauca 
Boyacá
Bogotá 
Tolima 
Santander 
Antioquia 
Chocó 
Córdoba 
Valle del 
Cauca 
Caldas 
Quindío 
Risaralda 
Cundinamarca 
Guajira 
César 
Norte de 
Santander 
Magda- 
lena 
Atlántico 
Sucre 
Bolívar 
San Andrés y Providencia 
Villavicencio
Tunja 
Manizales 
Santa 
Marta 


